The Perception of a Democratic Deficit in the EU - Essay Example

The EU is responsible for in excess of 20% of world trade and 31% of global output with significant impact on world affairs. Members not only derivefinancial advantages but also the respectability of being associated with others who believe in democracy and the rule of law (Steiner and Woods, p17). The original economic aims of the Treaty of Rome (1957) can be found in the preamble: …the removal of existing obstacles calls for concerted action in order to guarantee steady expansion, balanced trade and fair competition. (quoted by Bruce, 2001, p41) But society has changed enormously in the last 50 years and as Mitchell (2005) argues [that] with more nations joining, coupled with expansion in the scope of the EU’s mandate, an incongruity between popular democratic representation and expansion has developed. The phrase ‘democratic deficit’ was coined by Liberal Democrat MEP, Bill Newton Dunn in a 1986 pamphlet attacking Council secrecy – and can be applied to any so-called ‘democratic’ organization/country which is neglecting its democratic remit. In the current context it refers to the imbalance of power between national interests in decision-making within the Council of the European Union (Ministers) and across the EU institutions as a whole. Crucially European citizens have little say in what is done in their name once they vote for their MEPs. Mitchell (2005) clarifies this: Europe’s democratic deficit, whether it be perceived or real, is largely due to the EU’s institutional architecture, which promotes a type of circulatory decision-making process, but permits little input from the European public sphere. Compounding this situation is the informal nature of negotiations that often take place among and within the key policy-making bodies of the EU, leading to a less than transparent, and sometimes unpredictable, policy-making process. The institutions ultimately take their respective mandates from the Treaties which themselves are open to interpretation. It could be argued that the EU is not a well-defined cogent democratic entity – but a hybrid of functionalism, inter-governmentalism and mult-level governance (Steiner and Woods, 2003. p13). Indeed, quoting Dr Guiliano Amato, Aveblj (2005) points out that the EU’s stakeholders have yet to determine what the European Union ought to be – and therefore cannot begin to address the wider question of how to get there. Each member state is represented by a senior Minister with the President of the Council being appointed for a six-month term, thereby ensuring that in any fiscal year 2 different member states will have the opportunity to hold the Presidency. Although the representative Minister will have been elected to a seat by a majority in his/her national constituency and appointed to high office by members of his/her political party, critics argue that the manner in which Ministers are appointed means that there is no real European philosophy at work – the appointment is a consequence of a national appointment, rather than a separate goal in itself.. It therefore begs the question; to what extent can individual Ministers realistically be expected to put the greater good over and above national interests? Aveblj (2005) claims there is a European Ombudsman to provide oversight making the Council more accountable. However there are a number of ‘safe-guards’ built-in to the flow of decision making. It is the Commission, not the Council who determine which areas of policy are to be prioritised. Since the Single European Act, Council can no longer ignore Parliament’s opposition without a unanimous vote. Likewise a unanimous vote is required if Council wishes to amend the Commission’s proposals. It has been argued that the European Parliament should have greater oversight of the Council in order to redress this imbalance1. The Treaty of Amsterdam and the Nice Treaty have attempted to redress this by extending Parliament’s powers of ‘co-decision’ with the Council. However, as Steiner and Woods (2003, p14) assert ‘It is only where particularly sensitive issues (for example, taxation) are concerned that the co-decision procedure will not apply, leaving the Council with the whip hand.’ Whilst Members of the European Parliament (MEP) have been elected nationally and democratically since 1979, voter turn-out has fallen ‘which may cast doubt on the claims of the European Parliament to legitimacy on the basis of the direct election of its members’ (Steiner and Woods, 2003, p20). Further, they claim that the number of MEPs per member state is not calculated on a per-capita basis indicating lack of proportional representation. Of particular concern are those areas where the Council do not have to vote unanimously. Generally, the Council have voted unanimously (with an exception by the UK in 1982 in an attempt to abuse its right of veto on an unrelated matter) but in the event of discord the Treaty provides for qualified and simple majority voting. Clearly, use of majority voting means that a member state could be obliged to put in place a regulation or directive which it opposed. The more member states that join the EU, the greater the dilution of voting strength for existing members. The Ioannina Compromise 1994 does require member states to come to some form of compromise acceptable to all through continued negotiation. The Nice Treaty addressed the concerns that member states would attempt to undermine democratic decision-making by forming coalitions. Effectively a double majority is required: a majority of the member states have to vote, representing a minimum of 62% of the EU population. The European Commission are responsible for policy-making and implementing the decisions of the Council. Further the European Commission has a watchdog role, safeguarding the provisions of the Treaty. It is responsible to ensure that member states implement regulations, directives and decisions. The members are nominated by individual member states and agreed amongst the member states for a renewable period of 5 years. Currently, each member state has at least one Commissioner, (the five largest member states have 2 Commissioner). Enlargement will mean that it is no longer cost effective for each state to be represented by its own Commissioner. Once there are 27 Commissioners then a maximum number will be fixed by the Council and the posts will be assigned on renewal on an equitable basis. However Steiner and Wood (2003) remain unimpressed commenting that: Although Commissioners are supposed to be generally competent, whether they have any particular expertise in the portfolio allocated to them is a matter of luck rather than judgment, as individual Member States seek to ensure that its Commissioner has the most prestigious portfolio possible. One might argue that, as a result, the interests (or prestige) of individual Member States takes priority over the interests of the Community.” (2003, p.30) Each member state is represented by a judge in the Court of Justice. They are required by the Treaty of Rome to be independent and highly qualified judiciary. Their role is time-limited – a maximum appointment of 6 years, but can be reappointed – one assumes on merit. A judge can be removed from office by unanimous decision of his peers and the Advocates General who assist them by researching less well known legal points and arguments. Unlike English judgments, in the Court of Justice a single judgment will be handed down, with dissenting judgments obscured. This reflects the European approach to law-making which is inquisitorial rather than adversarial. Whilst Bruce (2001, p45) complains that judgments ‘seem the product of committee’ one could argue that given the weighty matters which typically appear before the Court and potential impact across member states then this is a much preferred, cheaper and consistent approach. According to Steiner and Woods (2003, p9) there has been a shift of emphasis away from the mainly economic conception of the EC to a more political idea, founded on fundamental rights and principles…liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. Ward and Picard (2005) argue that low participation rates by citizens during elections compromise the democracy of the European Union. Avbej (2005) calls this the social democratic deficit - which he distinguishes from the formal democratic deficit (bureaucracy) – resulting from lack of knowledge and interest in the EU Project and its institutions. Ward and Picard – both practising EPs at the time - said Should [Article 1-47] 2 be effectively implemented, the provision can increase the transparency of decision-making and contribute to the emergence of a European demos. This is a first step towards direct democracy “EU style”, a step that deserves much more attention and nurturing to move us finally and convincingly away from the old style of inter-governmental Europe into a real “citizens Europe”. There is therefore consensus amongst academics that involving EU citizens in a referendum regarding the Constitution and making them aware of the greater opportunities for direct participation, will begin to undermine this perception of social democratic deficit which in turn will break the cycle. The Constitution devotes a Title to the ‘Democratic Life of the Union’ which covers such things as Article 1-47 as well as democratic equality and representative democracy (Avbej, 2005). Increases in efficiency, transparency and accountability will assist in removing this perception and putting it in its proper context. Referendums might not be the best tool as citizens use the opportunity to vent on national issues (James, 2005; Beer, 2006). However, as Williams articulates: The issue is no longer whether Europe has a real or perceived democratic deficit. Ultimately, the perception of a democratic deficit itself represents a democratic deficit. What is needed is a commitment to install the lacking structural, institutional and procedural solutions that address an abyss which potentially threatens to engulf the democratic legitimacy of the EU and its institutions. Bibiliography Bruce, R. (2001): Success in Law. 5th Edition. John Murray (Publishers) Ltd. London Steiner, L and Woods, L. (2003) Textbook on EC Law. 8th Edition. OUP. London Web Avbej. M. (2005) Can the New European Constitution Remedy the EU ‘Democratic Deficit’? Available at: http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2005/demodef/avbelj De Beer, Patrice (2006). France and Europe: the democratic deficit exposed. Available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-europe_constitution/democractic_deficit_3610.jsp Mitchell, J. (2005) The European Union’s “Democratic Deficit”: Bridging the Gap between Citizens and EU Institutions. Polish Academy of Science Available at: http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2005/demodef/mitchell Newton Dunn, B. (2005). Challenge to Blair on EU Council Secrecy. Available at: http://www.libdemeuro.com/news/000097.html Wallis, D and Picard, S. (2005). The Citizen’s Right of Initiative in the European Constitution: A Second Chance for Democracy? Available at: http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2005/demodef/wallis The European Union: Balancing Democratic Deficit?. Available at: http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2005/demodef James, K. (2005) Curing the EU’s democratic deficit? Deutsche Welle. 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