How Can HR Working in the Intelligence Agencies Affect the Outcome of Interagency Collaboration - Essay Example

How can human resources (people) working in the bureaucratic Intelligence Agencies affect the outcome of interagency collaboration efforts? “Almost nothing,” wrote Eugene Bardach (1998), “about the bureaucratic ethos makes it hospitable to interagency collaboration.” (p. 232) His point is that the collaborative ethos values equality, adaptability, discretion, and results while the bureaucratic ethos venerates hierarchy, stability, obedience and procedures. This is the reason why reforming the intelligence community into a closer, more integrated and collaborative community, becomes a daunting task. The problem is particularly highlighted today as the American public, the polity and policymakers are all in a mad scramble about addressing the problem of intelligence failure that made the 9/11 terrorist attack by the Al Qaeda successful. Emerging policies concerning the intelligence community demonstrate a preference for a closer interagency collaboration as this was the factor widely blamed for the 9/11 attacks. However, the sixteen agencies and departments that comprises the American intelligence community will undoubtedly find it difficult to make the transition from an existing way of doing agency business to a new and more collaborative way because it require the human resource to withdraw even temporarily from bureaucratic philosophy. Here, agencies must spurn something that they have least respected and cherished. In addition, an agency must be willing to discard its culture if necessary, or, if possible, break it up into components, some of which might warrant being salvaged and recycled. This is the reason why human resource is pivotal in achieving interagency collaboration. This paper will address how human resources working in the bureaucratic Intelligence Agencies affect the outcome of interagency collaboration efforts. Specifically, this paper will discuss why each individual human resources, available to Intelligence Community Agencies, have more a more significant and influential role towards increasing interagency collaboration and integration than the technological advances and high budget resources they work with. II. Literature Review Presently, there is an excessive dependence on high-tech intelligence in the United States military establishment, including a tight integration between the technical intelligence and conventional military intelligence and that it could be problematic as demonstrated by the fighting in Iraq. (Posner, p. 70) There are several studies that show why human resource is significant in interagency cooperation in the intelligence community – a role that is even more significant than technological advances and budget resources. The technological intelligence reliance and its consequences is what Johnson, Ledlow and Cwiek have been pointing at in their discussion on information processing, as they that it does not work in a vacuum. Here, it was argued it is still people who perceive and evaluate information and that it is influenced by their judgments, including judgments on how others interpret and respond to these same messages. (p. 318) A series of interviews conducted by Riley et al., emphasized how traditional intelligence is very tactical and analytical – tips and liaison with connections or locations of subjects and the assessment of information, assembling of piece from various sources to produce an understanding of patterns or anomalies. (p. 38) This resource has a wealth of first-hand insights from the interviewed rank and file operatives in regard to intelligence work. The study, however, is specific to this aspect and, therefore, is not helpful in regard to a discussion of interagency cooperation. Theoharis and Immerman (2006) illustrated the importance of human resource in the intelligence field by extensively presenting evidences in history referencing the experiences of Britain, Russia and France. In their book, The Central Intelligence Agency, it was argued intelligence agencies must rely on human intelligence because this resource is the only ones that acquire experience and skills necessary to succeed in intelligence operations. (p. 111) Furthermore, it was established in the study intelligence professionals are required in order to build cooperation and ties. This work has the necessary data to establish why manpower plays a significant role in a spy network and hence, useful only to the extent of supporting an argument in human versus technology debate. The work did not explore much about interagency cooperation or how the human-factor figures in such circumstance. At present the US intelligence community is consisted of sixteen separate government agencies, including intelligence agencies, military intelligence, civilian intelligence and analysis offices under federal executive departments. The sheer number of these agencies leads to power struggle, rivalry, overlapping responsibilities, and so forth. A compounding problem of a very serious nature, wrote Boin and Stern (2005), is the unwillingness of organizations to cooperate with each other even in the wake of a disaster or an attack: “It would be naïve to think that under crisis conditions all pre-existing bureaucratic tensions make way for a mechanistic, rationalistic mode of centralized and tightly coordinated policymaking and implementation. On the contrary, interagency tensions often intensify.” (p. 58) This the reason why many studies on interagency collaboration point to leadership as a key element in bringing disparate units together. Johnson, Ledlow and Cwiek argued that it is imperative that leader among these agencies develop a sense of shared values and trust as they work together for essential common goals. (p. 321) Despite a well understood need for greater collaboration between agencies, and the establishment of a number of committees and working groups for that expressed purpose, the progress in the United States in regard to a meaningful interagency collaboration at the national or strategic level remains elusive. Forest attributed the reason for such lack of success to a number of organizational and bureaucratic factors and that one of these concerns human resources. To quote: From an organizational perspective, departments and agencies compete to establish or maintain primacy of roles and specific missions under established law, as this determines who has leadership and (to some extent) command over other agencies. Command gives an agency the authority to task or request resources from other agencies and departments in support of missions and control over the direction of policy and actions operationally. (p. 145) According to Johnson, Ledlow and Cwiek, interagency communication is a prerequisite to the coordination activity in preparation for and in response to terrorism and that n order to reduce the potential for terrorism and to mitigate its effects, agencies must communicate effectively and responsively: “Above all, they should be committed to working together as an integrated and unified team, to prepare for terrorism and restore normality following an act of terrorism.” (p. 321) This study was reinforced by several case studies particularly in regard to interagency cooperation as well as scenarios requiring interagency response and solutions. What their work has accomplished is to illustrate that the number of intelligence agencies do not necessarily mean conflicts and rivalries in responsibilities but that their roles complement each other. For instance, they stated: A wide range of agencies and organizations are affected by and concerned about terrorism… These agencies are well served to develop, revisit, and refine terrorism preparedness and response programs that facilitate communication and action. (p. 321) Johnson, Ledlow and Cwiek’s work was supported by Richard Posner who, in his book Uncertain Shield (2006), discussed not only the weakness of the technological intelligence, but the specifics of the leadership variable in the intelligence cooperation among various governmental agencies – information that the former study was not able to address. Analyzing several documents as well as statutes, Posner was able to identify roles for the leaders of various agencies such as the CIA and the Department of Defense including the people and departments that may be crucial to the enhancement of interagency intelligence cooperation and coordination. For example, he was able to identify that the Intelligence Reform Act authorizes at least 500-strong staff for the Director of National Intelligence that would be tasked to engage in coordinating with different agencies. (p. 71) Unfortunately, while Posner demonstrated several opportunities for engagement and cooperation with specific details on departments and personnel that could facilitate interagency cooperation, there were no concrete roles for individual players besides the leaders of intelligence agencies or the collective role played by specific departments. Human resource is also a centerpiece in the need for the reorientation of a large and centrally managed federal security apparatus into more flexible adaptable systems. According to Cushman, emphasis is needed on new personnel rules, new organizational models as well as fundamental change in attitudes. (p. 163) Recommendations to improve human resource to address issues of interagency coordination have been the subject of numerous literature. For example, Carafano and Weitz reiterated a recurring suggestion to better educate civil servants on interagency processes and allow for routine short-term rotations of service among US government agencies. (p. 243) In Interagency Operations: Coordination through Education (2000), Robert Smith encouraged the establishment of an interagency professional education system and introducing interagency curriculum at the National Defense University. Johnson, Ledlow and Cwiek also proposed the concept of interagency training as a partial solution to the inadequacy in the capability of the intelligence community in regard to its emergency response policies and capabilities. (p. 24) Roger George, in his analysis of the current resources, agencies, statutes and intelligence capabilities in place, posited a proposal that would achieve an architecture of permanent, pervasive collaboration that has no boundaries. The centerpiece of this new capability is supposedly the creation of a community-wide system of advanced intelligence assessment laboratories that would operate according to formal, documented assessment methodology. Here, besides the use of various methods, tools and techniques in order to produce credible intelligence, there is a requirement for the human analytic art that is honed through experience and lessons learned. Roger George calls this emergent strategy as “knowledge factories” or “computational collaboratories.” He said: The director of national intelligence might control the premier IC computational collaboratory to support national decision makers and foster interagency teaming on high-level intelligence projects such as NIEs. Eventually, the IC should be netted together by a multiagency complex of such collaboratories – a system of systems – one in each intelligence agency, all integrated over a wide-area network at multiple levels of security. (p. 268) George’s proposal agrees with Forest’s III. Analysis and Findings The available literature on human resource in the intelligence community could play a role in interagency cooperation and coordination has been sufficiently referenced particularly in recent studies. Enough references were made in regard to the advantages of operatives against technology or how politics hinder cooperation with the sheer number of intelligence agencies in the US government. However, the gap in the literature calls for a discussion on individual roles in interagency cooperation. In addition, there is a lack of reference on the factors such as organizational behavior, organizational culture – how to change these - so as individuals within an agency and the intelligence community as a whole - acquire a mindset or attitudes that allow for openness to a culture of engagement, cooperation and collaboration. Of course, there were discussions about training and education but there is a lack in initiative when it comes to structural change that aims to achieve this goal. For example, the proposed education in the National Defense University or the personnel training suggested by analysts – these are piecemeal and acknowledged as partial solutions to the interoperability problems of intelligence agencies. There is a difference between a “proactive personnel in the intelligence community” and a “proactive personnel in an intelligence community that encourages cooperation in all levels.” Presently, there are several initiatives that are being undertaken by the government in order to address to achieve collaboration within the intelligence community. For example, the office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) was created to better integrate efforts of the intelligence community into a more unified, coordinated and effective whole. Then, the National Counterterrorism Center was created with the mandate of serving as a multiagency center that analyzes and integrates all intelligence related to terrorism. The agency is also tasked with developing, implementing and assessing the effectiveness of strategic operational planning efforts that will achieve counterterrorism objectives. In regard to the existing intelligence agencies such as those of the FBI and the CIA, they underwent transformations so that they are further integrated in the intelligence community in as mandated by legislations such as the USA Patriot Act. The integration initiatives being undertaken within the intelligence community is sought to be achieved via an improved analysis and assessment based on current technology and modern intelligence gathering capabilities. The emerging policy in regard to the use of technology will ensure that Web-enabled virtual collaboration will soon become the normal operating mode for analysts sitting at their desks producing daily intelligence across the intelligence community. This development, however, does not minimize the role of human resources in regard to collaboration. In addition, there is a certain distributive characteristic in such system and that excessive reliance on this virtual collaboration strategy may produce new sources of errors. Hence, the circumstance calls for a stronger and more capable manpower in order to man the technological structure that would achieve the desired collaboration efforts. The new intelligence agencies and departments as well as the reform within the community itself that would supposedly bring the intelligence community together were relatively established recently. The corpus of literature in regard to the subject at hand precedes such development and so much has yet to unfold. For example, how effective would the DNI would be in fulfilling its mandate. How effective were the reforms in the FBI or the CIA? New research are yet to be undertaken that would explore and answer such questions. Nonetheless, these questions further emphasize the importance of people – leaders, agents, operatives, people who man the technologies, policymakers. They are the ones who would determine if collaborative reforms and objectives are met or not. IV. Conclusion What all these mean is that there is the primacy of human resources – the people variable – in the intelligence community and how it would achieve interagency collaboration. There had been several suggestions, theories and proposals that were put forward suggesting ways to establish the collaborative objective for the intelligence community. Most of these, however, emphasize emergent strategies that are primarily methodological, managerial, and behavioral in nature and, in addition, these suggested systems actually require modest expenditures and reliance on technical systems development and acquisition, infrastructure and manning levels. As established by this paper the fundamental problem in regard to achieving teamwork among the intelligence community lies in the political cultures/philosophies of the intelligence agencies concerned. The conventional wisdom is that these breeds diversity and rivalries among the agencies that hinder interagency collaboration. However, while this point of view has merits, it must not be forgotten that bureaucratic cultures, as with the broader American strategic culture from which they grow, have also provided a model for success and an esprit de corps that help recruitment, loyalty, retention, and a sense of mission within the intelligence community and the American government as a whole. This has been proven, from the American experience, that the mixing of many of these cultures has led and can continue to lead to innovation. Here, diversity and the differing agency and bureaucratic cultures are seen to be a net plus, helping managers to see problems from different angles particularly in law enforcement, clandestine operations, diplomacy and budget. This particular aspect in the field needs to be further studied as well. Such undertaking could provide a new perspective in regard to how to better deal with the bureaucratic system in such a way that strategies are formulated wherein the system fosters collaborative efforts and not function as a liability. References Bardach, Eugene. 1998. Getting agencies to work together: the practice and theory of managerial craftsmanship. Washington: Brookings Institution Press. Boin, Arjen and Stern, Eric. 2005. The politics of crisis management: public leadership under pressure. Cambridge University Press. Carafano, James and Weitz, Richard. 2008. Mismanaging Mayhem: How Washington Responds to Crisis. Greenwood Publishing Group. Forest, James. 2007. Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives. Greenwood Publishing Group. George, Roger. 2008. Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, obstacles, and innovations. Georgetown University Press. Johnson, James, Ledlow, Gerald and Cwiek, Mark. 2005.Community Preparedness and Response to Terrorism: Communication and the media. Greenwood Publishing Group. Posner, Richard. 2006. Uncertain shield: the U.S. intelligence system in the throes of reform. Rowman & Littlefield. Riley, Kevin, Treverrton, Gregory, Wilson, Jeremy and Davis, Lois. 2005. State and local intelligence in the war on terrorism. Rand Corporation. Smith, Robert. 2000. Interagency Operations: Coordination Through Education. Defense Technical Information Center. Theoharis, Athan and Immerman, Richard. 2006. The Central Intelligence Agency: security under scrutiny. Greenwood Publishing Group. Read More