Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism - Essay Example

Philosophy MinSeok Lee UCOR 2500: Final Essay Dr. Colaner Introduction The personality of individuals is totally separate from the entire body. This is according to E.J. Lowe giving his take on mental causation by Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism (NCSD). The theory argues that individuals are like substances when put alone, they however pause on the issues of whether an individual can be a separate entity from the body especially when the spirit is taken into consideration. It further argues that mental causation is better explained by the NCSD as Cartesian dualism therefore not giving a clear explanation on its happenings to an individual or body. In Cartesian dualism, the body and the mind are considered two different and distinct substances that are separable. This translates that an individual that exists independently without the effect of other beings, Jaegwon Kim. However states lack spatial location in Cartesian dualism fails to explain how any soul is causally related to its being. It has been known that the body and the soul are always connected so Cartesian Dualism needs to explain how the two are not connected in any way. Descartes tries to explain it in Descartes Dualism; he argues that the souls also referred to as an indidual’s self are purely mental substances that possess no physical characteristics therefore they create no spatial location. David Jehle interestingly disregards Jaegwon Kim’s argument in relation to substance dualism. In his way it is not possible to classify the being as a distinct entity from the soul or self. This work tries to bring out the views of three philosophers;- Kim Jehles’ and Lowe’s, on their arguments on casual relation between the brain and the mind. In conclusion I will explain why Lowe’s NCSD is the best argument to follow in the explanation. Jaegwon Kim’s argument against substance dualism Jaegwon Kim explains in his work, ‘the problem of interaction’, the radical disparity postulated between the brain and the mind and makes casual interaction between the two to show how each works. This concept has led to the denial of substance dualism by many philosophers. The problem of interaction however, is not well stated as an obvious argument against dualism, ( Jehle, pp. 565). Jaegwon Kim explains the reason why the problem of interaction is hard to be mentioned because, ‘it is hard to pin down exactly what is wrong with posting casual relations between substances with diverse natures and further explain in concrete terms what it is about the natures of mental and material substance that make them not fit to enter into the casual relations with each other’, Jehle, pp. 565) .Looking at the explanation it is totally impossible to get the clear point that is addressing the distinctness of the two and why they should be regarded as different substances. However Jehle in his article ‘Lonely Souls’, he argues that he had managed to locate the concrete problem with causal interaction between the brain and the mind. The problem he relates to concerns causation and what he refers to as ‘pairing’. He further gives an example in order to claim interaction between the alleged pairing and causation against soul to the body. He say, ‘take two souls a and b and a material substance m. Suppose a and b can perform a mental action simultaneously (at the same time) at time t. Then, say a’s mental action brings about a change denoted m in the time lapse t while b does not’. From the above explanation he gives a question, ‘what relation R will serve the link or the pairing of a’s mental action with the change brought about in m that does not hold b and m? Further, what causal chain will serve in tracing a tom? (Jehle, pp. 569). This explanation shows that Kim believes that this relation or chain cannot be something spatial because he does not find appropriate answers to the questions. He therefore concludes that the argument undermines the possibility of casual interaction between souls and bodies. This makes substance dualism ultimately unintelligible from a philosophical point of view, (Jehle, pp. 565-566) David Jehle’s arguments on Kim’s take on Dualism David Jehle however, argues that Jaegwon Kim’s basic argument against substance dualism fails in the way he explains in his articles, ‘Kim against dualism’. From this argument, Jehle provides several reasons to disregard Kim’s argument to show why substance dualism is all wrong. First, Jehle’s points out Kim’s argument as failing to clarify the unintelligibility of the brain. He says that Kim’s conclusion that s8ubstance dualism is unintelligible is obscure. He gives two kinds of concrete unintelligibility, (SU); position p is strongly unintelligible if no one could make sense of p and another one is ‘weak unintelligibility’ (WU); where position p is weakly unintelligible if no human currently understands p, (Jehle, 2006, pp. 568). Then he examines each unintelligibility argument as being false. Kim’s argument based on strong unintelligibility which following of; ‘1. If it is possible for souls to interact casually with material substances, then there must be spatial casual chains or rather spatial pairing relations between the souls and material substances. . 2. It is not possible that there are spatial causal chains or spatial pairing relations between souls and material substances. 3. Therefore, it is not possible for souls to interact causally with material substances. 4. And if it is not possible for souls to interact causally with material substances, then substance dualism is unintelligible. 5. Therefore, substance dualism is unintelligible” (Jehle, 2006, pp. 568-569).In this argument, Jehle points out that if third premise is either “metaphysical” or “logical”, then third premise is possibly wrong, in other words, it is possible for souls to interact causally with material substance. He also, reconstructs Kim’s this argument and then shows the Kim’s false premises. According to Jehle, Kim’s SU argument faces either is going to be entirely question begging, or it will rest on some indefensible and false premise. Kim’s WU arguments which is “No one currently knows how souls and bodies are casually paired or how there could be causal chains between them If so, then no one currently understands substance dualism. And if no one currently understands substance dualism, then substance dualism is not a useful or viable theory of mind.”(Jehle, 2006, pp. 572). In this argument, Jehle argues that this argument is not properly enough to attenuate substance dualism. In the Jehle’s argument, he is not only argues the fallacy of Kim’s argument but also, shows how brain and mind could be causally connected when he suggests a way for substance dualist to meet Kim’s challenging argument. In the Jehle’s paper, he said if substance dualists can give some proper explanation for KC (Figure. 1), it will support that the causation between a soul and body are intelligible. Figure 1.KC is a model from (Jehle 2006, pp. 573). ‘Kim against dualism’. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 130(3), 565-578. doi: 10.1007/s11098-004-2426-0 An account of causation is necessary to explain KC. Jehle gave an example that, “Some soul is such that it possesses a unique and singular property, such that in virtue of its possession of this property, it is able to causally interact directly with one and only one material substance by virtue of a property the material substance possesses and that property also only allows for interaction with the particular soul in question” (Jehle, 2006, pp. 574). This idea shows that there is possible that how soul and body causally connected. The argument of E. J. Lowe’s According to E. J. Lowe, NCSD may be defended on a number of grounds, one of which is that it is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard form of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental causation. (Lowe, pp.6). There are many reasons for doubting the identity of the human self with the human body. However, it is hard to explain the apparent fact that human has causal control over parts of our bodies by denying identity between human self and human body. Therefore, E. J. Lowe supports a form of substance dualism. Lowe agrees with the Descartes idea that self is distinct from the body or any part of it, but does not insist either that the self if separable from anything bodily or that it is spatially not extended (Lowe, pp. 8). Like it was mentioned earlier, Lowe’s NCSD, however, disputes Descartes’ two main arguments of substance dualism. Lowe points that NCSD is better than Cartesian substance dualism because of several reasons. First of all, NCSD is NCSD is less extreme. Lowe explains the reason that, “it is not committed to the possibility of disembodied existence.” (Lowe, pp. 9) Second, NCSD is plausible, in other words, more possible or believable because “it respects our intuition that we ourselves, not just our bodies, occupy space and have properties of shape, size, mass, and spatial location” (Lowe, pp. 9). And lastly, Cartesian substance dualism is not sufficiently compelling. There are two main arguments of Descartes which are “an argument from the conceivability of the separate existence of mind and body, and an argument from the supposed indivisibility, or simplicity, of the soul which he contrasts with the divisibility of the body” (Lowe, p.8). However, according to Lowe points that these two arguments, Descartes’ substance dualism, are not enough to compel to grounds belief. Physicalism, opposite argument to dualism that mental process is identical to brain process because they believe mental process can be changed by changing brain process, seems ill-equipped to explain the distinctively intentional or theological character of mental causation because it effectively reduces all such causation to ‘blind’ physical causation at a neurological level (Lowe, pp.6). NCSD,however, is well positioned to avoid both of failings because it does contain both the physical aspects of the self and the autonomous nature of mental causation. This is the main difference between NCSD and Cartesian dualism. Read More