Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle - Essay Example

Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle The notion of moral virtues, or excellences, as a mean is an idea promulgated by Aristotle in the second half of Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics. From his account, one gathers that Aristotle believes the virtue is a perfect mean between a vice of excess and a vice of privation. In a modern context, it is difficult to see why the thought that “everything in moderation” is the proper way toward moral virtuousness. However, from an Ancient Grecian perspective, the idea makes sense; “moderation is best” (métron áriston) is a phrase that emerged in Greece from a thinker named Cleobulus, known as one of the Seven Sages of Greece (Diogenes Laertius). In addition, when one realizes that Aristotle is attempting to inculcate good habits in people, along with a good state of character, a better context is drawn around his claims. That is, if one acts generally toward a mean of two vices, this will lead to a better outcome than acting toward vices. In modern terms, in which morality is cast as a matter of doing the right thing in various sorts of specific cases, this seems like an outdated model of conducting moral arguments. To the contrary, this idea of virtue as a mean—instead of virtue as right action—faces fewer destructive arguments than the latter perspective and is ultimately easier to defend philosophically. From an intuitive standpoint, Aristotle’s approach is appealing. Firstly, in our daily living, a moral action is one that depends on balance between two extremes. For example, the ideal middle ground between running into a burning building to saving people (stupidity) and doing nothing out of fear (cowardice) is the act of doing what you can reasonably do in order to save lives (bravery). Secondly, the mean is intuitive in itself in all cases. Our language is broad enough to encompass all possible middle grounds between vices that we might consider excesses. Language, insofar as it guides us to a means, is constructive in determining our moral code. For example, a speaker of the English language knows what it means to be starving and gluttonous, that these are extremes, and that satiation is the mean between them. Aristotle defines a virtue as a state of character in Book II, Chapter 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, which prompts a treatment of virtue as a mean. He writes, “Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate” (NE II:6, 1106a25-29). In other words, if a continuum between two excesses can be defined, then a midpoint between them can be established—a midpoint that is then constitutive of virtue. In contrast to modes of moralizing that modern people are more familiar with, Aristotle here is not concerned with denouncing certain actions as immoral and others as moral, but rather with conceptualizing a continuum of habits, characters, and dispositions that lead to generalized sorts of actions. In Aristotle’s minds, the habits, characters, and dispositions themselves are immoral or moral, not the actions that they lead to. In addition to language, we can determine the mean of two excesses by how they feel relative to us. In health, there is “excess, defect, and the intermediate” with respect to drink and food that both has the capability to harm us if we eat and drink too little to the point of privation, or if we eat and drink too much to the point of excess. The intermediate, or mean, in that case is relative to the person undergoing the process. Continuing with the metaphor, the difference in eating too little and too much is quite different if one considers the interests of a child and a large athlete. Clearly, an athlete needs far more food to sustain his bodily health than the child does, which suggests that in similar matters of morality, we can essentially “intuit” the excesses, defects, and intermediates involved with our actions. Aristotle addresses this point briefly, saying, “Virtue, then, is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it” (NE II:6, 1106b18-23). Here, the notion of “practical wisdom” is invoked, which is a term that refers to phronesis (or “street smarts” as it is colloquially known). Essentially, Aristotle is saying that a person intuitively knows his limits—his privation and his excess—and his disposition should lead him not to violate those limits as to become immoral. A problem that critics raise with this account as being dependent on a notion of practical wisdom is that it does not mention or consider an external standard by which we should judge passions and actions in a precise manner (Hsieh). A code of ethics for an organization, for instance, depends on the hope that all people within that context can act morally as defined by a given set of conditions. The view of virtue as a mean does not permit such codification of morality for two reasons: first, virtuous action is dependent on a person’s practical wisdom and second, Aristotle’s account does not conform to the codifiability (or universality) assumption of modern ethical theories like utilitarianism and deontology (Hursthouse). With respect to the first problem, not everyone following a set of moral propositions has the practical wisdom to discern for themselves what an excess is and what a privation is. Since the notion of virtue as a means is dependent on a person’s ability to intuit for himself what is defective and what is temperate, it is inherently incapable of being put down as a code. With respect to the second problem, the assumption of act-based theories of morality (namely, utilitarianism and deontology) that morality should cast certain actions (as opposed to dispositions) as unethical is antithetical to the approach of virtues as means. In addition, since virtues as means depends on an individual’s understanding of what the mean is in specific sorts of cases, and since language changes quite frequently, it is certainly problematic to lay down a code of ethical propositions based on the theory of virtue as a mean. Nevertheless, just because virtue as a mean cannot provide action-guidance, that does not defeat it in principle as the most accurate moral theory. To this, one might object to say that if a moral theory is no good for application, then why does the theory behind it matter? In response, conceiving morality as a mean between two vices is an approach that both theoretically and practically depends on practical wisdom. While it is a theoretically appealing theory of morality, it is also contains a strong sense of relativism that objections appealing to a code of ethics are shooting for. This relativism is based on the feelings and intuitions of individual people, deciding for themselves where the means lie. Of course, these feelings and intuitions are ideally based in reality, where the effects of people’s actions are actually seen; however, they do arise from “the pleasures and pains we feel” (NE II:9, 1109b1-2). Aristotle’s project is not to define morality and immorality in specific cases, but to defend his general “rule of thumb” that is best applied as a behavioral disposition. A general disposition is capable of serving as the basis for a moral code, even though it will not provide action-guidance to those who follow the code. But, as was mentioned previously, action-guidance comes from practical wisdom, not a set of rules, according to the theory of virtue as a mean. Virtue is a mean between two excesses. That virtuous mean is determined by individual people through a process of intuition. This account of morality is contrary to modern act-based theories that categorize actions rather than dispositions as ethical or unethical. As a general rule of thumb, virtue as a mean is naturally appealing and more beneficial to individuals that memorizing a code of ethics formed from an act-based approach. A state of character, or a habit, is constitutive of a good person, which will lead both to morally upright motivations and morally desirable consequences (Payton). Excellent at being human is both the cause and result of finding the mean, which leads to a positive feedback loop of being both happy and moral. Bibliography Aristotle. "Nicomachean Ethics." Athens, n.d. Diogenes Laertius. "Lives of Eminent Philosophers." n.d. Perseus Digital Library. 6 November 2011 . Hsieh, Diana Mertz. "Virtue as the Mean." 21 February 1997. Washington University. 5 November 2011 . Hursthouse, Rosalind. "Virtue Ethics." 18 July 2007. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 5 November 2011 . Payton, Robert L. "Virtue and its Consequences." 2000. Payton Papers. 5 November 2011 . Read More