Equal Citizenship Rights in the UK - Essay Example

Whether it can be argued that we all enjoy equal citizenship rights in the UK? Citizenship is defined as a socio-legal status bestowed with certain universal rights and duties on members of a specifically – usually national – community. As a core aspect of this status, social citizenship is linked, with specific sets of social rights (which will vary according to the particular arrangement of national social policy) – most obviously to a variety of social goods and services. However, social citizenship is becoming evermore closely coupled to changing order of contribution and belonging as complex forms of social politics surface in an increasingly complex and uneven public orb. Citizenship cannot be understood without an active theory of gender relations, and that political citizenship for women destabilizes private male oriented society and the family. Citizenship is about a transition from private to public patriarchy, not only the civilizing of capitalism. ‘Citizenship’ has become a very popular subject of debate in the last few years, suitable nationally and internationally, by both Left and Right, as well as by feminists. The interest in citizenship is not just in the narrow formalistic meaning of having the right to carry a specific passport. It addresses an overall concept summarizes the relationship between the individual, state and society. [1] In the liberal tradition individual citizens are supposed to have equal status, equal rights and duties, etc., so that principles of inequality deriving from gender, ethnic, class or other contexts are not supposed to be of relevance to the status of citizenship as such. The citizens are therefore constructed not as ‘members of the community’ but as strangers to each other, although they are sharing a complex set of assumptions about and expectations of each other which, when not fulfilled, can be enforced by the state. [1] This self of one has been criticized, however, by the ‘communitarians’ who claim that notions of rights and duties, as well as those of equality and privacy, have no meaning outside the context of particular communities are there with their views. On different grounds, the proponents of republicanism and the individualistic construction of citizenship is highly disappointing. They argue that such a construction of citizenship denies the possibility of citizenship as constituting a membership in a moral community in which the notion of the common good is antecedent to the individual citizenship choice. Liberal construction of citizenship assumes the priority of right over good. Republicanism, on the other hand, constructs citizenship not only as a status but also as a means of active involvement and participation in the determination, practice and promotion of the common good. [1] The question arises, then, what should happen to those members of the civil society who cannot or will not become full members of that ‘strong community’. In close to all current states there are migrants and refugees, ‘old’ and ‘new’ minorities and in settler societies there are also original people who are not part of the national community. In addition, there are many other members of the civil society who, although they might share the saga of common origin of ‘the community’, do not share important leadership value systems with the majority of the population in sexual, religious and other matters. The liberal definition of citizenship constructs all citizens as basically the same and considers the differences of class, ethnicity, gender, etc., as neither here nor there to their status as citizens. Conversely, the welfare state assumes a notion of difference, as determined by social needs. Those with similar needs must to get similar resources and those with different needs, different resources, or – more succinctly – treatment as equals rather than equal treatment. These differences were initially formulated exclusively as class differences. Social welfare rights were aimed at improving the quality of life of the working classes (as well as the smooth working of capitalism). When questions of entry and settlement have been resolved, the concerns of groupings constituted as racial minorities might be different from those of other members of the society. For example, their right to formal citizenship might depend upon the rules and regulations of their country of origin in count to those of the country where they live, as well as the relationship between the two. Thus, people from some Caribbean Islands who have been settled in Britain for years were told that they could not have a British passport because their country does not recognize dual citizenship and because they had not affirmed on time their intent to renounce the citizenship of their country of origin after it received independence. Concern over relatives and fear of not being allowed to visit their country of origin prevent others (such as Iranians and Turks) from giving up their original citizenship. Women workers who have children in other countries are often disqualified to receive child benefits like other mothers. Countries like Israel and Britain confer citizenship on those whose parents are citizens rather than on those born in the country. Further, the right of entry to a country is often conditional on a commitment by the immigrant that neither she-he nor any other member of their family will claim any welfare benefits. Citizenship needs to be examined, therefore, not just in terms of state, but often in relation to multiple formal and informal citizenships in more than one country, and most importantly, to view them from a perspective which would include the different positioning of different states as well as the different proper places of individuals and groupings within states. [1] The other partnership typology of citizenship is that of active–passive whether the citizen is conceptual idea as just a subject of an absolute authority or as an active political agent. The conventional differentiation, then, between ‘citizen’ and ‘subject’ is removed in and instead becomes a range of passivity and activity. The history of citizenship is different in different countries. In some countries, like in France and the USA, it has been the result of a popular radical struggle, while in others, like Britain and Germany, it has been more of a ‘top to bottom’ process. Similarly, in some post-colonial countries, like in India or Kenya, national independence was achieved after a long period of popular struggle, while in others, like in certain islands of the Caribbean that conversion was much more peaceful and political rule was passed smoothly from the colonial leaders to the local one. Today, virtually all the world’s population lives in countries in which some form of citizenship exists, at least in the Marshallian sense of being a member of a community.[1] Local authorities once provided health care, social housing, roads, income maintenance, planning, education (including most higher level institutions), police and social services plus, in many areas, gas, electricity, water, sewage and public transport. Clubs, centers and settlements ran citizenship classes, tease parliaments and debating clubs, and many workers felt pressed to engage in local politics. At some Halls, for example, they were expected to serve on school boards and similar bodies. Settlement and girls’ club workers were notably conspicuous. Seeing clubs as settings for the promotion of political and social awareness, yet aware that community and club work, unaccompanied by civic engagement, would never secure substantive reform. This deficit is no new challenge for community educators, but it constantly acquires new form. [4] The schools must teach pupils the basics of democracy and the duties, responsibilities and rights of citizens and citizenship. Subsequently there are three principal dimensions: [4] participation in democracy; the responsibilities and rights of a citizen; the value of community activity. The language of citizenship has also been a major discussion. In Britain ‘the active citizen’ has been put forward as an alternative to the welfare state, in which ‘the citizen’, constructed as an economically successful middle-class male head of a family, would fulfill his citizenship duties by giving his spare money and time ‘to the community’ In this conversation, therefore, citizenship stops being a political dialogue and becomes a intended involvement within civil society, in which the social rights of the poor are transferred, at least partly, from entitlements into charities. Obligations are shifted from the public sphere of tax-financed benefits and services to the private orb of charity and intended service. Rights become gifts and active citizenship assumes a top-down notion of citizenship. Typically, quangos, which are appointed rather than elected, have come to be the means by which various public services, like health and welfare, are being managed. [1] The various sub- cross- and supra-national and state collectivities of which people are formally and informally citizens can exist in a range of co-operative and convicting relationships which would differentially determine the proper position and the access to possessions of different people at different times. Considering these complexities and separating the notion of citizenship from the notion of the ‘nation-state’ is probably more common than ever n these days of ‘glocalization’. Similarly, such a critical separation is necessary given the growing number of states which privatize a growing number of their institutions. Many feminists – most notably the Latin American ones have found the notion of ‘citizenship’ to be the most suitable political enlistment tool in the post-Beijing era. It could be used to mix separate feminist struggles, such as those about reproductive rights, political participation, poverty, etc. Moreover, once the notion of citizenship is understood as a concept wider than just a relationship between the individual and the state, it could also put together the struggles of women against domination and utilization in the name of culture and tradition within their own racial and local communities and exceed the politically dangerous but rationally barren debate which took place in the UN conference on human rights in Vienna in 1993 about whether the struggle for human rights should be on an individual or a ‘group’ level. Power relations and crook of interests apply within ‘groups’ as well as between them. At the same time, individuals cannot be considered as distracted from their specific social positioning. [1] There was evidence of far-right white racist activities in some universities (along with claims of institutional inertia in dealing with the 18 problem), allegations of racist discrimination by universities (including some which made the national press), and localized instances of racist behavior (ranging from examples of graffiti through to classroom incidents). It was unclear whether this arrangement was management-led and service-wide, or restricted to the staff member who reported it and her close peers. Verbal harassment, racial abuse against a university staff member by a colleague, and a range of subtle forms of institutionalized discrimination and favoritism are also present. What remain to be seen is how Muslim women student respondents perceived and experienced racism and its relatives such as Islamophobia, and what structures exist within universities for combating these problems. [2] There has been a tendency of late to blend all Muslims as belonging to a single nation and hopeful to a single political aim. We contend that in the post 9/11 climate of Islamophobia women wearing the scarf are making a political choice. They are publicly branding themselves as Muslims at a time when such a label carries the possible fear of making them weaken to open hostility. But the Islam that they embody is distinct and different from the harsh, gendered divides imagination by main lead on both sides of the Islamophobic divide. The specificities demanded by those who imagine Islam primarily as an aggressive political force in the UK are very different from the flexibility that many women envisage. They aspire to belong to the people of Islam, idealized as crossing cultural, racial, geographical and political boundaries, an identity that is primarily inclusive rather than exclusive. [2] Nations and national projects are gendered in different ways. Feminist theory has raised important questions about the concept of difference. This draws on a theory of gender relations which links the different dimensions into specific kinds of gender regimes, either public or domestic gender regimes. This enables us to conceptualize different national projects as having a more or less public or domestic gender project. The clash between different national projects and with other polities, such as states, is issue between differently gendered projects. The usefulness of this mid-level concept is demonstrated through examples of the competing relations between the UK, Ireland, the EU and the Catholic Church in a worldwide age. [3] There are three accounts of citizenship - state-centered, pluralist and post-structuralism - none offers an entirely convincing understanding of the idea suited to the fragmented conditions of contemporary social politics. Instead, it is important to move away from these accounts and consider citizenship as a reflexive condition of `defensive engagement. Citizenship becomes a spotted social form concerned with the differential cooperation of social change as social and political actors struggle to create new identities and political dispute across a range of possible settings in an increasingly split public area. This interpretation has implications for our understanding of social inclusion and exclusion. [4] A program teaching basic facts about political and legal systems; why people should obey the police, parents and teachers and be nicer to each other may somewhat deliver. A citizenship will not cure weakness. For people to relate to democracy, and mature into full citizens, they must experience it in their daily lives. Make-believe participation will only generate doubt. In a democracy the people have final decision. [4] Momentous citizenship requires power. Without power, citizenship reverts to play and the more intelligent and principled participants will soon drain of involvement. That is the problem that is encountered when sponsoring forums, councils and consultations. The first two required activities but lack power being primarily designed to give authority to a local government system acutely aware of its own helplessness. Participants ultimately transfer knowledge to managers for negligible reward. Users still remain users, the existing power arrangements change not one bit. A study of young peoples participation in the decision-making process found this was undertaken predominately via focus groups, activity sessions, individual interviews, the arts, internet, indeed everything but direct democracy. Methods developed to produce managerial efficiency recognize will cumulatively hasten the demise of ‘the era of pure representative democracy’. The elite focus group weakens, democracy - transforming citizens into customers and users. [5] This should remind us that democracy and citizenship have been built on sacrifice and suffering. Young people are entitled as human beings to be treated with a basic respect, but their ideas and opinions are only entitled to respect to the extent they have been seriously thought through, are based on facts rather discrimination. Making courageous citizens should be focused rather than local citizens. Too much youth work still flatters rather than challenges, is intellectually and culturally wanting. Too many workers are fearful of giving offence, frightened of being mocked, and most comfortable when talking football, feelings or soaps. That is a tragedy for their duty is to help all, not only the fortunate, acquire the education appropriate to a free citizen. To cultivate small pockets of real purposeful equality wherein citizenship survives and from which it will range forwards. [5] BIBLIOGRAPHY & REFRENCES [1]. Nira Yu v a l -D a v is (1997) Women, Citizenship and Difference [2]. Dr David Tyrer, Liverpool John Moores University, Fauzia Ahmad, University of Bristol (2006) MUSLIM WOMEN AND HIGHER EDUCATION: IDENTITIES, EXPERIENCES AND PROSPECTS [3]. http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/publicationdetails.aspx?publicationId=6fd3e559-fb60-4152-97f3-e21dd45fb115 [4]. http://wiley.com\Wiley InterScience __ JOURNALS __ Nations and Nationalism.htm [5]. http://tonyjeffs.com/tony jeffs - citizenship, youth work and democratic renewal.htm Read More