Spinozas Conception of God - Essay Example

Spinoza’s Conception of God In his writings, especially The Ethics, Benedict de Spinoza logically defined existence and provided logical proof of hisdefinitions. He used logical progressions and relationships among those statements he considered to have been proven to make his conclusions. In the readings consulted, Spinoza did not really argue for or against the existence of God, though he stated that the existence of God was a logical conclusion. He took that as a given. What Spinoza was attempting was a definition of the nature of God and of all existence. What he finally proved to his satisfaction was that God is everything which exists, that God is infinite and eternal and that everything else proceeds from the mind of God, that is, all existence is thought in the mind of God. In the translated work “Of God” Spinosa began with simple precepts which he related, such as: “PROP. VII. -- Existence belongs to the nature of substance.DEMONSTR. -- The production of substance is impossible (by Coroll. to preceding Prop.). Substance, therefore, is the cause of itself; that is (by Def. 1), its essence necessarily involves existence; or, in other words, existence belongs to its nature. Q. E. D.PROP. VIII. -- All substance is necessarily infinite.”(Spinoza 7) This proof is at the beginning of his writing, and it identifies “substance” (something which exists) as being infinite and states the conservation of matter theorem very simply. What he goes on to clarify is that whatever exists, be it matter, energy or spirit, as a whole, is infinite, though the various types of “substance” (that which exists) may not be. These definitions are brilliantly simple. It is difficult in any language involving words to define anything which is considered to be infinite, because there really is no adequate definition of infinite. Just as it is linguistically impossible to define “nothing” without using a negative, it is equally impossible to define infinite in such a way that the human mind actually acquires a deep understanding of it. So we take it at face value as something which goes on forever and has no limit, even though we really have no real ability to understand what that means. Spinoza continues on this train to define existence as one substance: “It must, therefore, necessarily be admitted that the existence as well as the essence of substance is an eternal verity. And in this way we may conclude that there exists only one substance of the same nature, a point which I think it worth the trouble to establish here still more fully; and that I may do this in proper order,” (Spinoza 9) He went on to say that God is “Substance and contains ALL attributes, meaning that God is matter, energy, spirit, time and any other “thing” that can be said to exist, thereby containing all the attributes of all existence. "PROP. XI. -- God, or Substance constituted of an infinity of attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, exists necessarily." (Spinoza 12) In addition to this Spinoza goes on to say that God is perfect, because all that exists is perfect in it essence. That is, whatever exists is by the definition of that things which exists perfect. Then he proves logically that nothing exists outside of God, and that God is perfect in nature, as is all existence which is God, and cannot be any other way, for to be otherwise would be to be imperfect. He does not see this as a contradiction, because it is proven by the rule that a thing exists unless, by its very nature, it cannot exist. He gives the example of a square circle, which cannot exist, because circles are not square by their nature. God is perfect by nature and cannot, therefore, be imperfect. Spinoza was a genius of logical linguistic proof, and the translator took great care to translate exactly what he said, taking no liberties. It is likely nearly as difficult to translate Spinoza’s writings as it was for him to write them. Spinoza is often credited with beginning the concept of the reasoned philosophy, as in the writings of Albert C. Knudson. “The revival, taking its start from Spinoza, was reflected in the great idealistic movement represented by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, and in the theology and philosophy of Schleiermacher. If these thinkers did not expressly reject the personality of God, they at least took an uncertain and hesitating attitude toward it, and, on the whole, seem to have been inclined toward an impersonal view of the Absolute. This was particularly true of some of the later Hegelian theologians such as Strauss and Biedermann. By way of reaction against this tendency, there consequently arose a conscious need of a new emphasis upon the personality of God. Christian thinkers, who previously had taken the doctrine for granted, now felt it incumbent upon them to make it central in their teaching. “ (Knudson 291) Woolhouse examined a whole range of philosophers and their conceptions of God, and referred to Spinoza numerous times. “As such the human Mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God (2 P11D); and it follows from this, Spinoza says, that when we say that the human Mind perceives this or that, we are saying nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he...constitutes the essence of the human Mind, has this or that idea (2P11D).” (Woolhouse 155) He covers many of the various arguments with Spinoza. “Leibniz says that Spinoza is not far from the doctrine of a single universal spirit” (L 554). (Woolhouse 155) Woolhouse appears to have considerable respect for Spinoza. “There is, however, another way in which Spinoza has been understood when he says that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God (and also when he says that any mode of extension, and not merely the human body, has a mind which is part of that infinite intellect).” (Woolhouse 156) Frederick Pollock considered that many have not read the complete works of Spinoza, because there are few who can totally understand him. What he does not say is that it is the nature of that about which Spinoza writes which defies understanding, or, if understood, defies expression. “It is at least doubtful whether a single person can be named who has accepted the system of the Ethics in all points as it stands. But that is because Spinozas mind is above the level of the people who hunger and thirst after systems; and for that very reason the thought of Spinozas Ethics has slowly but surely interpenetrated the thought of the world, and even now works mightily in it, while other systems welcomed in their own day as new revelations are now in very truth past” (Pollock 79) Spinoza, like many of the philosophers who deal with basics, had only logic and linguistic logic to support his statements. It is my belief that other “proof” of the basic tenets of existence, God and the explanations of who and what man is are such that no other proof is possible, and if it were, language is inadequate to the task of explaining it. People, like Michael Della Rocca, argue with Spinoza, but their arguments depend largely upon their definitions of Spinoza’s words. “Certain of Spinozas basic principles enable him, in often surprising ways, to argue validly for the claim that there is only one substance. I argue this point here primarily by explaining how Spinozas denial of conceptual or explanatory relations between different attributes (such as thought and extension) obviates—in ways that have not been adequately appreciated— certain important challenges that face his argument for monism.” (Rocca 11) In my reading of Spinoza, he wrote extensively about very narrowly defines subjects and he defined his own words quite thoroughly, and to change these definitions does not refute what he said, it merely says something different. Rocca argues that Spinoza’s substance does not include various other substances of different natures. However, Spinoza, himself, said that his definition of substance would include all which exists in however many forms of as many attributes as exist, even be they infinite, which may be. That would include mind, spirit and even the contents of other planes of existence as all being included as part of God, since God is ALL which is. In writing this overview I can fully appreciate how much careful though went into the writing of Spinoza and many other philosophers. A writer has to take extreme care to use exactly the correct words for each statement and to avoid circular logic, if that is possible. In fact, it is not at all evident that it is possible to reason out these basic ideas without some redundancy and interrelated logic. It is the nature of language that it is finite, and is, therefore, a poor tool with which to define the infinite. Spinosa’s God may be the only thing or intelligence (or whatever else we may call God) in existence to understand these concepts completely, and, unless we have communication directly from that deity, in whose mind we exist, we may not be capable of understanding even a small portion. For those who have this direct communication from God, and I do not jest, it is still nearly impossible to put that understanding into words in any human language. Spinoza came close. His God is everything, infinite and perfect, containing all existence, including us and everything of which we can conceive. We are the proverbial “mote in God’s eye”. The up side of that is that we are, indeed, immortal, since anything which exists within God simply is, and is infinite by virtue of the infinity of that God of which it is a part. Works Cited Knudson, Albert C. The Doctrine of God. New York: Abingdon Press, 1930. Questia. 9 Oct. 2006 . Pollock, Frederick. Spinoza: His Life and Philosophy. 2nd ed. London: Duckworth, 1899. Questia. 9 Oct. 2006 . Rocca, Michael Della. "1 Spinozas Substance Monism." Spinoza: Metaphysical Themes. Ed. Olli Koistinen and John Biro. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. 11-34. Questia. 9 Oct. 2006 . Spinoza, Benedict De. The Ethics of Benedict de Spinoza: Demonstrated after the Method of Geometers, and Divided into Five Parts, in Which Are Treated Separately: I. of God. II. of the Soul. III. of the Affections or Passions. IV. of Mans Slavery, or the Force of the Passions. V. of Mans Freedom. Vol. 1. New York: D. VAN NOSTRAND, 1876. Questia. 9 Oct. 2006 . Woolhouse, R. S. Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz: The Concept of Substance in Seventeenth-Century Metaphysics. New York: Routledge, 1993. Questia. 9 Oct. 2006 . Read More