Response to the Rwandan Genocide - Essay Example

This paper proposes to analyze the case study of Rawandan genocide and US/UN response; by conducting a Meta analysis of the genocide itselfand then by doing a Meso analysis of International response. The answers to the questions will be structured and linked together so as to construct a holistic analytical framework. The core theoretical hypothesis will be based on the Dependency theory and Center-Periphery relationship and African state underdevelopment. An attempt will be made to link this with crystallization of Tutsi-Hutu rivalry. It will also be examined that how mutually destructive ethnic/tribal identities are a conscious construct of colonialism. The role of media will also be examined vis--vis as an aiding tool in the genocide and its deliberative inertia in generating public response. The international context of US foreign policy response will also be examined in the aftermath of Somalia and in the theoretical framework of national interest vs humanitarianism framework. The response of UN will also be examined under organizational interest. This approach to the case study will not only answer the posed questions but will also try to link the various dimensions and coordinates of this International Humanitarian crisis. The problems of Africa have to be viewed within the inter-contextual relationships of colonization, decolonization, racism and 'neo-colonialism'. In the small country of Rwanda approximately 800000 to 1 million human beings were slaughtered within a span of just around hundred days; in a ruthlessly organized manner. In order to lend perspective to our analysis about US and UN apathy towards this incident it is imperative that we first examine the context of Rwanda as a post-colonial state. Colonial Context: Rwanda's underdevelopment in both social as well as economic terms, which precipitated the massacre, has to be understood in terms of colonial state 'manufacturing'. Post colonial Africa was divided not according to natural or even perhaps geographical barriers. Countries were created in accordance with the territorial occupation of colonial metropole. The cauldron of state creation in Africa was designed to serve the interests of the metropole. The new nations, right from the outset were plagued with structural anomalies. The development problem in its entire scope was a conscious construct of metropole. The local elite was created and co-opted in an 'international social structure' serving the world capitalist economy. These elites are 'trained' and 'conditioned' in to western habits of 'consumption' and 'values' so as to serve the metropolitan interest even after they have left (Zartman.1976). Besides creating this, outward looking 'vernacular elite' (Jehan.1972), it is argued that social identities and strata are also a deliberate colonial construct. In case of Africa amorphous identities were crystallized in to tribal identities based on a 'race science' (Hintjens.2001), concept of social engineering. 'Rwandan genocide is the most dramatic example of race science in action since the Holocaust' (ibid, pp.25). It has been argued and reasonably established that amorphous identities in Rwanda were manipulated and converted in to lethal and organized form of solidified tribal affiliations (Gourevitch.1998, Gasana et all., 1999, Lemarchand.1996). The Tutsi and Hutu were class stratification, a status term rather then a defined, historical ethnic identity. 'Until the early twentieth century, an individual could be both Hutu in relation to his patrons and Tutsi in relation to his own clients'(Lemarchand.1996:pp.9-14). In the pre-colonial era this nebulous social positioning was never an ethnic stratification and social fluidity from Hutu to Tutsi and vice versa was common (Goyvaerts.1999; Newbury.1998; Prunier.1995). The Germans after the Berlin Congress got Rwanda as part of German East Africa and thereafter they transplanted their racist ideology in their colonies, including Rwanda. It was the German metropole which first of all implanted the idea of fairer and taller people being Hemitic Tutsis and the shorter darker people being Hutus (Robbins.1999.pp.270). The first written Historical accounts of Rwandan History were a European construct incorporating and establishing the themes of tribal identities. These Racist doctrines were institutionalized by the Belgians after World War I. The Belgian mandate and trusteeship rendered the 'voluntary quality' of social relationships between Tutsi and Hutu, obsolete (Hintjens.2001), replacing it with crystallized and immobile tribal identity. This tribalization was institutionalized by introduction of identity cards bearing the Tutsi or Hutu origin of the bearer. These identity cards became warrants of death in 1994. Tutsis became the revenue collectors and agents of Belgian Colonial rule and Hutus and Twa were excluded, a "vast interlocking network of relationships in whose interstices Hutu found protection and rose to power" was dismantled (Linden.1977,pp. 187: Prunier.1995, pp.45-46). After 1930s a Hutu could not become Tutsi. Belgians also introduced Cash Crop economy, creating a linkage with the International economic system and replacing the old barter system. A market economy was introduced, designed to benefit the metropole. In short market as elsewhere in the decolonized world, was not a spontaneous human organization in Hayekian terms but a deliberate institution for fascilitating the metropole. By the 1950s the Tutsis, who due to Belgian patronage were exposed to western liberal ideas began to organize resistance to the colonial rule. In a classical colonial response Belgian Officials and Catholic European clergy began to patronize Hutu 'underdogs' as 'authentic inhabitants' (Hintjens.2007). Hutu elite mainly from the North began to re-conceptualize their own identity and history (ibid,pp.31), aided by the European written history. Till the killings which started during the struggle for independence between the Hutus and Tutsi; 'there had never been systematic political violence recorded between Hutus and Tutsis-anywhere' (Gourevitch.1998; pp.59). This was the beginning of the hate syndrome between Hutus and Tutsis based on their respective hostile identities. Political Economy of Genocide: It has already been pointed out that the primitive economy of Rwanda was transformed in to a cash crop based economy linked with and responsive to International Market fluctuations. Coffee was the standard cash crop of Rwanda. The Debt problem, Structural Adjustment prescriptive measures, economic recession compounded the economic situation of sub-Saharan Africa and resulted in its 'marginalization within the global economy' (Adedji.1999; Allen.1995). In one year alone, (1987) the receipts from coffee was cut by two thirds. Resultantly, increasing, balance of payment (BoP) deficit of Rwanda exponentially (Chossudovsky.1997). World Bank's Structural Adjustment Package, devalued the currency by two third (Waller.1996). This decrease in purchasing power was directly proportional to increase in poverty of Rwandan people. The RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) invasion coincided with the strict economic austerity and increase in poverty. The Hebermanya regime was economically and politically cornered. The aid funds began to be diverted to Arming the Army. The food import funds were diverted in to arms purchase (Chossudovsky.1997; Lemarchand.1994). 'In their insistence on imposing economic and political conditionality all at once, International Development Agencies showed little sensitivity or concern about the likely effects of economic shock therapy for a country on the brink of civil war' (Chossudovsky.1997;pp.119). This economic crisis created an atmosphere conducive to hate propaganda. The Hutus began to blame Tutsis for all their ills and misfortunes. The destitution thus was translated in to a racial ideology based on hate. As Randrianja (1996) argues that; "The deepening of Africa's economic crisis tends to encourage a sort of cultural fundamentalism, comparable to other religious fundamentalism, as an escape for rural population, constituting an obstacle to genuine democratization" (Randrianja.1996, pp.39). Thus it can be argued that a form of 'race fundamentalism' was born out of this crisis which reduced the multiplicity of social and economic conflicts in to linear, all encompassing, hate based conflict. This collusion of individual identity around a racial ideology can also be explained in terms that, adherents of an ideology tend to coalesce around a singular collective identity 'displaying a strong desire for identification with this greater collectivity under an overpowering urge to fuse with something outside oneself, in times of crisis. It is an attempt to feel in control.'(Fromm.1960; pp.122). Thus these artificially created 'tribal identities', crystallized by economic crisis, became the raison-de-etre for the gruesome carnage that ensued in those hundred days. USA and UN Response Analyzed: 'If America has been a champion of Democracy [and Human rights], it has been a half-hearted one, US Foreign Policy has been as much, if not more, about projecting American Power, as it has been about promoting American principles'(Farrell.2000;pp.584). The end of USA's splendid isolation has been comparatively recent. The projection of US power overseas has only been a little more than one hundred year old (Smith.1994). Since then, 'United States made frequent use of force, to protect commercial interests, discipline its neighbors, asserts its standing with the European powers and, sometimes, to punch home American ideology' (Calhoun.1993). In the post Cold War years USA has emerged as the sole super power. The primary cause of US intervention, ostensibly was 'containment of communism', institutionalized through 'Truman Doctrine'. This policy option became irrelevant in post-cold war years. US direct strategic intervention up till 9/11 has been more to preserve its interests rather then any democratic or humanitarian ideals and values (e.g. Panama, Iraq). US as a deliberate policy design has tended to intervene in less strategically important areas through the mechanism of UN, In this way making it more legitimate and palatable to Congress and public opinion. International Interventions have displayed a trend to overemphasize 'rebuilding failed states' on a pattern more conducive to western standards, 'even when local forms of political community promise more legitimacy and consequently more stability' (Herbst.1996). The focus has also been on dealing with central authority or so called legitimate governments. In case of developing world, the aid transfer to 'statehood intensifies power struggles, as the wealth flows to the faction in control of the government' (Farrell.2000). In a strife torn developing country context, the essential focus should not be the questionable legitimacy of the government but the core value of peace (von Hippell.2000). UNOSOM II indulged in this primary fallacy and it focused on rebuilding central state structure. It focused on warlords thereby granting legitimacy to them by default (Farrell.2000). However US international Commercial/economic interests are best protected with dealing with central authorities, that can be molded in to compliance (ibid, pp.588). However the US backed international effort focused on garnering a peace agreement and dealing with warlords ended in disaster. A large and robust US force was deployed to Somalia to achieve humanitarian objectives in December 1992, it achieved its core objectives and mitigated the famine conditions. Things started to go wrong when Somalian democratization was attempted; it failed disastrously with the 'Black Hawk Down' (ibid). The US response was PDD-25, coming at the time when the massacre of Tutsis was being carried out. US dramatically shifted its policy stance on multilateral interventions. The Clinton Administration cowed down to ostensible Congress and public opinion pressure. It may be argued that the official US 'excuse' to shirk away from intervention in Rwanda and being instrumental in effectively blocking any intervention from Security Council as well is based again on fallacious moorings. 'Americans have consistently agreed by 2-1 margin or more that the US has a moral obligation to participate in efforts in trying to stop large scale civilian sufferings' (Kull & Destler.1999,pp.106-7). American Policy makers anticipated and assumed a collapse of public support for any Humanitarian mission after the death of American soldiers. It has been argued, that the Congress questioning the wisdom of UNOSOM II was based not on the Humanitarian aspect but the war with Aideed , the killing of rangers actually rallied public support (Burk.1999). 'American public did not give up its leaders did' (Farrell.2000) Therefore US disengagement and non-acknowledgement of genocide was a failure on the part of Clinton administration. The US administration deliberately avoided using the word 'genocide' so as not to evoke the 1948 Convention 'which enshrined the "never again" promise' (Melvern.2006). The US administration and world press continuously kept on referring to 'tribal killings', thereby mitigating the pressure on UN Security Council for recognizing what everybody realized. The US and media referral strategy may have signaled to the militias to continue their macabre enterprise unheeded. In Security Council US spearheaded the campaign of insisting on Rwandan Mission to be economical and small (ibid). Rwanda was a country of marginal and 'peripheral' importance for hard core US strategic interests, thus this perception allowed the 'perpetrators to continue, without the fear of outside interference. It has also been established that Clinton administration senior officials, had very early information about the scale of the atrocities and its genocidal nature (Power.2001). Policy decision may have been based on the premise that it was a tribal ethnic conflict quite common in that part of the world, little to do with core US interests and very bad for Public opinion given the Somalian debacle. It reflected a US policy inclination 'on the one hand a general disinclination to invest the so called 'peace dividend' in anything other than narrow, principally domestic interest' (Kent.2004). The post cold war politics became the determinant for humanitarian interventions. However it is also asserted that US was not alone in failing to prevent the Rwandan tragedy, other nations and UN were also culpable for this inaction. Our argument has arrived at the stage when we have to investigate the inaction by UN despite the increasingly clear situation. US intervention could not have been without the UN sanction and a legitimate mandate from SC. US was not the sole or the only actor. The inaction of UN also needs to be analyzed. UN Force Commander in Rwanda; Dallarie's faxes were consistently ignored. All the appeals fell on deaf ears. It has been asserted that in the case of Rwanda the structural and procedural constraints may be recognized within the UN system. Lack of political will of the great powers is not the isolated factor which determined the outcome (Piiparinen.2007). The functional mechanism of UN bureaucracy also has to be factored in any analysis. The organizational inertia within the UN bureaucracy can also be a factor in the breakdown of decision making. Methodological individualism has been employed for explaining the lack of decision making within UN in case of Rwanda (Barnett.2002). At the theoretical level, bureaucratic actions or the lack of them, are dictated by 'instrumental rationality' (Weber), obeying a cost-benefit analysis at the organizational level. A case has been made by Piiparinen (2007) about the overextension of UN peace keeping responsibilities (Piiparinen.2007, pp. 51). UN was facing a crisis of "an excess of credibility" (Boutrous Boutrous Ghali, quoted in ibid). The Somalian debacle had inculcated a syndrome in the UN beauraucracy and the feared to loose the credibility. Therefore in the first instance the proposal that was put before the Security Council was overambitious by design, with the perfect knowledge that it would be rejected. A force of 10000 was proposed, a chapter 7 mandate. "The Secretariat felt it safest for the interest of UN beauraucracy, to raise the level of requirements for an intervention to the point where the Security Council would find it unacceptable" (Piiparinen.2007, pp.53). Thus it is established that US was not alone in committing the inaction which led to the Rwandan Massacre. Before we conclude our argument, attention is drawn towards these words: "Hutus are killing Tutsis and Tutsis are killing Hutus", Boutrous Boutrous Ghali commenting on Rwandan conflict. "(It is a) tribal warfare involving those without a veneer of western civilization" Mayor Ed.Koch of New York City characterizing the genocide. (quoted in HRW report.1999). It is argued that genocide is not an incident in isolation. The whole world bears the collective responsibility and the collective shame. The pledge of 'never again' has been overlooked for strategic and organizational interests. Rwanda is a shocking reminder to our Human Values and core percepts of humanity. The explanation of the fact that the world stood by may lie in the dependency theory concept of 'core' and 'periphery'. Rwanda an African nation not only lies at the periphery of politico-economic world but it also lies at the periphery of humanity; this is our ironic conclusion. BIBLIOGRAPHY: 1. Zartman W (1976). Europe and Africa; Decolonization or Dependency, Foreign Affairs, January 1976. 2. Robbins. R.H. (2002), Global Problems and Culture of Capitalism: Allyn and Bacon. 3. 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