Human Diversity and Justice Professor Abed - Essay Example

?Philosophy Essays By Number Human Diversity and Justice Section A: Question According to Marquis (1989) abortion is immoral for two reasons: it deprives the victim of a future and it involves the infliction of pain and suffering on the victim. In order to substantiate the anti-abortion argument on the grounds of immorality, Marquis (1989) invites the reader to consider what is wrong with killing a post-natal individual. In killing a post-natal individual, Marquis (1989) points out that the individual is not only deprived of the current experiences of life, but all future and valuable experiences. Marquis (1989) draws analysis to the AIDS victim who suddenly confronts the prospect of an early death. This prospect must naturally come with a degree of regret and obvious fear and distress as the AIDS victim can clearly appreciate that with his life imminently cut short, he or she will not be able to continue to enjoy life’s experiences and will be deprived of a future life (Marquis, 1989). Marquis (1989) also argues that the deprivation of a future life is also relevant to children and infants. According to Marquis (1989) no one will disagree that it is morally wrong to deliberately take the life of an infant regardless of how valuable his or her future may be perceived so early in post-natal life. Even if one considers the morality of deliberately inflicting pain and suffering on animals, we come back to the conclusion that the deliberate infliction of pain and suffering on animals or non-humans with the ability to feel is morally wrong. Thus based on the assumption that killing deprives the individual of his or her future and intentionally inflicts pain and suffering on the victim substantiates the claim that abortion is immoral. However, Marquis (1989) argues that abortion is not always wrong as there may be very rare circumstances in which an abortion may be necessary to prevent a harm just as grave as the harm suffered by the fetus when a pregnancy is terminated. The main objection to Marquis’s (1989) argument is the comparison to the deliberate infliction of pain and suffering on animals. Marquis (1989) obviously uses this argument to point out that even where it is believed that the fetus is not yet a human being, it still has a biological existence and thus is capable of feeling pain and suffering. However, human beings do intentionally kill animals and thus inflict pain and suffering on animals. Yet the morality of the killing of animals for food and for accessories is hardly a huge subject of morality debates. It therefore follows that in making a case for the immorality of abortion, comparing the fetus with the deliberate infliction of pain and suffering on animals does not help to advance Marquis’s (1989) morality argument. Moreover, if Marquis (1989) accepts that killing is immoral because it deprives the individual of the continuation of his or her life and the value of a future life, it is necessary to consider whether or not the fetus is knowingly experiencing life and has a desire to continue to experience life. The problem with Marquis (1989) argument is that he invites the reader to disregard the perceptions and values of third parties and to examine the position of the victim alone. By taking this approach, it is difficulty to come to the conclusion that a fetus in the very early stages of pregnancy has any real life experiences. It is even more difficult to come to the conclusion that the fetus at an early stage of pregnancy has any real appreciation for the continuation of his/her life’s experiences or for the acquisition of future life experiences. Section A: Question 2 Judith Jarvis Thomson (1971) challenges the popular anti-abortion argument that abortion is wrong without exception because the fetus is a human being from the moment of conception. As such, the fetus always enjoys the right to life which is superior to the expectant mother’s right to privacy and to her own person. Thomson (1971) argues that even if it is accepted that the fetus is a human being from the moment of conception, the expectant mother has the right to abort the fetus although they may well be circumstances in which the decision would be morally reprehensible. Thomson (1971) supports her argument by comparing the unborn fetus to a dying violinist who is connected to another human being for at least 9 months and that the decision to unplug the dying violinist would most certainly cause the death of the violinist. Thomson (1971) goes on to argue that while it might be generous to agree to this procedure for the purpose of saving the violinist’s life it is not imperative to agree to this procedure purely on the basis that the violinists as a person has the right to life. Essentially Thomson (1971) takes issue with the extreme anti-abortion view and points out that by using the violinist example, that pregnancies resulting for rape or pregnancies that endanger the life of the mother or both the mother and the fetus certainly challenge the extreme anti-abortion perspective. Thomson (1971) argues that in the latter case, the right to life is conferred upon both the expectant mother and the fetus and certainly involves more than weighing the fetus’s right to life and the mother’s right to privacy and her own body. Ultimately, the question comes down to both the expectant mother’s right to life and the fetus’s right to life (Thomson, 1971). The extremist perspective does not reconcile this perspective because it holds that the right to life invariably means that abortion is wrong because it deliberately involves the taking of an innocent life (Thomson, 1971). According to Thomson (1971) the mother must simply see the pregnancy through knowing full well that at the end of the pregnancy she will die or both she and the baby will die. However, having an abortion to save her life is tantamount to murder (Thomson, 1971). Thomson (1971) argues that the extreme anti-abortion perspective fails to take account of the fact that the expectant mother has a right to life. In the alternative, if the extreme anti-abortion view takes the position that the expectant mother has a right to life, that right to life is inferior to the fetus’s right to life. Thomson’s (1971) argument essentially turns on cases in which the issue of abortion involves life or death for the expectant mother. As Brody (1972) argues, Thomson (1971) does not thoroughly engage considerations about the responsibility to save the life of the fetus and a “duty not to take it” (p. 2). Thomson (1971) argues that: Having a right to life does not guarantee having either the right to be given the use of or a right to be allowed continued use of another person’s body – even if one needs it for life itself (p. 56). It is this part of Thomson’s argument that causes the greatest difficulty. As Brody (1972) points out, this argument turns on the expectant mother’s right to “get back the sole use of her body” and in doing so confers upon her the right to kill a fetus which is arguably a human being with the right to life (p. 1). The expectant mother’s right to the absolute freedom to choose how her body is used cannot be superior to the fetus’s right to life. Even if one accepts Thomson’s (1971) argument that the fetus is similar to an acorn which cannot be perceived as an oak tree, as human life is far more significant than an oak tree. This comparison therefore appears to be too insensitive to human life. Certainly, science will argue that human life begins with the fetus which has definable human biological characteristics whereas an acorn is bereft of the features of an oak tree. Even so, when arguing whether or not the expectant mother has a right to abort a pregnancy, the only issue should be the risk of harm to the expectant mother’s life or health. While the extreme anti-abortion perspective would argue that the right to life is just as significant for the fetus as it is for the expectant mother, there is further prong to this juxtaposition that requires further consideration. In this scenario, the expectant mother is not only entertaining the right to life, she is also considering the right to the use of her own body. It is therefore argued, that when the issue of abortion merely revolves around the right to use one’s body as one pleases, the fetus’s right to life is significantly more important. However, when the right to life for the mother is just as significant an issue as the fetus’s right to life, the expectant mother’s right to her own body should function to tip the scales in her favor. In other words, the expectant mother should not be denied the right to abort a pregnancy in cases where the pregnancy itself would endanger her life. Brody (1972) rationalizes that the question should always come down to a logical and rational analysis of whether or not the expectant mother should be saved. Essentially, Brody (1972) argues that the decision to perform an abortion should be based on clear and convincing evidence that the abortion is necessary to save the life of the mother and that the woman rather than the fetus should be saved. However, Brody’s (1972) argument tends to suggest that the decision should be made by third parties and this too ignores the expectant mother’s right to life and the right to her own body. Section B: Question 3 Miller (2005) argues that the right to migrate from one country to another is not a fundamental freedom that ought to be protected. Freedom of movement is adequately protected to the extent that it is necessary to recognize and protect fundamental human rights and this does not include the right to indiscriminately leave one state and establish resident in another (Miller, 2005). In other words, freedom of immigration across borders is not a fundamental human right and neither should it be regarded and treated as such. Having established that there is no actual freedom of immigration in terms of a fundamentally protected human right, Miller (2005) advances two main arguments in support of the right of states to protect their borders from free and liberal access to nationals of other states. Firstly, states may wish to control border entrants for the purpose of protecting their culture. Secondly, states may wish to restrict the entry of unlimited immigrants to their shores for the purpose of controlling their respective populations (Miller, 2005). As for the cultural argument, Miller (2005) argues that states may have a: common public culture that in part constitutes the political identity of their members, and that serves valuable functions in supporting democracy and other social goals (p. 1999). In this regard, foreigners bring with them their own culture which includes political concepts that are inconsistent with the host state’s culture. While the immigrant will become assimilated with the host state’s public, the immigrant will also modify the host state’s culture. Thus if too many immigrants enter a state quickly, the public culture “may break down” (Miller, 2005, p. 200). Secondly, Miller (2005) argues that restricting the flow of immigration is necessary for controlling populations. Essentially, Miller (2005) argues that states are reasonably concerned that liberal immigration policies may cause their state’s population to grow to intrinsically unmanageable sizes. Obviously, states are concerned about the possibility that large populations may not only negatively impact the “quality of life” but may threaten efforts to protect the environment (Miller, 2005, p. 200). Miller’s (2005) second argument in support of immigration control and restrictions is reasonable. It is certainly important for states to protect their borders and the people who are legitimately within their borders and while they may not be able to dictate how many children adults should have without infringing the human right to privacy, they may certainly control who enters their states and for how long without infringing upon the fundamental human rights of their citizens. However, Miller’s (2005) cultural argument is flawed because it requires unsubstantiated assumptions. First it must be assumed that immigrants with non-democratic principles will want to move to a democratic country. Secondly Miller (2005) assumes that individuals with vastly different cultural values will immigrate to a country where the cultural values are quite alien to them. Thirdly Miller (2005) assumes that having taken their different cultural values to another country, immigrants will want to ignore the cultures of the host state and practice their own. It can just as easily be assumed that immigrants are attracted to the host state because they agree with or have the same cultural values. Thus this part of Miller’s (2005) argument in favor of restricted immigration has little or no merit at all. Section B: Question 4. Kukathas (2005) argues in favor of free and open immigration on the basis of two principles: freedom and humanity. In this regard, when borders are closed, “freedom of movement” is restricted (Kukathas, 2005, p. 210). When borders are closed, people are prevented from freely entering beyond those closed borders and as such, are confined to “their designated borders” (Kukathas, 2005, p. 210). Kukathas (2005) argues that in restricting the free moving of people, there must be compelling reasons for restricting the freedom of people if freedom is to have any value at all, Kukathas (2005) goes on to explain that when borders are closed, it effectively denies individuals the right to escape politically oppressive territories such as tyrannical regimes. Moreover, closed borders deny individuals the right to provide paid labor and at the same time deny employers the right to purchase labor (Kukathas, 2005). In addition, closing borders effectively denies individuals the right to “associate” Kukathas, 2005, p. 201). In this regard, it denies individuals the right to join or associate with loved ones or friends or the right to take case of dependents, “such as caring for children or parents” (Kukathas, 2005, p. 201). There are two main objections to Kukathas’s (2005) argument in favor of free immigration on the basis of protecting and safeguarding freedom. First, immigration laws and the idea of closed borders are necessary for documenting individuals who are within a specific territory and therefore providing budgets and resources for providing welfare and security for all individuals within a border. There are any number of practical reasons that necessitate closing borders. For instance, it would be impossible for states to cooperate with each other in the war against terrorism or trafficking in human beings, particularly children. Secondly, the freedom to move beyond borders is not restricted. Individuals are free to move across most borders provided they comply with immigration laws. In other words, if individuals want to escape tyrannical or other types of oppressive regimes they may do so under specific international treaties under which they may seek political asylum. Moreover, immigration laws permit individuals to cross borders provided they meet the requirements for permanent residence or for a visitor’s visa. These requirements are not intended to discriminate against immigrants, but merely to ensure that they will not be a political, economic or social burden to the country in which they wish to enter. Therefore the freedom of individuals lawfully within the host country is taken into account. These freedoms involve freedom from want and freedom from fear. In other words, there are legitimate arguments against freedom of immigration and in favor of regulated immigration. Once individuals seek to cross borders for the purpose of obtaining jobs, fleeing oppressive regimes or associating with others, they may do so under legitimately regulated and monitored frameworks that are intended to protect the freedom of those who are legally within the host country. Kukathas’s (2005) principle of humanity in defense of open borders takes the position that many individuals immigrate to escape extreme poverty and inhumane conditions. It would be inhumane to turn this category of disadvantaged persons away (Kukathas, 2005). Kukathas (2005) argues that it would be unjust to deny this class of immigrants “the opportunity to help themselves” (p. 210). It would even be wrong to deny “one’s fellow citizens the right to help those who are badly off” (p. 210). The greatest difficulty with Kukathas’s (2005) principle of humanity argument is that it fails to take account of the fact that citizens can offer assistance to disadvantages citizens beyond their borders in a variety of ways. There are several international organizations that offer humanitarian assistance to disadvantaged individuals through which citizens may donate their services and/or resources. Moreover, individuals in one country wishing to help others in particularly disadvantaged regions may offer assistance through sponsorship and may offer jobs to those individuals. In other words there are many ways in which humanitarian assistance can be offered to disadvantaged persons without placing an undue financial, social or political burden on the host country by taking the risk of permitting indefinite numbers of undocumented individuals with potential health or criminal problems to enter the host state. It is also argued by those against open immigration policies that permitting individuals to enter the borders of foreign country in an unrestricted manner would increase crime and therefore security concerns in the host state. Obviously, open immigration would certainly appeal to criminals who want to either escape the law in the home state or who may wish to move their criminal activities abroad (Block, 1998). With nothing to prevent immigration, these criminals would be free to move from one border to another and take their criminal activities with them. Moreover, the host country would be shielding these individuals from arrest, detection and prosecution at the cost of the victims who would be denied retributive justice or any justice at all. Essentially, free immigration engages a debate between the freedom of the individual seeking to immigrate and the extent to which this freedom encroaches upon the freedom of the individuals in the host state from want and fear. Since the host state has a duty to protect the freedom of those within their borders, they have a right to take an account of or to be able to account for those within their borders and to assess their ability to provide the resources for protecting those individuals’ right to freedom from fear and want. Section C: Question 5 Pojman (2005) justifies the death penalty on two primary grounds: “forward-looking” and “backward-looking” (p. 107). Essentially, Pojman (2005) argues that the death penalty provides for forward-looking in that it serves as a deterrent to other would be murderers. The death penalty serves as a backward-looking function as it recognizes the concept that murder is a heinous crime for which the only just punishment is death itself (Pojman, 2005). Pojman (2005) specifically argues that: Human beings have dignity as self-conscious rational agents who are able to act morally. Once could maintain that it is precisely their moral goodness or innocence that bestows dignity and a right to life on them. Intentionally taking the life of an innocent human being is so evil that the perpetrator forfeits his own right to life. He or she deserves to die (p. 108). There are several problems with Pojman’s (2005) justification for the death penalty on the grounds of deterrence (forward-looking) and just desserts (backward-looking). With respect to the deterrent effect of the death penalty, Zimmerman (2004) argues that thus far, this is purely a theoretical assumption and that this assumption is neither supported or unsupported in the literature. In fact, there are just as many reports in the literature supporting the deterrent effect of the death penalty as there are arguing against the deterrent effect of the death penalty (Zimmerman, 2004). Donuhue and Wolfers (2006) argue that it is just not possible to accurately test the assumption that the death penalty actually deters murder. This assumption is therefore based on “belief” and not on “evidence” (Donohue & Wolfers, 2006, p. 5). Donohue & Wolfers (2006) argue that there is no evidence whatsoever suggesting that the death penalty deters any type of criminal behavior. The death penalty has been in practice for most of man’s recorded history and yet crimes to which the death penalty have been attached continued to be problematic. One only need look at press reports today to observe that murder continues to be a significant crime problem despite the existence of the death penalty. There have been no public reports acknowledging an appreciable difference between murder statistics in states with a death penalty and states where the death penalty was abrogated or never existed. It therefore follows that Pojman’s (2005) argument that the death penalty is a useful forward-looking instrument of justice as it deters the commission of murder by others is not supported by reality. Pojman’s (2005) backward-looking argument is also problematic in that while it might be fair to assume that the individual who commits the heinous crime of murder deserves to die, who should commit the equally heinous act of taking the life of the murderer? Certainly, if it goes against the nature of human dignity to deliberately take the life of another, should not equally go against the nature of human dignity to deliberately take the life of a murderer? Complicating matters, when an individual is accused of murder, goes to trial and is convicted of murder, this does not mean that the individual is actually guilty of murder. Anyone paying attention to the news media will be aware that there have been many instances in which an individual convicted of a crime has been subsequently exonerated. Fortunately for those who were not put to death by the state, they were able to receive an award of compensation for the years of unlawful incarceration and allowed to resume whatever was left of their lives. However, for an individual put to death, he or she has no such options as death is irreversible. Once an individual is put to death, if his or her innocence is subsequently established, there is nothing that can be done to compensate that individual for a grave miscarriage of justice. Nevertheless, Pojman (2005) maintains that it is the “combined” merits of the deterrent (forward-looking) effects of the death penalty and the just desserts (backward-looking) nature of the death penalty that ultimately justifies the use of the death penalty (p. 121). Both justifications can only be sustained if two unsubstantiated assumptions are accepted. First is must be accepted that the death penalty has a deterrent effect. Secondly it must be assumed that state sanctioned execution is not as undignified as murder. With respect to the deterrent effect of the death penalty, there is no evidence supporting this assumption. It is just as plausible to argue that the death penalty does not deter would-be murderers. Likewise, there is no justification or rationale for assuming that state sanctioned executions are less dignified than murder. State sanctioned execution involve the undignified and deliberate killing of another human being just as murder involved the undignified killing of another human being. The killing in both cases is intentional in that they both intend to cause the death of an individual. Moreover, the killing in both cases involves making an assessment of the value of the life of another. If the murderer does not have the right to make this assessment it cannot be right for the state to have the right to make this assessment if human life is valued. It is commonly believed that all human life is worth saving. A murderer may or may not be rehabilitated and may or may not be able to turn his or her life around. However, once the murderer is put to death, this will never be known. It therefore follows, the Pojman’s (2005) justification for the continued existence of the death penalty is purely speculative and is not supported by robust evidence. When debating issues involving human life, only the best available evidence should be used to support arguments that involve the taking of human life. Section C: Question 6 Nathanson (2005) argues against the continued use of the death penalty on both theoretical and practical grounds. Theoretically and practically, Nathanson (2005) argues that it is typically argued that the death penalty is necessary for deterring other murders and it is a just and appropriate penalty for those who commit the most serious crimes. From a theoretical perspective, those in favor of the death penalty usually argue that the prospect of being executed for the commission of murder operates to deter those who would otherwise commit murder (Nathanson, 2005). Nathanson (2005) argues that from a theoretical perspective the deterrence argument sounds convincing. However, when one examines the fact, the deterrence argument loses its theoretical authority. For instance, according to Nathanson (2005), there is no evidence to support the contention that the death penalty is a more effective penalty than incarceration. In fact, it has generally been established that in states where there is no death penalty, there are lower murder rates than those states that have the death penalty (Nathanson, 2005). While it may be true that states with no death penalty may have lower murder rates than countries without the death penalty, a number of factors must be taken into consideration. It may be that guns are illegal in those countries without the death penalty. It may also be that the population is not as large or not as concentrated as in countries with the death penalty. In other words, the difference in murder rates in non-death penalty states and death penalty states may be related to factors that have nothing to do with the punishment for murder. Therefore whether or not the death penalty actually does or does not deter murder is speculative rather than proven by credible evidence. With respect to the argument that the death penalty is an appropriate punishment for those who commit the most serious crimes, Nathanson (2005) takes the position that this perspective is flawed. First this perspective requires using a punishment that is equally as reprehensible as the act for which the offender is punished. Secondly, it is inconsistent with popular concepts of the principles of punishment. Thirdly, it does not provide a rational basis for exacting just punishment. For instance, a killer may kill his enemy’s family. If we were to match his crime with his punishment, the appropriate punishment would be to kill the killer’s family (Nathanson, 2005). Thus from a practical perspective, the just desserts rationale is absurd. Nathanson’s (2005) argument relative to the just desserts rationale being intrinsically irrational is justified. For instance, the appropriate punishment for a murderer would obviously be to get him to come to terms with the pain and suffering that he or she has caused the victim and society and to confront the heinous nature of his or her crime while incarcerated for a life term. Death only provides society and the victims with a degree of retributive justice, but does not rehabilitate the offender and does not provide any form of restorative justice. Although the victim of a homicide may not be restored, the victim’s family can obtain a more productive form of restorative justice in the knowledge that the offender is remorseful and confronting the consequences of their conduct for the rest of his or her life. Works Cited Block, W. 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Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 193-206. Nathanson, S. (2005). “Why We Should Put the Death Penalty to Rest.” In Cohen, A. I. and Wellman, C. (eds.) Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Oxford, UK: Blackwell, Chapter Eight. Zimmerman, P. R. (May 2004). “State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder.” Journal of Applied Economics, Vol. VII (I): 163-193. Read More