Phenomenology of Death - Thesis Example

According to the accepted dogma of contemporary physics, ‘entropy’ is one of the more plausible ‘constants’ which we as humans are capable of knowing. That is, in contemporary terms. The history of physics by contrast, was much more secure through the ‘modern era’. A number of individuals have contributed to ‘greater uncertainty’, and they include Einstein, Heisenberg, and Godel. Although Godel was a mathematician, it is also the case that there is a close relationship between ‘physics’ and ‘mathematics’. ‘Entropy’ however, is a ‘constant’ which is preferred by individuals such as Stephen Hawking. As a ‘constant’ it’s highest expression is the ‘second law of thermo dynamics’ [Hawking, 1988: 99ff.]. It can be inferred that he is fairly familiar with the ‘history of the concept of time’, and as such, ‘entropy’ is one of the accepted constants in the universe by some contemporary physicists. The following is an essay and analysis of Heidegger’s concept of time in relation to the self. It will be argued that Heidegger’s concept of ‘temporality’, is inseparable from the concept of ‘finitude’ and ‘death’. Like the constancy of contemporary physics, ‘death’ or ‘entropy’ holds a special place in the heart of Heidegger. While temporality is invariably associated with finitude, the self, however, is problematic. For Heidegger, there is ‘authenticity’, and there is ‘Das Man’ [Gallagher, 1998: 117]. These ‘binaries’ have much to do with the concept of the self in relation to time in the following sense. Heidegger argues that ‘das man’ is ‘being towards death’ and is inauthentic as a result. Conversely, those who do not ‘act’ like ‘das man’ are in some sense authentic? This latter point will be taken up in the later half of the following analysis, and it is going to be argued that ‘determining what qualifies as ‘everydayness’ is a very seriously ambiguous notion. Thus, this paper will begin with a general discussion of ‘being’ and its opposite, namely, non-being, proceed to a discussion of ‘finitude’ in relation to inauthenticity, and finally, discuss the relationship between an authentic and inauthentic self in relation to temporality. According to Heidegger, the external world of ‘extension’ or as he states the world of the “senses” [Heidegger, 1961: 129] is largely understood as “quantitative modifications of the modes of extensio itself” [Heidegger, 1961: 131]. By contrast, the world can be characterized in qualitative rather than quantitative terms. By quantitative, he is implying the basic units of scientific measurement. However, these discrete units of measurement, and the application of these as a means of both understanding extension along with distinguishing it from the subject, are forms of abstraction. It is a means of treating the external world and of understanding it, as a world of objects or isolated entities. By contrast, he argues that the world of ‘things’ or the ‘ontic’ world is a form of extension that can or could be characterized and therefore understood in terms of how these ‘things’ are used. His term for this is the “ready to hand”, and he claims further that this is “not grasped theoretically at all” [Heidegger, 1961: 99]. Rather, it is a relationship to objects or things that is inseparable from the activity of using them. It might be an obvious example to state that to understood a ‘hammer’, is to understand how it is used, however this form of understanding is a stark contrast to how we really understand objects such as hammers or indeed, the beings or things in nature itself. This form of understanding, is an active engagement or a process typified by our most primordial ways of being involved in the world, so to speak. Heidegger further describes this in terms of a transformation of a thing understood as a sign to a thing understood as a reference. Moreover, such a reference is an “objectification” [Heidegger, 1961: 113], which includes the abstract quantitative properties outlined above: “But one must note that in such formalizations the phenomena get leveled off so much that their real phenomenal content may be lost ... such that they resist any sort of mathematical functionalization; nor are they merely something thought, first posited in an ‘act of thinking’” [Heidegger, 1961: 121-22, my emphasis]. Mathematical formalizations are abstractions (quantitative), and more importantly, they carry ontological assumptions concerning the nature of being as ‘extension’. Further, in the above quote, he is indicating that this notion is often thought as something which is “first posited in an ‘act of thinking’. By this, notions such as the Cartesian subject is a constant (as with mathematical entities) or a self-identical substance, and such abstractions have little or nothing to do with how beings actually are. For example, in the following passage he describes two different relationships to the same phenomenon, in quantitative and abstract terms, and also in terms of how ‘comportments’ toward other beings actually occur: “Gauged by the measure, seen for example on the meter stick, these estimates are very inaccurate ... a short walk is different for different persons, but still is familiar enough in the community of being with one another” [Heidegger, 1992: 230]. It must be stressed that one of the defining characteristics of ‘being’ for Heidegger, is “finitude”, and as such there is no absolute, unchanging ground for life. This qualifies the notion of ‘how beings actually are’. The Cartesian framework is an attempt to establish an ‘absolute and unchanging ground for life’, and is thus the antithesis of how Heidegger seems to want to define ‘being’. In other words, long before or prior to understanding ourselves as abstract and isolated entities, we are involved with the world – that is, we are socialized into a culture with a language, interests, concerns, and relationships with others. He argues that this very process of ‘abstracting’ the world of extension along with the subject as substance, is a process caused by the “unusability” of things [Heidegger, 1961: 105-6]. In other words, we only analyze in any detailed and abstract manner, objects that are not functioning in the manner that they ought to be. Just as one does not consult a doctor or a psychiatrist unless something is wrong, so too with how beings interact – their nature is not questioned or examined until something is broken. In general, Cartesian epistemology can be understood as a quantitative understanding of existence only. As he points out, when the ‘spatiality’ of a thing becomes the defining means of understanding a given entity or being, a limited form of knowledge of epistemology is what results. Or, what we are left with, is a the self as a substance which is separate from the world of objects measurable in space surrounding us. By contrast, he seems to be arguing that our relationship and involvement with the world around us is one characterized as a type of process or is a means of understanding which is akin to “Being as permanent”. In other words, there is a ‘constancy’ and permanent nature to the forms of understanding (e.g. quantitative, formal and mathematical), which is very obviously false. In other words, while the forms of understanding are constant, the content of thought changes. It is ‘finite’, ‘decays’, and ‘death’, and this is a more authentic ontology of the being of things. Further, another more accurate means of understanding the being of things, is to understand as he states, how things are “in-the-world” [Gallagher, 1998: 116]. That is, how entities and human subjects, are involved and relate to each other without viewing this relationship solely in terms of the quantitative idea of spatiality. There are, however, a number of problems with respect to actually gauging or defining everyday-ness in this sense. The following will examine some of the limitations of what Heidegger notes about ‘inauthenticity’, and in turn, discuss this in relation to the ‘self alongside temporarility’. That is, the authentic being in the world and somehow beyond ‘finitude’, and conversely, the inauthentic mode of being towards death. It will be recalled that in an above quoted passage from The History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger argues that there are some important distinctions in terms of ‘how we measure’. And, the analogy in question claimed that a ‘stones throw’ is “different for different people”, and moreover, this is how we ‘actually’ engage with the world – that is, as opposed to the abstract forms of measurement which are not so everyday. ‘The They’, or ‘Das Man’ is seemingly like the stone’s throw, it is different for different people. It is a cliché worth asserting that claims that ‘we are all individuals’, however, there is some grain of truth to every cliché which is also a cliché. The historical context of Heidegger’s ‘time’, and in particular, the time in which these particular works were written was marked by turmoil and problems. As the narrative goes, the Weimar Republic in Germany was replaced by ‘fascists’ in terms of political structure, and this is a good indication of the extremes of the age, so to speak. Moreover, Heidegger supported the fascists who opposed democracy, and immediately had this political system removed once they were elected in 1933. This can be interpreted as anti-democratic, or perhaps even as ‘elitist’ in some sense or another. However, what form of elitism is associated with the contrast between Das Man over and against authenticity, is equally subject to the problem of interpretation of Heidegger in this sense. Sean Gallagher asserts the following which is pertinent to the questions which are being raised at this juncture paralleling Nietzsche and Heidegger: “the dangers of the herd ... ‘tyranny of the majority’ .. Heidegger speaks of the dictatorship of the ‘they’ [Gallagher, 1998: 117]. In and among the philosopher’s mentioned, there are varying definitions of what qualifies as the ‘masses’. Generally speaking, this is often articulated in ‘cultural terms’, in normal parlance. For example, Nietzsche despised newspapers and popular culture, but affirmed some fairly elitist forms as well. That is, he preferred German composer’s over any other, and of course, he is well known for his writings on Richard Wagner – the most significant and arguably one of the most ostentatious opera composer’s of his era. In keeping with sensibility and culture at the level of art, it might be said that Heidegger is himself fairly ‘artless’. Leaving aside the question of his writing style in the tradition of figures such as Kant and Husserl, Heidegger wrote about fairly ‘low brow’ art, so to speak. Where Wagner edified the myth’s of the Germanic and Norse peoples, Van Gogh edified a pair of peasant shoes. These ‘peasant shoes’ are one of the works of art discussed in an essay titled “The Origin of the Work of Art” [Heidegger, 1977: 162-4]. In other words, to lump these figures together is problematic. What constitutes or qualifies as ‘the They’ is very obviously relative to the time. For example, the musical equivalent for Van Gogh’s peasant shoes would probably ‘folk’ music, and although many composer’s of ‘higher brow’ forms of music have appropriated folk music, Nietzsche argued that Berlioz was too ‘thin’ musically. One can only imagine what he must of thought of folk music therefore. Although ‘taste’ is seemingly not the subject of an analysis of ‘temporality’, it is being raised because there are some important ambiguities with what qualifies as ‘The They’. As such, the notion of selfhood in relation to this problem is equally ambiguous. Gallagher argues that in the end, Heidegger retreats from questions about Dasein’s relations with other people by focusing on Dasein’s own most authentic temporality by moving the focus from the sociality of das Man to Dasein’s own most being-towards-death, the retrieval of authentic temporality is reminiscent of the “epoche through which Husserl too claims to uncover a ‘more original’ temporality independent of the temporality of others” [Gallagher, 1998: 120], and as we shall see this is one of the core criticisms leveled at Heidegger by Paul Ricoeur. The closest approximation to a quick analogy to articulate authentic existence in Heidegger, can be culled from straight forward concepts in the practice of Buddhism. In normal parlance, the phrase that ‘nothing matters’ or ‘nothing lasts forever’ (there are other nothings) are phrases which seem to resonate with nihilistic overtones. However, a Buddhist might be said to actually affirm ‘nothingness’. That is, the state of nirvana is typified by the objective of completely emptying the mind to the point of having ‘nothing’ in the mind, so to speak. In this sense, it might be said that ‘nothing matters’ is a positive statement in a Buddhist ethos – a Buddhist might say in the most positive manner, ‘of course nothing matters’. Conversely, this is a phrase which used in ‘nihilistic’ discourse. For example, and drawing upon popular culture, it might be said that the now defunct band called Nirvana, conveyed through music a fairly nihilistic sentiment or conveyed the message that ‘nothing matters’. And, that ‘nothing matters’ can be negative does raise some problems. This said, Heidegger stands among the Buddhists over and against the Nihilist’s. This is not to claim that we was a Buddhist, and this condition of ‘nirvana’ was only raised as an analogy to reduce Heidegger’s concept of authenticity: Primary among these possibilities is an authentic otherness: the possibility of my own death, an alterity as nonexistence. In its inauthentic everyday-ness das Man conceals the possibility of Dasein’s own death. In the case of death, it’s always somebody else – a neighbor or stranger – who dies . . . this evasive concealment in the face of death dominates everyday-ness [Gallagher, 1998: 117]. It will be recalled that in the introduction of this analysis, that it was asserted that ‘entropy’, or, the second law of thermodynamics is regarded as one of the more ‘constants’ in the realm of physics. This is raised at this point for a number of important reasons. Heidegger is very careful in trying not to establish a ‘constant law’ regarding ‘finitude’. For example, he uses vague notions to describe this such as the ‘horizon of possibilities’. And, Gallagher too is careful not to be formulaic when approaching the notion of finitude. For example, in the above passage he refers to finitude (the meaning of temporality in relation to the self) as an ‘alterity of non-existence’. Thus, in formulating a definition of the self in relation to temporality or finitude, it is difficult to establish anything more than ‘horizon’s’ – that is, it is difficult to lapse into establishing a ‘constant’, so to speak. Heidegger’s emphasis is on the ‘subject’s own’ facing finitude and death. And, by emphasizing ‘the self’ he is maintaining that this is genuinely an individual experience. That is, more genuinely individual than the comportment of ‘das Man’ who are caught in the throws of everyday-ness Paul Ricoeur is unquestionably a critic of Heideggers concept of death. While known mostly as a literary critic and theorist, his background is similar to Heideggers insofar as they both come from the tradition of hermeneutics. Ricoeurs theory, was essentially extended to humans. That is, he maintained that: “there is no self understanding that is not mediated by signs, symbols, and texts ... that is to say that it is language that is the primary condition of all human experience” [Ricoeur, 1991: 15]. If one considers the idea that one can only describe their own individuality with the language of the community, it is difficult to avoid Ricoeurs insight. That is, however much I view myself as a nominal or particular individual, that particularity is dissolved the moment I begin to think about how express notions about myself. I can only find myself using the language of my community, and moreover, the knowledge which I inherited from the various social forces that went into constructing me. Thus, for Ricoeur, there is little distinction between studying a text of any kind, and studying a human. They are both constructed by language, and the meaning of both can equally be discerned or interpreted precisely because of this inner connection with language. This fundamental premise that we are constructed by language, is important for understanding some of the criticisms he levels toward Heidegger and especially death. One of the important dimensions of understanding a text, and humans for Ricoeur is that narrative has to be understood as a “public” phenomenon. He argues that time in narrative, is “public” time or part of the social nexus [Ricoeur, 1991: 190]. Time is both measured by interactions with other characters, and it is public because narrative is told to an audience. This challenges Heideggers notion of death as that which is only an individual is reconciled with as a means toward authenticity. Ricoeur writes: “Does not narrativity, by breaking away from the obsession of a struggle in the face of death, open any meditation on time to another horizon than that of death, to the problem of communication not just between living beings, but between contemporaries, predecessors, and successors?” [Ricoeur, 1980: 188]. If we cannot talk about death without language, and our thoughts are representations indicative of language, how can we escape the community? That is, how can we assert ourselves authentically as Heidegger believes if all of life is a narrative? Narratives are social phenomenon, and just as I cannot actually express my own particular individuality without using the language of the community, so too with any articulation or “self-understanding” of death. Ricoeur poses a serious challenge to authenticity which is so critical to Heideggers notion of death. Moreover, it makes the notion of Das Man critical to our self understanding, rather than a liability as Heidegger maintained. In conclusion, this paper has analyzed the relationship between the ‘self’ and ‘temporality’ as it explains the notion of Heidegger. The general approach of this paper was to present ‘temporality’ in terms of ‘finitude’, and conversely, to define and examine the ‘authentic’ and ‘inauthentic’ modes of selfhood in relation to finitude. The focus of this analysis was directed toward some of the ‘limitations’ both in terms of the concept of ‘relativism’ as it applies to defining ‘das Man’, but also the ambiguity of actually knowing with any certainty (epistemological problem) one’s own finitude. As Ricoeur argues, “self understanding” cannot be achieved without reference to the community. All thought, all expression is inextricably connected to language, and language is a social phenomenon. At the same time, it could be argued that however much the articulation and understanding might be social, there could be something experiential that is completely individual. Bibliography: Gallagher, Sean. The Inordinance of Time (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1998). Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1961). _______, Basic Writings. Translated by David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977). _______, The History of the Concept of Time. Translated by Theodore Kiesiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). Ricoeur, Paul. Narrative Time. Critical Inquiry Vol. 7, No. 1, On Narrative (Autumn, 1980), pp. 169-190. Ricoeur, Paul. From Text to Action. Essays in Hermeneutics, II. Translated by Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991). “On the Significance of death in Martin Heidegger” Read More