Critics to Dualism of Rene Descartes - Essay Example

Philosophy Gilbert Ryle’s Critique of Cartesian Dualism While Rene Descartes’ philosophical enterprise is best understood within the context of the influential philosophical school of rationalism, it can also be examined in light of Western philosophical dualism, that is, the distinction between mind and body. Regarded as the father of modern philosophy, Descartes’ philosophy consisted largely of a proof for God’s existence. This proof is characterized by a rational inquiry, purporting to prove through the faculty of reason that God must necessarily exist. In his letter to the Faculty of Theology of Paris, he writes: I have always been of the opinion that the two questions respecting God and the Soul were the chief of those that ought to be determined by help of Philosophy rather than Theology; for although to us, the faithful, it be sufficient to hold as maters of faith, that the human soul does not perish with the body, and that God exists, it yet assuredly seems impossible ever to persuade infidels of the reality of any religion, or almost even any moral virtue, unless, first of all, those two things be proved to them by natural reason. (Descartes in Popkin 1966, p. 122). To understand how Descartes came to offer a proof for God’s existence, it must be understood that his philosophical venture in the Meditations is in fact some sort of veiled theological treatise. It can be seen that Descartes’ aim in offering the Meditations was precisely for the purpose of providing rational proof for accepting the belief in God and the Soul, that is, rational proof that is sufficient to convince even the infidels. However, behind all the discussions on a rational proof for God’s existence lies the inherent dualism of Descartes. In this paper, the author examines Descartes’ dualism by taking into account his philosophical project as outlined in the Meditations on First Philosophy. The author then outlines Gilbert Ryle’s critique of Cartesian dualism, revolving around Ryle’s argument that the latter rests on a category-mistake. Descartes’ Dualism To examine Descartes is to examine the rationalist enterprise. It is within this context of searching for epistemological certainty that Rene Descartes’ philosophical enterprise should be examined. For while he sought to provide a proof for God’s existence, and in which case his endeavor became a theological work of some sort, his proffered proof is primarily a work in rationalist epistemology. In trying to establish what ought to be considered as the reliable foundation of one’s beliefs, Descartes began his rational inquiry by doubting everything that can be doubted. It is only rational as per Descartes, to base all beliefs upon a foundation that cannot be doubted. Hence, he assumed that if he can arrive at that belief which can no longer be doubted, then he would have arrived at the only reliable foundation of knowledge. Material or physical foundations simply will not do, because one can always ask: Is there an external world? The senses insist that there is, and the latter even provide some information as to the characteristics of this so-called external world. However, one can then ask whether or not the senses have been deceived in one way or another. It might also be the case that the senses themselves are deceiving the mind. In the first meditation, he states: All that I have, up to this moment, accepted as possessed of the highest truth and certainty, I received either from or through the senses. I observed however, that these sometimes misled us; and it is the part of prudence not to place absolute confidence in that by which we have even once been deceived (Descartes 1999, p. 129). Thus he justified his method of doubting everything, until he reached what he accepted as his first principle: that he exists, since in order to doubt, he must first exist. Doubting, as a form of thinking, seemed to prove to him that he is at least certain of the fact that he is a thinking thing. He is thereby able to conclude, “Cogito, ergo, sum”, or “I think, therefore, I exist.” However, it becomes evident that this idea opens up the problem of solipsism. How can one claim certainty on things that lie outside of one’s mind? Further, how are the mind and the body related? For while he is able to “prove” that the mind exists, it seems that anything lying outside the mind fell into the same category as the material world. Hence, the body is part of the material, therefore external, world. If that is the case, then proving the existence of the mind does nothing to prove the existence of one’s body, and vice versa. How are the two connected? Descartes answers that the connection is one of extension. As an example, he takes a piece of wax. By observing the wax, one can note the various characteristics, or more appropriately, the properties, of the wax: its color, texture, size, shape, smell, taste, etc. In other words, these are information readily available through the senses. However, when heat or fire is applied to the wax, it melts and it appears to have changed its properties: the color appears, different, the shape is different, the smell is different, etc. Now in all appearances, the wax has changed. However, it is still argued that it is still the same wax as before. How can this be known? The mind must somehow know that it is so. There must be something unchanged in the object, and that the mind knows this, but as to what exactly it is that lies unchanged, one cannot say for certain. Descartes then argues that the physical or material properties are to be understood as extensions of the essence of the object. Returning to the wax, Descartes believes that it is possible to expand the idea to the relationship between the mind and the body. He accounts for this dualistic stance by stating that the mind and body are like two clocks keeping perfect time. As to what precisely the relationship between the two is, he did not say. It became apparent that Descartes needed to prove the existence of God if only to guarantee the external world. Notice that if God is to guarantee the truth of clear and distinct ideas, then He is supposed to guarantee Himself, since the mind only has a clear and distinct idea of God. This is to beg the question. If the existence of God is now denied, Descartes’ philosophy lapses to solipsism, since the former is the supposed guarantee against the latter. If his “cogito ergo sum” is accepted, then that is the only belief an individual can be sure of. This paves the way for the problem of other minds. There appears to be no way to even assume the existence of other minds, since there is no way to gain access to the external world. The “Ghost in the Machine” As mentioned by Gilbert Ryle, dualism is really not original to Descartes. He writes, “Descartes was reformulating already prevalent theological doctrines of the soul in the new syntax of Galileo” (1991, p.57). It can be recalled that since the time of Plato, the distinction between the material and the immaterial has been taught (Plato, Book 7 pp.205-233). There is an assumed physical world, which is but a copy of the “ideal” or immaterial world. As Ryle went on to mention, this dualism has found its way into numerous areas of beliefs, from the “doctrines of sin and grace to the immortality of the soul” (Ryle, 1991, p.57). Dualism maintains that the body and mind are separate substances. Accordingly, mental properties can only be ascribed to the latter and physical properties the former substance. As already mentioned in the earlier part of the paper, this gives rise to a number of problems, including the nature of causal interaction between mind and body, and personal identity and the individuation of minds. Ryle calls this apparent split of a distinct but immaterial mind inhabiting a material body the myth of the “ghost in the machine”. He writes: I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’. I hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category-mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category… when they actually belong to another (Ryle, 1991, p.53). In other words, he believes that dualism in general and the Cartesian account of dualism in particular suffer from what is known as a category-mistake. In talking about the relationship between mind and body, it is assumed that what is true of the body should necessarily be applied to the mind in a binary sense. He writes further: The representation of a person as a ghost mysteriously ensconced in a machine derives from this argument. Because, as is true, a person’s thinking, feeling and purposive doing cannot be described solely on the idioms of physics, chemistry and physiology, therefore they must be described in counterpart idioms. As the human body is a complex organized unit, so the human mind must be another complex organized unit, though one made of a different sort of stuff and with a different sort of structure (54). Ryle believed that the concept of the mind as a distinct but non-physical entity with distinct non-physical properties was just such a category-mistake. In this case, the mistake arises from assuming that either the mind or mental properties can be understood in non-physical terms. It seems that the concept of mind as non-physical is always defined in negative physical terms, non-spatial, non-observable, neither in motion nor at rest (55). Whereas Descartes believes that the mind and body are like two clocks keeping perfect time, Ryle suggests that dualists only define the mind as “not bits of clockwork, they are just bits of not-clockwork” (55). If indeed minds are understood as such, then they are not just ghosts in the machine but are “spectral machines themselves” (55). In illustrating the idea of a category-mistake, Ryle gives as one example, the case of a foreigner who, visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time, is unable to identify the “University” even after being shown the numerous colleges, libraries, administrative offices, etc. He says that the mistake is in thinking that the “University” stood for an extra member of the class which the other units are members of, rather than a term which describes the way in which all that has been seen is organized. Ryle’s thoughts have been influential upon philosophers such as Rudolf Carnap and J. L. Austin. In arguing against the meaningfulness of metaphysics, Carnap likewise puts forward some criticisms against Descartes’ cogito ergo sum. He does this by showing that the cogito violates the logical rule that “existence can be predicated only in conjunction with a predicate, not in conjunction with a name…and that there is likewise a logical error in the transition from I think to I exist.” (Carnap, 1997, p.199). This type of analysis stems from the linguistic turn of Ryle, which in turn is preceded and influenced by the later Wittgenstein. Conclusion While it is true that dualism has been present in Western philosophy even before Descartes, it must be acknowledged that it was him who essentially made the logical and mechanistic justification for the mind and body split, in accordance of course, with the industrial and mechanical developments of that time. The noteworthy point is that Cartesian dualism has been influential even in the religious arena. Gilbert Ryle however, offers the argument that the notion of two clocks keeping perfect time is a myth, in the sense that closer examination of the dualist stance reveals the mind to be defined solely in negative terms opposite the physical, hence the term, not-clockwork. It is, Ryle insists, a category-mistake. The mind is often misunderstood as belonging to a certain category when in fact it belongs to another. This author tends to appreciate Ryle’s position, particularly the analytic approach that he takes in examining the dualist position. However, there seems to be a problem in understanding the term “category” itself. Upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that the notion of a category itself is not very clear. How does one define a logical category? What are its characteristics, if any? These questions serve to usher the mind-body problem to new levels. Bibliography Carnap, R. 1997. “The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language” in Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. Baird, Forrest, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. Descartes, R. 1966. “Meditations” in The Philosophy of the 16th and 17th Centuries. Ed. Popkin, Richard H. The Free Press, New York. Fremantle, A. 1954. The Age of Belief. The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., New York. Moore, G. E. 1997. “The Refutation of Idealism” in Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. Baird, Forrest, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. Plato. 1973. The Republic and Other Works, trans. by Benjamin Jowett, Doubleday, New York. Russell, B. 1945. A History of Western Philosophy. Simon & Schuster, New York. Ryle, G. 1991. “Descartes’ Myth” in The Nature of Mind ed. Rosenthal, David, Oxford University Press, New York. Wittgenstein, L. 1997. “Philosophical Investigations” in Twentieth Century Philosophy, ed. Baird, Forrest, Prentice Hall, New Jersey. Read More