Aristotelian Ethics: Emotion and Moral Virtue - Essay Example

Aristotelian Ethics: Emotion and Moral Virtue Moral theorists have long debated theissue of moral virtue. Democritus argued for the subjectivist concept of moral virtue that Epicurus was to adopt and transform into a broader model of philosophical self-indulgence. Protagoras introduced a conventionalistic and relativistic perspective of moral virtue. And Socrates argued for the virtue-based rationalist theory that became the prevailing theoretical perspective of moral virtue in Greek thought, one adopted by Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics (Bagnoli 4-5). The debate on emotion and moral virtue reveals how an individual sees the essence of emotion and its connection to reason has major influence on an individual’s understanding of virtue. It will partly influence how a person appreciates virtue and the steps one will create to attain it. Intellectualists will pursue virtue through actions based on reason, trying to develop the emotions by gaining knowledge and rectifying incorrect beliefs, specifically through techniques such as the Socratic Method or the Stoics’ cognitive therapy. Those who believe that emotion is a psychological ability separate from reason will view the quest for and ownership of knowledge to be inadequate to influence an individual’s actions (Broadie 394-395). Emotions entail their own form of training through techniques able to affect them. These techniques should include more than the rectification of incorrect beliefs and the quest for rational understanding. Aristotle is on the side of virtue ethicists. Aristotle argues that moral virtue is about right emotion and right action. The moral individual is generally situated in the middle as regards both. Hence Aristotle explains the premise: the virtuous individual feels “both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain… at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right aim, and in the right way” (Broadie 100). Simply put, to have emotions that are controlled and nurtured at the aforementioned ways is a distinguishing feature of moral distinction. Aristotle enumerates the particular emotions associated with particular virtues. He introduces a complex theory to explicate how behavioral consistency as regards behaving virtuously or morally is supported by an individual’s inclination to have suitable judgment and suitable emotions toward what s/he is asked to do in a particular situation. These inclinations are enhanced through habituation and education. The strengths of Aristotelian ethics are evident from two points of view relating to the nature of emotions and practical reason. Aristotelian ethics focuses on practical reason and believes that the fineness of character primarily determines the thriving or successful life. Aristotle’s theory of emotions strengthens the argument that moral intelligence develops from the correct habituation of emotions, which is the major undertaking of education, more particularly, moral education. Moral education is based on developing and directing the emotions toward aims and purposes that are reasonable (Sherman 152-153). Second, and accordingly, Aristotle’s ethics raised the debate about the standards for evaluating the correctness and rationality of emotions. Because it tries to develop a character wherein emotions are connected to reason, this ethical perspective argues that habituation of emotions is possible because emotions are open or receptive to judgment. The characteristic strength of Aristotle’s theory of emotions greatly surfaces in opposition to the “simple view of emotions,” which views them as “blind causes,” as part of the group of senses or feelings, and as part of the physiological model (Bagnoli 5). This competing perspective of emotions is the main hindrance to determining the contribution or role of emotions in morality, for it refutes that they are trainable and can be educated in accordance with the norms of reason. In its most basic and roughest form, this perspective sees emotions as automatic, unconscious, instinctive states, and thus a danger to rational and moral action. However, even we limit ourselves to these moral virtues such as courage and generosity. Their decisive foundation is much wider than that of numerous other perspectives of moral virtue. Reason and emotions establish the moral reaction. The argument of Aristotle is not the common one held by some that feelings and relationships allow us to meet the moral demands established by a more objective rationality. Instead, the point is that emotions are forms of moral reaction that establish what is morally appropriate and, in certain instances, what is needed. To act virtuously is to act virtuously in emotion and morals. It should be emotionally committed, and not only to have the emotion as a tool or supplementary. It is to understand in a manner that takes into consideration the messages of the emotion as much as the messages of reason. A behavior driven by the appropriate values but deficient in the appropriate emotion is outside the mean; it fails to manifest virtue. Without a doubt, for Aristotle, to behave for the correct reasons, as the individual possessing practical knowledge does, is to behave from the kind of knowledge that itself involves the perception and understanding of the emotions (Broadie 294). Moral decision emanates from that knowledge without essentially accepting the ideas of an objective agent. Emotions do not have to be denied or, more irresolutely, defended from a higher-order point of view, where a person asks how other people, in a similar situation, would act or respond. Aristotle’s interpretation can hence be viewed as an explanation of the contemporary debate between the particularist and impartialist moral perspectives. As regards the particularist, he will explain that the perspective of moral evaluation does not necessitate a higher-order viewpoint of objectivity (Sherman 3-4). It is that our opinion or judgment of certain situations and our wisdom of how to respond to such situations is itself an element of our moral reaction. Distinguishing the morally relevant aspects of a circumstance is part of morally proper reaction and is part of asserting virtue. The pursuit of virtue does not start with deciding or making choices, but with identifying the situations appropriate to particular goals. With regard to this, character is manifested in what a person “sees” as much as what s/he “does” (Sherman 4). Aristotle argues that a distinguishing feature of virtue is having the skill or knowledge to distinguish the specifics. Basically, Aristotle’s theory of emotions and moral virtue, in my opinion, is plausible. A person may gain ideas about how a virtuous life can be merged with the tranquility of reflection. The contemplation will be based on one’s personal beliefs, but also on those entrenched in the cultural fabric and on the opinions of the intellectuals. It is this point of view, apparently, that is the most plausible and convincing point of Aristotle. The practically knowledgeable person is hence, to some extent, a theoretician able to develop a rational notion of pleasure realized through an ethicist’s dialectical abilities. Ultimately, the Aristotelian ethicist should be practically knowledgeable. Aristotelian ethics entails knowledge of the specific situations of human life; it is rooted in experience. As theory, it is still inaccurate in anticipation of the more certain workings of practical knowledge in its decision-making and emotional purposes. Therefore, ethical theory is practical to the extent that it is a component of a larger task of establishing a goal which orients behavior. As argued by Aristotle, the objective of his analysis is to provide us with “knowledge [gnosis] of the good that will have great influence on our lives. And like archers who have some target [skopon] to aim at, with this knowledge we shall be more likely to hit upon what is right” (Sherman 12). Aristotelian ethics teaches us that to set a goal is simply to establish practical principles for good living. Works Cited Bagnoli, Carla. Morality and the Emotions. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Print. Broadie, Sarah. Ethics with Aristotle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Print. Sherman, Nancy. The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue. New York: Oxford, 1989. Print. Read More