Leibniz and the Notion of Monads - Essay Example

Running head: Monads Leibniz and the Notion of Monads Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz is the third of the three most well-known rationalists, the other two being Spinoza and Descartes. His philosophy, while greatly influenced by various philosophers traceable to the Greeks as well as contemporaries, such as Spinoza, is valuable in its methodology and logical sharpness. His notion of monads veers away from Spinoza’s account of substance, and is more similar to ancient Greek ideas. In this paper, the author discusses Leibniz’s concept of substance vis-à-vis his monadology, and argues that while it may not be entirely original, its value lies in its contribution to modern problems concerning the concept of self-identity. Substance and Monads Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz’s concept of substance, like many other philosophers, was influenced by the Aristotelian concept of substance, conceived as that which bears properties but is not itself a property. However, it is interesting that while Leibniz more or less subscribed to this view, he rejected Spinoza’s monistic understanding of substance as a singular reality. He differed radically from both Descartes and Spinoza as regards the relation of mind and matter, and as regards the number of substances. It can be recalled that Descartes allowed for three substances, namely, God, mind, and matter, and that the essence of matter was extension. For Spinoza, he admitted God alone as the singular substance, while holding that both extension and thought are attributes of God. For Leibniz, he held that extension cannot be an attribute of a substance because there is a plurality of individual substances, and this he termed as “monads”. He stated that “The monad, which we shall discuss here, is nothing but a simple substance that enters into composites—simple, that is, without parts” (Leibniz, 285). Each of these monads would have some properties of a physical point, but only when understood abstractly. The manner in which Leibniz describes a monad is essentially similar to the atoms of Democritus. However, there is also some similarity to the geometrical points of Pythagoras. Like Democritus’ atoms, monads are conceived of as the ultimate indivisible elements of reality which constitutes all material things. He stated: And there must be simple substances, since there are composites; for the composite is nothing more than a collection, or aggregate of simples. But where there are no parts, neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is possible. These monads are the true atoms of nature and, in brief, the elements of things (285). It is clear that these monads are neither extended nor composed of matter. Instead, Leibniz maintains that a monad is somewhat of a psychological entity, a natural consequence of his rejection of extension as an attribute of substance. Notice that once the latter is rejected as an attribute, the only remaining alternative is to accept thought as the sole attribute. Hence, Leibniz was led to deny the reality of matter, and to replace it with the notion of an infinite number of “souls” (287). Fundamental to Leibniz’s monadology is the notion that a monad is a unified, independent substance. Accordingly, everything that is true of a monad is contained within it and it therefore cannot enter into any causal relation with any other monad. He expressed this point in a logical way, saying that of every true proposition, the predicate is contained within the subject. He argued: There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed internally by some other creature, since one cannot transpose anything in it, nor can one conceive of any internal motion that can be excited, directed, augmented, or diminished within it, as can be done in composites where there can be change among the parts. The monads have no windows through which something can enter or leave. Accidents cannot be detached, nor can they go about outside of substances, as the sensible species of the Scholastics once did (285). This means that no two monads can have any causal relation to each other, and that if there is any appearance at all of such a causal relation, it is merely an illusion or a deceptive appearance. What the monads mirror, according to Leibniz, is the universe, because God has given it a nature which spontaneously produces this result. He stated that “each simple substance is a perpetual living mirror of the universe”(290). To account for what appears to be the influence of one monad on another, he seems to extend the Cartesian notion of two clocks keeping perfect time, by saying that there is a pre-established harmony between the changes in one monad and those in another, thus producing the semblance of interaction among monads. Using Descartes, Leibniz can be said to have an infinite number of clocks arranged by God to keep perfect time not because they are connected or related, but because they have a perfectly accurate mechanism. What this amounts to is the extreme view that every truth is a necessary truth. As a consequence, he maintained that everything happens the way it does because it must, and it must because God has chosen to make actual the best of all possible worlds. Things could only have been different if God had chosen to actualize a different possible world. However, it should be noted that the idea of God in Leibniz’s philosophy is one of a rational God. In other words, God is, in a sense, limited by what is logical, or only by logical possibilities. As a counter argument, the idea that since God is the author of rationality or logic, He therefore defines the limits of logic can be put forward. Leibniz’s notion of many possible worlds can be understood in this manner. A world is possible if it does not contradict the laws of logic. There are an infinite number of possible worlds, all of which God thought out before creating the actual world. Because of His goodness, God decided to create the best of the possible worlds, and He considered that one to be the best which had the greatest excess of good over evil. He could have created a world containing no evil, but it could not have been as good as the actual world, since some great goods are logically connected with certain evils. In the context of theological doctrines, free will is a good that is logically impossible for God to bestow in the absence of sin and evil. The Problem of Self-Identity As mentioned elsewhere in this paper, the philosophy of Leibniz was influenced in a significant manner by thinkers such as Descartes and Spinoza, as well as Aristotelian philosophy. While the conception of substance was not entirely original to Leibniz, his philosophical import can be seen from the contribution it has made in the more contemporary problematics concerning personal identity. What are the relevant criteria for determining personal identity? It can be seen that Leibniz’s notion of monads as the basic element of things has a direct involvement in the discussion. If not every property of an individual is essential to a person’s identity, which, if any, are? It can be argued that personal identity is constituted by what can be termed, ‘bodily continuity’, that is, the continuous existence of the same physical body from one event to another. However, there seems to be two problems with such an account. First, if an individual’s identity rests on the cells which constitute the body, then that person’s identity must necessarily change every so often because all the cells in the body are completely renewed every seven years. It is somewhat similar to having an old car and replacing all of its parts with new ones. So, the question is, is it still the same car? Apparently yes, as with the individual who has replenished every cell in his body. Thus, it appears that self-identity does not so easily reside in the physical make-up of a person. But the second difficulty with the above account of personal identity lies in the fact that sometimes, an individual is considered a “different” person due to an accident or severe psychological trauma. This is not merely a metaphorical consideration, but a legal, and even medical, one as well. Thus, there seems to be some psychological element that is necessary to the concept of the self or personal identity. In other words, the question of what makes something what it is remains. To further illustrate, if a green tomato turns red at some point, how is one to say that it is one and same tomato? If it does not lie in the property of being red or being green, then where should identity be placed? Another question that can be raised is, what exactly constitutes this identity? It can be seen that Leibniz’s notion of monads as windowless, unaffected elements of things, serve as a conceptual basis for identity, in that the monads are the basic constituents of everything there is. Hence, it is only logical to suppose that there is some sort of identity that can be derived from this, but it has proven difficult to pinpoint exactly. In conclusion, it can be seen that Leibniz’s philosophical import lies in his idea of monadology, a plurality of basic substances that makes up everything. While this pluralism is not new, it is the significance of this conceptual basis on contemporary debates concerning the metaphysics of self-identity that makes it relevant. As such, the monadology of Leibniz can be appreciated even today. Reference Leibniz, G. W. (1714). The Principles of Philosophy, or, the Monadology. In [title of anthology, editor]. Place of publication: Publisher. Read More