Case Brief - Research Paper Example

?Case Brief By Table of Contents Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1Cr 137 3 Marin v. hunter's lessee 14 U.S wheat.) 304 6 Frothingham v. mellon 262 U.S. 447 8 Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S 83 11 United States v. Richardson 418 U.S. 166 14 Bibliography 23 Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1Cr.) 137 Vote: 4-0 I. Facts of the Case On the last day of his term as president, John Adams appointed 16 Federal circuit court judges and 42 justices of the peace to the District of Columbia. William Marbury, the claimant, had been one of the appointees. In order for the appointments to be effective, the commissions were required to be delivered to the appointees. Most of the commission had been duly delivered. Jefferson argued that the remaining commissions were void since they had not been delivered by the expiration of president Adams’ presidential term. Marbury, an intended appointee applied to the US Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to ensure that the commissions were duly delivered. II. The Law Pursuant to Article III Section 2 Clause 2 of the US Constitution, all cases relative to Ambassadors, public Consuls and ministers and cases in which the state is a party, the Supreme Court is possessed of original jurisdiction. Any other case falling under the authority of the judiciary, the Supreme Court will have the authority to determine appeals subject to any exceptions and/or regulations that Congress may apply. Under Section 13 of the Judiciary Act 1789, the Supreme Court has the authority to hear appeals from circuit courts and state courts and will also have the authority to issue prohibitive writs to district courts and writs of mandamus to any appointed courts or individuals in public office. III. Legal Questions/Issues The main legal questions/issues were: Is the claimant entitled to the commission?Does the claimant have a legal remedy? Does the Supreme Court have the jurisdiction to review Congressional decisions and to ascertain whether or not such decisions are constitutional and valid? Does Congress have the authority to broaden the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as contained in Article III of the US Constitution? Does the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction include the authority to issue a writ of mandamus? IV. Holding/Decision and Action The US Supreme Court denied the writ of Mandamus with the result that the claimant did not obtain the commission. V. Opinion John Marshall, delivered the opinion of the court. The Court thus concluded that the claimant was entitled to the commission since it took effect once the Executive exercised its constitutional power of appointment and that power was the final act required of the executive exercising the authority. Therefore, once the commission was signed by the president it became effective. The court also ruled that the claimant did indeed have a legal remedy as it is implicit in the protection of civil rights: any person claiming harm has a right to the protection of the law. The US Supreme Court also ruled that the US Supreme Court has the power to review congressional decisions and to ascertain the constitutionality and validity of those decisions. It is the judiciary’s duty to state the law. In the application of the law to specific cases, the judiciary also has a duty to interpret and explain the applicable rule. When laws contradict each other, the Court has a duty to decide between the two. In all cases, the Constitution, the supreme law of the land will prevail where it is inconsistent with any other law. Moreover, the US Supreme Court ruled that Congress does not have the authority to expand upon the original jurisdiction accorded the Supreme Court beyond that conferred by Article III of the US Constitution. If Congress had such an authority, the Constitutional basis of original jurisdiction would be entirely meaningless. Finally, the Court ruled that the US Supreme Court did not have authority to issue a writ of mandamus within the parameters of its original jurisdiction. A writ of mandamus is solely within in the appellate sphere and not a matter for original jurisdiction. VI. The Decision as Precedent Prior to the Mabury decision, the court had ruled on issues relative to whether or not legislative acts that interfered with the “proper functioning” of the judiciary (Tushnet, 2005, p. 6). Marbury thus established a new precedent because it challenged the authority of Congress to require the judiciary to act in a way that it did not have the constitutional authority to do (Tushnet, 2005). VII. Summary of Legal Principles The main legal principle enunciated in Marbury is that it is the judiciary’s responsibility to determine whether or not executive and legislative powers are conducted within the constraints established by the US Constitution. VIII. Evaluation The Marbury decision contributes to the constitutional principle of the separation of powers. It essentially establishes the foundation for judicial review of the proper administration of executive and legislative power. Marbury establishes that it is the court’s duty to determine whether or not administrative decisions and acts were consistent with the authority delineated by law and whether or not the relevant law was the US Constitution or some other Act of law. IX. Free Space Marin v. hunter's lessee 14 U.S.(1 wheat.) 304 Vote: 6-0 I. Facts of the Case During the Revolutionary War, Virginia passed a statute that conferred upon the State the authority to take property owned and/or occupied by British Loyalists. The defendant (Hunter) was granted land under the statute which was held by the plaintiff (Martin) via Lord Thomas Fairfax. An initial suit was brought in an ejectment action in Virginia for a return of the property. The Virginia court of first instance ruled in Martin’s favor and that decision was reversed by the Virginia Court of Appeals. The US Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals and returned the case to that court for an execution of a judgment in Martin’s favor. However, the appellate court of Virginia refused to enter the judgment ruling that the US Supreme Court did not have appellate jurisdiction over decisions entered by the Virginia Court of Appeals. II. The Law The applicable law was contained in Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the US Constitution which states that the US Supreme Court will have “original jurisdiction” “in all cases” involving ambassadors, consuls, public officers, and cases where a state is a party. The US Supreme Court will have appellate jurisdiction in “all other cases before mentioned” subject to “such exceptions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make” (US Constitution, Article 3, Section 2, Clause, 2). III. Legal Questions/Issues Does the appellate jurisdiction of the US Supreme Court include appellate jurisdiction over state decisions on matters involving federal law? IV. Holding/Decision and Action It was held that the US Supreme Court does have appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions that involve the federal law. V. Opinion In delivering the unanimous decision of the US Supreme Court, Story J. ruled that the federal power conferred upon the US Supreme Court was granted by the people rather than the States. Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 specifically confers upon the US Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction and in doing so confers upon the Supreme Court the authority and duty to review decisions made by state courts. Story J. reasoned that if the Supreme Court did not have the authority to review decisions made by appellate state courts, those courts would obviously not have the power to hear cases involving federal law. Story J. also dismissed arguments relative to the sovereignty of the state judiciary. Story J. went on to state that since the Supreme Court had the authority to review executive and legislative actions by states, the case before it was similarly reviewable. Moreover, it was necessary for the US Supreme Court to have appellate jurisdiction in matters involving federal law to ensure consistency in the interpretation and application of federal law. VI. Separate Opinion Although Johnson J. concurred, he stated that his reasoning was slightly different. Johnson J. reasoned that the appellate jurisdiction of the US Supreme Court was necessary for facilitating final judgment and for maintaining an orderly process. If a state appellate court had the authority to refuse a judgment handed down by the US Supreme Court, the latter court’s decision could be reviewable by every state in the US. Such a process would result in chaos and disorder. VII. Decision as Precedent This case established the precedent that the US Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over state courts’ decisions in matters involving federal law. VIII. Summary of Legal Principle This case is the first case to establish the legal principle that the US Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over state courts when the issue involves the interpretation and application of federal law. The authority for this ruling came from Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the US Constitution. IX. Evaluation The reasoning submitted by both Story J. and Johnson J. are constitutionally grounded in that both opinions cumulatively, reflect the need for accountability, finality and consistency in the application and interpretation of federal law. Federal law binds all states and must be seen to bind all states in the same manner so that all US citizens are accorded equal protection under the federal law. X. Free Space Frothingham v. mellon 262 U.S. 447 Vote: 9-0 I. Facts of the Case Frothingham v Mellon is a consolidated case brought by Frothingham and the state of Massachusetts. Both plaintiffs sought to prevent the spending of federal funds under the Sheppard-Towner Act 1921 which allowed for federal grants to match state grants for programs under the Act for reducing mortality among pregnant mothers and infants. The plaintiffs claimed that the expenditure of federal funds under the Act was an encroachment of the 10th Amendment and deprived them of property without due process of law. The case brought by the state of Massachusetts originated in the US Supreme Court. The suit brought by Frothingham was an appeal from the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. II. The Law The applicable law is the 10th Amendment to the US Constitution which provides that: The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people (US Constitution, 10th Amendment). In other words, Congress may not force states to comply with any decision, rule, law or regulation not expressly authorised by the US Constitution. This case was therefore brought on the premise that Congress did not have the constitutional authority to implement or enforce the 1921 Act against either the state of Massachusetts or its citizens. III. Legal Questions/Issues Does the US Supreme Court have the authority to review and invalidate Congressional Acts on the grounds that they are unconstitutional? Under what circumstances can the US Supreme Court justify a review or invalidation of Congressional acts on the grounds that such acts are unconstitutional? IV. Holding/Decision and Action The US Supreme Court dismissed the claims and did not consider the merits of either case. The Supreme Court found that there was no justiciable issue and neither party had standing to bring their respective suits. V. Opinion Sutherland J. delivered the opinion of the US Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court reasoned that although states are parens patriae, the state is not at liberty to commence legal action for the protection of citizens of the state and of the US against the functioning of federal law on the grounds that such law was unconstitutional. The separation of powers mandated by the Constitution mandates that government is a system of separate but equal departments: legislature, executive and the judiciary. In general, neither arm of the government may “invade the province of the other” and neither “may control, direct or restrain the action of the other”. Thus the judiciary does not have the authority to review and annul congressional acts on the grounds that such acts are unconstitutional unless such a review can be justified on the grounds that the claimant has suffered direct harm or will suffer a direct harm (a justiciable issue). Since neither party could demonstrate a direct harm or a real threat of direct harm, neither party had standing/a justiciable issue. Essentially, a taxpayer could not claim standing purely on the basis that he/she was liable to pay taxes. VI. The Decision as Precedent This case introduces the precedent of standing. Previously, the doctrine of standing mandated that all parties could privately sue in respect of public rights (Winter,1988). VII. Summary of Legal Principles This case establishes legal precedents for setting out the proper circumstances in which the three arms of the government may challenge the decision and actions of one another. In this regard, the judiciary will not interfere with congressional acts unless it is satisfied that such acts have caused direct harm to citizens or states. In other words, the legal principles established are standing and justiciable actions. VIII. Evaluation Although the constitutional system of government is characterized by three arms of the government, it does not necessarily mean that each arm may do as they please. A system of checks and balances are necessary, but at the same time are restrained. Thus the US Supreme Court established limited parameters for reviewing and annulling acts of Congress under the legal principles of standing and justiciable controversy. IX. Free Space Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S 83 Votes: 8-1 I. Facts of the Case Taxpayer appellants challenged the propriety of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act 1965 which authorized the financing of instructive and academic content for religious and secular schools. It was argued by the appellants that the Act violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses contained in the 1st Amendment to the US Constitution and sought declaratory relief: the expenditures were not within the authority of the Act or alternatively, the Act was unconstitutional. A panel of three judges in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York heard the claim and based on the ruling in Frothingham v Mellon ruled that the appellants did not have the requisite standing. II. The Law The applicable law is found in the ruling of Frothingham v Mellon in which it was determined that a party could not have standing on the constitutionality of a Congressional Act unless it can be proven that the act is invalid and the party either suffered or was at risk of suffering direct harm. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clause was also relevant and forbids Congress making any law that respects “an establishment of religion” or prohibits “the free exercise thereof” (US Constitution, 1st Amendment). Article III, Section 2 is also relevant with respect to the determination of the controversy criteria. Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution which sets out the authority of Congress to “lay and collect taxes” was also relevant. III. Legal Questions/Issues Do taxpayers have standing in a law suit challenging government expenditure? IV. Holding/Decision and Action The US Supreme Court ruled that taxpayers did have standing provided they satisfied a two part test. First, standing could only exist where the constitutional challenge was brought under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. Secondly, the taxpayer must demonstrate that the law at issue “exceeds constitutional limitations upon the exercise of the taxing and spending power” and not merely that the law is “generally beyond the powers delegated to Congress” pursuant to Article 1, Section 8 (Flast v Cohen). V. Opinion Chief Justice Warren delivered the majority opinion of the Court. The Court ruled that Article III of the US Constitution did not entirely prohibit challenges on the part of taxpayers claiming unconstitutional federal tax and expenditure practices and policies. Obviously, taxpayers may have a personal interest in the results of such practices and policies. Therefore in order to properly come within Article III, taxpayers must satisfy the court that they have a vested interest in the outcome of any such law. Moreover, the taxpayer must also demonstrate that the statute or law challenged is ultra vires the taxing and spending parameters set for Congress under Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. The appellant taxpayers had standing under Article III because they claimed that tax revenue was being used in contravention of a specific constitutional mandate: the Establishment Clause of the 1st Amendment. Thus this case was distinguished from Frothingham v Mellon where the claim was a general one. VI. Separate Opinion Although Douglas J. concurred, he did not think that the case could be reconciled with Frothingham and argued that it should be overturned altogether. Hartan dissented and argued that the ruling in Frothingham was entirely correct and in order to maintain the separation of powers, claimants should not have liberal standing to challenge congressional acts as this would open up the floodgates for frivolous claims. VII. The Decision as Precedent The decision sets a precedent in that it extends the standing doctrine to permit taxpayers to challenge Congressional taxing and spending authority. Based on the ruling in Frothingham v Mellon it was generally believed that taxpayers did not have standing. VIII. Summary of Legal Principle The legal precedent establishes that taxpayers have legal standing to challenge Congressional taxing and spending practices in order to properly prevent the unconstitutional disbursement of taxpayer’s money. IX. Evaluation In order to maintain the constitutional premise of the three arms of government, it is necessary for an effective system of checks and balances. In particular, where taxpayers are liable to pay taxes, Congress as the legislative branch of the government must be accountable for how they use those funds. Therefore allowing taxpayers to challenge the unconstitutional and abusive use of those funds necessarily requires that they have standing in specifically defined circumstances. X. Free Space United States v. Richardson 418 U.S. 166 Vote: 5-4 I. Facts of the Case Richardson filed a suit against the CIA claiming that the CIA’s inadequate expenditure reporting pursuant to the Central Intelligence Agency Act 1949 contravened Article 1, Section 9, Clause 7 of the Constitution in that the said provision required regularly reporting public funds and expenditure. Applying Flast v Cohen, the District Court ruled that Richardson did not have the requisite standing. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Court’s decision on the ground that the plaintiff did have standing under Flast since Richardson challenged a statute on the basis of the Taxing and Spending Clause (Article 1, Section 8 of the US Constitution) and demonstrated a link between his status and a specific constitutional boundary relative to taxing and spending authority. II. The Law Standing cannot be established in cases where the grievance is general. III. Legal Questions/Issues Can the status of taxpayer be enough to establishing the requisite standing for challenging a statute and thus file a suit? IV. Holding/Decision and Action Merely being a taxpayer will not confer upon the taxpayer standing to bring a suit challenging a statute. The US Supreme Court therefore reversed the decision of the Appellate court and remanded the case. V. Opinion The majority opinion was delivered by Burger J who was joined by White, Blackmum, Powell and Reinquist, JJ. It was held that although Flast emphasized the necessity of satisfying Article III’s requirement for standing, it did not overturn Frothingham which established that a taxpayer is not at liberty to challenge actions taken by the federal government or the distribution of authority in a generalized way. Moreover, the challenge in this case does not specifically challenge taxing and/or spending authority but instead challenges a law relating to reporting processes and thus does not demonstrate the requisite connection between the claimant’s status as taxpayer and the reporting requirements of the CIA. Moreover, applying both Frothingham and Flast, the claimant has not demonstrated either a vested interest in the outcome of the challenged statute or that he has or will suffer direct harm as a result of it. VI. Separate Opinion Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall JJ filed dissenting opinions and basically held that the challenge was not insufficiently specific and expressed a real and continuing concern about policies relative to the Pentagon. This was a matter which was of concern to all citizens and thus standing should not be denied. VII. The Decision as Precedent The ruling does not set a precedent but it does reconcile the seemingly disparate decisions of Flast and Frothingham. VIII. Summary of Legal Principles Taxpayers will only have standing in cases where they can establish their status as a logical claimant and can connect their status to a specific Act relating to taxing issues and its outcome. Where the outcome of a taxing policy, law or practice was entirely speculative and general the claimant would not have standing. IX. Evaluation Challenges to government action are necessary for maintaining the federal system under the US Constitution. Thus, the limitations on standing may present a difficulty for maintaining a federal government system that is constitutionally bound to be accountable. The inadequate tax and expenditure reporting of the CIA appears to be a logical area of concern for all taxpayers. As noted by the dissenting opinion, this would be a matter that concerns a majority of US citizens and thus standing should not be denied. X. Free Space Defunis v. odagaard 416 U.S.312 I. Facts of the Case The plaintiff (Defunis) a white student, applied for admission to the University of Washington law school unsuccessfully. The plaintiff claimed that the university discriminated against him by accepting applications for minority students who were not as qualified as the plaintiff. The plaintiff argued that the university’s decision to deny his application for admission was therefore tantamount to racial discrimination and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause in the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution. The District Court seized of the matter made an order in the plaintiff’s favor to the extent that the university was forced to approve the plaintiff’s application for admission. The issue was before Washington’s Supreme Court and by the time the plaintiff entered his second year of study, the lower court’s decision was reversed. The plaintiff’s petition for a writ of certiorari was granted by the US Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court’s order was stayed until the matter could be heard by the US Supreme Court. When the case finally came up before the US Supreme Court the plaintiff was is the last year of his study. The university submitted that the plaintiff would graduate regardless of the case’s outcome. Both parties argued that the doctrine of mootness did not bar formal adjudication of an issue. II. The Law The doctrine of mootness arises out of the jurisdiction of the US Supreme Court under Article III of the US Constitution. Under Article III the US Supreme Court may only hear cases or controversies and a moot issue does not fall under the definition of case or controversy (2009). III. Legal Questions/Issues Can the court determine a moot issue in circumstances where the resolution of the issue would bring resolution to a significant social matter? IV. Holding/Decision and Action In circumstances where the court’s judgment in a legal cause ceased to be needed for forcing an outcome, the case becomes moot and the court has no authority to rule on the issue. The case was thus vacated and remanded. V. Opinion A per curiam opinion was published representing the opinion of the majority of the US Supreme Court. It was held that the US Supreme Court’s jurisdiction has a constitutional basis within the parameters of Article III Of the US Constitution. By virtue of Article III, the US Supreme Court may only hear matters that are characterized as cases or controversies. It therefore followed that an issue had to be alive and current at all stages of the review process. Thus the court held that once the initial issue has either been resolved or no longer exist before the court has an opportunity to hear it, the issue is regarded as moot and the court is bound not to entertain the matter on the grounds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The fact that an issue is regarded as moots and thus leaves a significant social issue open and contested will not be treated as an exception to the mootness doctrine. VI. Separate Opinion Dissenting opinions issued by Douglas and Brennan J indicated that the dissenting justices were of the opinion that when a case involved important unresolved social issues it should be regarded as an exception to the mootness doctrine. VII. The Decision as Precedent The decision does not break new ground and therefore is not a new precedent but rather an explanation and clarification of the jurisdiction of the US Supreme Court within the parameters of the doctrine of mootness. VIII. Summary of Legal Principles Article III, Section 2, Clause 2, of the US Constitution confers upon the US Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear certain cases. The requirement that the US Supreme Court only have subject jurisdiction in matters that are properly characterized as cases or controversies gives rise to the doctrine of mootness. In the US Supreme Court’s interpretation of the doctrine of mootness it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over an issue that is not alive or resolved. IX. Evaluation The constitutional basis of the US Supreme Court’s jurisdiction is founded on the need to set boundaries for the allocation of power in the federal system. However, it would appear that the US Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 is too narrow and unnecessarily restricts the court in the proper administration of justice. The dissenting judges’ opinion indicate that although an issue is resolved in a specific case, it remains a live issue generally and the court’s determination of the issue can contribute to the prevention of future constitutional disputes. X. Free Space Poe v. ullman 367 U.S. 497 Vote 5-4 I. Facts of the Case The appellants (married couples and their doctor) appealed a decision from the Supreme Court of Errors in Connecticut which affirmed a lower court’s dismissal of their suits seeking declaratory relief. The declaration sought was one stating that 1879 Connecticut statutes banning the use of contraceptives and medical advice relative to the use of contraceptives contravened the 14th Amendment to the Constitution. It was argued that the violation arose because it deprived the appellants of life and property and liberty without due process. The facts revealed that there had only been three prior prosecutions under the statute and they involved members of the medical profession although their cases were dismissed. II. The Law A penal law may not be challenged on constitutional grounds within the parameters of Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution if the statute is not enforced in the state in which it is enacted. In such a case, the statute is not ripe (or controversial) for constitutional challenge. III. Legal Questions/Issues Is the constitutional challenge filed by the appellants ripe so that the issue can be reviewed by the judiciary? IV. Holding/Decision and Action The statutes in question are not ripe for constitutional challenge since it is not enforced in Connecticut. Moreover, the appellants have not been injured from the existence of the statutes and there is nothing in the history of the Acts’ existence suggesting that they appellants were at risk of being prosecuted under the Acts. Thus the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. V. Opinion The majority opinion was delivered by Frankfurter J. It was held that the subject matter jurisdiction contained in Article III of the Constitution requires that an issue be controversial or a case in order to invoke the court’s jurisdiction. The complaint arises out of a general statement issued by the Ulman, the respondent in this matter, that he intends to execute his duties by prosecuting any offenses under the laws of Connecticut and that using contraceptives or giving advice thereon are offenses. These statements do not carry with them “immediacy of the threat” contemplated by the claims. Moreover, the statutes in question have been in force for the better part of a century and no one has been successfully prosecuted under the statutes. The lack of immediacy is further evidenced by the fact that contraceptives are popularly and openly sold in drug stores in the state of Connecticut and no one selling contraceptives have been prosecuted. VI. Separate Opinion In a dissenting opinion, Douglas J. argued that the mere fact that a citizen is under threat of prosecution amounts to harm and necessarily requires that citizens make choices that carry with it a risk of punishment and thus their constitutional rights should be ascertained. Harlan J.’s dissent argued that the 14th Amendment necessarily required that citizen’s liberty be protected from “freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints” (Poe v. ullman 367 U.S. 497). VII. The Decision as Precedent The decision in the case does not establish a legal precedent, it merely determines whether or not a specific case is ripe for adjudication and thus properly invokes the jurisdiction of the court. Thus a previously established principle is interpreted and applied by the courts. VIII. Summary of Legal Principle In order for a case to be regarded as ripe, the legal issue must be one that demonstrates a live and on-going controversy. In order to satisfy the ripeness requirement there must be some immediacy to the claim. Failure to demonstrate immediacy would render the claim unripe for a constitutional challenge. IX. Evaluation Harlan’s dissent is instructive and again requires not only a broader interpretation of controversy under Article III, but also of the liberties and protections accorded by the 14th Amendment. The ripeness doctrine should therefore be satisfy on the grounds that a penal statute is alive and not whether citizens are under immediate threat of prosecution under that statute. The mere fact that the statute is in force constitutes a restraint on free choice and liberty and to some extent the privacy of the individual. In fact, the statutes challenged under Poe were successfully nullified by virtue of a broader interpretation of the 14th Amendment in Griswold v Connecticut (381 US 479) as a violation of the right to privacy. X. Free Space Bibliography Defunis v. odagaard 416 U.S.312. Flast v. Cohen 392 U.S 83. Frothingham v. mellon 262 U.S. 447. Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479. Hall, M. I. “The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness.” The George Washington Law Review, (2009), Vol. 77: 562-622. Judiciary Act 1789. Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. (1Cr.) 137. Marin v. hunter's lessee 14 U.S.(1 wheat.) 304. Poe v. ullman 367 U.S. 497. Tushnet, M. Arguing Marbury v. Madison. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005. United States v. Richardson 418 U.S. 166. Winter, S. L. “The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance.” Stanford Law Review, (1988) Vol. 40(6): 1371-1516. Read More