Suffering of Animals - Essay Example

Singer argues, by use of example that the other principles are invalid; since they will leave out people we think should not be left out. For example, people do not think that it would be acceptable to take no notice of the well-being of somebody who is less intelligent than a standard person. Therefore, we can not probably think that intelligence is an appropriate decisive factor for moral consideration.

 Singer also argues that it is just by the good quality of something being sentient that people can say it has interests by any means, hence this makes sentience fall in a different category than the other principle. Singer is simply trying to ascertain that if a creature is not sentient, then the idea of showing it moral consideration does not make any sense. This off-putting argument is significant since Singer has a tendency of ending up leaving out humans who are no longer sentient for instance those in a coma. He is comfortable accepting the satisfaction to accept that outcome, but it is significant that he explains why the leaving out of some humans by his principle is not difficult since he has disapproved of other principles for their exclusion as this is his target.

 Nevertheless, ascertaining that beings that are not sentient are not worth moral consideration does not get enough illustration that the sentient beings are not worth moral consideration. He does not give much argument for his final claim, however; he appears to have the same justification in his mind. We also realize that it is clear that it is not pleasant for people to suffer so there should be that usual extension to recognize that suffering is unpleasant hence other beings are not an exception to that. Therefore, we need to differentiate between the two sufferings we need proof. Again in Singer’s arguments, it is so open that he thinks we cannot meet the proof hence one’s moral importance must be sentience. Singer may respond to the objections he gets that we do not need to treat humans and non-humans the same way but an extension of equal moral consideration to humans implies that we ought to count other creature’s interest. Similarly with interests of animals that are comparable, though not all interests are inevitably able to be compared. Singer here implies that we should not give animal interests less weight simply because the creatures that have them are animals but should give interest where it’s due.

Singer argues that adult chimpanzees are people, though human infants are not. Since they are aware of their existence ultimately people are exposed to some forms of suffering that sentient creatures cannot experience. For example, a sentient creature will feel pain when dying, but only human beings can experience the extra fear that person can experience the extra fear that accompanies awareness of its own humanity. A sentient creature can undergo some form of pain though only human beings are able to feel the hopelessness it brings by the awareness that that kind of pain will last a while. This means that human beings have some interests that sentient creatures do not. Eventually, taking the same consideration the interest that is able to be compared of all sentient creatures regardless of the species does not state that we have to treat them equally. If, for example, one has to save either a cat or a human being from a building that is burning, Singer would say you must save the human being since the weighing scale of pleasure over pain will be bigger when you save the adult than you save the cat. On the other hand, Singer contends that circumstances where a person faces that form of choice are odd moreover there are difficult cases like experimentation of animals, where we are required carefully to balance the total suffering our decisions will cause.

According to Singer, a good number of our practices towards other creatures are easy cases, especially in most of our practices towards animals, that we sacrifice important interests of animals like life and freedom, our practices toward animals for the case of unimportant human interests. For example,  when he says; “Since I have said, none of these practices caters anything more than our pleasure of taste, our practice of rearing killing other animals in order to eat them is a clear instance of the sacrifices of most beneficial interest of our own.