Are Reason and Emotion Equally Necessary in Justifying Moral Decisions - Essay Example

Are Reason and Emotion Equally Necessary in Justifying Moral Decisions? Everyday, life’s complexities pose challenges to a person’s decision-making skills. A person comes up with several decisions in a span of just an hour – some are trivial, some spell the difference between success and failure in a task, some even the difference between life and death. It is interesting to study the process a person goes through in arriving at a final decision, most specifically, moral ones that test his character and adherence to his value system. In deciding about trivial things – like taking the elevator or the stairs, or skipping breakfast or not, a person does not need to agonize on decision-making and spend precious time over it. Sometimes, a person is not even aware that a decision has been made as he goes through his day. However, when it comes to moral decisions that entail more intensive consideration of all factors involved, a person may be stunned enough to scratch, or even dig beyond the shallow surface and summon reason and emotion to help him come up with the right decision. History has produced deep thinking men who debated on the competing roles of reason and emotion in moral judgment. A man named Kohlberg (1984) even came up with a theory of moral development based on a hypothetical moral situation calling on children’s decision-making skills, and his theories attracted much attention from moral philosophers. His proposed dilemma was about a husband named Heinz who needed to decide whether to steal an overpriced drug to save his dying wife. It was theorized that young children conceptualize morality in terms of obedience to adults’ rules and regulations. They know that it makes them good children. This is so because they think in concrete, physical, egocentric ways and their social worlds are dominated by adults. On the other hand, older children think of morality in terms of cooperation with peers because they are cognitively able to comprehend the views of others and already understand concepts such as reciprocity and cooperation because their social worlds consist mainly of interactions with peers. Kohlberg based his work on this theory of cognitive development and emphasized reasoning as the key to moral development. He did not pursue any direction towards the role of emotion in the moral decision-making process. Basing on a vast amount of evidence gathered from structured interviews, Kohlberg’s rationalist model views moral judgments as primarily caused by complex reasoning. In considering dilemmas, defined as “scenarios constructed to highlight a conflict between two moral principles”, individuals engage in moral reasoning. However, it cannot be denied that engaging in moral reasoning still involves an emotional response. Despite the emphasis moral dilemmas place on reasoning and analysis, a great share of emotions, including weighing in the anticipated reaction such as guilt one associates with each of the options is considered. Being so, emotions may be guiding decisions when people choose the option that is least likely to elicit guilt or which generates least discomfort at the time of the dilemma. Usually, people go for the most convenient choice. Most of the moral decisions people make in their everyday lives are accompanied by strong emotions. For instance, personal dilemmas that involve loved ones hurting an individual evoked feelings of anger and righteous indignation; dilemmas involving giving in to temptation tended to evoke guilt, shame, and defensive reactions; dilemmas involving social pressure and threat of punishment tended to evoke anxiety, fear, resentment, and frustration; and dilemmas involving reacting to the needs of others tended to evoke sympathy. These are the situations that make people stop and give vent to their feelings while engaging in critical thought of causes and effects of the circumstances. It is interesting to note that being in the situation of involved decision-making in moral dilemmas has a biological effect not only on the heart, as it has the tendency to palpitate, but the brain as well. This implies that in such situations, a person’s whole being becomes involved- his thinking and feeling, his mind and heart. Emotions also surface in moral dilemma situations without arising from the options themselves. An example is the mere stress of being torn between two options. Sometimes, just to avoid being in this aversive state, people altogether avoid making decisions. At other times, emotions that are unrelated to the options end up influencing the final decision. An example is a girl’s choice between two courses of action, for instance, of continuing schooling or dropping out and pursuing gainful employment. Her final choice may be more influenced by her fear of her parents of making the wrong decision instead of carefully weighing which is best for her. Fearful individuals favor safer options, whereas anger leads people to take more risks. This proves that personality may likewise have something to do with decision-making skills. One controversial question that comes to mind is whether emotions are necessary for moral judgment/ decision-making. Take psychopaths. It is known that they have some kind of emotional dysfunction because they dont seem to feel remorse or empathy for their victims. Does this deficit corrupt their moral judgment because emotions are necessary to make the right decision? Or is their moral judgment actually intact, but their behavior is inappropriate because their emotions dont stop them from doing the wrong thing? This writer tends to believe the latter -- that emotions flow from moral judgments and control behavior. This question is quite intriguing, as it literally makes one think and feel at the same time. Eventually, the individual appreciates the role of emotion in moral decisions. The answer to the question at hand, “Are reason and emotion equally necessary in justifying moral decisions?”, may be relative to the situation – its significance, gravity, and effect to the decision-maker. It is wise to know that the use of both reason and emotion is readily accessible to human beings. These are the only things that separate us from the rest of the animals. These assure us that in the complementary use of both, our decisions… won’t go to the dogs. References Colby, A., & Kohlberg, L. (Eds.). (1987). The measurement of moral judgment (Vols. 1 and 2). New York: Cambridge University Press. Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814–834. Hoffman, M. L. (2000). Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and justice. New York: Cambridge University Press. Hume, D. (1969). An enquiry concerning the principles of morals. La Salle, IL: Open Court. (Original work published 1777) Kant, I. (1959). Foundation of the metaphysics of morals. (L. W. Beck, Trans.). Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill. (Original work published 1785) Kohlberg, L. (1984). Essays in moral development: Vol. 2. The psychology of moral development. New York: Harper & Row. Krebs, D. L. and Denton, K. 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