Modern Philosophy According to Descartes - Assignment Example

of Modern Philosophy Final Assignment Following the First Meditation, it is notuntil the Sixth Meditation that the meditator can once again defend a claim to have knowledge that she is seated with papers in her hands and that there is a fireplace nearby and a tower in the distance. Explain. Having established his own existence as a thinking thing, whose nature is to have thoughts, and having proved that God exists, and that he is no deceiver, Descartes replaces doubt with certainty. By the sixth meditation, he is only left with one more inquiry, I quote: “There now only remains the inquiry as to whether material things exist. With regard to this question, I at least know with certainty that such things may exist, in as far as they constitute the object of the pure mathematics, since, regarding them in this aspect, I can conceive them clearly and distinctly” (Descartes 111). Descartes comes to know that he gains knowledge of material objects through sense perception, but since sense perception is by nature, deceptive, how can Descartes prove that material objects exist independent of his mind? Herein, he uses the process of elimination to find out what causes his ideas of material bodies, and whether they can exist independent of his mind. In doing so, he first claims that he cannot be the cause of such material bodies, for it would go against his nature and freewill as a thinking substance. The cogito proves only that he exists as a thinking substance, but it does prove anything about his body. In addition, God cannot be the cause either, for these ideas I have of material bodies are mere adventitious ideas, which are based on sense perception, which are by nature, deceptive. He now knows that God is no deceiver. Therefore, material objects exist insofar as the idea he has of such objects is caused by the objects themselves. As Descartes claims, “nothing was so likely to occur to my mind as the supposition that the objects were similar to the ideas which they caused” (113). Thus, material objects exist independent of his mind, since its cause must have as much reality to its effect. However, this does not mean that material objects exist as his senses tell them to be. So what then is the true nature of material objects? Herein, Descartes observed a piece of wax and identified its qualities, that is, its color, taste, smell, texture and sound; all of which we come to know through our bodily senses. But when he puts this piece of wax on fire, all those qualities that he observed, changed. Nevertheless, he knows for certain that it is still the same piece of wax, so something must have remained so as to consider this wax as the same piece of wax. Thus, Descartes identifies certain primary qualities of the piece of wax, which remain constant, namely: figure, the capacity for change, and spatial extension. These primary qualities are what define the true nature of the piece of wax, and for all material objects and physical substances. What he initially perceived through his senses are mere secondary qualities of the object, which do not belong to the object itself, but are mere sensations and come from within him. In this regard, Descartes is now aware of the distinction between mental and physical substances, that is, mind and matter. According to Descartes, God created these two kinds of substances totally different from one another. Mental substances or the mind, is a thinking thing, has consciousness and is morally responsible for its thoughts. It is not spatially extended and has no capacity for motion, and has free will. On the other hand, physical substances or matter, has no consciousness, is subject to mechanical motion, is determined and is spatially extended. These two substances are two mutually exclusive entities, which are independent from each other. In other words, mind cannot be matter and matter cannot be mind. This leads to Descartes’ metaphysical dualism, which claims that there exists a two-fold reality, namely, the physical and mental reality. This doctrine can best be understood by an old English couplet: “What is mind? No matter. What is matter? Never mind” (Lavine 123). Indeed, Cartesian rationalism takes its extremes in this form of dualism, for how can one exist as a thinking substance who has consciousness and is free, relate with something which is spatially extended, has no freedom and no consciousness? Indeed, this gives rise to the problem regarding the possibility of interaction between the mind and the body. Descartes claims that human beings are made up of two substances, namely, mind and body. But how can the mind and the body interact when both substances are entirely different from each other? Descartes solution relates to how nerves in the all parts of the body inform the brain of a certain impression or sensation felt. In turn, the mind will receive this impression sent through the brain, and reacts accordingly. In an example given by Descartes, he describes how the sensation of pain is felt by his mind: When I feel pain in the foot, the science of physics teaches me that this sensation is experienced by means of the nerves dispersed over the foot, which, extending like cords from it to the brain… and excite in these parts a certain motion appointed by nature to cause in the mind a sensation of pain, as if existing in the foot… and hence the mind will necessarily feel pain in the foot, just as if it had been hurt; and the same is true of all the other perceptions of our senses (121). Given this solution, Descartes attains certainty in material and physical objects, while aware of the fact that his nature as a thinking substance is independent from his body and his senses. Thus, Descartes can now be certain that his existence, as well as the existence of an external world, are real, yet are entirely distinct from one another. He now gains certainty as to whether he is dreaming or is awake, as to whether physical objects are illusions or are actually in front of him. Indeed, through the method of doubt, Descartes was able to demonstrate the existence of material bodies as independent substances that cause our false judgments. It is in this regard that we can now replace all the doubts we started with, with absolute certainty. 2. Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, and Hume each argue for theories of freedom. Contrast the arguments and theories of two. Spinoza offers a deterministic theory of freedom. According to him, there is no such thing as purpose, end, and final cause. His elimination of final causality may be explained in terms of his view of reality. Spinoza views reality with unity, order and necessity. Given this perspective, it implies that there can only be one substance, and this substance is God or Nature. Everything else that is not substance, but exists in this world are but modes or modifications of God, and must therefore necessarily follow from God alone. Since substance expresses itself through modes, we, as modes of the one substance are not free insofar that our will is not a free cause. We are determined by some other thing in our existence and are both cause and effect of another mode, i.e. of another finite being. Thus it creates a kind of modal system, that when viewed, and taken as a whole, we can now refer to this as totality, and thus be attributed to God or Nature. Furthermore, although the elimination of final causality is what lies beyond appearances, it cannot be ascribed to human beings. For men conceive of an end or purpose in life. But in reality, they simply do not understand the respective determining causes. Once they begin to understand, that is, to know the system of causality, they will realize that there cannot be a final cause, for it would lead to an infinite regress backwards, forming an infinite series of finite causes. So it is evident then that form an, there can be no freedom in such a that that our will is not a free cause. Human beings only think they are free merely because they are conscious of their many acts but are ignorant of the underlying causes and determinants of such acts. Their decisions and actions, thoughts and deeds, are determined by their impulses or desires, whether they are or are not aware of them. “Therefore, those who believe, that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream with their eyes open” (Spinoza, “Ethics”). This implies freedom to be a mere illusion, with belief in causality as a fruit of ignorance. Therefore, in order to understand reality, we must refer to its causes and not an illusion of a future or goal, for there is no end; nature just simply “is.” It is only due to our conatus that we persist towards an end. A weak conatus will lead one to ignorance, but a high conatus, that is, through refining our knowledge of causes; we can achieve freedom. In effect, blaming or praising have no real place in this causal world. No matter how much we would like to blame or praise somebody for certain acts, determinism leaves no room for freedom or the free will of man. Thus there can be no choice, no purpose, and no end. And since we are not given any choices in life, we are in effect, given no responsibility for our actions. Our actions are determined by our desires. We do not will it freely. Thus, we are not accountable for it. This is Spinoza’s theory of freedom. Leibniz offers a rather different take on the matter. Where Spinoza appeals to the role of desires and emotions, Leibniz emphasizes on the role of logic. , For Leibniz, knowledge of life can be conveyed or expressed in propositions or subject-predicate relations; ‘subject’ meaning the ‘being’ of the person, and ‘predicate’ meaning the ‘attributes’ of the person. For Leibniz, all true propositions are analytic. Thus, substances are equivalent to subjects of an analytic proposition; they really do contain all their predicates. Since all true propositions are analytic, substances and persons are equivalent to subjects of an analytic proposition, for they do contain all their predicates. With this notion, Leibniz applies the law of continuity in order to confirm his theory that: each substance unfolds its predicates in an orderly and, from God’s perspective, predictable way. The law of continuity states that, “nature makes no leaps.” Thus, rest and motion are aspects of each other, merging into each other through infinitesimal changes “so much that the rule of rest ought to be considered as a particular case of the rule of motion” (Leibniz 34). Moreover, in any true proposition, as subjects contain their predicates; all existing human beings or monads, already contain their future behavior. Monads are logically prior to any corporeal form and are distinct from the others, possessing their own principle of action and force. They are independent; Leibniz calls these “windowless” monads, meaning, they do not ‘causally’ determine each other since they are distinct and independent from one another. In addition, Leibniz claims that we have a pre-established essence, and thus, we cannot make choices. How can there be freedom then if all future behaviors or purposes of monads are pre-determined by God? Each monad is involved in developing its built-in purpose and “every present state of a monad is naturally a consequence of its preceding state, in such a way that its present is big with its future” (Leibniz, “Monadology”). Freedom then for Leibniz does not mean freedom of choice, but rather, self-development. It is the ability to become what a person is destined to be without any barriers, for it is a person’s own nature that determines his or her own actions, and not some outside force. Also, it means a quality of existence whereby knowledge has passed from confusion to clarity. In other words, one is free to the extent that one knows why he or she does what he or she does. Furthermore, this view of freedom involves two characteristics: first, being committed to ones pre-established destiny, and second, knowing the reasons why one is pursuing his or her pre-established destiny or purpose. The reason one may have with regards to his or her pre-established destiny is because it is God’s will; and whatever God wills “is.” Thus, it turns out that Leibniz’s notion of freedom, like Spinoza, is actually an extreme form of determinism. For, given that monads are windowless, but interact and behave in accordance with their original and pre-established purpose, which are received in the very beginning through God’s will, these monads depend not upon external causation, as Spinoza would claim, but upon the given or permanently fixed internal nature of each monad, for God pre-establishes an orderly arrangement by infusing specific purposes into several monads. This constitutes Leibniz’ theory of freedom. 3. Discuss Kant’s account of our knowledge of 7+5=12 as a response to Hume and as a main argument for Kant’s transcendental idealism. Immanuel Kant distinguishes between 2 types of knowledge: A priori and A posteriori. According to Kant, all our knowledge begins from experience. However, Kant also remarks that not all arises from experience. Knowledge from sense experience is a posteriori. On the other hand, we also have knowledge prior to experience and not dependent on it, this is a priori knowledge. Furthermore, the criteria for a priori knowledge is explained further in two points: necessity and strict universality. To demarcate further between these two types of knowledge, Kant distinguishes two types of judgments: “analytic” and “synthetic.” Analytic judgments are those whose predicates are included in the subject, while synthetic are those whose predicates are not included in the subject. Furthermore, analytic judgments are said to be a priori, for they are self-evident and are universal truths, they do not depend on experience to justify their truth-value. Synthetic judgments need validation through experience or experimentation and are thus depended on it. However, Kant also claims that there is a third type of knowledge; “synthetic a priori” knowledge. Synthetic a priori knowledge do contain its predicate in its subject, but satisfies the criteria for a priori knowledge, meaning they are not dependent upon experience and are affirmed to be universal truths. To emphasize on this further, Kant gives the example 7 + 5 = 12. According to Kant, the said proposition is synthetic because it is not an analytic judgment. For Kant, the predicate, 12 is not immediately unraveled in the concept of 7 and 5. To justify, when you think of 7 and 5, you think of the following: 7, 5 and plus which is not twelve. So in that way, 12 is not contained in the summation of 7 and 5 and the said proposition is a synthetic judgment. Now, it is a priori because the aforesaid proposition is a necessary self-evident claim and a universal truth, i.e. that the connection between 7 and 5 will give you 12. Kant’s analysis of the said synthetic a priori judgments enabled him to justify the validity of mathematic and scientific principles, which can be employed to extract exact knowledge of the phenomenal world thereby extending our knowledge of reality. So we are brought to the question: How are synthetic a priori judgments possible? How are the principles of mathematics and science possible? To Kant’s view, these synthetic a priori judgments stem from two a priori structures of the human mind, namely, the sensibility and the understanding. The sensibility is the ability of the mind to receive objects through sense perception. Herein, we have 2 a priori structures, which accompany our faculty of the senses. These are the forms of intuition, which are space and time. So when we perceive of a thing, our minds cannot help but perceive it spatially and temporally existing. These concepts says Kant are a priori, for it is not possible to perceive of an object without occupying space and time, but it is possible to conceive of space and time without objects. The understanding on the other hand is the ability of the mind to make judgments about things. This can also be described as the faculty of reasoning or judging. Furthermore, the a priori structures that belong to this faculty are the 12 categories of the mind. According to Kant, when we perceive the world and its objects, all our impressions will be defined and judged according to these 12 categories of the mind. And in this manner, we shall thus secure exact knowledge of the objects of sense. In line with this, Kant argues that the mind is an active lawgiver and it imbues organization and structure on the objects of experience. In relation to this is his view on knowledge. For Kant, knowledge is a cooperative enterprise between the knower, i.e. the subject, and the thing known, i.e. the object. That is to say, knowledge of a given object can only be attained in reference to the knower or subject. Thus, knowledge of objects is dependent on our minds. Without our minds, knowledge of such objects becomes meaningless. In line with this argument, Kant declares that “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind” (40). This simply means that knowledge of the phenomenal world can only be possible through a cooperative affair between our sensibility and understanding, otherwise knowledge of reality becomes impossible. Indeed, unlike Hume, our mental states are not merely a series of perceptions, which occur one after the other. Kant believed that all our perceptions are rooted in a unifying element, which organizes and structures our experiences of phenomena. This element is called the transcendental unity of apperception of the self. For example, when I glance at the classroom, I am bombarded with several impressions, such as the blackboard, chairs, books, etc. These impressions however are not mutually exclusive but cohere in a certain owner, which puts connections among our impressions. This owner is the transcendental self or “I.” Furthermore, without the “I,” our mental states will not be possible. After establishing his stand on the credibility of human knowledge, Kant cautioned that our knowledge is limited to only a partial aspect of reality. To explain further, Kant surmised that what we can know with certainty is the “phenomenon,” which means the appearance of a thing. In addition, the certainty of phenomenon can be fully encapsulated by our a priori forms of intuition and the categories of the mind. However, Kant insists that the phenomenon is only the surface of another reality, which is non-empirical, i.e. the “noumenon.” This noumenal reality is regarded as something unknowable and is the ultimate substrate that causes the appearance of a given thing. Given this, Kant concludes that the concept of the noumenon does not extend our knowledge of reality. Rather, it reminds us about the limitations of human knowledge. Thus, to Kant, what we can know with certainty is only the phenomenon or the world of experience. We can never know the existence of the noumenon for the reason that it surmounts the parameters of our minds. Works Cited Descartes, Rene. Discourse on the Method and the Meditations. Trans. John Veitch. New York: Cosimo, 2008. Print. Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999. Print. Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Monadology. Trans. Robert Latta. The Universtiy of Virginia College at Wise. Web. 7 May 2011. . Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. The Philosophical Works of Leibnitz. Trans. George Martin Duncan. New Haven: Tuttle, Morehouse & Taylor, 1890. Print. Spinoza, Baruch. Ethics. Trans. George MacDonald Ross. University of Leeds. 1999. Web. 7 May 2011. . Read More