Six-Day Arab-Israel War - Essay Example

Six Day Arab Israel war Introduction: The six day Arab-Israel war in 1967 is a distinctive turning point in the contemporary history of the Middle east. Israel demonstrated that it was capable of initiating swift, strategic strikes that could significantly political balances in the region, since it seized additional territories which has placed about one million Arabs within the sphere of Israel’s direct control in the captured territories. Up to this point, the Arabs had questioned the legitimacy of Israel’s existence as a State, after the war, the Arab states have become more focused upon territorial boundaries. Moreover, it has also resulted in a special relationship between Israel and the United States after the conclusion of the war, with military support available for Israel from America. This has further fuelled the discord in the Middle east region. The events of the war: In 1956, during the Suez crisis, Israel had advanced its military into the Sinai peninsula, but with heavy diplomatic pressure from both the United States and the Soviet Union, Israel withdrew forces and a UN peacekeeping force was stationed in Sinai. One of the major reasons why the Suez crisis had been precipitated was the closure of the Tiran strait to Israeli shipping, but after the Suez crisis, the strait was reopened and there was temporary peace in the region despite the lack of resolution of the issues plaguing the region, since none of the Arab States recognized Israel as a separate state. The events leading up to the war were actually set into motion when Egypt became suspicious about an imminent Isreali attack on Syria planned for May 17, 1967. Such suspicions were based upon militant speeches that were being made by Israeli leaders and the substance of a Soviet intelligence report on the hostilities along the Israeli-Syrian border. As a result, Nassar personally ordered for the mobilization two divisions of troops across the Suez Canal during a late night meeting on May 13 and 14. (Bergman 2000, p 44). These troops were to be sent into Sinai with the intent of putting the armed forces in Sinai on full alert and completing the troop mobilization before an anticipated Israeli attack on May 17th. On May 18, 1967, the UAR began expelling the United Nations Emergency forces, which were there to provide a peace keeping buffer in the area and this led up to the closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli ships on May 23rd. This was akin to a trumpet call for war, because Israel had earlier made a public declaration that it would equate any interference with freedom of navigation along the strait of Aqaba as a causative factor in a war, because it would encourage the Egyptian air force to overfly the Dimona nuclear reactor.(Parker, 1992, p 177-197; Bregman, 2000, p 41-55). As a result, the UAR’s move to close the strait was viewed with alarm in international circles and there were frantic diplomatic efforts initiated to re-open the strait. After three weeks of bristling tension between Israel and its neighboring Arab states, when all frantic diplomatic moved to ameliorate the conflict failed to succeed, the Israeli air force, fearing an attack by Egypt, on June 5, 1967 launched a strike against air bases in Jordan, Syria and Egypt, which led to the destruction of almost 80% of the planes belonging to these States. This was followed up by military operations in which the Israeli troops advanced swiftly into Arab territory and occupied the Gaza strip, the western bank of the Jordan as well as the Golan Heights. Israel had expected to be entangled in a single front ground war with Egyptian forces, because it had assumed that the military restraining through the paralysis of their air forces would render both Syria and Jordan to subside into verbal assaults. However, both these countries began bombing targets in Israel, as a result of which the decision was made to expand the war, so that the Israeli forces moved into bloody ground confrontations into the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Jordan had signed a mutual defense treaty with Egypt on May 30, joining the already existent military alliance with Syria and President Nassar declared “Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight.” (BBC report). Jordan attacked western Jerusalem and Netanya. In the case of Syria, hatred of Israel fuelled the country’s decision to enter into combat as also King Hussein’s fear that his dynasty would be threatened if he did not join Nassar in the war. This led to continuous cross border shelling of Israel by Syria, despite Israel’s reluctance to engage Syria, as per a cabinet vote on June 8th, on the advice of Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Minister of Defense. The military argument he offered against attacking the Golan heights was that it would be an uphill battle against a strongly fortified enemy and could result in losses of up to 30,000 troops. Other military leaders such as Levi Eshkol and David Elazar, the head of the Northern Command were more open to the possibility of a Golan heights operation, and on June 9th Moshe also joined with them and authorized the attack. The progress of the war: In terms of the war, Israel’s pre-emptive strike provided it unqualified superiority over the skies. In contrast to this, the Arab air forces were unable to mount an effective attack, with attacks of Jordanian and Egyptian Tu-16 bombers into Israel during the first two days of the war all being destroyed, with Egyptian bombers shot down and Jordanian bombers destroyed on the airfield. Moreover, several disillusioned Egyptian pilots defected into Israel with their MIGs before the outbreak of the conflict and Israel was able to successfully use these planes to gain a significant advantage over their enemies. Over the sea, the war was limited, although intimidation was present, there were no direct engagements. A greater part of the conflict over the last four days of the war raged between the ground troops, of which Egyptian troops numbered about 100,000, with 950 tanks and more than 1000 artillery pieces, while Jordanian army strength was 50,000 and Syria 75,000. (Pollack, 2002, p 59). The total strength of the Israeli army, including reservists was 264,000, but in terms of general competence and training as well as discipline and morale, the Israeli forces were superior to the combined Arab forces. While Yitzhak Rabin, Chief of Staff had originally formulated a ground strategy to fight up to the Gaza strip and hold Egyptians hostage until the Tiran strait was re-opened, the Southern command Brigadier General had a plan whereby all Egyptian forces in the Sinai would be destroyed. This strategy of completed destruction was favored by Rabin, and while the initial plan was not to arrack Syria because of the expected losses of troops, the strategy was later reversed on June 9, and the Israeli capture of Golan Heights spelt the end of the six day war. Factors which contributed to its victory were the determination in implementing an innovative plan as well as the disorganization among the Egyptian troops as opposed to the well trained, disciplined Israeli troops. Israel completed its final offensive on June 10, 1967 and a cease fire was signed the day after. The Soviet role: One of the major players in the war were the Egyptians, who initiated the events leading to the war on the basis of a Soviet report. The contents of this report about an imminent Israeli attack on Syria on May 17 were conveyed by Dimitri Pojidaev to Ahmed Hasan Al Feki, the Egyptian Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The same information was also conveyed to the Anwar Al Sadat, President of the Egyptian national Assembly.(Parker, 1993, p 3-35). Although the Soviets later claimed that no such information had been given, the report could possibly have been based upon an Israeli cabinet decision of May 7, according to which Israel would respond with retaliatory strikes if Syrian border incursions continued.(Brecher, 1980, p 45). In recent times, some theories hold the Soviet instigation of the war to be a part of the wider game plan of the Soviets to introduce a second Cold war front in the Middle East. Since the United States was heavily involved in south east Asia, the Soviets wanted to instigate a regional war in the Middle East with the purpose of destroying Israel as well as those Arab regimes which were pro-West.(Bregman, 2000, p 45-46). President Nassar was responsible for drawing Syria into the war as well as King Hussein of Jordan who was initially reluctant to be a part of the war. Resolution 242: The cease fire agreement of June 11, 1967 was followed by the United Nations Security Council resolution 242 which was unanimously adopted by the United Nations Security Council on November 22, 1967. This resolution calls for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. One of the terms of the Resolution required the “withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” as well as the “termination of all claims or states of belligerency”.(www.mideastweb.org) However, the terms of this resolution were not acceptable to Syria, which however, formally accepted Resolution 338, which incorporated the principles of resolution 242. In view of the fact that the United Nations could not force the parties to enter into an agreement, the Resolution served as the basic grounds for the establishment of peace in the region. Resolution 242 has been the subject of much controversy following its inception, since most Arab countries content that the resolution calls for Israel to withdraw its troops from all the occupied territories, while the Israeli position is that the withdrawal is not meant to encompass all territories. Resolution 242 is often used by Israeli critics to support the position that the disputed lands of the West Bank belong to the Palestinians, however while the Resolution does state that this is disputed territory for which the status is to be negotiated by a peaceful agreement, it does not by any means state that the land belongs to the Palestinians.(Sun, 2007, p A8) The most important feature of the Resolution was its Land for Peace formula, whereby all the warring parties agreed to return lands in order to ensure peace in the region. Israel withdrew from Sinai while Egypt withdrew its claims to the Gaza strip and Jordan withdrew its claims for the West Bank and has signed the Israel Jordan Border Treaty of 1994, which has set out the Jordan River as the border line between the two countries. However, the Golan Heights and the Gaza strip have remained a subject of dispute. Israel and Syria were involved in talks throughout the 1990s in order to negotiate a peaceful withdrawal of Israeli forces from Golan Heights but the process was hindered by Syria’s insistence on recovering 25 kilometers of Israeli territory in the Jordan River valley which was seized by Israel in 1948. However, this position has little international support, since borders currently recognized are in accordance with the 1948 borders. The Gaza strip is also a disputed piece of territory which the Palestinians are trying to claim. The pre-emptive advantage: One of the major reasons for Isreal’s victory in this war was its advantage of the pre-emptive strike.(Thornborough, 2002). Its initial military strike was brilliantly executed, to neutralize all three of the primary Arab forces. The strike had the advantage of surprise and the Israeli airforce was superior in training and nature of the aircraft. Two thirds of the Syrian airforce was destroyed in that first pre-emotive strike, which forced the remaining one third to retreat to distant bases without much of a role in further warfare. However, this cannot be stated to be the only reason for Israel’s success, although such brilliant military strategy makes the Isreali victory akin to a victory of David over Goliath, with Goliath representing the combined Arab forces, topped by Egypt’s impressive military force. Rather, Egypt’s boast that it had the largest air force in the Middle East was likely an inflated one because many of its planes were inoperational and inferior in terms of kind of aircraft and training, while the number of its ground troops were “approximately 100,000 men” (Bregman, 2000, p 48). As a result, Israel had an absolute qualitative military advantage, which contributed to its victory. Results of the six day war: The six day war of 1967 produced far reaching changes, which are still a part of the political scenario of the region in the present day. Israel’s decisive military victory established it as a super power in the region. Moreover, the war re-drew geographical boundaries, with new cease fire lines firmly establishing Israeli control over Palestine, as well as Egypt’s Sinai and Syria’s Golan Heights, thereby expanding the territory under Israeli control. Moreover, there was a considerable shift in the political landscape of the region with the emergence of the settlement movement and debates within Israel about Zionism and its territorial aims. (Zuckerman, 1999, p 149-155). With Israeli control over the Gaza Strip, West Bank and east Jerusalem, the perennial debate and issues on settlement have continued to plague the region, which possibly may not arisen if Jordan had restrained military activity, because Palestinians may have resigned themselves to becoming citizens of Jordan instead. However the six day war has pushed the Arab-Israeli conflict into the forefront of international politics and resulted in the United States emerging as the staunch ally of Israel, and a formalizing of their special relationship in 1981 (Little 1993, p 563-85). This special relationship of the United States with Israel which has emerged subsequent to the war may be part of the reason for the continuing discontent and discord brewing in the area. While the six day war established the legitimacy of Israel’s existence once and for all, American support has generated much rancor among Arab States, since it offers Israel the advantage of superior military support from the United States. There is also a religious significance that is inherent in the aftermath of the war. The rule of the Jordanians was that Jews and many Christians were forbidden from entering into the old city of Jerusalem, which is also the site of the Western wall, a holy site for the Jews. The Jewish sites in the area had not been maintained during the period before the war and many of the cemeteries of the Jews had been desecrated. However, after the end of the six day war, this territory is not in the hands of Israel and their religious administration has been handed over to the respective religious groups. Therefore from the Jewish point of view, the war had great significance, because it restored to them the territory in Jerusalem which had belonged to their forefathers in history. References: * BBC Report. “1967: Egypt and Jordan unite against Israel” Retrieved October 14, 2007 from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/30/newsid_2493000/2493177.stm * Bregman, Ahron, 2000. “Israel’s wars 194793.” London: Longman. * Brecher, Michael, 1980. “Decisions in crisis: Israel, 1967 and 1963. Berkeley: University of California Press. * Little, Douglas, 1993. “The making of a special relationship: The United States and Israel 195768.” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 25(4): 563-85 * Parker, Richard B, 1992. “The June 1967 war: some mysteries explored”, The Middle East Journal, 46(2): 177-197 * Parker, Richard B, 1993. “The politics of miscalculation in the middle east” Indiana University Press * Pollack, Kenneth, 2002. “Arabs at war: Military effectiveness 1948-1991” Bison books * Sun Journal, 2007. “U.N. Resolution 242” Sun Journal, August 9, 2007, pg A8 * Thornborough, Anthony M, 2002. “Iron hand: smashing the enemy’s air defences” Sparkford: Haynes Publications * “UN Security Council resolution 242” Retrieved October 15, 2007 from: http://www.mideastweb.org/242.htm * Zuckerman, Moishe, 1999. “The June 1967 war and its influence on the political culture in Isreal.” In “Looking back at the June 1967 war” (Haim Gordon edn)., Westport: Praeger Read More