The Democratic Deficit in America - Case Study Example

 Introduction UK Member of the European Parliament, Bill Newton Dunn is credited with coining the phrase ‘democratic deficit’. The phrase was coined ‘to describe the lack of popular input into EU decision-making.’1 Democratic deficits are characterized by government policies that seemingly conduct themselves in a manner inconsistent with the underlying features of the democratic system.2 Critics have become increasingly skeptical of the democratic soundness within the European Parliamentary system and have been satisfied to assign the phrase ‘democratic deficit’ as an adequate reflection of its mechanisms. The reason for this resolve is manifested by the European Union’s administrative processes. Executive dominance is chief among the flaws attributable to the democratic deficit that is said to characterize the European Parliamentary system.3 The enhanced role of the European Parliament is said to decrease and minimize representation of the Member States and as such threatens parliamentary sovereignty. The European Parliament appears to enjoy decision making in what is viewed by many as a predominantly executive political system. The European Union has dominated a number or areas in which it determines and issues policies usurping national control in these areas. 4 The second factor contributing to the notion that the European Union is characterized by what is called a democratic deficit is the nature of the European parliamentary elections. It is generally felt that Europeans vote in the election process on the basis of domestic issues rather than on issues on a wider European level. Moreover, as there are typically no real political parties vying for office within the European Parliament the representative capacity of those invariably elected is compromised.5 A matter of concern that accounts for the perception that the European Union is demonstrative of a democratic deficit is the apparent disconnect between the European Union and its citizens in general. The apparent lack of transparency associated with the EU’s parliamentary decision making process is directly responsible for this general disconnect. This lack of transparency is inconsistent with the ideals of public accountability that largely characterizes the democratic process.6 The broad powers afforded the European Court of Justice is also another factor contributing to the notion that the European Union governs in a manner consistent with a democratic deficit. The doctrine of ‘direct effect’ essentially dictates that the EU law will prevail over the national laws of the Member States and obviously threatens the parliamentary sovereignty of those States. 7 The overall impact of the difficulties with the democratic failures within the European Parliamentary process is that policy decisions made at the executive level are typically out of touch with the European citizenry. The fact of the matter is that political groups and trade unions are primarily focused on domestic issues and do not direct their energies and attentions toward issues on a broader European level.8 Therefore the overall impact of these considerations is that it is virtually impossible to promote real democratic representation of the citizens of Europe in the European Parliament as it is currently constituted. Recognizing the democratic deficit At a meeting held by the European Council at Laeken, Belgium on December 14-15, 2001 the Members present emphasized a desire for Member States to play a more pivotal role in the affairs of the European Union. Peter Hain, Secretary of State for Wales speaking at Westminster Hall on the Convention on the Future of Europe noted that ‘the protocols envisage a formal role for national Parliaments.’9 The European leaders while meeting in Laeken declared that the European Union 'stands at a crossroads, facing twin challenges, one within and the other beyond its borders…European institutions must be brought closer to its citizens; beyond its borders, the Union is confronted with a fast changing, globalised world.'10 This resolve is known as the Laeken Declaration.11 In response to the Laeken Declaration, the European Council endeavored to improve and increase national sovereignty by implementing a European Constitution. A treaty establishing a constitution for Europe was signed on 29 October, 2004 in Rome and was required to be ratified by all Member States by November 1, 2006.12 Articles 1-2 of the Constitutional Treaty are consistent with the main goals expressed by the Laeken Declaration. The opening Articles declare that the European Union is founded upon mutual respect for basic human dignity, democracy, equality, human rights and the rule of law in general. The Articles go on to maintain that these goals and values are the mutual concern of all Member States ‘in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between men and women prevail’.13 Obviously, the underlying goal is to institute sovereign remedies by widening the participation of the European citizenry through its representatives. The Laeken Declaration expressed this concern as follows: ‘what citizens understand by "good governance" is opening up fresh opportunities, not imposing further red tape. What they expect is more results, better responses to practical issues and not a European superstate or European institutions inveigling their way into every nook and cranny of life.’14 Sovereign remedies The Laeken Declaration sets as its goal an improvement of European Union division and definition of competence within its borders. Implicit in this goal is a desire to relinquish some control to national sovereignty. The Laeken Declaration also envisions simplifying its treaties with a view to democratizing its institutions, making provision for European Parliamentary elections and extending the decision-making process to include co-decision making processes.15 The Declaration confirms that clarification and consolidation of the existing four treaties will significantly achieve its objective toward promoting improved and enhanced transparency. The EU then considered the implementation of these goals via the enactment of a Constitution. ‘The question ultimately arises as to whether this simplification and reorganisation might not lead in the long run to the adoption of a constitutional text in the Union.’16 Tony Blair’s response to the Laeken Declaration was rather agreeable and shared his thoughts with The House of Commons on 17 December 2001. He maintained that the goals of the Laeken Declaration were not disingenuous and provided for stricter scrutiny of the Union and allowed for wider participation by Member States. Blair went on to say that ‘the days of isolationism are gone, rightly. Our role now is to be a leading partner in shaping the Europe of the future, not following reluctantly the shape moulded by others. We are playing that role now. We will continue to do so’.17 The inescapable conclusion is that Blair views the Laeken Declaration as a means to address the democratic deficit within the European Union by virtue of sovereign remedies. The idea of implementing a European Constitution appears to be the only means of providing sovereign remedies while at the same time cementing the goals of a unified Europe. However, the current draft is flawed in that it reserves far too much power and relinquishes far too little to its Member States. The delimitation of competences compromises the ability of Member States to participate freely in the new Union under its Constitution. Article 1.13 provides as follows: ‘The Union shall have exclusive competence in the following areas: Customs union; competition rules for the internal market; monetary policy (for eurozone members); common fisheries policy; common commercial policy.’18 In a half-hearted attempt to meet the objectives of the Laeken Declaration that purports to have a desire to promote greater participation of Member States, Article 1.12 makes the following concession: ‘The Member States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised, or has decided to cease exercising, its competences.’19 Article 1.11 makes a further dismal concession by allowing that ‘Competences not conferred upon the Union in the Constitution remain with the Member States.’20 Jan Wouters noted that ‘rather than strictly demarcating spheres of competence, the European Union should be further developed as a multilevel governance system in which, depending on each policy sphere, tasks and – even more so –responsibilities are attributed to different layers and in which the different players are linked together by efficient arrangements while preserving a sufficient degree of autonomy.’21 The Constitution as it stands compromises the concept of individual democracies within the European Union and can be said to run counter to the democratic objective of the Laeken Declaration. Article 1.1 automatically dispenses with this notion by providing ‘this Constitution establishes the European Union, on which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives they have in common.’22 A treaty by nature automatically recognizes sovereignty of contracting states. A constitution, on the other hand is supreme law of a state which requires recognition and submission by insubordinates within the state. The Treaty separated the EU from its Member States while the Constitution brings them together under the umbrella of a Union which is not legally distinguishable from its members. There appears to be further conflict between the Laeken Declaration and the Constitution for the EU. This conflict is manifested by the provisions contained in Part IV Article 444 which permits the European Council of Presidents and Prime Ministers to unanimously empower the Council of Ministers to make decisions by virtue of a majority vote in circumstances where a unanimous vote is now required. Although this can be vetoed by a national parliament’s objection, formal approval is not necessary.23 Article 444 has the potential to prevent Member States’ participation in the creation of new treaties by virtue of national vetoes. All that is required under Article 444 is a majority approval by EU’s presidents and the individual prime ministers that are representing governments. No doubt, prime ministers are democratically elected, but this procedure compromises the Laeken Declaration to promote transparency. Article 444 does not permit scrutiny of its decisions by indirectly allowing majority rule in such a broad fashion. Moreover, Article 1.18 makes provision for a flexibility clause by allowing that if the Constitution does not permit the EU enough authority to achieve one of its broad goals the Council of Ministers by a unanimous decision ‘shall adopt the appropriate measures’.24 This provision gives the Council of Ministers the authority to enhance their own powers without having to rely on a treaty to that effect. This of course gives way to the Laeken Declaration’s commitment to close the gap between the Union and the citizens. Purporting to be a democratic document by virtue of the Leaken Declaration the Constitution repeals and replaces ‘an existing treaty article, Number 308, which applies only to the internal market, and extends its scope to everything in the EU Constitution, including civil and criminal law, fundamental rights, social policy, culture etc. This is an extraordinary power to have in a supposedly democratic document.’25 Article 1.36 of the EU Constitution permits Council Ministers the authority to delegate their law-making powers to the Commission who represent non-elected members on matters that the Council decides are not essential. ‘Non-essential’ has a potentially broad application.26 This is obviously an affront to popular concepts of democracy and the democratic vision of the Laeken Declaration. Article 1.36 also effectively ‘turns the EU Commission, a body of nominated, not popularly elected persons, which France's president De Gaulle once described as "a conclave of technocrats without a country responsible to nobody", into a subordinate legislature in its own right, which we all as EU citizens must obey.’27 It also appears that any goal set by the Laeken Declaration for the promotion of transparency did not extend to the Union itself. If so, Article 1.40 is gravely misguided in that it makes the Member States vulnerable to transparency and total accountability to the Union. Article 1.40 provides that ‘before undertaking any action on the international scene each Member State shall consult the others within the European Council or the Council.’28 This provision effectively robs citizens of democratic governance within their respective Member States with the consequence of widening the gap between the citizenry and the Union. Implicit in this provision is a suggestion of the Union’s superiority and this obviously deviates from the objective of unity as encompassed in the Laeken Declaration. The word ‘loyalty’ implies that the Union is superior to the Member States which will empower the Union by virtue of ratification of the EU Constitution. The general idea of the Laeken Declaration was to repatriate some element of individualism back to the Member States by making provision for a substantially more active role in the decision making process. This role was intended to be one in which individual citizens not only felt that they had some input in but were able to scrutinize the decision-making process. As it stands the EU Constitution effectively truncates any chance of scrutiny by providing the Union with what might amount to autonomous powers. Moreover the democracy of the Member States is compromised by a Constitution that forces loyalty and compliance with the Union. As noted previously, a treaty which relinquished some measure of power unconditionally would have been a far more effective sovereign remedy than a Constitution that gives power with one hand and withdraws it with the other. Bibliography Convention on the Future of Europe. Westminster Hall. 20 March 2003 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo030320/halltext/30320h01.htm Viewed February 6, 2007 EU Constitutional Treaty 2005 Majone, G. (2005) Dilemmas of European Integration. Oxford University Press Moravcsik, A. (2002) ‘In defence of the democratic deficit: reassessing legitimacy in the European Union’ Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol 40, Issue 4 Reif, K and Schmitt, S. (1980) Nine second-order national elections: a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results. European Journal of Political Research. Vol 8, Issue 1 Scott, Dermot. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. 29 October, 2004. http://www.europarl.org.uk/constitution/ConstitutionMain.htm Viewed February 6, 2007 Straw, Jack. EU Constitutional Treaty: Straw Statement: House of Commons. June 6, 2005. http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&a=KArticle&aid=1115144244649 Viewed February 6, 2007 The House of Common Debate: The First Special Report. December 17 2001. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmfaff/509/50903.htm Viewed February 6, 2007 The Laeken Declaration December 14-15, 2001 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.ASP?lang=en Viewed February 6, 2007 Thompson, Jessica A. Review of Siedentop, Larry’s Democracy in Europe. (2001) New York: Columbia University Press Wouters, Jan. “Institutional and constitutional changes for the European Union – some reflections in the light of the Treaty of Nice”, European Law Review, Vol.26(4), August 2001 Read More