Brief Facts about Legal Cases - Essay Example

United s v DeLatorre United s Court of Appeals, 2009 Legal History: Delatorre appealed a conviction for conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute. Facts: On February 27th, 2006 Drug Enforcement Agency Ron Skipper conducted surveillance on a dwelling house in Georgia where it was suspected that illicit drugs were being carried out. Skipper observed an Infiniti arriving at the residence and DeLatorre exiting the home and entering the Infiniti and backing out. Simultaneously a Ford left the garage driven by the previous driver of the Infiniti. DeLatorre was observed stopping the Infiniti and speaking to the individual driving the Ford. Shortly afterward the Ford left with the Infiniti, driven by DeLatorre following. At one point the cars pulled up alongside one another and the drivers spoke to each other. A traffic stop involving the Ford discovered cocaine and DeLatorre had been observed driving by the traffic stop twice and slowing down to observe the scene. A search warrant executed on the home uncovered more drug-related evidence. DeLatorre was subsequently arrested and charged with conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine and aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute. Legal Issues: Delatorre appealed his convictions on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to substantiate the conviction on each of the counts. In particular, Delatorre argued that the probative value of the evidence against him was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Delatorre also argued that the trial judge abused the discretion by allowing the prosecution’s expert witness to give evidence on issues that fell outside of the witness’s expertise. Holding: The appellate court rejected DeLatorre’s arguments and appeal and affirmed his convictions. Legal Reasoning: Referring to the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 702, the appellate court ruled that experts may testify to any fact or opinion based on “specialized knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” provided the expert is “qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education” (Rule 702). Moreover, if the court errs in determining the expertise of a specific expert witness pursuant to the definition provided in Rule 702, the conviction will not be overturned if the error was harmless (United States v Carrazana, 921 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1991). The expert witness testified to drug language and schemes characteristic of the illegal drug trade. The appellate court ruled that courts have allowed Drug Enforcement Officers to testify as experts relative to drug trades language and schemes. In this case the appellate court was satisfied that the expert witness, as a Drug Enforcement Officer had the necessary training, experience and skill to testify as an expert to such matters. It has already been ruled that an officers experience in dealing with illicit drugs is sufficient to qualify under rule 702 (Garcia 447 F.3d). The appellate court therefore ruled that the evidence provided by the expert was qualified and was more probative of guilt which outweighed any prejudicial effect. Moreover, even if the trial court had erred, the error was harmless as there was more than enough independent evidence upon which a jury properly instructed could have convicted DeLatorre. Commonwealth v. Gaynor Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 2005 Legal History: Gaynor was convicted of the rape and murder of four women which occurred in Massachusetts between 1997 and 1998. He appealed his convictions. Facts: The main facts involved the extraction of DNA evidence from the bodies of the victims and evidence at the crime scene. Autopsy findings revealed evidence of anal penetration. Gaynor had informed his brother that he conducted anal intercourse with women in encountered in the area where the victims were found. Moreover, Gaynor’s brother had driven him to the area on previous occasions in late 1997. The 4rd victim was allegedly last seen driving her car with Gaynor in the car with her. Gaynor when questioned by police denied being in the car with the fourth victim and that he left the victim’s company around the same time as the witnesses who had placed him with the victim in her car. Gaynor reported that he went to a bar where he drank with a former co-worker. However, both the bartender and the former co-worker denied seeing Gaynor on the night in question. The defendant’s girlfriend was also unable to corroborate Gaynor’s claim that he had returned to her place on the night in question at about 12:30 A.M. Additionally, while at the police station Gaynor was asked if he would provide palm print, fingerprint and blood samples. Gaynor agreed. The samples were collected and Gaynor was subsequently arrested and charged with rape and murder. Legal Issues: Gaynor challenged the trial court’s ruling in several pre-trial motions admitting into evidence the DNA test results. Gaynor specifically argued that the search and seizure were unlawful as his consent was obtained by “trickery” and thus he did not consent to the search. Moreover, Gaynor argued that the DNA extracted from mixed samples were not reliable enough to be allowed into evidence and that the Cellmark Diagnostics calculations of frequency were inadequate. Holding: The appellate court rejected Gaynor’s arguments on appeal and essentially ruled that he had failed to demonstrate that the trial judge had committed irreversible errors if there were errors at all. Legal Reasoning: The appellate court ruled that there is sufficient authority for the admission of the reliability of an expert’s conclusion based on clinical observations and experience (Commonwealth v McNickles 434 Mass 839 (2001)). As for the mixed DNA samples, the appellate court ruled that it is common for mixed samples to be produced from two or more persons in sexual assault cases. Experts typically report that the results in those circumstances are inconclusive. In this particular case, the DNA test results were founded on singular DNA sources and where mixed sources were used, the only test results used were those that produced sufficient evidence of the donor. I addition Gaynor’s claim relative to the risk of contamination in the collection, storage and handling of samples is without merit as the experts accounted for the risk of contamination in interpreting the results and conducting the tests. As for the cellmark data base, the appellate court ruled that it was not an issue the frequency calculator was conducted in a way consistent with a reliable and accurate product rule established by Commonwealth v Curnin 409 Mass. 218 (1991). Finally, based on the record of the trial, there is no evidence to support Gaynor’s contention that he had been tricked or coerced to consent to the collection of samples pursuant to the search and seizure requirements contained in the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution. People v. Wilkinson Supreme Court of California, 2004 Legal History: Wilkinson was convicted of battery on a custodial officer, driving under the influence of alcohol and failing to stop at the scene of an accident. The Court of Appeal quashed two of defendant’s convictions: battery (the constitutionality of the statutory offence) and the trial judge erred when it denied Wilkinson’s application for a hearing to determine the propriety of admitting a polygraph test results in Wilkinson’s defence relating to Wilkinson’s lack of knowledge of the ingestion of intoxicating substances relative to the driving under the influence charge. The Supreme Court of California allowed a hearing to consider the Court of Appeal’s ruling on these two issues. Facts: According to the evidence submitted at trial, Wilkinson was observed driving in an erratic manner during the early house of the morning of February 17, 1999. In the process, Wilkinson’s vehicle ran over a divider, hit a parked car and continued to travel switching lanes. Wilkinson eventually came to a stop and laid her head on the passenger’s seat. When police arrived, they knocked on the car window rousing Wilkinson who responded by driving off. A chase ensured for about three blocks. Wilkinson smelled of alcohol and her speech was slurred. She admitted to having had a few drinks and could not complete a field sobriety test. When told she had to take a blood or breath test, she did not reply. At the police station the defendant was disorderly and grabbed a custodial officer’s arms leaving welts. Legal Issues: Is the statute creating the offence of battery on a custodial officer irrational since it creates a more serious offence for batter without injury than battery with injury, thus violating the equal protection clause of both state and federal constitutions? Did the trial court err in refusing to admit the defendant’s polygraph test into evidence? Holding: The statutory offences relative to battery on a custodial officer do not contravene the equal protection clause of either state or federal constitutions. Moreover, since polygraphs are inadmissible in evidence, the trial court did not err in refusing to admit the polygraph test results into evidence supporting the defense. Legal Reasoning: The court reviewed the legislative history of statute creating battery on a custodial officer in Chenze 97 Cal. App.4th 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 362 and ruled that the inclusion of battery with injury and battery without injury was necessary to give prosecutors flexibility in determining whether or not to pursue charges in appropriate cases. In other words, batter with injury may be prosecuted as either a misdemeanour or a felony. Moreover, legislators recognized that there may be instances where injury was sustained, but it was not serious enough to pursue the charge as a felony. As to the admission of polygraph tests and their results, the Appeal Court erred in stating that a trial should have been conducted pursuant to Fry v United States (D.C. Cir 1923) 293 F. 1013 and People v Kelly (1976) 17 Cal. 3d 24 130 Cal. Rptr 144 549 P.2d 1240 to determine the admissibility of the tests. Pursuant to Evidence Code Section 351.1 polygraph tests and their results are inadmissible into evidence without exception. Thus Evidence Code Section 351.1 dispenses with the need to conduct a Kelly/Frye hearing relative to the admission of polygraph tests and their results. Kelly/Frye hearings are conducted to determine if expert evidence is admissible. Evidence Code 351.1 already determines that polygraph tests and their results are inadmissible. Thus no Kelly/Frye hearing was necessary as the judge was statutorily bound not to admit the polygraph tests and its results. City of Cleveland Hgts. v. Katz Court of Appeals of Ohio, 2001 Legal History: Katz appealed against a judgment in which he was found guilty of speeding in contravention of Section 333.03 of the Codified Ordinances of Cleveland Heights. Facts: A police officer gave evidence that while parked at an intersection in Cleveland Heights around 8.30 P.M. in February 7, 2001, he saw Katz’s SUV coming out of a number of cars and coming in his direction at an unauthorized rate of speed. With the use of his radar, the police officer was able to confirm that Katz was driving at 47 MPH in 35 MPH zone. At the trial, the officer testified as to his experience, training and skills relative to the use of the speed detecting radar. Another officer testified to his role in maintaining and testing the radar devises such as the one used by the police officer for detecting Katz’s rate of speed. The trial judge admitted into evidence four documents recording the tests and their corresponding results on the radar speed detector used in Katz’s case. Legal Issues: There were two issues raised on appeal. First, it was argued that the radar detector’s speed results should not have been admitted as there was insufficient evidence calibrating the radar speed detector device. Secondly, there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction. Holding: The trial court did not err in finding Katz guilty of speeding. The police officer’s evidence of speeding pursuant to the radar speed detector device was admissible and the calibration evidence was sufficient to support its reliability. As a result Katz’s argument that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction was overruled. Thus Katz’s conviction was affirmed. Legal Reasoning: Referring to East Cleveland v Ferrell (1958) 168 Ohio St. 298, 154 N.E. 2d. 630, the appellate court ruled that a trial judge is at liberty to take judicial notice of the “technical theory of operation and the scientific reliability of stationary radar devices” (City of Cleveland Hgts. v. Katz, 2001). However, this does not mean that the defendant may not challenge the reliability of the device. This may only be properly conducted by calling those who manufactured the device to testify as to its make and technical functioning. Moreover, the prosecution had proven that the device was functioning properly. It was up to the defendant to challenge this evidence by producing proof to the contrary. Since this was not done, Katz’s challenge must be denied. As for the calibration tests, the state was not under a duty to prove that the equipping used by the officer conducting the calibrating tests were properly calibrating. Instead, it was enough for the state to produce the officer operating the radar speed detector device to testify to Katz’s speed as calculated by the device once it was determined that the device was properly functioning and calibrating when it was used to detect Katz’s speed. The officer operating the speed detector radar device was sufficiently skilled, experienced and trained to determine whether or not the device was functioning properly and could properly operate the device. Moreover, calibrating tests proved that the radar was functioning properly. Thus based on the reliability and admissibility of the evidence obtained from the radar speed detector device, the trial court had not erred in his finding of guilt as there was more than enough evidence to support a finding of guilt. Read More