Theory of the New Deal Synthesis of the Marshall Plan - Essay Example

A Geopolitical View and the Theory of the New Deal Synthesis of the Marshall Plan: A Comparative Book Review of John Agnew and Nicholas Entrikin’s (Eds.) “The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor” and Michael J. Hogan’s “The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952” Introduction The Marshall Plan is something that evokes feelings of pride and satisfaction from those Americans who are familiar with what it is—whether from the personal experience of actually living its glory days or from history classes that venerate the genius and determination of its foremost proponent and namesake, General George C. Marshall (Thompson 2003). Although the Marshall Plan, otherwise known as the European Recovery Plan (ERP), is one of the most well-received policies of international aid headed and created by the United States, it has not been free from controversies (Hitchcock n.d.). Even with the good press associated with the Marshall Plan, revisionists and diplomatic historians from both the United States and the sixteen involved nations from Western Europe—even more than fifty years after its ratification and implementation—still debate on its origins, motives and effects (Agnew and Entrikin 2004, p. 1). For instance, historical revisionists have found that “the economic impact of the plan has been significantly downgraded as scholars concluded that the crisis of 1947 in Europe was less grave than American policy-makers had thought” (Hitchcock n.d.). With these considerations in mind, two of the most substantial and celebrated books on rethinking and revisiting the Marshall Plan will be reviewed in this paper in order to shed some light on what the real purposes and effects of the Marshall Plan are in relation to the United States’ supposed gigantic role in the economic recovery of Europe. The book by Michael Hogan and two chapters from Agnew and Entrikin’s volume will be compared against each other through their contributions to the rethinking of the Marshall Plan. While the former is very detailed, the message that Hogan wants to state is somewhat lost within the detailing of the various facets of the creation of the Marshall Plan. On the other hand, Agnew and Entrikin’s chapters are composed of separate papers that present an all-encompassing view of the Marshall Plan and its effects. These separate chapters that can stand on their own present a more comprehensive and understandable argument as to the significance of the Marshall Plan in history. It can be said then that quality and readability of a work does not depend on the length and an extreme attention to detail, but on a concise presentation of facts and figures that would make the reader understand and accept the argument presented as true. Although there are a lot of differences between the two books, one of the main causes for this conclusion is the fact that Marshall chose to dwell on every facet and event that surrounded the creation and implementation of the Marshall Plan, while Agnew and Entrikin decided to present a logical argument based on a collection of works, with each having provided the volume with a significant contribution to the argument being presented. The way in which these two books were written constitute the way this reader perceived their success in presenting a solid argument. A Comparative General Critique In rethinking the Marshall Plan, its actual origins and purposes need to be considered. Both books in this review present their own analyses and interpretation. Although there are points of similarities, as can be expected in a historiographical analysis, there are still some notable distinctions in the facts as presented by the various authors. This is also due to the fact that the book “The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952” is written by a single author, while “The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor” is actually a compilation of ten papers, with an introduction from the editors and organized into three parts, and articles presented at a November 1997 UCLA conference entitled “The Marshall Plan: Lessons after 50 Years (1947-97) - Through the Cold War and Toward Unification” (Agnew and Entrikin 2004, p. xvii). Because the latter is a collection of relevant papers on the examination of the continuous effects of the Marshall Plan and its legacy composed by various professionals in history, economics, political science and human geography and written by scholars from some of the major players and beneficiaries of the implementation the ERP like the United States, Germany, France and Great Britain (Agnew and Entrikin 2004, p. 4). On the other hand, Hogan’s lengthy book, totaling in at four-hundred and forty-five pages, uses mostly American and British sources as primary references, with German and French academic articles and books as secondary sources. In this sense, the compiled works found in Agnew and Entrikin’s book present a more comprehensive analysis of the Marshall Plan and its actual impacts in Europe in the evolution of world events, such as the Cold War and globalization. It also presents varying points of views and writing styles, complete with statistical comparative graphical representations and maps for emphasis and better understanding, that are more interesting to read. Furthermore, what makes it distinct from other books on the Marshall Plan is its “continuity of the Marshall Plan as a metaphor and model for beneficent external intervention to aid in economic transformation under conditions of socio-economic collapse” (p. 4). It focuses on the long-term effects of the ERP and presents an in-depth analysis, not only of its impacts and relevance today, but also its origins and purposes. “Indeed, it is remarkable that the Marshall Plan remains so prominent in political discourse at a time when the world that it helped to construct has changed so significant” (p. 21). Although all of the papers within this compilation present clear and logical arguments, chapters 2 and 4 particularly present new and conclusive data on the Marshall Plan. while the former details the real economic achievements of the Marshall Plan by presenting and clearly enumerating the author’s doubts on the perceived success of the ERP by presenting hard facts to support his claims, the latter focuses on the lasting—if they indeed were—effects of the Marshall Plan on France. The editors have found a way to provide readers with an all-encompassing and exhaustive analysis of the Marshall Plan situated in a geopolitical context. Aside from just glorifying the impacts of the Marshall Plan, Agnew and Entrikin went one step forward in creating relevance for the ERP today and presenting contrasting views that leaves the readers to make up their own minds about the real significance of the Marshall Plan at present and how it has shaped American and European economic relations, politics and history. While Agnew and Entrikin did an outstanding job of shedding light on a new perspective on the Marshall Plan, Hogan, on the other hand, presents a lengthy discussion of the Marshall Plan—that is almost just a detailed historical narrative of the policy—that is tiring to read and presents much confusion in a reader that is not well-versed in diplomatic international history. Because of this fact that Hogan forgets that not everyone understands the terminologies he uses in the book in that he fails to clearly explain the important events and decisions involved in his analytical narrative, the book somewhat fails to actually impart the knowledge that it wants to share with its audience. Furthermore, Hogan’s lack of use of statistical graphs and charts that would have helped a lot in illustrating the claimed success of the Marshall Plan—while he spews out statistics and numbers throughout the duration of his discussion—deeply affects the understandability and readability of the book. Another important criticism against the book is that his argument is presented in a chronological manner. Because the argument dwells on the past—in proving that the New Deal synthesis inevitably affected the way the Marshall Plan was conceptualized and paved the way for its success—the message is somewhat lost in the middle of the discussion of the sequential events surrounding the Marshall Plan. Although Hogan succinctly and clearly explained his argument at the start of the book, the remaining chapters and their extremely detailed narrative, with little analysis, made this reader confused as to what he really wanted to say in the end. This does not mean that he presented an illogical and incomplete argument. He did prove his point in the concluding chapter and recapitulated everything, but it is just that the detailed and lengthy discussion, coupled with the technical terms, became confusing and boring. However detailed his account of the various events that have influenced the Marshall Plan and its effects, Hogan’s extreme attention to detail may as well have been one of the main faults of the book that led to its convincing power being considerably diminished. The book’s nine chapters provide the readers with a drawn out discussion on the power struggle that took place during the diplomatic negotiations of the creation and implementation of the Marshall Plan. What Hogan did that was new to the Marshall Plan volume is his contextualization of the ERP within the evolution of the New Deal and the New Era. It uses the New Deal Synthesis as the theoretical framework of the book. Instead of moving forward, as what Agnew and Entrikin had done, Hogan backtracked and traced the origins of the Marshall Plan within the context of Hoover’s New Era and Roosevelt’s New Deal policies. He presented his thesis in so much detail, that if not for the concluding chapter, the message was somewhat lost in the middle. Furthermore, Hogan’s book opens up the important question: “so what?” So what if the New Deal paved the way for the success of the Marshall Plan? How is that relevant today? How can that present a new perspective on the Marshall Plan? Does it affect the perceived success of the ERP? Notwithstanding these questions and criticisms, Hogan’s book still presents readers educated in diplomatic politics and economics with significant insights into the nuances of the Marshall Plan and how they affected its outcome. The Origins and Purposes of the Marshall Plan It can be safely assumed, for the most part, that any book on the Marshall Plan will contain insights on its origins and purposes. Although Agnew and Entrikin’s book focused more on the impacts of the Marshall Plan, the supposed purposes of the ERP was still discussed, most notably in the chapter written by British historian Alan S. Milward entitled “Europe and the Marshall Plan: 50 Years On” (pp. 58-81). Aside from providing a critical analysis of the purposes and impacts of the Marshall Plan, Milward also criticized Hogan for “attributing Europes speedy economic recovery post World War II to Marshall the plan (p. 19). Milward proposes that aside from the main goal of creating “The West,” the Marshall Plan’s purposes include European and American “military security, social security based on economic success, and social and political cohesion” that need to offer a far better option than communism (p. 77). Milward further argues that these purposes open the Marshall Plan into misinterpretation and radical reductionist thought that leads to the assumption and negation that the United States is the sole and major influence that led to Europe’s rapid economic growth after World War II (p. 79). Milward is considered to be one of the leading experts of the Marshall Plan and he presented his arguments in a way that has just the right details and supported by necessary facts, is totally focused on the topic at hand, and is very readable. One can learn a lot about the Marshall Plan just by reading the second chapter. Moreover, he provides the readers with a new way of looking at the Marshall Plan—not just the usual American way, but a more logical, penetrating and skeptical way of disproving the supposed all-encompassing significance of the United States’ role in the rejuvenation of European economy. It certainly commonsensical to conclude that “explanations are not likely to get any better as long as they suppose that as far as productivity and growth were concerned the only flow of influence that mattered was from America” (p. 79). In the first chapter of Hogan’s book entitled “Search for a “creative peace”: European integration and the origins of the Marshall Plan,” he states his interpretation of the objectives of the Marshall Plan primarily to be able to create supranational bodies that will facilitate the economic and political integration of Western Europe into the world through the removal of trade regulations, tariff and other impediments; the establishment of the European trade union; and the conversion of currencies (pp. 26-53). Throughout the course of the Marshall Plan, one of its purposes is also to find a way to revive Germany’s economy and productivity “without restoring its prewar hegemony” (p. 8). After these objectives are met, Hogan argues that it ultimately led to the revitalization of European economy and to the suppression of communism. Hogan further narrates the events that led to the creation and success of the Marshall Plan through his New Deal Synthesis theory that composes the main thesis of his book. The New Deal Synthesis Hogan’s long analytical narrative presents a new argument that the Marshall Plan and its success—as Hogan’s position is that the policy is successful in its revival of European economy—is inevitably intertwined with the creation of a new trend of American diplomacy which started in the Hoover’s New Era (although it essentially failed, it was a good beginning) and Roosevelt’s New Deal (p. 3). If not for the New Era and the New Deal reshaping American international relations and restructuring the global economy, there would not have been a stage on which to set the Marshall Plan and its resulting success, which was a “turning point in the world position” of both the United States and Great Britain (p. 150). Basically, the point of all four-hundred forty-five pages of Hogan’s book is to simply prove that the Marshall Plan is the brainchild of the New Deal coalition (p. 13) in that it paved the way for the creation of “an integrated Western European economy much like the large internal market that had taken shape in the United States under the Constitution of 1787,” which was the vision of the New Deal synthesis (p. 427). The Geopolitical View If Hogan immersed his discussion in the narration and analysis of the Marshall Plan through a synthesis of the New Era and New Deal, Agnew and Entrikin, on the other hand, compressed a volume of highly enlightening and critical papers that explores the geopolitics involved in the implementation and supposed success of the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan was implemented in sixteen European countries; Agnew and Entrikin recognized this fact and showed the various perspectives regarding its effects and successes in the long run. Particularly interesting is the way the authors of the various chapters, not only present the different aspects of the impacts of the ERP, but also incorporate in their writing their nationalistic tendencies—with each from different nationalities. Hence, the impact of the ERP in Germany was discussed by a German, in Great Britain by a Britton, in France by a French discussing sources that were written in French, and so on. An example of this is how Milward directly criticized and opposed Hogan’s view that the Marshall Plan was a success from all fronts and that its significance in the revival of the Western European economy is overarching and so great that Europe could not have recovered in that way if not for the drafting and implementation of the Marshall Plan. Gérard Bossuat, in the chapter “The Marshall Plan and European Integration: Limits of an Ambition,” admits that the French economy was indeed helped a lot by the Marshall Plan; however, its effects was not as great and not as enduring as the American military presence in France (p. 127). Here, Bossuat presents a clear argument of how the Marshall Plan did not create European Unity—at least it was not the pioneer of the concept. Through a pessimistic look at European Unity, he tackled the organization of the Marhsall Plan and its effects on Europe, with particular focus on France. Being French in nationality made Bossuat gain access to sources in French; and this made the paper more focused, detailed and all-encompassing. He presented his argument in a clear manner using headings to separate his ideas, supported by undisputed facts, that made the reader fully understand what he meant when he concluded that “The OEEC represented a hope for uniting Europe, primarily because US policy makers vaguely imagined that it would be a model for the United States of Europe. But Europeans forged it as an organization of cooperation, not as one of integration” (p. 147). Bossuat also presented the limitations of his study and other questions that need to be asked to formulate a more complete analysis of the Marshall Plan and its contribution to European Unity. The strength of Agnew and Entrikin’s book is that it logically presents the chapters in a way that clearly progresses towards seeing the relevance of the Marshall Plan today, in learning from it and using it as a model for creating a policy with a unified advocacy that the world will benefit from. The two chapters analyzed here show how the compilation provides new insights and arguments regarding the Marshall Plan and how they have presented them in a clear and understandable manner. The Effects of the Marshall Plan Although there is a consensus between the two books that the Marshall Plan indeed has positive consequences both in the revival of the economies of Western European countries, the degree of the positivity of these impacts vary. Hogan concludes that the economic growth and stability gained due to the minimization of the bilateral nature of the European economy and the opening up of trade in the multilateral world through “a more equitable distribution of production” spurred by the Marshall Plan successfully curbed communism and unified Western Europe (p. 419). Crucial to the results of the Marshall Plan is the development and propagation of economic integration from which stems the “multilateralization of intra-European trade” (p. 437). This “Americanization” of European economy, which involves a neo-capitalist reorganization of the United States and Europe, is a long process that started with the New Era, followed by the success of the New Deal, which culminated in the consequent triumph of the Marshall Plan (p. 419). Likewise, Agnew and Entrikin state a similar view of the move from bilateralism to multilateralism as crucial to the establishment of a more open European economy (p. 234). This was engendered by the Marshall plan as it sought to establish a unified financial aid policy that does not involve sixteen national plans; but rather a single integrated plan that serves a common goal, whilst being implemented in a number of ways depending on the situation of each country as “there never was a formula, nor were there even criteria; there were considerations. Each country made its claim for aid on whatever grounds it chose” (p. 234). Regardless of the assertion of whether or not the Marshall Plan generated the Cold War, Agnew and Entrikin do not deny its positive impacts. In short, the Marshall Plan’s long-term effects and its legacy, aside from the significant formulation of a unified international policy geared towards a common goal, lie in the fact that it is a good model that can be reinvented to address global problems being experienced at present as it has paved the way for the creation of the open world economy—despite some major differences then and now—and its ideals can still become relevant today (p. 262). “Indeed, it is remarkable that the Marshall Plan remains so prominent in political discourse at a time when the world that it helped to construct has changed so significantly” (p. 21). Conclusion While Hogan focuses more on the short-term effects of the Marshall Plan, Agnew and Entrikin demonstrate the long-term impacts of the plan, the varying perspectives that come from an in-depth analysis of its impacts, and its possible relevance in solving global problems today. Although Agnew and Entrikin maintain the positive effects of the Marshall Plan, they suggest that some of them were blown out of proportion. For instance, when looked more closely, the financial aid allocation of the Marshall Plan “tells a set of different national stories about the impact of the plan rather than the single one about Europe as a whole that usually prevails” (p. 19). Notwithstanding the arguments and serious considerations purported by the book regarding the degree of the impacts of the Marshall Plan, both books give positive feedback regarding the significance of the Marshall Plan in helping speed up the economic recovery of Western Europe after the Second World War. While both books present similar results in their analysis of the Marshall Plan, its purposes and its impacts, with varying degrees and explanations, they differ greatly in their presentation and the way they analyze the ERP. It is the opinion of this writer, being a non-expert at American diplomacy and world economics, that Hogan became too immersed in the details of the Marshall Plan and its historical roots in the New Deal synthesis that he somewhat failed to form a cohesive and understandable argument. He tends to lose the reader somewhere in the midst of his lengthy discussion of the various decisions and debates that made up the drafting and implementation of the Marshall Plan. Agnew and Entrikin, on the other hand, give their readers an interesting read through the different perspectives presented by the ten authors who wrote the chapters of the book. Although a compilation tends to present a non-cohesive argument—as each chapter can stand alone—the editors’ introductory chapter serves as a guide in understanding the book. Furthermore, the way the book was organized makes way for a better understanding of how the Marshall Plan can still serve as a model for an economic intervention policy that can successfully aid distressed nations. In this sense, Agnew and Entrikin were able to send their message across to the readers. Regardless of these opinions, it cannot be denied that each book presents new insights on the Marshall Plan. Bibliography Agnew, J. and Entrikin, N. (eds.) 2004, The Marshall Plan Today: Model and Metaphor, London, Routledge. Cox, M. and Kennedy-Pipe, C. 2005, ‘The Tragedy of American Diplomacy? Rethinking the Marshall Plan’, Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 97–134. Hitchcock, W. I. n.d., The Marshall Plan and the Creation of the West, In The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Hogan, M. J. 1987, The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Thompson, R. Y. 2003, ‘The World Hangs in the Balance": George C. Marshall and the European Recovery Plan’, Social Education, vol. 67, no. 6, pp. 316+. Read More