Concept of God with Particular Reference - Essay Example

The debate concerning whether God exists or not has been abound with energy for centuries, throughout eras. While there are two main sides of the argument, each has its further conflicting ideas and reasoning within it. I will be focusing on the classical theistic concept of God, particularly in relation to his omnipotence, and the extent to which this is criticised by conflicting theorists. Indeed, Thomas Aquinas is a central contributor to this area, and his theory will be assessed in light of personal as well as other conflicting and synchronised opinion. It is no surprise that Classical theistic concepts of God fundamentally propose the existence of God. But how exactly? Aristotle perceived God as the first principle, the unmoved mover, the ‘primary essence’ (Metaphysics 12.8; 1074a36-39). Thomas Aquinas depicts ‘one first immovable Being, a primary cause, necessarily existing, not created; existing the most widely, good, even the best possible; the first ruler through the intellect, and the ultimate end of all things’ (Aquinas 1270, art.III). One can begin here to see the entirety with which classical theists tend to view the extent of the existence of God. It appears primarily elusive, but it seems that this very elusiveness fuels its rigorous withstanding against criticisms. But can one capture a more specific concept of omnipotence, of the deeper concept of the existence of God? Omnipotence, being the central concept of God’s existence, requires a more thorough definition in order to evaluate its resilience (or failing) against alternative theories. While one recognises that the task at hand is not to merely describe how Aquinas depicts the existence of God, and which arguments he refers to in order to strengthen his theory, it is also valuable in understanding further his theory. For, in order to criticise a theory, one must attempt to understand, and thus analyse it in all of its splendour. One cannot deny that Aquinas does indeed adopt an interesting stance; he expresses what God is not, and in doing so, provides a beautifully crafted set of attributes, of which God is. Concerning his main work on the issue, Summa Theologica, one grasps the strength with which he approaches and then deals with the difficult issue of plausibly testifying to the existence of God. But by predicting criticisms and answering them thus, he not only testifies to the existence of God, but builds a fortress of reason around it, preventing immediate weakening attacks from critics. Omnipotence is maximal power; it is perfection, the power to bring about states of affairs. But does this just simply mean that God possesses ultimate power and can exercise it as such? When Aquinas claims that ‘nothing is better than what is in God; because whatsoever is in God, is God’, (ST: Qu25, art.1) does he simply mean that God is the greatest, period? Surely a sound theory requires a much deeper explanation, and characteristic of Aquinas, he provides one as thus. Let one begin with the concept of power in relation to God. Only God creates, bringing something from nothing, for he is the act itself and cannot be acted upon by anything else (ST: Qu45, art.5). It is important to note that Aquinas does not express God as able to do anything; he is not power in itself, rather he is knowledge and will. This stems from the concept that God cannot be the cause of anything, for he is ‘pure act’ (ST: Qu25, art.1). Indeed, in Question 25, he explores this concept, in relation to God’s omnipotence, and addresses the criticism that it is difficult to fully understand exactly what God can do. But he answers that omnipotence does not give God unlimited power, ‘since power is said in reference to possible things’. (ST: Qu14, art.3). But if God is pure act, can he not do anything thus? Aquinas certainly suggests this when he states that God’s act is not distinct from power (ST: Qu 25 art.1). One could interpret this vagueness of Aquinas as a ‘catch all’ concept and thus ward off potential critics by leaving his theory open to different interpretations depending on the criticism. Yet, this power of God is ‘limited’ to logical possibilities; not even God can make a circle with unequal radii: ‘Anything that implies a contradiction does not fall under God’s omnipotence.’ (ST: Qu25, arts. 4, 5). This is rather similar to Spinoza’s proposition that only the actual world is possible (Ethics, I, 33). So, Aquinas is proposing logical discourse – indeed he keeps within boundaries and does not fall victim to attributing metaphysical attributes to God that are not possible. I consider this to be a powerful strength of Aquinas’ theory – to attribute impossible attributes to the concept of God’s existence can make him more ‘unworldly’ and thus ‘out of one’s league’ to text, but also leaves open the concept to realist criticism. Aquinas has resisted this attack and bases his theory on a logical version of existence and ability of God. This is a running technique throughout Summa Theologica, Aquinas criticises his own concepts and then explores answers to rebut the criticisms. In this manner he is able to strengthen his theory and further explore it. In question 14, Aquinas recognises the criticism that if God cannot do the impossible, he cannot know the future, and thus he cannot cause things that are not (ST: Qu14, art.8). And through his answer, Aquinas causes one to acknowledge the distinction between potentiality and impossibility. Because something is potential does not make it impossible – ‘it is not necessary that whatever God knows, is, or was, or will be’ (ST: Qu14, art. 9). Thus these things exist because God knows of them, God does not know of them because they exist. It is a strong contention, and Aquinas addresses it directly and with confidence and plausibility. This is the beauty of his self-criticism. Another valuable foundation giving strength to Aquinas’ theory is his ‘realistic’ stance. Aquinas does not separate man from God entirely; he does not portray God to be some ‘outer-worldly’ being such as Descartes does by separating completely body from soul and thus God from man. He conveys that ‘we find a certain imitation of God in man…in that all man’s soul is in his body…in the same sort of way as God is in the world.’ (this is in the clayton book – god and contemporary science, page 235, footnote 4). Immediately we see a connection between God and man, which allows one to associate and see as graspable the concept, by relation to interaction. Thus one can conceive of God’s interaction in the world on a rather plausible level, through the mental and physical dualism comparison (Clayton: 1997, p. 235). This is a powerful element within Aquinas’ theory; for if one can grasp the concept that God, although omnipotent and eternal and such, can participate in the world, then one can grasp his existence – Aquinas brings us closer to God, mentally. But bringing this connection between God and man proposes some potential problems. If God can do anything logically possible, is he thus not able to sin, as man? If so, is not God nothing more than a higher being, a human with simply greater power to exercise acts? Aquinas fundamentally denies that God is corporeal, thus ‘God cannot do all things that are possible to created natures’ (Davies: 1992, p. 123). Therefore, God cannot sin, for this ‘cannot be reconciled with omnipotence’ (Aquinas: Proslogion 7) and denies God’s nature which is the perfect good. This argument is not entriely convincing to myself, for it states ‘God can do everything logically possible, including sin, but he cannot sin, because he is God’. So, he has the ability to sin? It seems that Aquinas here uses the concept of omnipotence to back up any vague argument he has, so that ‘God can do anything logically possible, except sin. Why? Because he is omnipotent’. On a personal level, I find that the term ‘omnipotence,’ despite its definition is not strong enough to answer satisfactorily any criticisms that really threaten the theory. In short, the overal classical theist theory seems to lack the existence and essence that, say, the Neo-Classical theory of Hartshorne possesses (Hartshorne: 1962). The classical theory also seems to affect the concept of human freedom. Aquinas explains that God brings about every happening; he creates every reality. So does this mean that he creates every decision that humans make? If so, we make no decisions for ourselves, and we have no autonomous freedom – we are essentially mere puppets. However, he maintains that this does not jeopardise our freedom as humans – God has will and we have will, and God causes us to freely decide as well as controlling what we decide (ST: Qu19, art.8). But we do not always decide well, so if God causes this, he cannot be the perfect entity – he is in effect willing us to sin. This is a considerable weakness in the classical theist theory, and has dire implications for the will of God and his inability to sin. Aquinas here states that God does permit sin, but only in order to bring greater good, and again, one is caused to question whether ‘the greater good’ can be perceived as a safety net, its strength based upon the inability to become proven or disproven. Nonetheless, Aquinas takes the stance of Abelard, in that God is incapable of sinning himself (ST: Qu25, arts. 5-6). In any case, on must come to understand that the classical theist argument is not about proving or disproving. It concerns the strength of the arguments that claim God’s existence and his composition. Where Aquinas provides some strong arguments, they do not seem to be backed up by anything more than vague terms and ‘catch-all’ concepts. Indeed, he provides the connection between God and his interaction with the world, but he does not seem to provide strong answers to critics. Indeed, Richard Swinburne refers to phenomena, not explainable through science and backs up Aquinas’ theory by reference to logic. It does cause one to question at all whether the existence of God can be answered by or even connected to the concept of logic. Bibliography Aquinas, T. (1270): Reasons in Proof of The Existence of God. Aquinas, T. Summa Theologica. Reprinted in Gilby, T. (1951) (selected and trans.) Saint Thomas Aquinas: Philosophical Texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cobb, J. B. and Griffin, D. R. (1977) Process Theology: An introductory exposition. Belfast: Christian Journals. Clayton, P. (1997) God and Contemporary Science. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Davies, B. (1992) The Thought of Thomas Aquinas. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fischer, J. M. (ed.) (1989) God, Foreknowledge and Freedom. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. Flew, A. (1955) ‘Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom’. In Flew & MacIntyre (ed.) New Essays in Philosophical Theology. London: SCM. Gale, R. M. (1991) On the Nature and Existence of God. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hartshorne, C. (1983) Insights and Oversights of the Great Thinkers: An evaluation of Western Philosophy. Albany: New York Univ. Press. Hartshorne, C. (1984) Omnipotence and other theological mistakes. Albany: New York Univ. Press. Kenny, A. (1979) The God of the Philosophers. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Kenny, A. (1980) Aquinas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980. Owen, H. P. (1971) Concepts of Deity. London: Macmillan. Pailin, D. (1986) Groundwork of the Philosophy of Religion. London: Epworth. Ch 7. Peacocke, A. (1979) Creation and the World of Science. Oxford: Clarendon. Peterson, M. et al. (1991) Reason and Religious Belief. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Rea, M. C. (2008) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Stump, E. (ed.) (1993) Reasoned Faith. Ithaca: Cornell UP. Swinburne, R. (1978) The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon. Taliaferro, C. (1998) Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. Oxford: Blackwell. Ward, K. (1982) Rational Theology and the Creativity of God. Oxford: Blackwell. Read More