Korean War in 1950 - Research Paper Example

Korean War in 1950 Introduction Although this was not the first time the nation had suffered from wars, the Korean War (1950-53) was one of the most underrated wars in history. Unbeknown to those without prior knowledge, the Korean War, also called “The Forgotten War,” was one of the most costly wars in history in terms of the number of lives lost.1 However, the war got caught in a limbo between World War II and the Cold War, both of which were still fresh and reverberating. Indeed, one of the defining characteristics of the Korean War was its intricate web of tensions, involving failed attempts to unite the Republic of Korea and the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea. It was painfully aggravated by the political maneuverings and power struggle of three powerful states. The United States, the Union Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), and, the People’s Republic of China, each had their respective ambitions and designs over the divided country, giving the war domestic and international dimensions. For the leaders of those times, Soviet’s Joseph Stalin, China’s Mao Zedong and the US’ Harry Truman, prestige was highly at stake and war was a means to achieve that end. Using the traditionalist view of “Soviet Responsibility” and the “Kim Il Sung” hypothesis, this essay will assess who “organized and planned” the South Korean attack: Stalin or the North Korean leader or both.2 This essay will further cite pieces of evidence from related literature that because of prestige and other underlying motives, US, China and Russia strategically involved themselves in the Korean War. Stakes in the Korean War Following WWII, the Korean War became a proxy war for the US and the Soviet Union, where the ideological subordinates of democracy and communism took the cudgels from their superiors. It was the extension of the Cold War, defined by YourDictionary.com as the “hostility and sharp conflict as in diplomacy and economics between states, without actual warfare.”3 Conflict between two or more states is therefore strained during a Cold War as each party chooses to intimidate the other through satellite states rather than engage directly in war. Both the US and USSR were vying for the reputation of “superpower” or the most influential and powerful state in the world. Because each state followed diverse political ideologies, these ideologies were the primary means through which they waged their indirect wars. Supremacy of economic and military values was also put to gamble in the process, along with diplomacy. Other sources said that the growing Soviet influence throughout Europe, the US need to preserve its status, and the poor US-USSR relations were some of the immediate causes of the Cold War. Each superpower must have experienced a “security dilemma,” fearing a loss of influence in the post-WWII scenario.4 It would have been interesting to discover whether Korea would still be divided at present supposing the hostile relations between the US and the Soviet Union had not existed. The Cold War was somehow responsible for planting “the seeds of civil war.” Koreans were powerless against the decision to divide the peninsula; being subject to Japanese governance in the decades before WWII, it had no legitimate government of its own. At the Cold War’s onset, “the United States and the Soviet Union [tightened] their control over their satellites within their own spheres of influence.”5 The divided Korea was just among the first of these satellites. The heavy competition for influence led to proxy wars through these satellite states. It was the most reasonable method for US, Russia, and China were permanent members of the Security Council, the governing body behind the newly formed United Nations in 1945. For its founding members to directly engage in war with each other would be an insult to the UN peace effort. This would present a bad example to existing and potential member-states.6 Indeed, it was not clear how much Stalin, Mao or Truman “wanted” a war in Korea. The pieces of evidence provided by historians are subject to multiple interpretations. It was apparent that each leader was a strategist, who considered the stakes first to see whether engaging in the Korean War had more benefits than costs. Stalin, in particular, anticipated “dramatic changes” which would make circumstances favorable to the Soviet cause.7 Because it was written in the pages of history, all foreign parties must therefore have regarded the Korean War as a hidden goldmine of sorts, where underneath a cloak of violence was a stream of advantages and opportunities. Stalin Inspired the Korean War: Fact or Fallacy? Then US Secretary of State Dean Acheson once branded the South Korean invasion as a “Soviet-inspired conspiracy.” This goes without saying that he held the Communist state and Joseph Stalin seriously responsible for the Korean War. As to how true this accusation was remains puzzling until now. Historical evidence suggests that although Kim had a degree of autonomy, North Korea’s economy was mostly dependent on the Soviet Union. Accounts of their meetings attested that Stalin had promised Kim financial, cultural, educational, and military aid, but all the while denying his requests to forcefully attack South Korea.8 Following this logic, North Korea’s dependence on the Soviets meant that the Korean War would not have transpired had Stalin rejected Kim’s repeated permission to attack the South. The traditionalist view advocates that Moscow exerted influence and control over its surrogate states, China and North Korea. This makes the idea of North Koreans moving on their own as “inconceivable.”9 Stalin had known all along that Kim was going to attack the South. He was not entirely opposed to the idea, but he had doubts on the latter’s timing. He initially refused to go along with Kim’s plan because he had his own goals to consider. Stalin had three primary goals which composed the general Soviet Foreign policy: peaceful coexistence, world revolution and national security. Such goals sometimes “overlapped and reinforced one another”; at other times, the goals were contradictory. For propagandistic purposes and to increase the Soviet buffer zone in Asia, Stalin “alternately exploited” peaceful coexistence and world revolution. When conflicts arose, however, Stalin always prioritized the demands of national security. Entering the Korean War would have advanced these goals. For one, if Kim successfully captured the South, then the Soviet buffer zone and ideological influence would include the whole Korean peninsula, and not just one-half of it.10 No matter how beneficial a South Korean invasion might be, the timing was not right for the Soviets. The problems Stalin had to face in consideration to his goals made him refuse Kim’s requests. Firstly, he saw how weak the North Korean army was, and doubted whether Kim would ever successfully claim victory over the South. Secondly, the presence of US troops in South Korea, which lasted until 1949, prevented Stalin from considering a war because of a probable US intervention that would ruin the North’s chances.11 Third, Stalin and the Soviet Union in general suffered a setback when Yugoslavia, under the leadership of Josip Broz Tito, defiantly adopted a non-aligned position although remaining a Communist state. This angered Stalin who accused Tito’s government of deviating from Marxist principles and moving towards bourgeois capitalism. Yugoslavia was consequently expelled from the international association of socialist states. Tito was “next on Stalin’s list after Korea.”12 Finally, the Sino-Soviet relations experienced a strain after the establishment of China’s communist regime under Mao Zedong. Strains included territorial issues (e.g. Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Manchuria) and the Sino-Soviet treaty, which Mao’s equality principles deemed biased towards the Soviets. Stalin was mourning the loss of control over those particular Chinese territories, which Mao’s government wanted to regain control of. Hence, unsure of USSR’s relationship with China, which was on the brink of hostility, Stalin hesitated to wage a Korean war that could have backfired against him. Ironically, the problems he had with Mao strengthened the need to secure the Korean peninsula.13 Korea would be the best alternative to the strategic territories he lost in China. Stalin did want a war in Korea to achieve his three goals, but he was evaluating whether the benefits of being in war would outweigh the costs. If such was not the case, then at that occasion, war was not ideal for both Soviets and its North Korean cronies. His earlier instinct, given the presence of US troops and the condition of the North Korean military among others, pushed him to set aside his plans until the “international situation” changed to his advantage. Stalin “needed the impetus to justify taking action [on the South]—a motive that would override his [aforementioned] concerns.” When US troops withdrew from the South, then a stroke of genius that possessed Soviet officials (i.e. mobilizing communist/guerilla factions within South Korea so that pressure will be exerted internally and externally), Tito’s rebellion, and Sino-Soviet relations strengthened (because Mao’s demands were granted to prevent Sino-US rapprochement and to keep China under Soviet control), Stalin found the necessary “changed international situation” to further the goals of his Communist state. He assessed the circumstances as favorable to him and thus, at some point between January and April 1950, allowed Kim set into motion the civil war that would perhaps extend the Soviets’ buffer zone and ideological prestige in Asia.”14 Stalin was primarily responsible for the war because, even without direct involvement, he had undisclosed motives on the Korean peninsula and had prior knowledge of Kim’s forceful unification plans. He had only to say yes and the war would begin. What caused him to agree was that the Communist Koreans demonstrated their “revolutionary enthusiasm after the withdrawal of U.S. troops.” He was convinced of Kim’s contention that after launching a surprised attack by 200,000 Communists from the North and guerillas from the South the war would be won in three days, making any intervention on the part of the US pointless. The situation in the Far East presented several openings for the Soviet Union to intimidate the US (at least behind its back). Stalin also needed a substitute to the Chinese warm-water port, which it used to have control until the Mao’s party took over China. This reinforced Stalin’s interests in the Korean peninsula because he wanted to “secure a dependable [system of] sea communications and approaches to the Soviet military-naval base at Port Arthur” as he once did with the Chinese warm-water port.15 Furthermore, the Korean War was also an alibi and an indirect warning to Yugoslavia. Through the example of North Korea’s forceful attack on the South, Stalin was suggesting to Tito that he could forcefully take Yugoslavia to unify the USSR. The Shared Responsibility of Korean Leaders Another major reason for the hardening of the tensions that led to the Korean War was the installment of leaders who had strong educational foundations on the respective ideologies they adhered to. If Kim Il Sung was tasked to head the provisional Communist government of North Korea, the South elected, in the name of democracy, Syngman Rhee as president. Because both leaders were staunch advocates of their respective political beliefs, they each “determined to reunite [Korea] under their own rules.”16 “The intense nationalistic goals of both halves of Korea” justify the civil war aspect of the Korean War as well as the fact that Rhee and Kim were jointly accountable to it.17 Both leaders wanted a war, but they both also wanted to win it without compromising their respective political values. “Kim Il Sung… had been supporting guerrilla activities in the South for over three years,” and given the economic conditions of South Korea, he was almost certain to defeat the other half. However, rice harvest thrived in 1949, indicating a forthcoming recovery. Later on, Kim was on tenterhooks upon learning of Rhees enlargement and rearmament of the Southern forces. Pyongyang recognized that its military advantage over the South was declining, thus Kim felt the need to act fast or his own national sentiments of reunification would never come to fruition.18 Acting fast, of course, entailed permission from Stalin, who considered only his own welfare. In his hastiness, Kim miscalculated the capability of his and the enemy’s forces. He was not able to predict how fast US could intervene in the war. If China had not sent “volunteers” to North Korea, Kim’s communist regime would have been annihilated.19 On one hand, because he refuse to agree to a number of ceasefire proposals countless of times, Rhee was highly unpopular with his allies and his decisions contributed to a divided Korea. He also vetoed any peace plan that failed to completely eliminate the North. His leadership style was high-handed and he had a single-minded ambition of leading a united Korean peninsula with the help of UN forces. US hesitation to bomb Mainland China apparently made Rhee impatient as he wanted stronger methods to be used against Chinese Communists. Under him, South Korea was ruled in an autocratic manner. Rhee never took dissentions kindly and he treated captured communists rather ruthlessly. His character, principles and decisions, added to Kim Il Sung’s, had helped ignite the widespread violence in Korea for two years.20 China’s Contribution China’s participation escalated the already complicated dimensions of the Korean War. Mao Zedong felt that victory against the Chinese Nationals would be empty if he was not going to chase them down to Taiwan, subdue them, and acquire recognition for the People’s Republic of China by the world of states. Partaking in the Korean War was therefore necessary because Mao’s important allies were there. China badly needed the Soviets’ “air and naval assistance…to seize Taiwan,” and North Korea for its troops, which once assisted the civil war it had just won.21 The Korean War severely impaired the Sino-American relations Mao Zedong initially hoped to achieve. He was at first willing to support the US during the Roosevelt administration so as to balance Soviet influence. However, Roosevelt decided to support the Nationalist Party Koumintang (KMT) instead and ignored Mao’s Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The implied rejection pushed the CCP to seek aid from Moscow, giving China the stereotype of being Stalin’s proxy. Further resentment grew when Truman’s administration continued to support the Nationalists. When the Korean War broke out, Americans intervened to support Nationalist refugees to Taiwan at the same time it intervened for South Koreans. The bad blood China experienced under Roosevelt which resurfaced in Truman’s administration, including the debt of gratitude China owed to Stalin when he conceded to the revision of the Sino-Soviet treaty, gave Mao an “impetus” for war and barred any possibility of Sino-US rapprochement.22 Chen Jian argued that China’s involvement in the war was primarily motivated by Mao’s decisions to encourage "continuous revolution" in the country as well as to broaden his own power. He further contended that Mao took advantage of the Chinese peoples "victim mentality" to mobilize public opinion. Such mentality forces individuals to harbor stereotypical feelings that foreign powers are going to bank on the weaknesses of their homeland and pushes them into a defensive stance.23 During the North Korean offensive on June 25, 1950, Mao’s government had already decided that “the United States was Chinas primary enemy.” Military confrontation was inevitable. Chen believed that the Chinese leadership escalated the Korean War out of the need to “consolidate the revolution and to maintain its momentum.” Other motivations integrated a longing to restore Chinas former role as a major power. China was wary of the United States as a “long-term and enduring threat” to its rise to power.24 The support for North Korea would ward off American “imperialist actions” towards China, which in turn would forge a stronger and “mutually beneficial” relationship with its fellow Communists and intensify its communist authority nationally and regionally.25 Truman’s Containment Policy One of the US’ main objectives in South Korea was to ward off Communist influence in Asia (and maintain its own influence). The Soviets’ intervention in the affairs of Greece and Turkey pushed the establishment of the Marshall Plan, which sought to aid war-torn areas in Europe as a way to dilute the seeping Communist ideology. US did not want Communism to spread in Asia as it had in Eastern Europe, thus during their trusteeship in South Korea, they neither persuaded Korean Rights to support nor warned them to “exercise restraint in attacking” the Korean leftists.26 Although the Truman Administration successfully established an independent state in South Korea, it was unable to “develop and coordinate military strategy and foreign policy.” Following the withdrawal of American troops, there was indeed a changed international situation which prompted the Soviet Union to give North Korea a mild go signal. America launched a new defense policy that excluded Asian countries from its defense parameter in the Asia-Pacific region. Had the US clearly stated it would defend South Korea, then the Soviet Union would not have been fooled into allowing North Korea to attack. Its failure to clarify its commitment to South Korea forged a “conflict that would shape US-Asian policy for decades.”27 There were also allegations that the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea in 1949 was part of the plan to lure out the enemy. This signified that America was amenable with war to serve its interests. If ever North Korea did attack first, it would have an alibi to intervene, defend a noncommunist country, and then drive out communist influence. In addition, the Soviet Union exploded an atomic bomb in 1949, which caused another surge of insecurity on the part of the American government, because it implied that US no longer had the monopoly of nuclear weapons, first used to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki in WWII. In effect was an arms race to restrain each other’s unspoken threat and where Korea was the stage for demonstration.28 There were also “underlying tensions” within Truman’s government which became the driving force for US intervention in the Korean War. Truman apparently faced criticisms and domestic pressures for being soft with communism abroad. Some Republican members of the Senate were already clamoring for stronger anti-communist policies. Thus, the onslaught of South Korea gave Truman the opportunity to save face and prove to his critics that his administration had not been soft with communists outside America. At the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, Taiwan was included in the US “peacekeeping” agenda to the annoyance of Mao.29 It was said that the collapse of the Nationalist regime in December 1949 was "an even greater disaster for American policy than Pearl Harbor.” America was shocked at the "loss" of China – or perhaps the China that once shared its political ideals of democracy, libertarianism, and capitalism. China would have been a formidable ally, whose economic and military resources could replenish those of the US. Korea was therefore one of the substitutes for the China it lost (as it seemed influence over China was the key to controlling Asia, an idea the USSR was able to grasp earlier than the US).30 Truman escalated the Korean War not just to serve American anti-communist sentiments, confront Soviet nuclear intimidation, and quiet the loss of China, but also to respond to an overt aggression by a Communist state and iron out a proper containment policy in Asia. Truman deployed forces to Korea without further encouragement from Congress or the public, though failing to consult with either party.31 Conclusion In the general sense, Burton Kaufman’s statement practically summed up the essence of the Korean War as a “power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union superimposed on a civil war between North and South Korea.”32 It is the belief of this essay that the foreign and local parties to the Korean War were mainly motivated by highly contended values in international politics, particularly prestige, to serve their respective interests. More importantly, however, these values prompted Stalin, Mao, and Truman, as well as the respective leaders of North and South Korea, to get involved in the Korean War. Considering his extensive list of motives and his threefold goal, not to mention his control over the North and China, Stalin bore primary responsibility for the conflict. 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