An Analysis of Cartesian Dualism - Essay Example

?An Analysis of Cartesian Dualism Introduction Rene Descartes argues that the major value of scepticism is that it frees individuals from biases and facilitates a separation from the senses. The dynamics of scepticism is used because Descartes considers trust in the senses as strongly ingrained and requires drastic actions. He believes this faith develops during early years, during which the mind is strongly connected to the body and the physical world. Too much dependence on the senses leads to mistakes about the nature of God and the mind, as well as the physical world (Morton, 2010). This essay critically evaluates Descartes’s claim that the mind is not a part of the physical world. It also includes a brief analysis of the response of modern science to this classical assumption. A Cartesian Perspective of the Mind Descartes believes that the tendency to associate sensible features with bodies is a mistake developed during childhood. During these early years individuals acquire the belief that the physical world is strongly connected to their sensations, or that it has the types of attributes it seems to possess in sense perception, both sensible and automatic. But indeed, he argues, bodies possess only automatic attributes, such as motion, size, and shape, and people’s perception of sensible attributes are brought about by formation of these attributes (Wilson, 2003). Challenging the simple perception of the physical world is a major objective of the Meditations. The movement against faith in the senses, and specifically against the belief that bodies are the same as sensations, is an important instrument in realising this objective, because Descartes believes the simple understanding of the physical world is mostly rooted in the notion that bodies are the same as people’s sensations (Morton, 2010). Descartes started his pursuit of truth by using his newly developed method of inquiry. His method used intense scepticism—all ideas that are doubtful were disregarded, including ancient wisdom taught by scholasticism. More critically, Descartes also doubted ideas coming from the senses because “from time to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely those who have deceived us even once” (Wilson, 2003, p. 37). Evidently this argument encouraged questioning much of the established knowledge, and eliminating them as potential groundwork of thought. All ideas of the physical world might be untrue, since knowledge of them arises from the untrustworthy senses. Moreover, the presence of the physical body was questioned based on the same justification (Engel & Soldan, 2007, p. 334): “I shall consider myself as not having hands or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all these things”. Descartes afterward thought that in order to doubt, he should exist as a ‘thinking’ being: “I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind” (Christofidou, 2013, p. 41). And then he defines a ‘thinking’ being as “a thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions” (Morton, 2010, p. 81). This series of arguments led him to his concluding point: the mind is not part of the physical world. In particular, an important outcome of Descartes’s argument was a deep disunion between mind and body. Descartes believed that the mind and body are made up of different components (Dawson, 2013, p. 58): “Indeed the idea I have of the human mind, in so far as it is a thinking thing, which is not extended in length, breadth or height and has no other bodily characteristics, is much more distinct than the idea of any corporeal thing”. The mind was actually intangible—the mind’s existence did not rely on the existence of the physical world or the body. However, even though Descartes believes that the mind is not part of the physical world, he conceded that mind and body had to be connected one way or another. He emphasised that the abilities of the mind could be utilised for making choices beneficial to the body, to which the mind is connected. Descartes believes that the mind, as a thinking entity, has the power to use different rational processes in the information given by the defective senses—sensory information may be refuted, verified, recognised, or doubted. In other words, these processes could not merely tell the mind of what would give advantage or disadvantage to the relationship between the mind and body, but may also be used to develop a strategy to acquire the advantages or prevent the disadvantages (Rozemond, 2009). Moreover, the mind—through its ability to spur action—may make the body carry out needed actions to actualise the strategy. Descartes’s argument that the mind is not part of the physical world is a philosophical perspective referred to as ‘dualism’. Dualism has mostly been renounced by modern science. Most modern scientists, including practitioners of cognitive science, use another philosophical perspective known as ‘materialism’ (Rozemond, 2009; Christofidou, 2013). Materialism states that the mind is produced by the brain. Despite that it has rejected Cartesian dualism, majority of the central principles of established cognitive science are based on the arguments that Descartes introduced in the 17th century (Morton, 2010). In fact, classical cognitive science is a fusion between materialism and Cartesian philosophy. In essence, Descartes refuted the Platonist perception of human beings and considered the link between mind and body as true and important (Engel & Soldan, 2007). However this established concept of a separate mind and physical world is very problematic and vague. When confronted with this dilemma, Descartes consistently claimed that the connection between the mind and the physical world cannot be understood by more definite and different explanations, but that it does not have to be explained in the least. He argues that the idea people have of this connection is a basic concept and claims that by itself it must be simple or normal to everybody, because it is the idea people have of themselves as ‘thinking’ entities, which is common from their everyday actions and experiences. The mind and the physical world, as Descartes views these concepts, can be definitely and distinctly understood only if explained independently from each other. However, they cannot be understood as united, because this would be to perceive them simultaneously as one single concept and two distinct concepts, which, according to Descartes, is not possible (Rozemond, 2009, p. 102). The lesson to be obtained from these arguments is dual: not merely are concepts like ‘substantial forms’ or ‘real qualities’ (Rozemond, 2009, p. 102) to be taken out of the scientific knowledge of the natural world, but the occurrences to which they can be significantly related to bypass scientific knowledge. Indeed, this is the outcome that Descartes raised: only a science of the human body exists. In order to be an object of science, as Descartes explained, the physical world should be viewed as ‘mechanically moved extended matter’ (Baker & Morris, 2013, p. 96). Essential features of human experience and nature are thus excluded from the range of scientific knowledge when that knowledge is restricted to what satisfies the criteria of a mechanistic science of nature. Hence, the concept of dualism does not go well with modern science. Modern science demonstrates that the assumption that the mind is not part of the physical world has several aspects that make it very questionable. For instance, Descartes’s argument that the interaction between the mind and the body occurs in the pineal gland was explained by modern science as incorrect. Modern science raises this question against dualism (Baker & Morris, 2013): If the mind is really separate from the physical world, then what is the explanation for the capacity to produce mental attributes through purely physical ways? Still, modern science does not firmly prove that dualism is incorrect. The fact that dualism is not able to clarify the interaction between mind and body is not an adequate basis to repudiate the assumption; proponents of dualism could plainly answer that human beings still have an incomplete knowledge of the universe in order to fully comprehend this interaction. Moreover, they may merely claim that this ‘thinking thing’ is a reality and trust in it through faith (Wilson, 2003). Nevertheless, in that case they are merely depending upon religion rather than carrying out scientific inquiry. Merely arguing that the argument that the mind is not part of the physical world is true because they think it is a blind alley and can result in new knowledge. Conclusions Descartes’s dualism has been very influential. The assumption that the mind does not belong to the physical world has been adopted by several contemporary philosophers. However, there are practically no scientific bases to believe in the Cartesian dualism today. The argument is unjustifiable and questionable for numerous reasons. First and foremost, it makes the mind too mysterious and incomprehensible. Descartes argued that the mind was inseparable, that it is impossible to break it down into structured array of interconnected components. Yet, the mind apparently has a broad range of potential states. It can generate an unlimited number of ideas. It can understand and sense. And its senses and thoughts arise from its connection with the physical world. References Baker, G. & Morris, K. (2013) Descartes’s Dualism. UK: Routledge. Christofidou, A. (2013) Self, Reason and Freedom in Descartes Metaphysics. UK: Routledge. Dawson, M. (2013) Mind, Body, World: Foundations of Cognitive Science. UK: Athabasca University Press. Engel, S. & Soldan, A. (2007) The Study of Philosophy. UK: Rowman & Littlefield. Morton, P. (2010) A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind, second edition: Readings with Commentary. UK: Broadview Press. Rozemond, M. (2009) Descartes’s Dualism. New York: Harvard University Press. Wilson, C. (2003) Descartes’s Meditations: An Introduction. UK: Cambridge University Press. Read More