The Ideas of Delinquency and Criminality - Essay Example

Foucauldian Dis and Punishment The ideas of delinquency and criminality are intimately interwoven in various social theories. In other words, different frameworks attempt to account for and explain the social realities of these concepts. However, it is in the works of French intellectual Michel Foucault on penal institutions that the idea of punishment as part of a discourse of power is made explicit. It is noteworthy that his genealogical works in particular, involve a problematization of the self. This constitution of the self includes the question of how the notion of criminality is itself formed within the context of discourse. In this paper, the author presents Foucault’s ideas on the discourse of criminality vis-à-vis other sociological theories, such as labelling theory, symbolic interactionism, and social imagination. Thereafter it will be argued that perhaps, such theories in fact fall within the relations of power that Foucault insists are components of discourse, demonstrating the extent of Foucault’s theory. The Nature of Disciplinary Institutions Disciplinary institutions are, by and large, places where power is exercised and coursed through various mechanisms, but not merely for its own sake. The latter observation is made by subjecting the study of such institutions to a reversal: is it really the simple case that power is found only on one side, exerting its influence through restrictions and rules? The answer as per Foucault is ‘no.’ Not only can power be understood in the negative, it can also be seen in the positive, as a productive relationship. This is an aspect of power relations that is either overlooked or altogether dismissed. Without doubt, it is in Discipline and Punish (1977) that Foucault’s concern with discipline and surveillance becomes even more pronounced than his other genealogical works. Here he examines the progressive sophistication of disciplinary mechanisms such as punishments employed in prisons that are in fact, upon closer scrutiny, representative of the same progression of disciplinary mechanisms in society. He undertook an examination of power relations using the penal institution as a take-off point, for the primary reason that it is here where the different disciplinary techniques used in the exercise of power are more evident. At the outset, he shows how torture and execution was made a public spectacle, with the condemned man being paraded in a manner deemed suited to the crime he committed. Interestingly however, public tortures and executions soon became a ‘hidden’ affair, with the condemned man being transferred secretly from one place to another in a manner as inconspicuous as possible, using plain carriages with no particular distinguishing mark indicating that the cargo was a convicted felon. Nevertheless, Foucault points out the concern that the institution has with the ‘body’, a preoccupation that the prison has in common with the asylum and the hospital and, upon close examination, with other institutions as well. The shifting of torture and execution from the public to the private realm (resulting in more economical disciplinary techniques) subtly demonstrates how mechanisms of discipline evolve and take other forms. In an interview, Foucault states: What I wanted to show is the fact that, starting from a certain conception of the basis of the right to punish, one can find in the work of penal experts and philosophers of the 18th century that different means of punishment were perfectly conceivable. Indeed in the reform movement… one finds a whole spectrum of means to punish that are suggested, and finally it happens that the prison was in some way, the privileged one (Foucault, in Lotringer, 1989, p.286). Using the prison as an example, Foucault demonstrates how such disciplinary institutions utilize different techniques to form ‘docile bodies’: a direct coercion of the body to produce both productive subjects and instruments with which to channel power (Foucault, 1977, p.136). He poses the question of how and why discipline is utilized as an important institutional technique. With the individualization of ‘man the machine’, to borrow from Marx, discipline functions to analyze and transform the body into a manipulable being, capable of being put to productive use by the institution. ‘Productivity’ in this sense refers to the condition of being able to carry out and further the cause of the institution. Thus, the meaning of ‘productivity’ depends on the institutional demands imposed upon its subjects. In the following part, it will be made evident that for Foucault, the institutional role of the prison-model of society paves the way for the production of specific types of individuals. At the end of the chapter entitled Panopticism, Foucault explicitly stated: The practice of placing individuals under ‘observation’ is a natural extension of a justice imbued with disciplinary methods and examination procedures. Is it surprising that the cellular prison, with its regular chronologies, forced labour, its authorities of surveillance and registration, its experts in normality, who continue and multiply the functions of the judge, should have become the modern instrument of penality? Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons? (p. 228). In this particular passage, Foucault outlines the mechanisms that the prison uses in controlling criminality. On closer examination, what he in fact outlines are the mechanisms that operate within different social institutions. This is a noteworthy point, since the institutions that he mentioned, i.e. factories, schools, barracks, and hospitals, all function in essentially the same way as the modern prison. These all use specific procedures and techniques to discipline subjects. Jeremy Bentham’s concept of the Panopticon became an influential model for modern day architectural efficiency. The prison that he envisioned was to be constructed in such a way as to have the individual cells arranged in a circular manner, with an observation tower at the center of the formation. Light coming from the outside of the cells illumines the inmate for whoever is staying at the observation tower, while the observer in the tower itself remains hidden from the cells’ occupants. From Discipline and Punish, 1977 This arrangement reverses, yet makes even more powerful, the traditional notion of incarceration that is, the putting away of criminality. In the panoptic model, visibility becomes the central principle that governs incarceration. In Foucault’s words (1977), “Full lighting and the eye of a supervisor capture better than darkness, which ultimately protected. Visibility is a trap” (p. 200). In other words, the one who is being observed is aware of being observed, thus making him/her prone to the effects of the disciplinary gaze. It is this gaze that makes discipline possible, relying on the capacity of the supervisor to see constantly. Thus, to assume that someone is in the observation tower even if there is no one there is the full effect of the Panopticon. Foucault (1977) further clarified: Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary;… in short, that the inmates should be caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers. (p. 201) It can be seen that central to the effective use of the panoptic principle is the efficiency of surveillance mechanisms. The latter should function in such a way as to force the recipient of disciplinary power to keep watch over his/her own actions, because of the fact that s/he is being observed by the authority figure. The concept of the gaze is what makes discipline work. Delinquency and Criminality in Foucauldian Discourse The notions of delinquency and criminality are rather difficult notions to isolate and explain. Various theories attempt to explain it, but such theories most often do so by considering the different relevant factors that exert influence on an individual. Some of these factors are family, peers, and the individual’s demographics or environment. However, it can be seen that these theories are all relational; that is, from interactionism, to labelling, to social imagination, relations of power are the common threads, just as Foucault claims. The family as an institution is often referred to as the basic unit of society. As such, it is crucial to a childs development, whether morally, socially, or emotionally. Further, most of what a child knows is learned from exposure to the factors in the home setting, such as parents and siblings. A parent can inadvertently teach his/her child undesirable lessons when the child witnesses the parents delinquent or criminal behavior. Peers can also teach a child or individual delinquent or criminal behavior just as the parent can. If the child’s peers engage in such behavior, then the child or adolescent might also associate with them by way of engaging in similar behavior. Peers can also cause delinquent patterns of behavior in an individual by labelling the latter as a delinquent. If the child feels perceived as delinquent, s/he might actually start to act the part as a source of self-esteem. A child’s surroundings, especially during the formative stages of development, can either beneficially or adversely affect social behavior. Such demographics can be seen as contributing factors to criminal patterns of behavior. Undesirable living conditions, coupled with a neighborhood with a high crime rate, have the potential to lead to criminal activity. On the other hand, if the adolescent’s living conditions are positive, then in all likelihood the latter may develop into a responsible individual. Delinquent behavior cannot be considered a cultural norm because by definition, a behavior is delinquent precisely for the reason that it is against a societal norm. As Calhoun et al (1989) state, "Sociologists define deviance as any behavior that members of a social group define as violating their norms. This concept applies both to criminal acts of deviance and non-criminal acts that members of a group view as unethical, immoral, peculiar, sick, or otherwise outside the bounds of respectability" (p. 168). The idea of criminality and delinquency as deviant behavior is accounted for by theories such as labelling, social imagination, and symbolic interactionism. Labelling is a theory founded on interactionism, a sociological perspective which asserts that a social organization is formed in a manner that operates on an interweaving of social relations. Such an interweaving of relations in turn helps to create personal identities of individuals, hence making the notion of individuality meaningful in the first place. In his work, Mind, Self and Society George Herbert Mead (1934), stated, “The meaning of a gesture by one organism, to repeat, is found in the response of another organism to what would be the completion of the act of the first organism which that gesture initiates and indicates” (p. 147). Certain gestures may affect individuals similarly, as in the case of language as a symbol. “Thinking always implies a symbol which will call out the same response in another that it calls out in the thinker” (Mead, 1934, p. 148). Symbols then become significant in that they give consistency and meaning to particular social actions or moves. Symbols, then, function to influence the actual formation of the self. Labelling is an interesting theory that might indeed be crucial in understanding and curbing deviant behavior, such as that of juvenile delinquency. Leighninger et al (1996) state that: Social groups make deviance by making rules whose infractions constitute deviance and by applying these rules to particular people and labelling them as outsiders. From this point of view, deviance is not a quality of the act that a person commits, but rather a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions to the "offender." The deviant is one to whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant behavior is the behavior that people so label (p. 332). This implies that when an individual, such as a child, gets caught for engaging in a particular offence, s/he may begin to see him or herself in a negatively. Such is the power of labelling, especially if the ones who so label are persons of influence such as family members or peers, or institutions such as schools or perhaps the state itself. In short, a negative self image resulting from negative labelling might make a person prone to engaging and perhaps associating with criminal activities and agents. Sociological imagination on the other hand, refers to the capacity of an individual to somehow connect independent, social, and historical forces to specific incidents in a person’s life. In the Sociological Imagination, Mills (1959) writes: The facts of contemporary history are also facts about the success and the failure of individual men and women. When a society is industrialized, a peasant becomes a worker; a feudal lord is liquidated or becomes a businessman. When classes rise or fall, a person is employed or unemployed; when the rate of investment goes up or down, a person takes new heart or goes broke. When wars happen, an insurance salesperson becomes a rocket launcher; a store clerk, a radar operator; a wife or husband lives alone; a child grows up without a parent. Neither the life of an individual nor the history of a society can be understood without understanding both (Mills, 1959). He seems to suggest that people somehow view their personal problems as societal problems, connecting their experiences with the wider historical changes and public issues that are occurring in society. For example, a person who finds himself in an impoverished condition may interpret his status as a consequence of a public or social ill, thus the perceived need to protest against this particular social problem. There is some sort of projection of personal experience into the sphere of public experience, identifying this impoverished state as a shared experience. As mentioned above, these theories are but some frameworks from which delinquency and criminality are examined. However, in a much larger sense, it can be argued that all such theories operate on the idea that such social phenomena happen within social relations, or more appropriately, in relations of power. In discussing productivity, it can be understood to refer to the capacity of institutions to produce individuals of a specific type, utilizing punishments as mechanisms. In their book, Michel Foucault (1984), Cousins and Hussain write “that imprisonment is also enveloped in a mechanism of power” (p. 173). It is important to point out that if the disciplinary mechanisms found in prisons are understood as representative of societal mechanisms for control, then it makes sense to argue that the phenomena accounted for by various sociological theories are in fact a result of disciplinary mechanisms in one way or another. Foucault sees discipline, therefore, as combinatory: it functions to combine elements, in this case, individuals, into a uniform mass not through the individual variables found in each element, but through the characteristics imposed upon it because of the space it occupies. Hence, the space defines the capabilities of each individual, which in turn contribute to the collective function of the mass. As it were, the individual is trained through its designation or position, the series that is relevant to his codified space, and through the issuance of a systematic order or command from the authority (Foucault, 1977, p.166). Conclusion In sum, what is made evident at this point is that punishment in Foucault should be understood as something much broader than simple retribution. Instead, punishment is an act that is subsumed under the notion of discipline, or training. As such, the prison institution is designed to re-form a criminal into an individual who can be reintegrated into mainstream society, in order to be made useful and productive once more. As already mentioned, the mechanisms used by society are by and large the same mechanisms of discipline used in institutions such as the prison. Within this larger framework, it is implied that the notion of punishment, in all its forms, operate as a part of a purposeful social design within which all other theories become possible. What is positive about such a societal setup is the fact that techniques such as punishments are not entirely negative or prohibitive. Relations of power are important for Foucault because of the positive effects borne out of it. As a final positive note, consider what he says that is summed up best in an interview: It seems to me that power is ‘always already there’, that one is never ‘outside’ it… But this does not entail the necessity of accepting an inescapable form of domination… To say that one can never be ‘outside’ power does not mean that one is trapped and condemned to defeat no matter what (Foucault, 1980, p.141). While Foucault did not agree with the prison per se as the best form of punishment, he saw in the prison a mechanism that, as used by the society, functions as a state mechanism for internalizing discipline. That means the individual would be responsible for governing or disciplining himself from within. Every time the person "feels" the "gaze", he would be forced to govern himself. In other words, the effects of discipline are felt even though the disciplinary power is absent. The prison is therefore not simply a place for punishment, but a model of an effective mechanism. References Calhoun, C., Light, D., & Keller, S. (1989) Sociology. 5th ed. New York, Alfred A. Knopf. Cousins, M. & Hussain, A. (1984) Michel Foucault. New York, St. Martin’s Press. Foucault, M. (1977) Discipline and Punish. Alan Sheridan trans. New York, Vintage Books. Foucault, M. (1989) What calls for Punishment? In: Lotringer, S. ed. Foucault Live. New York, Columbia University, pp. 279-292. Foucault, M. (1980) Power and Strategies. In: Gordon, C. ed. Power/Knowledge. New York, Pantheon, pp. 134-145. Leighninger, L., & Popple, P. (1996) Social work, social welfare, and American society. 3rd ed. Needham Heights, MA, Allyn and Bacon. Mead, G. H. (1934) Mind, Self and Society. USA, University of Chicago Mills, C. W. (1959) The Sociological Imagination. Lewis & Clark College. Portland, Oregon, USA, retrieved May 1, 2006, available at: http://www.lclark.edu/~goldman/socimagination.html Read More