Geo-Political Diversity to Economic Union: the Evolution of Europe - Essay Example

Geo-Political Diversity to Economic Union: the Evolution of Europe By consenting to combine resources, the European Union’s member states have moved effectively toward replacing the old status quo, in which antagonistic ethnic populations frequently bickered over resources, shifting political allegiances and lines on a map. Europe has remade itself as an economic federation, a leader in the global economy. In that light, Europe can no longer adequately be defined as a territorial entity. 1 The historical boundaries that have for centuries framed the very definition of Europe have become superfluous in the modern era. Europe’s rarely stable, long-fought-over borders have shifted countless times as a consequence of war and political realignment. An awkward patchwork of states, loosely conjoined by political and religious ideas generally held by the ruling elite, stricken by conflicts arising from shifting political allegiances: that is Europe as it was. “The changing fortunes of empires and states, and the lives of those inhabiting these territories, have in large part unfolded in the shadow cast by these phenomena. Nations and nationalism have therefore been implicated in some of the most profound political changes of the past two centuries” (Dunkerley et al., 2003, p. 44). The illusion of geography The rise of the European Union, with its economic ramifications for the organization’s individual member states, has changed the meaning of Europe. The traditional role played by lines of physical demarcation, many conceived and established before the advent of the modern nation state, has been rendered passé. The old geographical notion of Europe, the continental “fortress” the Allies invaded in 1944, has given way to a more modern and practicable concept: a burgeoning, not-necessarily-contiguous economic powerhouse, technologically hardwired together, more inter-connected by business and economic factors than it ever truly was by transitory lines on a map. The Herodotian idea of nationhood, which has its origins in the ancient Greek polis system, reached full flowering in Europe in the 18th century. Emmanuel Kant, Jeremy Bentham 2 and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, to name a few, wrote about a coherent national European system but “espoused widely different conceptions of European unity…This confusion about what is meant by a united Europe is as relevant today” (Jones, 2001, p. 6). Even at its height, the “quilt” of familiar states, established to give Europe’s ethnic populations distinct identities (not to mention political power), was, in many instances, an artificial construct. European ethnic groups, of course, are no more bound by abstract political divisions than are populations in other parts of the world. A common principle of European history is that “any notion of a ‘common culture,’ even at the most abstract level, is always open to dispute. Even Poland, commonly cited as an example of a largely ethnically homogeneous country, has citizens who are ethnic Belorussians, Ukrainians and Germans. In practice, it is not possible to speak of a common national culture” (Dunkerley et al., 2003, p. 45). From nationalism to stability Nevertheless, the European nation state has flourished for more than two centuries in spite of the cataclysmic effects of nationalism, a phenomenon that fostered misguided hubris, even racist ideologies. Yet Dunkerley (2003) explains that “it is evident…(the development of nations) would not have been possible without the contribution of nationalist movements across Europe promoting the ideology of nationalism.” The destruction and economic ruin of World War II may not have put an end to nationalism but it certainly gave the nations of Europe common cause, one that spurred interest in new ideas for economic recovery and long-term stability on the continent. 3 In 1946, Winston Churchill gave form to these new ideas in a speech that outlined his vision of a post-war European federation. By proposing “a kind of United States of Europe” (Jones, 2001, p. 7), Churchill aimed to reconcile France and Germany in a manner that would avoid the mistakes made after World War I, mistakes that laid the groundwork for yet another war. The subsequent realization of that vision has made Europe a leading force in world economic affairs. Still, the EU cannot truly be said to possess the political or cultural coherence of the United States comprised, as Europe is, of multiple languages and traditions. As such, while its influence is felt in the economic arena, Europe remains a splintered political entity, unable or unwilling to act as a united body when it comes to formulating cogent foreign policy and acting upon it in a timely fashion when crises arise. The united Europe of the early 21st century is not as much a geographically defined bloc as it is an inorganic economic creation, designed to maintain prosperity and ensure its own political stability. “The prospect of this stable anchor has been the precondition of for restoring economic prosperity, which in turn underpins continued stability in the region” (Kok, 2003). Multiple voices In the EU’s current model, we may see elements of the concepts proposed by theorists such as Kant, Bentham and the Comte Saint Simon. But for all practical purposes, Europe’s governing body most closely resembles the loose confederation suggested in the writings of Maximilien Sully, to whom European unity meant a unity of sovereigns, acting in concert but maintaining a full degree of latitude within their own political spheres (Jones, 2001). 4 As a union speaking with multiple voices, ill-adapted to situations calling for concerted action (or reaction), the EU has not achieved the cogency needed to establish a course of action, marshal its resources with dispatch and adapt over time to changing political circumstances. The EU’s reaction to crises in the Middle East is a recent manifestation of this political incoherence. “Externally, the EU has played no part in addressing the problem of Iraq, the most important question of foreign policy in the world today. Its members have been deeply and visibly divided; worse, the EU and its foreign policy instruments have played no role at all. While individual member states have played a major part in the question on the international stage, Europe as a whole has been non-existent…The EU’s economic weight must be accompanied by a political voice in world affairs” (Kok, 2003, pp. 3-4). Current electoral processes inhibit the ability of the EU’s leaders to establish a tradition of unilateral political action. “Representatives at the EU level are elected, and so can formally be ‘thrown out.’ However, the processes of electing national politicians and even the Members of the European Parliament are not contests about the content or direction of EU policy. National elections are about domestic political issues…issues on the EU agenda are rarely debated” (Follesdal & Hix, 2005, pp. 18-19). Forging a worldwide economic identity In spite of the relatively prone position from which EU leaders wield authority, the union’s aim to establish a dynamic, knowledge-based economy (Kok, 2003), has met with considerable political success. The grand economic vision of the union’s founders has been slow 5 coming into focus, coalescing awkwardly, even haphazardly; a mirror of Europe’s painful and problematic road to political union. There was an initial lack of coordination between large European businesses and government officials, a situation that frustrated corporate executives. “A dissatisfaction with the national route of European policy making provided incentives for European big business to organise politically at the European level” (Greenwood & Aspinwall, 1998, p. 112). Acting from a strong sense of mutual self-interest, these corporate entities initially set their sights beyond the confines of continental Europe, only gradually adapting their outlook to fit the new political model. “In certain respects, these large companies went global first and European second. The lessons they learned overseas in other markets and in interactions with other firms prompted them to redefine their home market as the European as opposed to national market” (Greenwood & Aspinwall, 1998, p. 112). This relatively compact group of large European firms eventually organized in order to influence economic policy, a significant move that has helped remake Europe in economic terms. “In the case of the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT), business leaders were key players in promoting the single market programme in the first place. In many respects, large firms themselves were the agents for the EU’s institutional change during the 1980s” (Greenwall & Aspinwall, 1998, p. 113). That institutional change gathered momentum over the past several decades as Central and Eastern European countries, previously held in thrall or threatened by the former Soviet Union, sought membership, effecting a consolidation of national territories and resources that invading 6 armies failed to achieve over the course of centuries. Thus, the EU, which the European Commission characterized as a “soft power” in its 2006 report to the European Parliament and Council, “has achieved more through its gravitational pull than it could have achieved by other means” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006, p. 2). Achieving cohesion amid expansion The commission’s report on the EU’s fifth enlargement succinctly described not only the union’s true role on the global stage, but captured in a few words what Europe has become: “Economically, enlargement has helped to increase prosperity and competitiveness, enabling the enlarged Union to respond better to the challenges of globalization. This has brought direct benefits for Europe as a whole. Enlargement has increased the EU’s weight in the world and made it a stronger international player” (Commission of the European Communities, 2006, p. 2). In spite of achieving the world’s largest economy, Europe faces challenges wrought by economic stagnation and high unemployment. A further - and persistent - problem is the stability of the single-market economy, the logical extension of the model conceived by the EU’s founders and its corporate power structure. Coordination on this point has been largely dependent on voluntary cooperation; failure to cooperate is not subject to formal sanctions (Scharpf, 2002). The drive toward economic cohesiveness has been complicated by four models that reflected regional diversities, according to Sapir (2005). The “Nordic” and “Anglo-Saxon” 7 models functioned efficiently, but the “Continental” and “Mediterranean” types, which accounted for two-thirds of the EU’s gross domestic product, were unsustainable (Sapir, 2005). Reform of such inefficient systems must be carried out if the EU is to maintain its economic gravitas on the world stage. Ensuring the viability of a seamless economic order for all members is key. “Transforming the enlarged European Union market of 27+ members into a genuine Single Market, where goods, services, capital and labour are allowed to freely circulate, would offer great opportunities to old and new Member States alike. But this rosy scenario…can only materialize if national labour market and social policies become more conducive to changes in specialization” (Sapir, 2005, p. 3). Europe today: a more realistic view The recent economic slowdown and the logistical problems inherent in unifying divergent nationalities and cultural traditions continue to hamper efforts to transform Europe into a cohesive political and economic unit. Greater clarity and a more realistic view of what Europe can accomplish would help streamline the policymaking process and perhaps help return a sense of security and optimism to the union and the community it serves (Tsoukalis, 2006). As has been discussed, enlargement holds the promise of prosperity but can act against efforts to integrate resources and increase the possibility that the EU may fail to realize the vision and long-term goals implicit in its formation. In little more than a half-century, Europe has made measurable progress in realizing its 8 vast economic potential. The EU’s member states have combined resources and moved away from the old status quo in which antagonistic states bickered over imposed geographic divisions. In spite of the problems inherent in bringing together a traditionally fragmented region, Europe exists today as a technologically sophisticated economic federation rather than a territorial entity. 9 References Dunkerley, D. et al. (2003) Changing Europe: Identities, Nations and Citizens, London: Routledge. European Commission (2006a) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006-2007 Follesdal, A. and Hix, S. (2005) ‘Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik’, European Governance Papers, EUROGOV No. C-05-02 Greenwood, J. and Aspinwall, M. (1998) Collective Action in the European Union: Interests and the New Politics of Associability, London: Routledge Jones, R.A. (2001) The Politics and Economics of the European Union, Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar Publishing. Kok, W (2003): ‘Enlarging the European Union – Achievements and Challenges (Report to the European Commission) Sapir, A. (2005) ‘Globalisation and the Reform of European Social Models,’ Bruegel Policy Brief, November. Scharpf, F. (2002) The European Social Model, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 40, No.2, pp.645-70 10 Taylor, G. (2000) Freedom, Responsibility and the Media, Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam University Press. Tsoukalis, L. (2006) ‘The JCMS Annual Lecture: Managing Diversity and Change in the EU’ Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 44, No 1, pp.1-16 11 Appendix EU Crisis Management Command Structure Jones, R.A. (2001) The Politics and Economics of the European Union, p. 456 12 Read More