Diplomacy in Politics - Essay Example

I. Introduction WE would all admit, I suppose, that we can obtain information and guidance from an expert in his own particular Even the idlest professor may say something of value on a topic which has been his main means of livelihood for a long period of time. But such technical discussions are better made under different auspices. I would be taking an unfair advantage of you if I were to address you today on international history. And on the great issues of life and conduct I am doubtful whether exposition and exhortation can accomplish very much and still less whether an academic mind is very capable of dealing with them effectively. No less a person than Mr Gladstone, it is recorded, was of the opinion that the University Common Room was as bad as the Bank of England Parlour in narrowing the point of view. It seemed to me, therefore, that I might best, perhaps, speak on a subject which throws some light on the complexity of human nature and which I have had some opportunity to observe at close quarters. I am sure you will acquit me of any undue estimate of the importance of the role which I myself played in a subordinate position during the two great wars, if I illustrate my theme occasionally from my own experience. For it is by action that a man is made most vividly aware of the limitations which human nature imposes on the conduct of policy. It is no accident that the two most scolding pens amongst British historians today are wielded by two who have had no practical experience of political or military affairs. The subject of diplomacy has of course been expounded by a long array of writers. They have, however, often considered it in the wider aspect of policy rather than in that of the method by which policy is implemented. But today I intend to speak of the tactics of diplomacy, not of its strategy. There is, it is true, as in war, a vital connexion between the two. The most magnificent conceptions of policy are useless unless there is a means of putting them into effect. In the last war immense devotion, skill and energy and a wealth of economic and statistical information and analysis were devoted to the elaboration of plans by which the war against Germany could be quickly won by a bombing offensive. Their only weakness was that it was impossible to carry them out. Similar situations often arise in the formation of foreign policy. For this reason even in this field a subordinate may be able at times to make a contribution to great events and no Foreign Minister has ever touched greatness unless he was himself fully aware of the minutiae of his business. On the other hand, of course, it is no use possessing to the highest degree the art of finding means to ends unless those ends are worth obtaining. But this afternoon it is means not ends that I shall be considering. On that part of their subject nearly all writers since Machiavelli, in spite of the reputation of the profession, insist on the employment in diplomacy of those virtues which we value most highly in our ordinary avocations. Trickery, subterfuge, lying, the appeal to the passions, to cupidity, lust or the desire for honours, are almost universally condemned. Only conduct of the highest moral character is allowable. One of the most distinguished men of letters of our time, Mr Harold Nicolson, has summed them up, in his admirable study of the subject, as truth, accuracy, calm, patience, good temper, modesty and loyalty, and to this list of virtues he adds the qualities of intelligence, knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality, charm, industry, courage and even tact. Far be it for me to cast any doubt on these highly commendable judgements. But these same writers invariably point out that many diplomats hardly live up to such high standards. And it is well to remember that the main object of diplomacy is to obtain what one wants without recourse to violence. It is the interests of his own country that a diplomat has to secure and defend. In his private life he may be prepared to sacrifice his own interests for the sake of others. But it is only very rarely that such a situation occurs in the relations between states. Where it does occur, as when Britain was prepared to make substantial sacrifices to abolish the Slave Trade, the world refuses to believe in the reality of the moral purpose. At any rate, you will all probably agree that the art of diplomacy consists in obtaining the maximum national interest with a minimum of friction and resentment of others. Of course national objectives can be obtained by some states by a mere exercise of power. But in most periods of history there has been a balance of forces in the world and for many centuries a community of nations has existed of which even the most powerful states must take account. Their diplomatic problems are often as difficult as those of their weaker neighbours. Moreover diplomacy has become to a very large extent not so much a relation between two states as a complex of relations inside groups of states and between different groups of states. No two governments negotiate without being acutely aware of the effect of their actions on other governments and very often the actual transactions, whether in formal or informal conference, must be multilateral. Nor need I emphasize the fact that diplomacy sometimes attempts to obtain results by influencing the public opinion on which governments depend. In the cold war it is one of the principal weapons on either side. But this is war, not diplomacy. Among states whose relations are relatively peaceful, such activity is a two-edged weapon. It is after all governments which decide and governments have more influence over those they govern than anyone else can possess. They react vigorously to any attempt to force their consent by an appeal to those whom they represent. Direct action on peoples is nearly always a failure unless it is done by the collaboration of governments who are anxious to obtain support for a common purpose. Diplomacy, therefore, is a transaction between individuals or groups and successful diplomacy depends, in my opinion, mainly on three things; first, on producing a climate of opinion in which the desired ends can be most easily obtained; secondly, on devising the forms of agreement in which these ends can be translated into practical accomplishments; and thirdly, on creating or perceiving the right moment at which the maximum effort can be applied. For these purposes it is, of course, necessary to possess skill in the presentation of argument and a complete knowledge of the facts. In the complicated world of today a minister may often possess the debating ability without the necessary information and this is especially true of the greater states whose interests cover the widest range. The expert on a particular aspect on the other hand, may often be unable to appreciate the wider considerations which affect the whole character of the discussions. The creation of an organization in which at all points expertise and a broad outlook can be combined is thus one of the essentials of successful negotiation. But to produce the right climate of opinion needs other qualities which depend on character as much as on intellect. It is a difficult subject upon which to generalize. Every problem has its own complex of circumstances and personalities and their relative significance and importance may well only gradually become apparent. A primary requisite is for the negotiator to show that he understands and appreciates the necessities of others and that he is ready, even anxious, to satisfy them so far as he is able. But even in bilateral negotiations he will often be able to ascertain differences in opinion or at least emphasis amongst members of the other side, for only rarely does an important negotiation take place solely between two individuals. In multilateral negotiations there will certainly be variety of opinion. He can then encourage and support those aspects which lead in the long run to conclusions which meet his own interests. It may well be that he should not reveal too clearly at the outset the whole of his own mind. This is well recognized in diplomacy. No one expects everything to be immediately disclosed. I had to work by influence and diplomacy, writes Mr Churchill in his last volume, in order to secure agreed and harmonious action with our cherished Ally . . . I did not therefore open any of these alternatives at our meeting . . . It may also at times be advisable to go a long way up what you know to be a blind alley, which someone else has suggested, in order that when the time comes to turn back you may on a second venture be accepted as the guide. It may on some occasions be wise to adopt a very circuitous route to the objective that you may not come up against insuperable obstacles at the outset. Much skill can be shown in obtaining assent to general propositions which can at a later stage logically lead to concrete and detailed agreements not anticipated when the first step was taken. And one must be aware, of course, that similar considerations and expedients will have occurred to others and not assent too readily to their propositions without realizing exactly what one is doing. In multilateral negotiations it is sometimes imperative to allow other conflicting views to destroy one another before suggesting the course which one wishes to pursue. It may even be necessary to support one side or another in a project which one realizes is not really defensible in order to obtain similar support at a later stage of the negotiation. But more often, in my actual experience, success is obtained by the method, always preferable if it is possible, of a direct and candid approach to the objective because of the conviction that it is such that in the long run the interests of all concerned are best served by it. It is then the business of the negotiator to carry this conviction by every resource of argument and persuasion, to create the feeling that such a course is the natural, indeed, the inevitable result of the negotiation, to ward off the complications and irrelevances that either accident or design introduce into even the most carefully prepared discussions, and, if necessary, to defeat, expose, or neutralize opposition based on more sinister motives that cannot be avowed. One of the best examples of such successful diplomacy is that by which Dr Weizmann brought into existence the Jewish National Home, which I was able to observe closely in the later stages of the First World War. When that war began, his cause was hardly known to the principal statesman of the victors and its administrative centre was in Germany. It had many enemies and some of the most formidable were amongst the most highly placed of his own people. The task which Dr Weizmann set himself of transferring the centre of Zionism to London and obtaining the cooperation of Britain in Palestine was more difficult than that of any other statesman of the smaller powers, not excepting Masaryk or Venizelos. He once told me that 2,000 interviews had gone to the making of the Balfour Declaration. With unerring skill he adapted his arguments to the special circumstances of each statesman. To the British and Americans he could use biblical language and awake a deep emotional undertone; to other nationalities he more often talked in terms of interest. Mr Lloyd George was told that Palestine was a little mountainous country not unlike Wales; with Lord Balfour the philosophical background of Zionism could be surveyed; for Lord Cecil the problem was placed in the setting of a new world organization; while to Lord Milner the extension of imperial power could be vividly portrayed. To me who dealt with these matters as a junior officer of the General Staff, he brought from many sources all the evidence that could be obtained of the importance of a Jewish National Home to the strategical position of the British Empire, but he always indicated by a hundred shades and inflexions of the voice that he believed that I could also appreciate better than my superiors other more subtle and recondite arguments. Read More