Animal Consciousness - Essay Example

Animal Consciousness Introduction Possession of a feeling of self-definition within the inanimate and animate universe should attract a sense of awareness by an organism. Consciousness denotes the entire control of the feelings and interactions that a being has with the world around it. One of the most important aspects of possession of consciousness is the control of the mind and making decisions that denote a systematic course of action. Knowing about certain information and eventually utilizing calculated mental output to formulate a specific cause of action complement such control of actions in an informed behavior response1. Inanimate things and organisms such as plants have limited capability to demonstrate such control of actions since the absence of a brain in their makeup eliminates chance for knowingness. It is a difficult affair to demonstrate the various levels or consciousness as possessed by various animals since the emergence of the debate on whether there is consciousness in animals. However, it is agreeable across both sides of the debate that consciousness exists in human beings. Debate therefore appears to revolve around the issue on whether consciousness exists in animals, and up to which level of organism organization. Debate has since emerged about the possibility of animals possessing consciousness as would elevate them to the same status with human beings (Schönfeld, 1). This discourse addresses the standoff on paradigms, aware of the fact that earlier versions support consciousness in human beings alone while emergent thoughts support existence of consciousness in animals as well. The first section explores older schools of thought that restrict possession of consciousness in humans while the second section explores the paradigm shift occasioning the inclusion of animals among those creatures possessing consciousness. A personal reflection is contained in the ending of the discourse, giving a position on the debate. Making an account of animal consciousness debate, it is clear that current thinking about animal consciousness is a mess as Dennett brands it. Paradigms A comparison of the old and the new paradigms and scientific propositions on the consciousness debate affirms the view that there has been a generally perception that animals are not like human beings regarding several aspects. Among the aspects that seemingly existed without much questioning and doubt is the issue of animal consciousness. As it appears, Schönfeld holds the opinion that the there was a feeling that it was not scientifically indulge research into such a topic since it touches on scientists feelings and their own thoughts2. Traditional schools of thought regarding the topic of consciousness as presented by Schönfeld (1) adopt the research on application of consciousness in linguistic usages. The author presents a range of cultural backgrounds that may have defined the understanding across the vicious cultural sections in the world. Spiritual and linguistic interpretations of consciousness have taken charge for a long time in human history, most of which demonstrate the cultural expression of the language owners. In some languages, there is a marked capacity to express the actual relationship between a creature’s existence and its environment capturing the incorporation of the brain control of events and actions defining the relationship. However, some languages lack some elements of the entire universal creature representation in the relationship with the environment as well as the control of actions under the understanding of consciousness. The new paradigm on consciousness is an interpretation of consciousness to be present not only in humans alone, but also in animals as well. In the ensuing debate, both cultural divides are evidently conspicuous in the standoff. It perhaps confirms earlier raised point that the origin of a possible standoff would be elicited by the cultural differentiation among the two groupings. In the new paradigm, it is plainly brought out into the limelight that consciousness is an exclusive trait for certain creatures since animals also possess certain attributes that manifest possession of consciousness. In the new paradigm, it is clear that postulates formulated in the support of the practicality of animals possessing certain traits that previously went almost uncontested to belong to humans found unwelcome reception. Apparently, the new paradigm opens the rift between the two ideological settings, which interestingly attracts the attention of religious teachings (Schönfeld, 3). The new paradigm presents factual backing arguments backed by phenomenal evidence; in the form of natural manifestation of what the protagonists argue are undisputable realities. Natural occurrences in animals such as those observed in bees and monkeys have been branded as communication or conscious actions which have consequently attracted controversy from the antagonist side of the debate. Baars (7) argues that sufficient brain studies supporting consciousness have been availed but fails to support the organizational complexity of the brain as enough evidence for consciousness. Similar sentiments are held by Griffin (11) “Rather than insisting that animals do not think at all, many scientists now believe that they sometimes experience at least simple thoughts…” However, the failure to demonstrate basic scientific tenets in the arguments brought forward raises questions on the sustainability of the arguments as Dennett reckons. Basing a position on the paradigms, a huge shift is identified by the fact that the older paradigm seems to dispel possibilities of animals being conscious of their own existence, actions or responses to stimuli in the environment. However, the new paradigm conspicuously makes an allowance on animal consciousness, with a debate arising from the perspectives thereon. However, while complexity of organization in life sciences becomes the topic of consideration, it is not clearly brought out if animals are in the same bracket with human beings who possess undisputable consciousness. A one sided application of evidence by proponents of animal consciousness disqualifies any sustainable case for the possibility of animal consciousness (Dennett, 17). The author holds the opinion that personal intuitions are relied in the formulation of the theory that animals are conscious of their behavior or responses to stimuli. In the opinion of Schönfeld (1), it is wrong for scientific research to be based on the personal feelings or intuitions for a matter under consideration. In light of such a perspective, speculating on the presence or absence of consciousness in animals would be laughable for any scientific research intended to unravel such inconsistency. In Schönfeld (2), a comparison of Latin-English and other Eurasian languages is made for purpose of exploring the link in the traditional perspective of consciousness interpretation among various creatures. In English for instance, consciousness is not clearly enumerated in the ordinary cultural interpretation through linguistic usages. The author reckons that the missing element of an extrapolation or explanation across all creatures does not serve the interests of the inquisitive consciousness researcher from that perspective. However, it brands one side of the organisms, namely humans, as the only explainable group of organisms for the observable function of knowingness and response to stimuli through intellectual expression. On their part, Eurasian languages contrastingly present the culture of their origin to define consciousness as a dimensional segment of the living world. As such, there is room for intuition to the effect that both humans and animals alike possess consciousness, depending on the applied dimension. Such a culture representation of the two forms of the living world softens the perception likely to be developed by the inadequacy in other cultural interpretations. Perhaps, the origin of the emergent fully fledged debate on the sustainability of argument supporting animal consciousness could be traced from the traditions and cultural application and perception on animal consciousness. While using cultural perspective on a scientific study would appear to assume major scientific tenets, the debate on presence or absence of animal consciousness should be treated with the contempt it deserves, since it is a mess as Dennett (16) postulates. Dennett (16) presents various perspectives regarding the debate and holds the opinion that certain postulates on animal consciousness require trustworthy reference points. The author reckons that while there is all the freedom to think independently regarding the various debates in the scientific domain, it should be a representation of the actual position in our conscious interpretation. In support of the arguments formulated by the author, I equally find it worrying that scientific postulates to the effect that animals could control their actions for an intellectual expression of intuition could be availed just but to aggravate the standoff. It is unbelievable that certain sections of consciousness debate would still stand their ground and support presence of consciousness in unpleasant scenes such as in the case of vultures feasting on rotting carcasses. Despite the notion that animals apply consciousness which is basic knowledge and awareness of basic stimuli from the environment and the subsequent control of actions, it beats logic why animal fail to manifest the level of human intuition in knowledge. According to Dennet (19), cognition defines consciousness which implies that animals, despite the complex and advanced level of nervous systems that they have cannot qualify to possess consciousness. I hold the opinion that animal conscience is not practical, despite the emerging postulates that support intelligence in animals to defy generally accepted psychological and scientific results. According to ordinary social organizations, animals may manifest astounding level of complexity that should not be confused with consciousness. In conclusion, consciousness remains a natural phenomenon whose presence or absence in certain creatures would not be changed by engaging in controversial debates. It is irrelevant for scientists to apply mythical positions in formulation of research topics because they will always remain to be wrong. Works Cited Baars, Bernard J. “On the Difficulty of Distinguishing Between Conscious Brain Functions in Humans and Other Mammals, Using Objective Measures,” June 2011, WPE Portfolio Reading Set Dennett, Daniel C. “Animal Consciousness: What Matters and Why,” June 2011, WPE Portfolio Reading Set Griffin, Donald R. “Animal Minds: Beyond Cognition to Consciousness,” June 2011, WPE Portfolio Reading Set Schönfeld, Martin “Animal Consciousness: Paradigm Change in Life Sciences,” June 2011, WPE Portfolio Reading Set Read More