Parti Socialiste and the Parti Communiste Franais - Essay Example

Parti Socialiste and the Parti Communiste Français: Amis Étranges of the 1970s In the recent 2007 French Presidential election, Segolene Royale, a member of the Socialist Party (PS) lost the election to UMP candidate Nicholas Sarkozy. In the attendant legislative election of the same year, the Socialists are a strong minority in the Assembly, and for the first time during the Fifth Republic the Communist Party of France (PCF) failed to gain more than requisite number of seats to caucus as a unit, and were forced to align in a leftist coalition known as the Democratic and Republican Left.1 The precipitous decline of the role of the PCF in French politics has been manifesting itself for some time. During the 1980s the Socialist Party became the party of the Left in France, electing Francois Mitterrand to two terms during that time. In order to explain these developments one must look to the previous decade for the social, political, and organizational practices and beliefs that facilitated this change in the ideological left in France. An examination of the theoretical and ideological apparatuses that precipitated this political shift along with a presentation of cultural and political events that led to a realignment of political strategies of the two parties will be followed by an inquiry into the organizational and leadership practices and beliefs of the two groups. The subsequent analysis of the ebb and flow of the respective fortunes of the PS and PCF should reveal that the Political Left in France has operated under a "Coalition as Rivalry"2 paradigm to the ultimate benefit of the PS and the seemingly irrecoverable detriment of the PCF. Forming out of the Section Francaise de Ilnternationale Ouvriere (SFIO) in 1905, the Socialist Party was cobbled together with an uneasy mix of Marxists, members of workers parties, revolutionaries and reformists.3 The uneasiness of this arrangement eventually led to a splintering of the "feeble" alliance and at the 1920 Congress of Tour, what was to become the PCF was formed.4 The rather hard ideological line of the PCF illustrated by the slogan, "sovietization á outrance" is indicative of the affiliation that French Communists had at the time with Soviet Politburo.5 The Socialists and Communists did briefly come together in an unofficial capacity, along with the radicals in a mid-1930s movement known as the Popular Front. That coalition was interrupted by WWII. After WWII, much of the left was united against Gaullism though nevertheless splintered over the issue of Algerian Independence. The start of the Fifth Republic saw perpetuation of the orthodox commitments of the Communist Party in France despite growing dissention among the ranks in the European left. These parties, including ones in Britain, Italy, and Hungary were experiencing a mass exodus of party faithful and a philosophical crisis of faith. The PCF however remained nominally loyal to their Leninist-Stalinist roots, exemplified by their indignation and recrimination of the "Khrushchev Thaw."6 The SFIO, beginning at the end of the Fourth Republic and continuing into the Fifth Republic, struggled to define itself ideologically between centrist factions and the committed PCF, and as such saw a steady decline through the 1950s and 1960s.7 Despite attempts by SFIO to form alliances and create coalitions with the Radicals and remaining non-Communist remnants of the Popular Front, 1969 saw electoral disaster when Gaston Defferre, the newly formed PS candidate for president received less than 5% of the electoral vote.8 The French Left overall suffered losses in the National Assembly throughout the first two post-war decades, representing 60% of the vote in 1945 to just under 40% in 1968. Figure 19 The primary issue for the Left and specifically for the Communists was motivating its constituents in the economically and politically stable milieu of Gaullist France.10 As one commentator described it, "What is certain is that the France of 1968 does not seem able to give itself the luxury of a political scene as passionate as that of Czechoslovakia, as dramatic as that of the United States, or as glorious as that of Vietnam. Neither the agitation of a minority of the students of a few universities, nor certain workers demonstrations, nor the discontent which reigns in Brittany affects seriously our political life."11 Just a few weeks later "minor agitation" would blossom into nationwide riots and a political crisis that would lead to the semi-collapse of the De Gaulle government and the end of his politics de grandeur. That period known as Mai 68 or May 1968 saw an upheaval not so much of the governmental and political order, but a diminution of the prior moral hegemony and a cultural shift in values.12 The PCF, despite its stated ideological affiliation with the CPSU,13 was committed by the late 60s to functioning within the political system as a legitimate tool for protest and reform rather than a staging ground for revolution, the events of Mai 68, manifested the theoretical tension between the partys origins and their now alleged republican values.14 The causes, upheaval, consequences, and interpretations of Mai 68 have been contested by historians and political scientists alike. The attitude of the PS with its nationalist leanings and philosophical ambivalence was understandably critical of the movement. Though it did in the subsequent years give voice to the qualitative demands of the less extremist portions of the uprising. The PCFs response is typically framed as paradoxical if not outright contradictory.15 One of the more intriguing points of contention was the PCFs, rhetorical, political and organizational strategies in responding to the events that transpired during the month. There was an expressed concern on behalf of the party leadership that there were extreme left-wing elements especially within the student phase of the crisis whose motivations and aims ran contrary to the partys core, which were the workers and labour unions. Those elements were less interested in a proletarian revolution and more so in anarchy and sexual freedom. However, as other segments of the population became more involved; the PCF recognized that a general labour strike could not be avoided. It is thought here that PCFs strategy changed markedly by publicly supporting the workers and the "movement," while privately they attempted to distance the strikers from the loosely connected ideologically extreme elements among the rioting student populations.16 Finally, after de Gaulles brief exile in Baden-Baden;17 supposedly taken because there was a consensus among senior officials that a governmental collapse possibly immanent, he returned at the end of the month to offer presidential elections. In a move that is commonly indicted for being antithetical to the revolutionary status of PCF, they were one of the first groups to accept the offer. The tactics deployed by the PCF seem initially to betray their professed revolutionary aims; however, some hold that this complaint overestimates the legitimacy and unity of the "movement" and overestimates the formality of the opposition that the PCF levied against the students.18 The loose affiliation of groups, which represented the left-wing extremist elements, were a smaller minority of the overall zeitgeist then what is intimated by those who are interested in underscoring the irresponsibility of the movement as such. It is also likely that the PCF acknowledged and were conscientious of the conservative political mood of the polity in France- the events of May 1968 aside. It has also been counterclaimed that in fact the PCFs response was in-line with the brand of Communism practiced in France. A brand of Communism that did not obsequiously fawn over Leninist-Maoist style insurrection, but spoke truth to power through action on the "democratic road to socialism."19 This conscientiousness was affirmed when de Gaulles coalition party attained a substantial victory in the general elections of that year. Though these events precipitated the eventual abdication of "Le Connetable,"20 it was not as a direct result, thus setting the stage for the rehabilitation and rise to regency of the Socialist Party and a more marked decline of PCF in the 1970s. In July 1972 faced with a Gaullist21 victory in the general election of 1968 and the presidential election of 1969, the PS and PCF agreed to a common platform.22 Known as the Common Program (CP), its mission was to document a theoretical framework which allowed for the basic contours of a capitalist society to be transformed through a democratically gained extension of public control over the economy.23 The CP has been described by scholars as rife with contradictions and ambiguities, but the genuinely progressive nature of the document was admitted by even its harshest critics on the left.24 The most lasting consequence of the Common Program was to establish the credibility of the PS as a legitimate party capable of handling the reins of power. 25 The PCF was by far the better organized and better mobilized party, having privileged access to the largest trade union the Confederation General du Travail (CGT). The PS having mobilized along with the PCF allowed them to adopt the heirs of legitimacy while simultaneously operating as a check on the more militant members of the PCF. This rhetorical and political placement resonated well in the French legislative elections of 1974 and 1978 nearly attaining outright victory in the 74 election, losing by only the narrowest of margins. However, the legitimizing of the PS seems to have come at the cost of the total "deradicalization" of the PCF.26 Figure 227 The PCF was no longer considered the radical party of the left; in poll data collected from the period a massive shift in perceived ideological placement occurred aligning the PCF only 1.6 points away from the PS in 1978. In 1967 that number was more than 11 points. This is all the more noticeable because the movement of the PS on the Left-Right spectrum shifted left by less than 3 points, thus its PCFs own spectral shift to the right that accounts for the perceived moderating stance, no doubt asking questions of the identity of the party among the polity. This is explained by the increasingly difficult rhetorical and ideological position that the PCF was placed in when it created the CP with the Socialists. Recognizing that a leftist majority would never be possible alone in the current climate, members of the PCF had to sympathize and support the PS in its attempts to mobilize against the conservatives, while simultaneously fearing and actively trying to stem an ideological and political monopolization by the PS of the Left. That means advocating leftist ideas against the right and concomitantly advocating communist concerns against the socialists. The tensions that the PS faced were somewhat similar, but markedly absent were any ideological pretensions of being the political vanguard.28 This uneasy coalition emblematized by the CP was destabilized in June 1977 as Communists disconcerted about the approaching economic crises were eager to renegotiate the tenets of the program. The Socialists and their Radical Party partners could not accept some of the newly adopted viewpoints and conditions of the PCF namely: the acceleration of nationalization processes, membership in the European Communities (EC), and nuclear strike force capability.29 The PCF fearful of an overwhelmingly dominant PS in the upcoming elections broke with the Socialists and spent significant resources in attempting to effectively attack the PS and Conservative coalition in the first round of balloting in the 1978 legislative elections. The result was a renewal of a conservative majority in the National Assembly despite what the prevailing conventional wisdom had predicted: a victory for some form of the Left.30 The PS and PCF naturally blamed each other for this electoral debacle, and the Socialists would have to wait until the next decade for a victory of the Left under Mitterrand. Francois Mitterrand is the integral figure of French Socialist politics of the 1970s and 80s. The rehabilitation and establishment of the PS as a major political force in France cannot be discussed without him. He was instrumental in founding the coalition with the PCF and helped to frame the Common Program. After the untimely death of Georges Pompidou, the Socialist rise to power was almost realized a decade earlier than it did when Mitterrand lost the 1974 Presidential election to moderate Valery Giscard dEstaing by approximately 400,000 votes.31 By 1975 it was clear that the "first party of Left" was not the PCF or the Radicals but the PS under the shrewd guidance of Mitterrand.32 Some of the reasons behind this eclipse of relevancy include some notable organizational and practical differences between the two groups. The PCF remained the more organized of parties having over 600,000 registered members during much of the 70s, while under Mitterrand the PS only managed to grow to 150,000 members.33 Furthermore, the organizational strategy adopted by the PCF was disciplined and hierarchical while the PS utilized a more multiform, pluralistic approach. The PCF was "democratically centralized" meaning the partys platform was discussed internally, apart from the public, and once compromises and positions had been explicitly decided, they were released tout court and rallied around uniformly.34 The PS had very open and public debates and groups within it often had their own publications and offices. The other organizational difference stems from what the French call "lentrisme." Despite Socialist majorities or at least widespread Socialist sympathies within labour unions, students groups and trade guilds, the zealous and idealist types that tended to gravitate towards the PCF were much more vocal and active minorities in those group as well, and as such would enter a group as a statistical minority but through active mobilization could manage to wield majority power quickly. This kind of activism also operated on the municipal level; Communist mayors and officials would apply significant pressure on industrialists and other influential citizens of their communities to financially support the party and would establish a spoils system for members of the party who became a part of the community, such as offering low-rent housing exclusively to party affiliates.35 Despite this activist lentrisme strategy, the one question that the PCF could never find an effective answer for, is how to convince the non-Communists, i.e. 80% of the voting public, that with the increasingly despicable perception of the Soviet State and its various restrictions of rights, liberties, and draconian policies, the PCF was no longer the ardent and full supporter of the CPSU it once was.36 This was an apprehension that was equally shared with the conservatives, moderates and other members of the "Union of the Left." Despite their exceptionally understated support of the Mai 68 rebellion, the reservations that lingered grew through the Cold War decade that was the 70s, and as the "Soviet Menace" seemed to grip the imaginations of centrist Europeans. To the degree that the PCF was unable to provide satisfactory reassurances to that question, increasingly induced the remaining undecided moderates during elections of the 70s and 80s to vote Socialist. As the PS began to flex its electoral muscle and started to shape economic and social policy in France, a growing awareness also developed of a need to construct a coherent and feasible foreign policy that would not overly alarm or counter-mobilize any other political faction or group of people in France. Mitterrand had long been committed to an anti-Gaullist stance on foreign policy, especially regarding the nuclear strike force that de Gaulle had implemented. A strong proponent of Socialist principles, which were naturally antagonistic to militarization, Mitterrand also opposed the exploitation of African conflict and the Gaullist willingness to participate in the weapons trade.37 However, as the PS was a "big tent" he had trouble reconciling some of the various factions of his otherwise strong coalition on issues of foreign policy. Particularly, certain nationalist factions such as Centre dEtudes de Recherches et dEducation Socialistes (CERES), had foreign policy positions closer to Gaullism than even to their PS brethren. Mitterrand needed their support in order to maintain control of the party and its place of dominance on the left. As such many of the foreign policy decisions reflected a degree of ambiguity, suddenly made more ambiguous by the stunning shift of the Communist party to supporting the nuclear strike force. This move prompted Mitterrand and the PS to adopt a more realistic attitude towards Europeanist and Transatlanticist positions and a de-emphasis on world disarmament.38 In 1981 Francois Mitterrand gained the residency of Elysee Palace that had eluded him for the past seven years. In that election he did not have the support of the PCF and advocated the Parties Platform, known as the 110 Propositions for France. Though the PCF had denounced Mitterrands "turn towards the right," his strategy was enormously successful much to the detriment of the right as it was the Communists, and the PS gained an absolute majority in the corresponding legislative election of that year. The PS had also managed to co-opt millions of previously PCF supporters as the Communist Party only received 7% of second round balloting of the election.39 The coalition as rivalry established for the PS a platform from which to launch their rehabilitation on the shoulders of the organizational juggernaut that was the PCF, while maintaining a philosophical flexibility not available or necessarily desirable to the PCF. In sum, this combination allowed the PS to grow between the Communist Left and Republican Right as a non-ideological socialism with a human face that proved quite appealing to an easily dismayed and fickle French polity. Bibliography Assemblee-Nationale. The French National Assembly-Main Bodies. 2008 13 March . Biewener, Carole. "Class and Socalist Politics in France." Review of Radical Political Economics 19.2 (1987): 61-76. Cerny, Philip G. and Martin Schain. French Politics and Public Policy. London: Routledge, 1981. Charlton, Sue Ellen M. "Deradicalization and the French Communist Party." The Review of Politics 41.1 (1979): 38-60. Clough, Shepard B. "Review: The Founding of the French Socialist Party." The Political Science Quarterly (1957): 312-313. Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste and James A. Corbett. "France and the West: Concerns and Hopes." The Review of Politics 39.4 (1977): 451-472. Fields, A. Belden. "Liberte, Egalite & Surtout, Fraternite? The Struggle over Womens Liberation in the French Communist & Socalist Parties." Polity 18.4 (1986): 553-576. Hoffman, Stanley. "Gaullism by Any Other Name." Foreign Policy 57 (1984): 38-57. Lacorne, Dennis. "On the Fringe of the French Political System: The Beliefs of Communist Municipal Elites." Comparative Politics 9.4 (1977): 421-441. Libbey, Kenneth R. "The French Communist Party in the 1960s: An Ideological Profile." Journal of Contemporary History 11.1 (1976): 145-165. Machin, Howard and Vincent Wright. "The French Left Under the Fifth Republic: The Search for Identity in Unity." Comparative Politics 10.1 (1977): 35-67. Macridis, Roy C. "The Immobility of the French Communist Party." The Journal of Politics 20.4 (1958): 613-634. Mendel, Arthur P. "Why the French Communists Stopped the Revolution." The Review of Politics 31.1 (1969): 3-27. Reynaud, Jean-Daniel. "Trade Unions and Political Parties in France: Some Recent Trends." Industrial and Labor Relations Review 28.2 (1975): 208-225. Reynolds, Chris. "May 68: A Contested History." October 2007. Sens [public]. 13 March 2008 . Rochon, Thomas R. and Roy Pierce. "Coalitions as Rivalries: French Socialists and Communists, 1967-1978." Comparative Politics 17.4 (1985): 437-451. Wilson, Frank L. "The French Left and the Elections of 1968." World Politics 21.4 (1969): 539-574. Read More