Liberalism and Theory of Justice vs Anarchy, State and Utopia - Assignment Example

This is good, and can be very good if you respond to my comments below. You have the elements of an excellent paper, but some of them just need to be a bit further developed. Question 2: Nozicks entitlement theory of justice defines a just holding as one that has been obtained through acquisition, transfer or rectification.(Nozick, 15-51). A historical entitlement makes the justice holdings dependent upon some historical property of the distributes rather than past actions or efforts or merit. When an acquisition is made, it would be just so long as such an appropriation by one person is not achieved at someone elses expense. Nozick states: "It neednt be that the foundations underlying desert are themselves deserved, all the way down" (Nozick 225). In understanding the proviso that one persons appropriations of X not make others worse off, Nozick offers a two part argument. The first part of the argument assumes that an individual possesses an asset X, irrespective of whether or not he deserves it, and his possession of it does not violate anyone elses right to possess it. Based upon this, Nozick offers the argument that if another asset Y arises out of X through a process that does not violate anyone elses rights or entitlements, then the person is also entitled to possession of asset Y. (Nozick, 225). Moreover, since historical entitlements arise out of distributions that are the result of local exchanges among individuals, Nozick contends that individuals are entitled to them and have a right to them, without necessarily having possessed some talent or having out in effort or performed some work to gain this asset, because such an acquisition has not necessarily been acquired illegally. A person is not entitled to an asset only when he is also entitled to the talents that made such an acquisition possible. Hence, the foundations of desert do not themselves have to be deserved "all the way down" (Nozick 225), i.e, an individual may just have some of the things. Sandel sums up Nozicks position as follows: "arbitrariness does not undermine desert, and ….even if it did, a version of natural liberty and not the difference principle would emerge as the preferred result." (Sandel, 82). Sandel however, rebuts this argument by distinguishing between desert and entitlement. He agrees with Nozick that the foundations of desert may not necessarily be deserved "all the way down" because firstly, "no one can deserve anything unless there is some basis for the desert" (Sandel 83) but it is this basis itself that is difficult to determine. Sandel points out that the notion of possession itself requires that "somewhere down there, there must be a subject of possession that is not itself possessed." (Sandel 84). This poses a next to impossible situation, for example, trying to determine whether a person deserves his good character in the first place would be extremely difficult. But where entitlement is concerned, Sandel differs sharply with Nozick and the latters rebuttal of Rawls argument about leaving natural assets out of the distribution of assets. He points out that Rawls makes a clear distinction between the self and its attributes, as a result the question of whether or not the desert is deserved does not arise at all, because the self is dispossessed of all its attributes: "…the self is left bare of any substantive feature or characteristic that could qualify as a desert base……the self, strictly speaking, has nothing, nothing at least in the strong constitutive sense necessary to desert." (Sandel 85). On this basis, Sandel argues further against Nozicks contention that although there may be arbitrariness in the distribution of assets, this does not necessarily mean that those assets must be deserved. Sandel points out that Nozicks argument that "I cannot deserve what is arbitrarily given"(Sandel 85) and therefore I am entitled to possess it without deserving it, is flawed, because the real question is not whether the individual deserves it but whether s/he can possess what is arbitrarily given. Sandel argues that as Rawls has clarified, the self is a distinct, separate identity and the essential part of this identify cannot be tied up in terms of possession of arbitrarily given assets. If this was the case, the self would not constitute a stable identity but be constantly vulnerable to changes on the basis of assets possessed and their transfers. Therefore, he supports Rawls argument that in examining the distribution of assets, no individual can properly "be said to deserve anything because no one can properly be said to possess anything." (Sandel 85). Sandel however, differs from Rawls in his conception of the highly individualistic self. He clarifies that “my ends are benevolent or communitarian when they take as their object the good of another or a group of others.” (Sandel 61). The Rawlsian self on the other hand is “standing always at a certain distance from the interests it has.”(Sandel 62). Hence while Sandel presents his view of desert, it reflects the communitarian self rather than the individualistic self. Well, this is Rawls argument against desert (as reconstructed by Sandel). It is not one Sandel would endorse, because it embodies (in Sandels view) an impoverished view of the self, one that Sandel rejects in favor of the communitarian self. The question of desert must of necessity, be examined from a moral perspective, because desert, or deserving something, is a moral concept arising irrespective of the presence of institutions. Entitlement however must be differentiated from desert, because it is equivalent to a possession that can only be validated through the application of rules laid down by societys institutions. An entitlement arises as a result of "legitimate expectations founded on social institutions." (Sandel 99). On this basis, the question of what an individual deserves must be assessed from a moral perspective, but an entitlement cannot exist without the validating force of some kind of institution and can never be deemed to be deserved in a moral sense. This is a very good summary of Sandels distinction between desert and entitlement. Sandel contends that Nozick is unable to resolve the discrepancy between desert and entitlement, and fails to acknowledge the "lesser moral force" of entitlement.(Sandel 99). He states that Nozicks argument itself begins from a faulty premise, because it places entitlement on par with desert without ever establishing its "pre-institutional credentials" (Sandel 99). He contends that Nozick argues in favor of people having the right to be entitled to all the assets they may have, just on the basis that it is not had illegitimately, but Sandel presents Rawls’ argument that merely being in possession of something does not necessarily mean that one is entitled to it. (Sandel 100). The basis of this argument is that the individual deserving the asset, i.e, desert, may apply only in a natural state before the existence of political and legal institutions. But possession of an asset does not necessarily indicate that he is entitled to possess it, unless it can be shown that such possession acquired in the natural state has been validated through the institutions that exist in society. On this basis, he upholds some aspects of Rawls’ rebuttal of Nozicks historical entitlement theory. It is possible that Nozick may have grounds to contend that an individual is entitled to an asset if he deserves it on the basis of his attributes, because Rawls conception of a self stripped of attributes is unrealistic. Okay; I see that you are here recognizing Sandels rejection of Rawls argument. But above, you should try to make it sound less like you are attributing Rawls argument to Sandel. However, it is difficult to say that people deserve their natural assets because what attributes would they have that would make them deserve their natural assets? The natural argument that people make is that someone might deserve wealth because of the persons great natural assets (and the use to which he puts them), but on what basis does the person deserve his natural assets? Nozick sounds like he concedes that the person doesnt deserve their natural assets; this is why Nozick talks in terms of entitlement, not desert. Nozick may also be able to contest Sandels position that an entitlement will be valid only after receiving the seal of one of societys institutions. Since Nozick has argued fiercely in favor of individual autonomy and the right to develop ones assets, he may also be able to extend the argument by reasoning that those very rules of society, which constitute institutional forces, are founded on the basis of agreements between individuals. If an individual has an asset which he has procured through any means that has not interfered with the rights of another individual, this in itself means that no resistance has been offered by anyone else to his right of possession. This lack of resistance would also mean that there is an acceptance by society of the individuals right to possess that asset, which gives him the valid stamp of approval by societys institutions and will therefore constitute an entitlement, applying Sandels argument about what constitutes an entitlement. Sandel has also recognized the difficulties in Rawls’ conception of a self stripped of attributes, by focusing on the contractarian aspect of justice as fairness. He points out that the notion of justice in a particular society may be decided on the basis of a social contract where a “group of persons must decide once and for all what is to count among them as just and unjust” as well as the principles they uphold to reform institutions. (Sandel 105). This would support the argument presented above, that the right of possession of assets may be endowed to individuals based upon contractrian rules existing at the time. But Rawls’ conception of justice requires that this social contract be disregarded and the question of justice be decided on the basis of what they might have agreed to “under the requisite hypothetical conditions.” (Sandel 105). This might not be a feasible position to take, because on the basis of a social agreement, people may have agreed to grant entitlement of certain natural assets to certain individuals. This is a potentially interesting counterargument. You might want to say more about how people would agree (from the contractarian perspective) to grant people entitlement to their natural assets and all that flows from the exercise of these assets. In fact, you need to pursue this, because you still havent On the basis of the above, Sandels argument refutes Nozicks entitlement theory only to a certain extent. While he may be right in stating that desert cannot be equated to entitlement, there are other grounds on which entitlement to natural asses can be established, such as on the basis of the contractarian perspective presented above, wherein individuals are granted the right to their assets by a common agreement of others in society. But this isnt what you argued above; you argued that people are institutionally entitled to their natural assets and all that flows from them. This is the argument that I noted above is potentially interesting, but needs to be further developed. At any rate, you need to decide on a strategy: defend a pre-institutional notion of entitlement that is somehow different from desert, or argue that people are (institutionally) entitled to their natural assets and the fruit of these assets. As I said, you have a promising line of argument for the latter conclusion, but it needs to be further developed. Nozick has explained that such assets are acquired as gifts or on the basis of voluntary exchanges, and assuming that no one else in society has contested their right to possess those assets or that no one elses rights have been trampled upon, this indicates that the assets have been acquired in a manner that would have satisfied the existing norms of society at a particular period of time and would therefore be valid. On this basis, such acquisitions would also have been granted the right of possession under the systems of law and justice prevalent at that particular period in time. As a result, they would have the force of the legal institutions of society to support the respective individuals claim to be entitled to that asset and possessing the asset without resistance from anyone else may itself give an individual the entitlement to that asset. Works cited: * Nozick, Robert. "Anarchy, State and Utopia", Basic Books, 1974. * Sandel, Michael. "Liberalism and the Theory of Justice", Cambridge University Press, 1998. Read More