Political and Strategic Contribution of Amphibious Operations - Korean War 1950-53 - Essay Example

What was the political and strategic contribution of amphibious operations to the Korean war 1950-53? Does this input offer any guidance to the modern UK amphibious force? Introduction: The history of warfare witnessed several examples of proper strategic planning of amphibious operations and according implementation of the same has led to triumph in an act of war even amidst the most adverse of situations. An adequately strategic amphibious assault is capable of not only delivering troops to the crucial points, where it would have been more complicated and troublesome for the artillery to reach on foot but also helps in occupying those places at the right point of time so that the enemy can be caught almost unprepared and by cutting their supply chain, they can be lead to their defeat, consequently, the entire scenario regarding the progress of war can be changed (Schwartz 310). Historically, successful strategic implementation of such operations was attained by Julius Caesar and William the Conqueror during invasion of Britain. Later on, further development in war techniques and addition of air force has led to considerable changes in the existing situation. Since the World War I onwards, the art of strategic warfare reflected that if success through an amphibious attack needs to be attained, perfect cooperation is required among each three division of an army and implementation of this reflection attained its culmination during the Second World War (Schwartz 310). While the success and consequent onslaught of the Third Reich was holding the entire world with a stronger grip, participation of the United States in the backdrop of the World War II and naval collaboration of the American and Royal Navy introduced the “Golden Age of Amphibious Warfare” (Alexander, and Bartlett 1). The entire course of the World War II was changed due to several amphibious landings conducted by naval forces of these two nations and the highest success of such collaborative effort came through success of the D-Day operation on 6th June 1944 (Alexander, and Bartlett 1). By the end of the Second World War it was clearly realized that proper co-ordination among various departments of an army and their adequate cooperation with that of the naval department is absolutely essential to win a war and development of a well-balanced naval force, thus, received considerable attention from the national security perspective. However, due to the huge financial loss that the United States and British government experienced, it order to recover from the situation, they did not have any other option than to reduce allocation of budget for defense system, leading to not only reduction in the total number of armed forces but also to lessen the operations related to amphibious activism (Speller 213-15). Keeping in mind the huge reputation and admiration of the opponents that the Royal Navy earned with all these years of expertise and conducted several effective amphibious operation plans, whether the early glory would be retained by them, was questioned within the domain of modern amphibious warfare. However, the success of Inchon Landing during the Korean War clearly proved that the importance of amphibious operations was not ignored, rather added another feather to the crown of the Royal Navy (Gatchel 186). The Korean War: Background and Importance of the Inchon Landing Korea, being an important centre for both industrial activism (North Korea) and agricultural production (South Korea), remained as a subject of special attention for the neighboring nations in the East, especially for Japan, China and Russia. While for China, Korea could have acted as a barrier against all efforts of foreign invasion, for Japan it was dangerous for national security and Russians were interested to capitalize over it “ice-free ports” to expand the scope of Russian hold over East (Wainstock 2). Plight of Korean people under Japanese occupation commenced since the Japan-Russian War (1904-05) and in 1910 Japan established colony in Korea. Since that time onwards till the end of World War II, Korean people encountered massive exploitation in terms of both socio-cultural and economic existence by the Japanese: “Japanese was taught in schools, and all facets of Korean culture and traditions were suppressed. It even became mandatory for the Koreans to adopt Japanese names. During the World War II the Japanese exploited Korean industry and agriculture to support their war effort. Millions of Koreans were drafted into the armed forces, employed in industry, or even shipped to Japan, and forced into service as laborers and comfort women throughout the occupied countries” (Rottman, and Dennis 7). The end of World War II led to defeat of the Axis force and Japan, being a part of it, also had to totally compromise over its long hold over Korea. The relief to both Southern and Northern Korea was introduced by collaborative effort from the United States and the Soviet Union. The XXIV US Corps took hold of the South Korea on 4th September 1945 and the Red Army led the North Korea 12th August of the same year, territorial difference was marked by the 38th Parallel at the Northern Seoul (Rottman, and Dennis 7). The United Nations also came forward shortly to deliver the democratic existence for Korean people and with the help of Soviet Union and Communist China, the North Korea or Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was formed (Rottman, and Dennis 7-8). In August 1948, South Korea also received status of a democratic nation as the Republic of Korea (ROK) under the presidency of Syngman Rhee. However the situation of war was created as there was no effort from the United Nations or the existing superpowers to unify these two regions. Additionally, both withdrawal of army by both the Soviet Union and United States added further initiative in the entire scenario. The President of North Korea, Kim, however, with the help of implicit support from the Soviet Union, despite lesser population of the nation, developed a more effective and efficient armed force compared to the South Korea and according to several diplomatic documents that were released much later than that of the war period, explicit evidences were received that “Kim pleaded for Soviet premier Josef Stalin’s permission and support to unify the country by force” (Kaufman 515). Stalin also approved and empowered with such approval “North Korea launched a surprise invasion of the ROK on June 25, 1950. Many of the North Korean troops were battle tested, having served with the Chinese and Soviet militaries during World War II and also with Chinese during their civil war. Northern forces quickly overran the poorly equipped and only partially trained ROK army, which was aided only by a contingent of 500 KMAG advisors” (Kaufman 515). Keeping in accordance with the peace process initiated by the United Nations as well as of the provisions of the Nuremberg Trail, in very presence of the Soviet representative, North Korean invasion and consequent development of war situation was harshly criticized by the United Nations Security Council. The contemporary US president Harry S. Truman was provided with the required authority to defend the invasion and empowered with such authority, Truman conferred General Douglas MacArthur as the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations force, comprising fifteen other nations of which Australia, New Zealand, Canada and United Kingdom played very crucial part (Kaufman 515-16). Inclusion of the United Kingdom’s Royal Navy in the entire operation surely enhanced the scope of amphibious attack to a considerable extent and General MacArthur also received a strong foundation to Inchon attack a success, without which the process of defeating the North Korean army would surely remained a prolonged process (Wainstock 46-49). Strategic Importance of Royal Navy in the Korean War: The relevance of Amphibious Attack in modern warfare Revaluated If a comparison can be done between the expertise of the North Korean army and the United Nations force, it could have surely been asserted that there cannot be any match between these two parties. However, the two greatest disadvantages against the United Nations forces were, first, the reduction in the number of armed forces and expertise of the amphibious operations; second, geographic location of Korea. In an act of war, preserving the supply chain is very important and it also is equally important to break the same chain of the opponent in order to make them weak. While the North Korean army and their war strategists planned to capitalize on the geographical adversity, General MacArthur did not have any other option than to go for counterattacking and occupying some of the most crucial points that could have acted on favor of the United Nations army to break the supply chain for the enemies. Through his extensive experience in the field of strategy development, he clearly realized that in the Korean War successful amphibious landings would surely change the course of war drastically, and consequently he identified Inchon as the primary area for such landing (Wainstock 47-48). While several of his comrades were highly skeptical regarding successful amphibious landing in Inchon, the General was completely resolute and also asserted considerable trust on capability of the naval department: “My confidence in the Navy is complete, and in fact I seem to have more confidence in the Navy than the Navy has in itself. The Navy’s rich experience in staging numerous amphibious landings under my command in the Pacific during the late war, frequently under somewhat similar difficulties, leaves me with little doubt on the score” (MacArthur; Cited in Duffy, and Carpenter 88). No matter how confident MacArthur was about capacity of the Navy and consequently also has attempted to channelize his confidence through his speech, but words never have won a war. Strategically the General was right but the naval officers actually realized how tough it would be to produce positive results out of this operation. Some of the General’s comrades were of opinion that the desired amphibious landing in Inchon is impossible (Wainstock 47) and the same note of impossibility or desirability of the opponent party to conduct an amphibious operation in Inchon, according to the “official history of Marine Corps operations in Korea” was “probably the least” (Duffy, Carpenter 84). However, the strategic genius of MacArthur clearly realized if the geographical troubles can be handled then occupation of such an important strategic location would not be difficult because the enemy would also assume that the United Nations army would not be interested to execute such a landing. Thus, despite opposition from various departments of armed forces, he stuck to execution of the operation and due to his prior contribution for the United States he also retained President Truman’s support (Wainstock 47). Keeping in mind the level of reduced efficiency of the US marine department after the World War II, efficiency of the Royal Navy and their strategic expertise to execute such difficult operations to success remained an important source of the General MacArthur’s confidence. Though most of the historical references cast entire focus on efficacy of the US marine force for their amazing success in the Normandy Beach invasion during World War II, however, such an attempt, perhaps, would not be a success if adequate support was not received from the British Naval forces (Nash 154). Besides providing artillery support to the US army, the British Navy took care of logistic supplies, which helped the Allied forces to enjoy a better situation than that of the opponent. During the Korean War, though both the naval forces were almost shadows of their past glory (Rottman, and Dennis 9), however, success in the Inchon Landing (officially known as the Operation Chromite), was attained due to the successful collaboration of US navy’s “a mere handful of auxiliaries” and a British Fleet Train “that was base-dependent and ill equipped to replenish ships at sea for extended periods” (Nash 154). While reflecting over the glorious period of Royal Navy, Ian Speller has observed that immediately after the Second World War, the entire Royal Navy only had the power to parallel the US naval force, consequently earned the rightful capacity to dominate the sea region during the War: “By the end of the war the British possessed an understanding of amphibious operations rivalled only by the United States and had an amphibious fleet that included over 5,000 ships, crafts and landing barges and over 100 amphibious vehicles” (Speller 213). During the Second World War, despite success of the Nazi force throughout the Europe, Britain remained the sole and undefeated challenger of the Third Reich and efficiency of the Royal Navy would surely claim considerable credit for the same because it prevented the German Navy from dominating the Atlantic. However, since the end of World War II the inconsistency of the Royal Navy became conspicuous and it becomes evident with the comparison during and aftermath the World War II: “Despite this success, the British displayed a remarkable consistency in their approach towards amphibious operations in the years after 1945. In the late 1940s and early 1950s amphibious operations were generally accorded a very low priority and amphibious capabilities suffered accordingly” (Speller 213). The Korean War, in this context is of great importance, as it sent clear message to the British Naval authority that keeping in mind International political situation as well as nature of conflict, the importance of amphibious operation and consequent sharpening of the amphibious skills need to be continued. While the British Naval department was famous for its mobility and judging the situations of amphibious war, between the years of 1945-50 the aspect of mobility was largely ignored. First, a huge number of vessels, required for increasingly amphibious mobility were rejected and second, implementation of new technological devices for smoothing an amphibious operational execution process was also discouraged or provided with less attention. The situation of urgency during the Korean War was capable enough to point out that in the context of protecting international as well as national security, such situation of crisis can occur at any point of time. Thus, the amphibious fleet requires to be ready with its highest level of efficiency and mobility as well, so that in time of action adequate measures can be taken promptly. In the Korean War, the British and American Navy were completely at an advantageous position because compared to the kind of support they received, the North Korean army was almost at nowhere. Thus, such a scope of limited war could not actually evaluate the strength of the Royal Navy and irrespective of their shortcomings they have won the war (Nash 169). Compared to this situation if a stronger opponent could be imagined in place of North Korea and if it is also considered that the stronger opponent could have given an effort to defend Inchon like that of the Germans in the Normandy, the United Nations force would have surely encountered a huge damage and possibility of defeat could have also been brighter. Perhaps leader of the Bottomley Committee, Air Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley anticipated such situation of crisis long time back, during the final half of the Second World War. The Bottomley Committee clearly suggested that end of the World War II would impose huge financial pressure on the British government but irrespective of these pressures, the issue related to amphibious operations should not be compromised and “Britain’s peacetime armed forces would remain ready to conduct similar operations in the future” (Speller 215). Ian Speller in this context has reflected, “The recommendations of the Bottomley Committee were centered on the belief that operations on a similar scale to the Normandy landings might be necessary in the future. The scale and range of forces required for such operations were beyond the reach of any specialist amphibious force that Britain could afford to maintain and it was accepted that the armed forces as a whole would have to become more proficient in this mode of warfare” (Speller 215). Keeping in mind the necessity and insistence of the General MacArthur to occupy Inchon, it can be said that assumption of the Bottomley committee was correct and Royal Navy finally conducted another operation like that of the Normandy Beach invasion. The serious flaws of the contemporary Royal Navy did not draw attention conspicuously because of the less powerful North Korean army. Had it been a stronger opponent, magnitude of the devastation of the naval forces would have been huge. Clearly, the British Navy learned from the mistakes and did adhere to the prescriptions of the Bottomley Committee properly, aftermath the Korean War. While on one hand, use of modern technology was encouraged and increased to a considerable extent in the British Navy, on the other hand, considerable importance has also been casted on enhancing the level of efficiency of the marine soldiers. Occupation of the Falkland Island and preventing Argentinean attack were major challenges for the Royal Navy. Despite the fact that entire infrastructure of the Royal Navy was not changed and rebuilt accordingly till then, in a way Royal Navy improvised their techniques successfully, clearly suggestive of the fact that past lessons have helped in altering nature of amphibious operations since the Korean War (Schwartz 310). Conclusion: The Inchon landing in the Korean War can never regarded as the perfect evaluating factor of the strength and weaknesses of the Royal Navy. However, from the strategic perspective of amphibious operation importance of the Inchon landing is immense as it provides an opportunity to the British military force to self-evaluate their power and to which extent the improvements are necessary in order to defend the adversities at the right point of time, by keeping a close watch over modern trends of warfare. The Inchon landing provided a clear message that Royal Navy requires to be ready to defend any situation of crisis and their level of expertise should be of such magnitude that even amidst most adverse of geographical and human conditions a course of war can be changed. Works Cited Alexander, Joseph H. and Bartlett, Merrill L. Sea soldiers in the Cold War: amphibious warfare, 1945-1991. Maryland: Naval Institute Press. 1995. Carpenter, Ronald H. and Duffy, Bernard K. Douglas MacArthur: warrior as wordsmith. California: Greenwood Publishing Group. 1997. Dennis, Peter. and Rottman, Gordon L. Inchon 1950: The Last Great Amphibious Assault. Oxford: Osprey Publishing. 2006. Gatchel,  Theodore L. At the waters edge: defending against the modern amphibious assault. Maryland: Naval Institute Press. 1996. Kaufman, Will. Britain and the Americas : culture, politics, and history : a multidisciplinary encyclopedia. California: ABC-CLIO, Inc. 2005. Nash, Peter. “The Royal Navy in Korea: Replenishment and Sustainability”. British naval strategy east of Suez, 1900-2000: influences and actions. London: Routledge. 2005. Schwartz, Maurice L. Encyclopedia of coastal science. Dordrecht: Springer. 2005. Speller, Ian. “Amphibious Operations, 1945-1998”. The Royal Navy, 1930-2000: innovation and defence. London: Routledge. 2005. Wainstock, Dennis. Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War. California: Greenwood Publishing Group. 1999. Read More