The Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories - Essay Example

The Epistemology of Conspiracy Theories In his essay titled 'Of conspiracy theories', the author Brian Keeley discusses certain epistemological issues pertaining to conspiracy theories. He argues that there are certain features that are shared by most conspiracy theories, which make them irrational to accept. He defines a conspiracy theory as “a proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons the conspirators acting in secret.” This definition assumes that the proposed explanation is but a theory that contradicts an official 'received' explanation of the event in question, and that a conspiracy theory attempts to attribute the cause of the event to certain nefarious conspirators considered to be all powerful. Moreover, it is assumed that the conspiracy is carried out in secret otherwise other people would be in a position to prevent them being successful. The epistemological concern of the author is with such conspiracy theories as described above, as distinct from those that do not pose a similar epistemological concern due to not pertaining to events with nefarious objectives and not being organized to be kept secret for long. On the other hand, it is acknowledged that these distinctions alone do not help to distinguish clearly between those conspiracy theories that are unwarranted and those that are warranted, as was demonstrated for example with the Iran-Contra Affair. Nonetheless, he points out that unwarranted conspiracy theories (UCT's) are the ones that pose philosphical difficulties, and it is these that he sets out to analyse by offering an explanation as to why they are popular, and why people should not believe in them. He also expresses an interest in discussing the wider philosophical issues surrounding conspiracy theories as well as examining the wider implications of many people nowadays accepting them as true explanations of events. This situation deserves being studied because it indicates a growing conflict between opposing views with some people accepting the mainstream received views and others that are more acceptive of the views of conspiracy theorists. The author terms the main tool of conspiracy theorists as 'errant data'. This type of data is considered to exist as either contradictory data, or data that is unaccounted for. Whereas the former is concerned with data that conflicts with official explanations, the latter is concerned with data which the official explanations are unable to account for satisfactorily. He makes the point that “Conspiracy theories are attractive, a fact demonstrated by their current popularity. But their alleged virtues are subtly flawed.”, and then tries to prove this. The attractiveness, or rather strength, of conspiracy theories lies in their ability to seemingly unify the explanations of different events. By their very nature, they are always able to explain more than other competing theories. Conspiracy theories explain not only the 'received account' of events, but also the errant data that these official explanations generate. It is precisely this 'virtue' of conspiracy theories that the author describes as their 'beauty', i.e. their “wonderfully unified accounts of all the data at hand, both those the official story explains, plus those niggling, overlooked errant data.” Also, conspiracy theories are sustained by making people believe they are indeed only conspiracy theories, i.e. not widely believed, which might otherwise make the truth be revealed. Errant data is believed by the author to play a critical role in UCTs. He believes that when an official received account fails to explain certain errant facts, the existence of a conspiracy becomes the best explanation of the event. Although he points out that this has also been true of science, which reflects the imperfect nature of human understanding, he also points out that the work of a conspiracy theorist is in a domain in which “the investigated actively seeks to hamper the investigation”. By their nature, UCTs are unfalsifiable, but their actual problem lies with “the increasing degree of skepticism” that they require as positive evidence. Whereas scientific belief rests on the outcome of “a social mechanism of warranted belief production”, mature conspiracy theories rest on the pervasive skepticism of people that are unwarranted. The problem with skepticism is that it “undermine[s] the grounds for believing in anything”, a point that was supported with the example of the denial of the Jewish holocaust. It becomes necessary, sooner or later, to recognise a conspiracy theory as unwarranted for warranted explanations to exist. In order to support his arguments, the author gives several examples, especially that of the Oklahoma City bombing in which it was noted that no BATF (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) employees were present at the time, which led them to be implicated. Another line of argument made by the author as a philosophical issue and implication of the popularity of conspiracy theories, concerns influence and control. Believing in conspiracy theories entails believing that events are “capable of being controlled”, which the author considers to be an outdated world view. In order to support his argument, he draws some comparisons between the previous world view characterised by belief in God and other supernatural forces, through the rise of materialist science and capitalism, and the era of the late twentieth century described as consisting of “an extremely large number of interacting agents, each with its own imperfect view of the world and its own set of goals”. He simply does not believe that the current system can be controlled. In other words, he suggests that there is now a breakdown in orderliness, which contradicts the world view of conspiracy theorists, although he admits it is not thrilling to reject the conspiratorial world view. He basis his arguments on his belief that there is no broad meaning or significance in this world. Given the situation faced by people in having to choose between either “an almost nihilistic degree of skepticism” and “the absurdism of an irrational and essentially meaningless world”, with a conspiracy theorist being defined as one who embraces the former, Keeley proposes people should take an alternative position. In this regard, he suggests people should not concern themselves overly in cases when (mainstream) theories of social events do not make sense in view of the available data. He also recommends people should not over rationalize about the people involved and the world itself, and that conspiracy theories should be recognized for what they are in terms of adopting the first choice of extreme skepticism with respect to viewing people and their motivations and behaviour. The main position of the author himself was to relate his analysis of conspiracy theories with the concept of 'miracles' as analysed by Hume; that is, to undertake the analysis in the same vein. Unlike with conspiracy theories, miracles seem to offer explanations with respect to believing them to be real, that are never warranted. According to the author's analysis of conspiracy theories, these theories in contrast are largely unwarranted. He acknowledges that distinguishing between good and bad theories though is not an easy task, as conspiracy theories are numerous and range between some that are highly implausible to those that are somewhat believable. Instead, it is advised that a consensus should be reached after tracking certain theories over time in terms of identifying the point at which the extent of skepticism begins to overtake what is plausible and can be accepted. The author also draws attention to the actual theorists behind conspiracy theories as being part of the problem more than the theories themselves. In other words, it is suggested that the problem could be psychological in nature in that arises because some people are unable to cease searching for conspiratorial explanations of certain events, even when they do not even appear to be related. Regardless, the usefulness of examining conspiracy theories is also acknowledged by the author given that they allow for distinguishing between good explanations and those that can be safely assumed to be bad and thus labelled as conspiracy theories. Work Cited: Brian Keeley. 'Of conspiracy theories'. The Journal of Philosophy, 96 (1999): 109-126. Read More