The Concept of Classical Foundationalism - Essay Example

Dialogues concerning Natural Religion: Hume’s Evidentialist objection to belief in God In this expository essay, I will provide an argument on Hume’s evidentialist objection to belief in God on the basis of its attachment to classical foundationism. In order to argue that Hume’s evidentialist objection to belief in God stems from the truth of classical foundationalism, I will provide a definition of classical foundationalism whilst explaining the kinds of basic beliefs that classical foundationalist thinks is improper. In addition, I will provide a discussion on why Clark and Plantinga believe that the classical foundationalist must reject classical foundationalist. Finally, I will provide a discussion on the various beliefs that Plantinga thinks are properly basic. These discussions will provide a vista to bring forth arguments on Plantinga and Clark’s arguments against classical foundationalism. The main aspect under discussion, which forms the thesis problem, is the Hume’s evidentialist objection to belief in God being a function of the truths within classical foundations and such truths may not be very valid and logical especially in the contemporary philosophy. Classical foundationalism is a theory and structure of knowledge that adheres to specific forms of internalism especially in reference to providing justifications to some basic beliefs. Classical foundationalism stems from the concept of modern foundationalism developed by Rene Descartes. Rene proposed the principle of modern foundationalism on the basis of sense (Descartes 80-81). The forms of internalism are not only limited to justification of basic beliefs but also the strong access to specific requirements such as infallibility, indubitability, and incorrigibility revolving around the basic beliefs. There have been increased debates on classical foundationalism within the world of philosophy. Most of the debates revolve around the aspects that make classical foundationalism a more convincing philosophical concept and aspects that discredit the philosophical concepts. Contemporary philosophers continued to argue for and against the propositions of the classical foundationalism as a philosophical perspective. In such debates, various propositions have been identified to support the concepts and existence of classical foundationalism. Plantinga confirms that classical foundationalism exists in the proposition that, A belief is acceptable for a person if and only if it is either (i) basic (i.e. self-evident or incorrigible), or (ii) believed on the evidential basis of propositions that are acceptable and that support it deductively, inductively, or abductively In the above proposition, various truths regarding classical foundationalism are obtainable. Firstly, classical foundationalism holds that there are basic beliefs that exist without the need to provide justification or evidence. Moreover, classical foundationalism also holds that there is no need for a reference point to other beliefs for a basic belief to be justifiable and be in existence. On the other hand, classical foundationalism holds that non-basic beliefs can only exist if they are justified by basic beliefs (Plato and Cooper). Hence, the classical foundationalism provides two requirements for a belief to be reasonable and be in existence; the belief should either be basic or be ultimately supported by basic beliefs. Other than being basic or supported by basic, a belief is regarded as properly basic if it meets various requirements and conditions, which include being self-evident, incorrigible, evident to the senses, and infallible. In simple perspectives, classical foundationalism subscribes to the notion of believing in a given proposition on the basis of evidence from other proposition. On the basis of the definition of classical foundationalism, it is necessary to discuss and evaluate Hume’s evidentialist objection to belief of God. An evidentialism approach to beliefs points out that a belief is only rational if and only if there is sufficient argument, evidence, and reasons for such beliefs. According to David Hume, a belief in God is only rational if there is sufficient evidence to support such belief. However, the absence of sufficient evidence towards the belief in God makes the whole aspect irrational (Hume 197-226). Such evidentialist objection by Hume has been linked to the truths or propositions of classical foundationalism by various contemporary philosophers including Clark and Plantinga. In Part XI of Dialogues concerning natural religion, Hume, through Cleanthes and Philo argue on the available evidence that could be used to support the hypotheses about the existence of God. Hume strongly believe that in the belief in God there are four main hypotheses, which include God is perfectly good, God is perfectly malicious, God is both good and malicious, and God is neither good nor malicious (Hume 197-226). In any of the hypothesis, Hume through Philo argues that there should be evidence of either good or bad. Unfortunately, Hume strongly believes through Philo that good and bad in the universe are functions of general law, that is, they (good and bad) follow general law and not any invisible forces. Hume confirms that within the universe there are no indications or evidences of struggle between good and bad. In this perspective, if God is really good then the good will constantly be in fight with the evil and if God is malicious or bad then the bad will be in constant fight with the good (Hume 197-226). On the basis of lack of such contradictions and evidence, the evidentialist objective of belief in God by Hume can be linked to classical foundations, which require that for a non-basic belief to exist it must be supported by other basic beliefs. In this case, the belief in God is seen as a non-basic belief. Amazingly, Hume continues to display adequate evidence on how his evidentialist objection to belief in God can be linked to truths or propositions of the classical foundations. Through Philo, Hume in Part XI argues that there is no reason to look for or trust any evidence on the existence of God. Instead, Philo advises that there is need to identify the revelations that inform humanity on the existence of God and the characteristics of that God. The revelations are seen as evidences depicting that God exists and the nature of God as well (Hume 197-226). Whilst Philo argues that there is need to look for more than evidence to support the belief in God, Hume makes Demea to feel offended by such sentiments. After Demea’s exist, Philo asserts that No one [more than he] has a deeper sense of religion impressed on his mind, or pays more profound adoration to the Divine Being, as he discovers himself to reason, in the inexplicable contrivance and artifice of nature (Hume 228) Through this dialogue it is clear that Hume detest everything else other than evidence. In order for the belief in God to be rational there is need for adequate or sufficient evidence. Throughout the dialogue between Philo and Cleanthes, Hume had tried to argue out that without sufficient evident, reason, or argument it is irrational to believe in God’s existence (Hume 197-226). This is the basis of classical foundationalism, which presupposes that for a belief to be rational it has to be basic (with features of incorrigibility, infallibility, and self-evident) or be supported by basic beliefs it is a non-basic belief. The belief in God is not basic; hence, for it to be rational there is need for support from basic beliefs. Unfortunately, there are no arguments, reasons, and evidences from basic beliefs that support the non-basic belief of God’s existence (Hume 197-226). For instance, a basic belief that would support the existence of God would be if God was in existence and he was good then every individual would be in a state of continuous enjoyment without any suffering. This is not the case as asserted by Hume; thus, concluding that the lack of reasons, arguments, or evidence in believing in God make such beliefs irrational. In this case, if classical foundation was true then beliefs in God are only rational in the event that there are reasons, arguments, and evidences that are themselves self-evident, incorrigible, and evident to sense. Despite its wide application in explaining specific forms of arguments, classical foundationalism has received a lot of criticisms from contemporary philosophers such as Clark and Plantinga. According to these contemporary philosophers, classical foundationalism is not self-justifying and thus should not be used substantiate a philosophical claim like Hume does in relation to belief in God. In his argument, Plantinga discredits the classical foundationalism’s proposition on the conditions that need to be satisfied for a belief to be rational. In respect to the belief being basic, Plantinga argues that the proposition itself is not properly basic since it is neither self-evident not appropriate especially with respect to the immediate experiences of an individual, which in most cases are used in judging the rationality of a belief. Plantinga further points out in his disagreement that the criterion developed for accepting the rationality of a belief does not count on the basis of lack of self-evidence and incorrigibility properties that are identified by the philosophical perspective. Since Plantinga sees that the classical foundationalism criterion is itself not sufficient, there is no way by its own standard can the classical foundationalism meet the criterion stated for accepting a belief (Clark 132-136). These perspectives are also voiced by his student Clark who strongly believes that it is not self-justifying; thus cannot explain substantially philosophical perspectives on beliefs. In this respect, Clark argues that evidentialism is in itself irrational and cannot be used to judge the rationality of a belief (Clark 132-136). Consequently, Plantinga uses his arguments to dismiss the plausibility of classical foundationalism and all the philosophical concepts attached to it such as the evidentialist objection of belief in God as discussed or argued by Hume. Plantinga strongly believes that the belief in God is properly basic and does not need to rely on arguments, reasons, and evidences that are themselves self-evident, incorrigible, and evident to sense, that is, they can be derived from personal experiences as discussed by Rene Descartes in line with understanding philosophical concepts on the basis of sense. In conclusion, though Clark and Plantinga’s arguments do not fully describe the aspects of self-refuting of the classical foundationalism, I agree with their arguments. Following the arguments by Rene on the use of sense, there are certain circumstances that sense do not actually provide a convincing idea on various events. If sense were that strong then I bet very few of us would seek medical attention and agree to undergo through laboratory tests. This is because if our senses were strong enough then we would be able to sense what disease or ailment we are suffering from. On the same principle, it is not justifiable (that is according to my perception) for one to argue that the use of sense should be enough reasons to make one agree with a belief. For instance, in incorporation Rene’s arguments on the concept of classical foundationalism, it means that the aspect of reasons, arguments, and evidences being evident to sense, self-evident, and incorrigible should be the basis of making judgment on whether to accept or reject a belief. If one is having a terrible headache then the sense would be able to tell the person that he/she is suffering from malaria; hence, obtain malarial drugs rather than go for medical examinations to identify the disease or ailment. Therefore, self-evidence, evidence-to-sense, and incorrigibility are never sufficient in making a person form a judgment regarding a particular belief. Works Cited Clark, Kelly James. Return to Reason: A Critique of Enlightenment Evidentialism and Defense of Reason and Belief in God [with Special Attention Given to the Work of Alvin Platinga]. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1990. Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy (Edited by Bailey Andrew). Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press, 2013. Print. Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Natural Theology < http://books.google.co.ke/books?id=f29XAAAAcAAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=David+Hume:+Dialogue+concerning+the+natural+religion+2nd+edition&hl=en&sa=X&ei=GECgUvTBOaLf4wThyYAw&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=David%20Hume%3A%20Dialogue%20concerning%20the%20natural%20religion%202nd%20edition&f=false> Plato and Cooper, John. Five dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002. Print. Read More