How was the Cuban Missile Crisis perceived in the USA and Cuba - Essay Example

How the Cuban Missile Crisis was perceived in the USA and Cuba December 18, 2005 The Cuban Missile Crisis is the closest that the United States and the USSR have ever come to fighting a nuclear war. To fully appreciate the magnitude of this conflict, the events during and leading up to the crisis as well as the three differing viewpoints and motivations must be illuminated. The U.S. and Cuban governments were each compelled to action by the fear of each other. Both countries posed a threat, real and implied, to the other. Nuclear bomb paranoia swept the post World War II world. In no place or time was this fear more apparent than during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During the 1962 crisis, Fidel Castro, Nikita Khrushchev and John Kennedy jockeyed for the upper hand, each employing bold moves that brought the world to the brink of possible annihilation. Prior to the Cuban Revolution in the mid to late 1950’s, the tropical island of Cuba was a favored tourist attraction of U.S. citizens. The United States government held substantial control in Cuba’s economic and political dealings. However, Castro, a leading political figure in Cuba, refused to be controlled by the United States. The United States government suspected that when Castro assumed power on January 1, 1959, his communist government would pose a close threat to America. Castro further raised concerns when he seized property belonging to prosperous Cuban Nationals and foreigners in an attempt to improve conditions for working-class Cubans. Many of these properties belonged to businesses owned by U.S. companies and individuals. U.S. suspicions and concerns were heightened in December, 1960 when Castro officially and openly aligned Cuba with the Soviet Union. Less than one month later, in early January, 1961, the U.S. severed diplomatic relations with Castro and imposed a trade embargo on Cuba that remains in effect to this day. The embargo stopped the flow of oil to Cuba and the sale of its major cash crop, sugar, from Cuba. In April, 1961 a group of Cuban rebels backed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency in a plan approved by the president, invaded southern Cuba at the Bay of Pigs The invasion was an attempt to overthrow Castro by instigating a Cuban rebellion, but all rebels participating in the invasion were killed or captured within four days of the landing. So he could later deny U.S. involvement, Kennedy refused to provide any air support dooming the mission (Frankel, 2004, p.50). The Cuban victory during the Bay of Pigs Invasion served only to strengthen Castro’s grip on Cuba and to embarrass the new president, who had not yet been in office three months. The U.S. made no secret of the plan in the attempt to unify Cubans against Castro. The majority of Cuban residents, though, took exception to U.S. intervention in Cuban affairs and united behind Castro. Castro and many Cuban citizens, quite correctly, considered this action an aggressive, illegal invasion by the U.S. and a broken promise by its president. After foiling the Bay of Pigs invasion, Castro learned that the U.S. staged a mock invasion of a Caribbean island in 1962 (“Thirteen Days”, 2004). The purpose of the mock invasion was to overthrow the leader Ortsac, Castro spelled backwards. Because of this, Castro became even more convinced that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent. Alarmed by this escalating threat by a major world super-power, Castro escalated the importation of missiles from the Soviets in what he and Khrushchev described as a “defensive mechanism” to thwart future aggressive acts by its neighbor 90 miles to the north (“Kennedy-Khrushchev”, 1996). The Soviet Union, deeply involved in a cold war with the U.S., eagerly sent munitions, medium-range missiles and equipment to build airfields in Cuba. Castro viewed the Soviets’ aid as building blocks to a strong Cuba-U.S.S.R. alliance. For the Soviets’ part, Khrushchev was motivated to arm Cuba in order to take U.S. attention away from the Berlin Wall being erected. The Soviets did not want the U.S. to occupy Berlin and use the German city as a spying base while promoting anti-Soviet propaganda. Kennedy, meanwhile, was arguing for a greater U.S. military presence in Berlin. Having missiles in Cuba was also a Soviet opportunity to gain a strategic arsenal close to America. Khrushchev eagerly extended an offer of assistance to the then desperate Castro and offered new trade opportunities to ease the effects of U.S. sanctions as well as the promise of protection from U.S. hostilities. Castro, on his part, was fearful of an invasion by the U.S. but did not ask the Soviets for missiles. He said at the time he thought a simple Soviet-Cuban pact would be a sufficient deterrent to a U.S. invasion. For an example, he pointed out that the U.S. had many of these pacts and that they were respected (Gott, 2004, p. 199). However, Cuban misgivings about missile placement and its threat to draw fire from U.S. aircraft went unvoiced at the time. It is unclear if Castro understood better than Khrushchev that moving and hiding missiles would not be an easy secret to keep or if the Soviets did not care if they were noticed. Castro urged the Soviets to make the missile placements public to help avoid an invasion. Khrushchev, who had said “Don’t worry, I’ll grab Kennedy by the balls and make him negotiate,” to Castro’s brother in July of 1962, believed there would be no problems from the U.S. if the missile were discovered (Gott, 2004, p. 204). Back in the Soviet Union, Khrushchev was under pressure from the majority of Soviet officials to stand strong against the U.S. His motive in placing nuclear missiles in Cuba was an effort to restore the balance of power in the Cold War. He was assured by the Soviet military that the installation could be done secretly and that the Americans would not discover the missiles until well after they were placed. A widely held belief of Castro and Khrushchev was that if the Soviet Union lost the arms race, that weakness may induce a first strike from the United States. Missiles placed in Cuba would solve that problem. By 1962, tension between Cuba and the U.S. was at its height. Kennedy was perceived by Khrushchev as immature and even incompetent following the June, 1961 summit in Vienna. These perceptions were only bolstered by the botched Bay of Pigs invasion. Furthermore, the U.S. had taken no action while the Soviets were slowly constructing the Berlin Wall. Khrushchev and, therefore, Castro perceived that they had an upper hand in negations with Kennedy and fully expected him to back-down in the face of threats made. In July, 1962, Castro boldly announced that Cuba would proceed with all necessary measures to protect his country and had the backing of the U.S.S.R. Castro, in his mid-30’s, was apprehensive of the American military power, but the new President of Cuba was energetically engaged in building an idealistic government he thought would be a model for the world to follow. In addition, he had the super-power Soviet Union as an important ally and perceived Kennedy as a weakling. It’s of little wonder he stood tall with Khrushchev and talked tough during the crisis. From his viewpoint, he had ample reasoning to believe that he would win this conflict and that Cuba would become a respected political and military voice in world affairs. On August 31, 1962, Senator Kenneth Keating announced to the Senate and Kennedy that there was evidence of Soviet missile installations in Cuba. Amidst recent warnings by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in a speech to the UN that an American attack on Cuba could mean war with the Soviet Union, Kennedy ordered a U-2 reconnaissance flight over western Cuba in mid-October. The U-2 spy-plane flying over western Cuba did indeed discover and photographed evidence of missile sites in Cuba (Frankel, 2004, p.88). During this escalation of tensions between the U.S., Cuba and the Soviet Union, Kennedy had the advantage of a high-level team of experts to advise him. This team, Ex-Comm (Executive Committee of the National Security Council), was composed of Kennedy’s most trusted high-level advisors. Khrushchev and Castro made decisions largely by themselves (Allison, Zelikow, p.110-113) Members of ExComm were, not surprisingly, divided between those who favored air strikes on the Cuban missile bases and those who held out for diplomatic discussions to solve the growing problem. Kennedy decided on a naval blockade around the island of Cuba to prevent the delivery of military ordinance. The blockade established an ultimatum as well as a compromise. Discussing the issue with Ex.Comm, Kennedy sought to anticipate Khrushchev and Castro’s response to the blockade. He reasoned to the members of Ex-Comm that if the Soviets did not give way within a day or two, a U.S. air attack on Cuba would commence soon followed by an all-out invasion of Cuba. This internal compromise solution by Kennedy bought time for a possible diplomatic solution while soothing the group that advocated immediate warfare. Gromyko reassured Kennedy on Oct. 18 of that year that Soviet aid to Cuba had been intended only for the "defensive capabilities of Cuba" (Frankel, 2004, p. 86). Regardless, Kennedy met with his Ex-Comm and ordered the blockade instituted immediately. Castro did not realize the U.S. had discovered the missile sites, but was alarmed at the build-up of war ships in the area. He immediately planned for two types of retaliation. One was to initiate covert acts upon U.S. personnel and facilities in Latin America, the other was to have Cubans in and around the United Nations building to carry out acts of terror (Frankel, 2004, p. 86). By Oct. 23, 1962, U.S. ships had taken up position in an 800 mile perimeter around Cuba. That same evening, Kennedy addressed the nation on television to announce U.S. intentions. A war of words and a political chess match ensued. Kennedy found that the Soviets were prepared for the high-stakes rhetoric. In a letter dated Oct. 22 to Khrushchev, Kennedy informed the Soviet premier that the U.S. considered the missiles in Cuba to be a threat to the security of the western hemisphere and that they will be removed. “At the same time,” Kennedy said, “I wish to point out that the action we are taking is the minimum necessary to remove the threat to the security of the nations of this hemisphere. The fact of this minimum response should not be taken as a basis, however, for any misjudgment on your part. I hope that your Government will refrain from any action which would widen or deepen this already grave crisis and that we can agree to resume the path of peaceful negotiations” (“Kennedy-Khrushchev”, 1996). Khrushchev responded the next day, “I must say frankly that measures indicated in your statement constitute a serious threat to peace and to the security of nations. The United States has openly taken the path of grossly violating the United Nations Charter, violating international norms of freedom of navigation on the high seas, the path of aggressive actions both against Cuba and against the Soviet Union” (“Kennedy-Khrushchev”, 1996). On the evening of the 23rd, Kennedy addressed the nation via television. It was the first time the American public was aware of a crisis. In the address, Kennedy appealed to the Cuban portion of his audience describing how he had “watched with deep sorrow how your nationalist revolution was betrayed and how your fatherland fell under foreign domination. Now your leaders are no longer inspired by Cuban ideals; they are puppets of an international conspiracy” (Gott, 2004, p. 205). Castro replied the next evening, also via television, claiming that the Americans were trying to prevent Cuba from arming itself. He called the blockade an “act of piracy.” Cubans at that time, for the most part, stood behind their president. The Bay of Pigs invasion had served to strengthen their resolve and mistrust of the U.S. (“Thirteen Days”, 2001). On Oct, 24, 1962, U.S. ships were finally in place successfully blockading Cuban waters. Soviet ships en route to Cuba with questionable cargo either slowed down or reversed their course with the exception of one. U.S. Military forces went to Defcon 2, the highest ever to that point in U.S. history. (Defcon is a federal reference to Defense Condition. Defcon 5 stands for peacetime condition while Defcon 1 means at war. Defcon 2 indicates the nation is fully mobilized for war) (Detzer, 1979, p. 164). The next day, Oct. 25, Kennedy received a letter from Khrushchev in which Khrushchev comments that there is a "serious threat to peace and security of peoples" (“Kennedy-Khrushchev”, 1996) “Just imagine, Mr. President, that we had presented you with the conditions of an ultimatum which you have presented us by your action. How would you have reacted to this? I think that you would have been indignant at such a step on our part. And this would have been understandable to us” (“Kennedy-Khrushchev”, 1996). On receiving this, Kennedy decided to give Khrushchev more time and pulled the quarantine line back to 500 miles from the 800 previously set. His reply to Khrushchev blamed the crisis on the Soviet Union and its actions instead. During an Ex-Comm meeting, Kennedy said that he believed the quarantine alone would not force the Soviet government to remove its offensive weapons from Cuba. A CIA report from earlier that morning stated that there was no halt in progress in the development of the missile sites in Cuba and another reconnaissance flight revealed the Soviets were also attempting to camouflage the missiles (Allison, Zelikow, 1999, p.208). Kennedy then discussed a proposal to withdraw U.S. missiles from Turkey in exchange for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Khrushchev was busy trying to find a compromise solution to the crisis without consulting or even notifying Castro of his intentions. On Oct. 26, he sent a letter to Kennedy proposing the removal of Soviet missiles if Kennedy would publicly announce never to invade Cuba. As part of the proposal, this announcement was to be followed by a letter dated on Oct. 27 proposing a public trade of Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. missile in Turkey. The missiles in Turkey were of concern to Khrushchev because they were located just 150 miles from Soviet land. Kennedy wrote Khrushchev a reply stating that he agreed to make a statement that the U.S. will not invade Cuba if Khrushchev removed the missiles from that country, but did not refer to the missiles in Turkey (“Kennedy-Khrushchev”, 1996). On Oct. 28, Khrushchev announced over Radio Moscow that he has agreed to remove the missiles from Cuba. Castro, his administration and his top commanders knew nothing of this broadcast. They had received no copies of letters sent to or from Khrushchev regarding the issue. Cuban officials only learned of this deal between the super-powers several hours after it was announced on the radio (Frankel, 2004, p. 145). Castro was reportedly furious about the lack of information and about the Soviet decision to withdraw. When he heard of the Soviet deal with the U.S., reports indicated he became so angry, he kicked a wall and broke a mirror that had been hanging on it. He said that Khrushchev “lacked cojones (balls)” (Detzer, 1979, p. 260). He further argued that the missiles should never have been detected and that hiding and camouflaging the missiles should have been the responsibility of Cuban, not Soviet, troops, implying the Cubans would have done a more effective job. Castro sternly argued against the U.S./Soviet agreement by arguing a genuine solution would have included five more points: (1) an end to the economic blockade against Cuba; (2) an end to all subversive activities carried out from the United States against Cuba; (3) a halt to all attacks on Cuba carried out from the U.S. military bases on the island of Puerto Rico; (4) the cessation of aerial and naval reconnaissance flights in Cuban airspace and waters; and (5) the return of Guantanamo naval base to Cuba (“On the Brink”, 1997). Throughout the Soviet-American negotiation period, Castro was busy preparing for war, so he was more than dismayed when he learned that the U.S.S.R. sacrificed Cuban interests for a perceived Soviet advantage in the removal of U.S. missiles in Turkey. That removal, incidentally, never came to fruition. The Turks considered the missiles a deterrent to Soviet aggression and ultimately refused to remove them. Not knowing of the negotiations, Castro had ordered his troops to shoot down U.S. planes, which they did. A U-2 was shot down by a Soviet Surface-to-Air Missile and its pilot killed. Upon learning of this aggression, Khrushchev was concerned that this incident would deter the ongoing diplomatic efforts and was further unnerved by a message from Castro. In the message, the Cuban president urged him to prepare for a nuclear war against the U.S. In a message back to Castro, Khrushchev said, “Naturally, you understand where that would lead us. It would not be a simple strike but the start of a thermonuclear war” (Allison, Zelikow, 1999, p. 127). The situation was further complicated by a U-2 flight that unintentionally entered Soviet air space, but a conflict was averted when the U.S. spy plane left the restricted air space before military action could be taken. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev held the constant concern during the crisis that an incident such as this would initiate a war. Khrushchev never intended to start a war, nuclear or otherwise, over the missiles in Cuba. Castro’s military actions based in part by being kept ignorant of U.S./Soviet talks, may very well have been the catalyst for Khrushchev to acquiesce to Kennedy’s demands to dismantle the missiles in Cuba. Tensions eased on October 28, but the ordeal was not yet over. During final negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Castro, who felt betrayed by Khrushchev, tried to halt the removal and inspection of the missiles. He eventually backed down and the two sides reached an agreement. The Soviet Navy shipped the missiles back to the U.S.S.R. on the decks of the ships so that American reconnaissance planes could count the missiles and ensure that all had been removed. (“On the Brink”, 1997). Successive U.S. administrations have kept Kennedy’s promise not invade Cuba. After the Soviet Union’s collapse in the early 1990s, Cuban exiles’ hopes were revived of an American invasion to free their country. Yet still the promise has been kept. Cuba still is a nation of poverty led by a communist dictator, and the U.S. embargo remains in place crippling the Cuban economy. Poor communication among the three governments contributed in large part to the misunderstandings and the acceleration of the Cuban Missile Crisis. In 1962, there was no communicative connection between American and Soviet leaders. Kennedy and Khrushchev used a variety of written communiqués as well as television and radio speeches to negotiate with one another. This unreliable and indirect form of communication nearly led to nuclear war. If Khrushchev had not agreed to remove the missiles, the U.S. would have invaded Cuba within days. The Soviets then would have launched their battlefield nuclear weapons. In that event, Kennedy would have had no choice but to launch U.S. missiles at Cuba or, more likely, the Soviet Union. The U.S. was ready for all-out war. Realizing how close they had come to catastrophe of historic proportions, Kennedy and Khrushchev established the "hot line" between the White House and the Kremlin so they could speak directly as a direct positive result of this course of events (“On the Brink”, 1997). The Cuban Missile Crisis was certainly the most important conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This marked the beginning of what seemed to be a new willingness of the nations to cooperate and communicate. Kennedy made friendly overtures to Castro to ease tension. The cold war seemed to have a real chance to warm. However, on November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was assassinated in Dallas. Eleven months later, Premier Khrushchev was removed from office by Communist hard-liners, partially because he was perceived as weak during the Cuban Missile Crisis, an ironic twist after he had proclaimed Kennedy was weak. One cant help but wonder what would have happened if these two men had stayed in power. The averted war with nuclear implications most assuredly changed the course of the twentieth century for the better as leaders were forced to consider the realities of the situation. Perhaps the same two people who had brought us so close to nuclear war, changed by that experience, could have brought us further from it in less time. References Allison, G. and Zelikow, P. (1999). Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. 2nd ed. New York: Longman. Detzer, D. (1979). The Brink: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Publishers. Frankel, M. (2004). High Noon in the cold war: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Ballantine. Gott, R. (2004). Cuba: A New History. New Haven: Yale University Press. John F. Kennedy Library and Museum. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Volume VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges. (1996). Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of State. ThinkQuest. (1997). On the Brink [online]. Available from [December 14, 2005]. Thirteen Days. (2001) [DVD]. Dir. Roger Donaldson. Infinifilm. Read More