Undergraduate Programs in Philosophy - Essay Example

? Philosophy Philosophy – IUP In 2.172, the Wittgenstein s that there way the picture can its pictographic form. From this view, there are different perspectives to this statement: 1. No picture element can correspond to the pictorial form of the picture. 2. No picture can be able to depict that it has a pictorial form 3. It is not possible for a picture to portray that any other image owns a pictographic appearance. 4. It is not possible for a picture to portray its own pictorial form. Statements 2 and 3 can only be valid if a picture is corresponding to a particular item in reality; this is an statement that is still debatable. In to accept this requirement, a counter example to 2 and 3 is that a spatial picture is capable of depicting anything that is spatial. In this case, therefore, for a normality that is partial to be portrayed, it means that spatial structures of the picture imply the pictorial appearance of the picture. The spatial normality depicted means the spatial appearance is also portrayed. We represent facts about reality to ourselves through pictures. The elements a picture has correspond to the elements that a fact also has. These elements constitute the fact. For instance, if a fact is formed by the combination of three pictures, then the fact also represents the three pictures if its picture is also taken. The elements of the three pictures must also be seen in the picture of the fact as well; all combined in a particular similar way. This combination of the elements of the image is what the author referred to as the structure of the picture. The illustrative appearance is what enables a picture to be able to organize its elements or components in a given determinate way. A picture only displays its pictorial form. It is not able to depict the pictorial form. 2.712 is the conclusion of other sentences in the Tractatus. According to 2.171, “a picture cannot in any way depict a reality of the form it has. Consequently, a spatial picture only depicts anything that is spatial while colored pictures depict anything that is colored, and so on”. Following 2.712 is 2.713. it states that a picture is only represent its subject from outside its position. This means that the picture will show something from a position outside its own. 2.714 goes on to say that a picture is not able to put itself out of its representational form. These three other statements from Tractatus are the only points with which the conclusion can be proven. The only thing that a picture has in common with the state of affairs it assumes is the pictorial form it owns. Any particular picture owns a pictographic appearance. Therefore, a picture is only able to depict a reality of the form it has as its own. Even though 2.171 only speak of only ‘form’, this ‘form’ could be taken to mean the pictorial form too. According to 2.173 and 2.714 ‘subject’ is highlighted to mean the normality, which the picture is to portray. In this case, a picture should portray the pictographic appearance it has in the normality available. Nonetheless, the pictographic appearance exists in the image just as it exists in an entity. This is also the same as structure exists in state of affairs. There is no appearance or form that exists past an object or on the exterior of an object. Similarly, no structure exists of the boundaries of a state of affairs. From the point of view 2.174 represents, we may say that the idea of the self is relevant. This states that it is not possible for a person to be conscious of his or her own consciousness from the point of the same consciousness. Analogously, it is not possible to see a person’s opinion if viewed from the very same opinion. Similarly, it is not plausible, and commonly known that anything that cannot be conceived is virtually impossible. The author of this book, states that each image has its appearance. Nonetheless, it is not possible for the picture to be able to put itself outside the representational form it represents in order to depict the very same form. If this is impossible, then according to 2.713, it follows that a pictorial form cannot possibly be able to be depicted by any state of affairs there is. According to 4.121: "Propositions cannot embody logical form: it is only mirrored in them. Something that finds its reflection in language, the language cannot represent” This follows the same argument as 2.172. propositions are simply thoughts that are organized into a form that can be communicated. Thoughts, propositions, logical pictures, as well as facts share only share a common logical form. A certain proposition only represents a certain thought as we know it. It also follows that the thought is possibly a logical picture that a certain fact may or may not have. This is because a picture, thought, proposition, and lastly, a fact, all possess the same form logically. It should be observed, however, that propositions could not be sentences. It is quite clear that propositions can depict anything in reality. However, they cannot depict their own logical forms. Propositions only have the ability to what is outside of them. In order to portray logical form, the proposition has to be out of its perspective; outside of the logical space, it assumes. A proposition is only capable of showing a logical form; it cannot depict it in any way whatsoever. A proposition can only shares the logical form with the reality it depicts. However, what can be able to be shown cannot be expressed in speech. Propositions possess the internal properties with the with the facts they portray. Further, still, the formal concepts of the propositions, facts, and the state of affairs define their formal properties. These formal concepts we are introduced to by the author clarify the missed distinctions left out by earlier philosophers like Russell and Frege. References Claes, J. (2009, December 27). Simulations by Wittgenstein. Retrieved March 3, 2012, from The World as Computation: http://claesjohnsonmathscience.wordpress.com/article/simulations-by-wittgenstein-yvfu3xg7d7wt-66/ Garrett, B. (2006). What is this thing called metaphysics? London: Routledge. Wittgenstein, L. (1921). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. London: Cambridge. Read More