The Phenomenological Mind - Essay Example

The Phenomenological Mind Of the phenomenological method, Husserl used the maxim that things are described and shaped through the individual’s act of experiencing the objects. This once revolutionary claim has, however, paved the way to a more cooperative and reformist stand due to renewed interest in various mental phenomena that could have been left out by such a view, as well as staggering neuroscience advances. Gallagher and Zahavi (2008) premise their book on the fact that cognitive science and phenomenology are mutually constraining and compatible disciplines. The phenomenological mind as used in their book could mean either that the mind is phenomenological in nature, or it could refer to a methodology of phenomenology used by the two authors. In this case, the authors intend the latter connotation. They provide a brief history related to philosophical inquiries into the mind in the first chapter, of which the content consists of both the phenomenological and analytical tradition, after which they introduce the phenomenological method in the second chapter. The authors’ guiding idea is that, although transcendental phenomenology’s conceptual tools constrain empirical research in illuminating, new ways, enactive and embodied scientific knowledge of the mind, in turn, could help to re-define phenomenology. According to Gallagher and Zahavi (2008: p6), one concept underlying phenomenology is that preoccupation with functionalism, identity theory, materialism, dualism, and other metaphysical issues may lead to highly abstract and technical discussions, which fail to connect to experience. Thus, one essential concern regarding the philosophy of the mind should be about providing an account of experience that is phenomenologically sensitive. A phenomenological account of one’s perception is distinct from a neuroscientific or psychophysical account. In this case, phenomenology mainly deals with gaining a proper description and understanding of our mental experiential structure. In achieving this, the phenomenological approach neither attempts to come up with a naturalistic explanation for the mind’s consciousness, nor its neurological or biological basis. The authors draw from Husserl’s understanding of phenomenology as not being interested in analyzing the human mind’s psychophysical make up or in investigating the mind’s consciousness empirically but, instead; to comprehend what characterizes feelings, judgments, and perceptions intrinsically (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: p10). Gallagher and Zahavi (2008: p10) identify the concept of phenomenology being necessarily introspective as a major misconception of the phenomenological method, including the definition of phenomenology as only being concerned with mental dimensions involving aspects that are purely subjective. While phenomenology involves knowledge of subjective experience of an object or things and is, therefore, usually in the first person, it does not need to be always introspective in nature. Rather than being a subjective account of one’s experience, phenomenology is an account of one’s subjective experience. Phenomenology is an inquiry method that seeks to comprehend conditions underlying the possibility of how the human mind experiences their surroundings and the world. In the phenomenological approach, the central concern is consciousness as the human mind’s essentially subjective manner of experiencing the world and being open to this world (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: p11). In their work, the authors explore areas that cognitive and analytical science tend to neglect, specifically as these will be the areas in which phenomenology can collaborate with psychology and neuroscience most successfully and apparently. In chapter 4 of the book, the authors explore the temporality of experience, which is identified as one of these neglected aspects of cognition and consciousness, despite being of utmost importance to both cognition and consciousness. Gallagher and Zahavi (2008: p77) contend that everyday human encounters and activities that they engage in are permeated with various temporality aspects. In this case, the human mind anticipates things about to occur and those that occurred in the past, while also maintaining a working sense of things that just happened. Expectations of any event or person and the fulfillment or otherwise of such expectations are projected into a yet-to-be future. Temporal navigations are important for individuals to navigate various streams of experience, without losing themselves, in order to exist in a meaningful and coherent world. One core finding reported in the book is that memory consists of different faculties of the human mind, in which there are various dissociable and distinct processes. This distinction between different memory types, including semantic, procedural, working, and episodic memory can be substantiated both conceptually and phenomenologically (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: p79). The temporality of experience in phenomenology is also referred to as time-consciousness, which the authors contend is one of phenomenology’s most difficult topics. Memory disorders, such as severe anterograde and retrograde amnesia, in which people lose one of the identified types of memory as another is retained, illustrate the fact that temporality are of critical experience to action, perception, and experience (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: p80). Quoting Husserl, the authors argue that perceiving an object that is temporarily extended, along with perceiving change and succession, would not be possible where consciousness was only a series of experiences without connecting points, or if it only provided a momentary slice of the thing or object. This would mean that a manifest phenomenological difference between hearing or seeing and imagining or remembering exists, especially in light of intuitive presentation of succession. The depth and width of experience are of importance with consciousness retaining the sense of an initial experience as the second experience happens, which is, in turn, enriched by anticipating the next experience. As the human mind experiences something, every concurrent moment of consciousness is kept intentionally, creating a coherency stretching over a temporal duration that the individual experiences (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: p84). Consciousness and its temporal structure can be described in terms of primal impression, retention, and protention. Using the example of a conversation, Gallagher and Zahavi (2008: p85) state that retention ensures that the words’ intentional sense are kept available even following the end of the conversation, while consciousness’ protentional aspect provides a sense of where the conversation is headed, which are all essential to the individual’s experience of speaking meaningfully. Retention, in this case, is not a specific aspect of consciousness but, rather, consciousness possesses a structure of retention, which makes retention a type of intentionality as consciousness retains what passes consciously. Human time cannot be considered as the objective or subjective time of consciousness but, instead, should be considered as a bridge between cosmological and phenomenological time. Human time constitutes the time in which the individual’s life stories occur, while it is also a narrated time articulated and structured by narratives that are symbolically mediated (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: p95). Moving on, Gallagher and Zahavi (2008: p171) point out that phenomenology considers the human existence in the world as being characterized as practical action, in which the human mind encounters worldly entities through their use, instead of perceiving or theorizing about them detachedly. The world as perceived by the mind consists of practical use references, rather than a complex unity of objects that are characterized by extension, materiality, and substantiality. The nearest object to an individual is not really what is geometrically closest but what that individual is concerned with, and can attain and utilize. The human mind is not theoretically occupied with perceptual things but with using, handling, and caring for these things. The individual’s mind in cognition relates afresh with entities in a world that they already know, meaning that cognition defines secondary modification of the individual’s primary existence and can only be attained as the individuals already exists in the world. Rather than relating with theoretical objects, humans in daily life interact with objects of personal, aesthetic, emotional, or practical value. Generally, action takes place in a specific environment that is both social and physical, which, in turn, shape the human mind’s intentions (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: p172). The presence of a phenomenology of agency is not a broadly accepted fact in the phenomenological approach in the study of the human mind. However, Gallagher and Zahavi (2008: p177) recognize the phenomenology of agency as being dependent on the individuals consciousness of agency, meaning that where one thing causes something to occur, they are not an agent and have no idea they have caused the occurrence. Conscious knowledge required for an entity to be involved in agency does not, however, have to be complicated or of a high order and is in most cases involves a pre-reflective awareness. It may also involve explicit consciousness that consists of reasons that are well developed. The authors also relate the phenomenology of agency with the individual having an experience of an intention to commit an action, which they associate with exercising free will. It would seem that intentional action exists, therefore, where one makes a deliberate decision to act. However, intentional actions are not always predated by such deliberations and decisions, especially where one acts prior to having a chance to decide whether to act (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008: p178). Thus, intentions reside in the individual’s actions and the perception of any observer would view the intentions as being expressed through the individual’s actions. The phenomenological approach to understanding the human mind proposed by the authors is critically acute, particularly when orthodox views pertaining issues being discussed are put forth. Their criticisms are motivated invariably by their suggestions of a shift in relevant features of specific aspects of the human mind. The notion of a lived body and bodily awareness, for example, are identified as trumping objectivist and mechanical agency notions, which even get to a point of rejecting embodied views of cognition. They argue that it is not possible to build intelligent and simple agents that can perform specific tasks in messy environments and in real time, especially when the study of the mind seeks to comprehend the sense of agency on the basis of lived bodily experience. Thus, only research frameworks that can work from an embodied perspective of the first person are considered useful in the phenomenological approach to studying the human mind. On the other hand, higher order consciousness theories and representational perception views are considered insufficient in understanding the first-person, pre-reflective awareness that characterizes the individual’s experience of their environment as situated and embodied agents. Reference Gallagher, S., & Zahavi, D. (2012). The phenomenological mind. London: Routledge. Read More