Nature of European Limits Affecting Ukraine - Assignment Example

Nature of European Limits Affecting Ukraine al Affiliation Admitting a country to full European Union membership is normally an uphill task given that different countries have diverse treaty, laws, policies and confinements. The European Union is a political-economic entity comprised of 28 member states that are located in Europe. The EU functions through a system of intergovernmental and supranational institutions. The EU has a single market, which is achieved through standardization of system of laws. The union aims to ensure the free movement of people, services, capital and goods. As well, member states are required to maintain common policies on trade, fisheries, regional development and agriculture. However, given the complex limits specified by EU to its member states, it has become impossible to admit Ukraine. Ukraine is considered a defiant member since in most occasions it has failed to agree on EU limits. On the other hand, the country has not upgraded to partnership status ‘similar to that accorded to Russia’ given its low volume on trade and quality of infrastructure. The incoming research will examine the nature of limits that have continued binding successfully status maturity. The report will demonstrate the power of European union in different perspectives, most especially sanctions against Russia. As well, the report will investigate EU security ability against possible aggression. The report will prove that the current political crises are not near conclusion given that membership into the union has taken a different form. The Situation The current problem began with Ukraine refusing to sign a trade deal with European Union. The treaty that was both an economic and political entity compelled Ukraine to be subjective to European Union. There were a number of political crises, which resulted to questions of corruption. Students and other young people constantly protested against the incoming and outgoing regimes. In fact, concerns of corruption polarized the entire scene. Militia who continued fighting in the countryside joined rowdy youths. As a result, the country has heavily been balkanized by gangs wanting to control different areas. The number of current segments is four. Meanwhile, Russia annexed Crimea due to gas concerns. This made the Kiev based government to panic. As such, Ukraine is being involved in one of the worst trading zone disputes of the 21st, century. As a result, the country has been entangled in a revolutionary political arena. At the center, the European Union (EU) backed by the United States is promoting policies, which compels Ukraine to respect various multilateral agreements between Ukraine and EU member states. On the other hand, Russia is encouraging Ukraine to look east for business. There has been an ongoing Ukraine-Russia gas dispute, which has polarized the relationship. The problem is that Russia is the still Ukraine largest trading partner, and she feels she needs to protect that particular trade (Sasse, 2007, p. 44). However, Ukraine is ambitious in exploiting the European Union larger and markets that are more dynamic (Viter and Pavlenko, 2006, p. 43). Ukraine has a smaller per-capital income of $ 2,979 against that of EU combined at $ 35,849. In simpler words, Ukraine is attempting to secede from Russia, while Moscow is not willing to let go. Gas politics have centered debates. For that reason, there have been pro Moscow based rebels residing in eastern Ukraine. These rebels have continuously conducted offensive militia activities against the government of Ukraine. In particular, rebels have attacked small towns and put up checkpoints to emphasize their control. The nature of these events has polarized trade, aid, security and politics. Expanding the Europeanization agenda has resulted in maturity of the problem. The fact that it cannot assume a mere partner status enshrines its desire for accession as unquestionably legitimate. This had a weight on geo-strategic importance as well as, covetousness that arouse in the process. Ukraine questions the European Union on the question of its limits, its institutions and the country’s future. Ukrainian responses as perceptible among Europeans meant that there is political confusion on the reigns in Kiev and Russia. On the other hand, Russia is more or less reassured by Ukrainian procrastination. She is praying for time, leaving the European Union best placed to start discussion. Howard (2014, p. 34) further argues that Russia would like to see Ukraine join the regional organizations that it dominates, but the model put forward based on its own values and methods which do not appear to be very attractive. Meanwhile, Ukraine is attempting to launch the idea of a status of neutrality similar to that recognized for Austria. Limits List of Limits As for the limits, EU common strategy on Ukraine spells out a number of broadly defined strategic goals. Firstly, EU requires Ukraine to contribute to the emergence of a stable, open and pluralistic democracy in Ukraine. According to Roth (2008, p. 511), Ukraine should process a well specified rule of law that underpins a stable, functioning market economy, which will benefits all the people of Ukraine. As well, Ukraine should maintain political stability, by ensuring it enshrines stability and security in Europe and the wider world in finding effective responses to common challenges facing the continent. Likewise, EU should increase economic, political and cultural cooperation with Ukraine as well as, cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. Moreover, Ukraine is required to strengthen co-operation on non-proliferation and disbarments and in the fields of environment, energy and nuclear safety. As well, Ukraine is still required to reform the energy sector to ensure that privatization is possible; this will ensure that the organization improves tax collection. Similarly, Ukraine is required to the press ahead with reform of the Judiciary and financial institutions in order to improve the business environment and attract foreign investment required in the much needed in the modernization of the Ukrainian economy underdeveloped infrastructure and technological standards. Assessment and Extension of Limits Europeanization is not possible since Ukraine suffers liberalization. EU has continued limiting countries that are willing to apply. In particular, Ukraine like Russia was keen to agree greater visa liberalization with EU countries; however, it has taken long time to negotiate. As well, EU has not streamlined international security issues. In 2010, German chancellor Merkel had proposed the Meseberg process, for an EU-Russia security council. Originally, Russia had agreed to this, however other member states did not support the proposal. It is clear that Ukraine has a special place in EU foreign policy due to its uncontested status of ENP frontrunner enjoyed between 2004 and 2010. Petrov and Kalinichenko (2012, p. 324) believe that Ukraine represents an important references point for the evolution of the EU’s approach towards its Eastern neighbors. Ukraine refused to sign the deal since it believed the treaty was an undercut. Ukraine saw the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA) as a codified in an association agreement with Ukraine and the very first Association Agreement containing the DCFTA, and was negotiated, after rounds held over subsequent years with Ukraine. As part of the approach, EU maintains positive conditionality. In this case, Ukrainian leadership is expected to welcome and embrace the principle. Wolczuk (2012, p. 187) points out that the association agreement, whose negotiation were concluded in the last months of 2011, reinforced the centrality of the positive conditionality principle. The document aims for a higher degree of integration, which is referred as much deeper than it was offered through the European Agreements in central and other Eastern European states. Meanwhile, the association agreement established the prospects of the DCFTA to return compliance with the EU demand and adoption of the acquits, covering a wide range of objectives from holding free and fair elections to intellectual property rights. However, Ukraine abandoned the initial membership-or-nothing approach and started treating the ENP in a more pragmatic method. This constrained free flow of Ukrainians who were willing to work in Western Europe (See Appendix 1). As well, a fundamental feature of the EU-Ukrainian relationship is the Shadow of the membership perspective. Arguably, while Ukraine’s leadership eagerly desires membership, the EU is not offering it. According to the established cooperation formula Shepotylo (2010, p. 676), EU enshrined a number of political and economic reforms in Ukraine. The heavy political reforms were not achievable at the time. Primarily, the ENP was not considered ultimate but one that had intermediate objectives of Ukraine’s foreign policy. For that reason, Ukrainian politicians were not capable of forming an effective coalition to move the country forward on a reform course. Secondly, the ENP was not effective for EU policy that tool several years to evolve from conception to implementation assessment. Justifiably, this means that there were no precedent of successful ENP-zation for politicians in Ukraine to rely upon. Furthermore, Eisele and Wiesbrock (2011, p. 141) that even though the ENP Actions plan were more detailed than the PCAs, the actual extent of legal approximation in several sectors remained vague. In fact, the actual reward of the ENP turned to be a moving target. The EU’s offer was defined as a stake in the EU internal market. This opened prospects for goods, services, capital and persons. However, EU limited Ukraine given that the degree at which they stressed that the ENP benefits were economic rather than political, yet the initial offer of the stake in the EU internal market was substituted by the DCFTA. This confused because a prospects of the Free Trade Area had already been stipulated in the PCA. White and Fekyunina (2014, p. 81) believes that this limited Ukraine since the differentiation of a thin and deep FTA did not resonate beyond a few experts on economic aspects of Ukraine-EU relations. The difficulty of keeping up with the changing offer of the EU translated itself into political incentives for the domestic public (Appendix 2 for graph) In addition, at the political level, there was arguably the scope for the EU to support Ukraine’s pro-reform politicians and foster the process of convergence of the process of convergence of the Ukrainian legislation with the EU. In fact, EU released detailed report Visa requirements for Ukrainian citizens travelling to the EU created principle elements of the EU’s initial offer of stake in the EU’s internal market (Europarl, 2013). In fact, visa-free travelling remained an ambitious project. Puziack (2009, p. 43) establishes that such an approach would have been encouraged the pro-reformation of Ukraine. However, despite of steps like the Visa Facilitation Agreement, the launch of the dialogue in 2009 meant that the adoption of the Visa Liberalization Action plan in 2010, was not possible. In fact, the Annual Threat Assessment Undertaken by Europol indicated that lifting of visa restrictions for Ukrainians was considered extremely negative to the EU, as this perspective was connected with the Opening of new routes for the organized crime. For that reason, the implementation of the objectives established to the action plan presented a challenge to the process of the transfer to the EU norms, rules and regulations turned out to be fragmented, decentralized, uneven and often limited to a paper exercise. Webler (2014, p. 26) contends that given that the standards of democracy and economic norms had strongly deviated from those of the EU, Ukraine’s integration with EU lacked the proper forms of engagement. Along with the absence of a clear political, signal that Ukrainian political strategy, the low institutional capacity in Ukrainian and in particular the existence of a strong horizontal coordination institution accounted for the modest results. As such, the adoption of the acquisition specified by the action plan has not attracted political attention given that it was rather a process led by bureaucrats and followed by an audience comprising of the modest political factions. The limits of the initial concept conditionality implied in the PCA to have more apparent framework. Ukraine’s key trading partner Russia has however not pursued the right incentives to become a partner. Hence, Ukraine’s cooperation with Europe Union via Russia has not matured overtime. Sanctions against Russia for its involvement For Russian involvement in hardening Ukrainian bargaining position, the EU backed by US, developed a number of sanctions. After the defeat of Crimean referendum, US, Canada and European Union signed a treaty recognizing Crimea as an independent state. EU also supported Japan and Australia to impose sanctions against Russia. Meanwhile, Japan halted talks about space exploration, investment and military matters. On the other hand, Australia imposed Sanctions against Russia for its involvement in annexation of Crimea. This included financial sanctions and travel bans of high profile individuals from Russia. The second round of sanctions saw EU backed United States ban business transactions with seventeen Russian Multinationals. The Russian Government also suffered heavily after the EU banned firms, Novatek and Rosneft and two banks, Vneshekonombank and Gazprombank (Moscow Times, 2015). In turn, Russia has scheduled its own sanctions. For instance, periodical cuts of wheat and gasoline supplies leading to increased prices of these two commodities. The possible effect on the economy is recessionary periods. As well, Russia has banned certain high profile individuals from visiting Russia. Ability to respond to Aggression As much as Russia responded with its own series of sanctions, including banning all European Parliamentary Members from stepping foot in Russia, there are concerns about an Aggression. EU is a strong member of North Alliance Treaty Organization (NATO) a rivaling military treaty against Russia. Two days ago, NATO paramilitaries arrived in Ukraine prepared for Combat with Russia. This was promoted by Russia threat that it will bomb Denmark Ships if she joins NATO shield (Garofalo, 2015). Although it is not clear who will win the war, what is clear is that civilian masses will suffer the greatest causality due to disruption of services. Conclusion Europeanization of Ukraine cooperation can hardly be seen as a success story, which is not just because of the poor progress, but as well, the limited systematic effect of the cooperation. From the above research, it is clear that the EU-Ukraine strategic partnership is an unfortunate example of a relationship between two sides pursuing different agendas. The Ukraine aspiration being a much more ambitious than the EU is prepared to accept the nature of the strategy. Besides, the membership offensive is proving to be distorted agenda further worsening the relations with the EU. This seems to have partially reversed the logic of conditionality initially applied by the EU. Reflectively, while realizing that Europeanization is not something to be resolved by the on-going political crises, Kiev will be required to look for an association similar to that of Turkey. Alternatively, the EU can grant Ukraine an upgraded status by promising future membership. At the very least, this strategy will help Kiev partially to escape the pressure of the conditionality, which the EU has sought to impose by the PCA. References Bordelex Editor. (2014, May 30). Blog: Ukraine - EU, waiting for the free trade deal sign-off - Borderlex. Retrieved April 18, 2015, from http://www.borderlex.eu/graphs-week-ukraine-eu-trade/ Eisele, K., & Wiesbrock, A. (2011). Enhancing Mobility in the European Neighborhood Policy? The Cases of Moldova and Georgia. Review of Central and East European Law, 127-155. Europarl. (2013, April 8). Parliament approves EU visa facilitation agreements with ... Retrieved April 18, 2015, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/content/20130412IPR07192/html/Parliament-approves-EU-visa-facilitation-agreements-with-Ukraine-and-Moldova GAROFALO, A. (2015, March 22). Russia threatens to aim nuclear missiles at Denmark ships if it joins NATO shield. Retrieved April 18, 2015, from http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/03/22/us-denmark-russia-idUSKBN0MI0ML20150322 Howard, C. (2014). Brothers armed: Military aspects of the crises in Ukraine. Minneapolis, Mn.: East View Press. MPC. (2012, December 18). Labour Emigration from the EUs Eastern Neighbourhood: How to get the numbers right? Retrieved April 18, 2015, from https://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/labour-emigration-from-the-eus-eastern-neighbourhood-how-to-get-the-numbers-right/ McLaughlin, L. (2014, May 9). The Conflict in Ukraine: A Historical Perspective. Retrieved April 18, 2015, from http://www.summer.harvard.edu/blog-news-events/conflict-ukraine-historical-perspective Moscow Times (2015). Third Wave of Sanctions Slams Russian Stocks". Moscow Times. 17 July 2014. Retrieved 21 January 2015. Petrov, R., & Kalinichenko, P. (2012). The Europeanization Of Third Country Judiciaries Through The Application Of The Eu Acquis: The Cases Of Russia And Ukraine. International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 325-353. Puziak, M. (2009). Real Convergence of New EU Members. An Experience for Ukraine. Journal of International Studies, 40-49. Roth, M. (2008). EU-Ukraine relations after the orange revolution: The role of the new member states. Perspectives on European Politics and Society, 505-527. Sasse, G. (2007). The Crimea question: Identity, transition, and conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Distributed by Harvard University Press for the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute. Shepotylo, O. (2010). A Gravity Model of Net Benefits of EU Membership : The Case of Ukraine. Journal of Economic Integration, 676-702. Viter, O., & Pavlenko, R. (2006). Ukraine post-revolution energy policy and relations with Russia. London: GMB. Webler, W. (2002). Evaluation and Accreditation of Higher Education Establishments in Ukraine. Experiences as an Adviser in a EU-Tacis Project with Reforms in a Former Member of the CIS. European Education, 5-25. White, S., & Feklyunina, V. (2014). Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus The Other Europes. (Online-Ausg. ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wolczuk, K. (2012). Implementation without Coordination: The Impact of EU Conditionality on Ukraine under the European Neighbourhood Policy. Europe-Asia Studies, 187-211. Appendices Appendix: Ukrainian Labor Emigrants Appendix 2: Nature of PCA’s-FTA Read More