The Rwandan genocide: Principles of Solidarism and Culture-Relativism - Case Study Example

Rwandan genocide Overview of the Crisis The Rwandan genocide took place over an approximated 100 day period starting on the 7th of April 1994 up to mid-July of the same year. The genocide gets estimated to have witnessed the loss of between half to one million Rwandese lives. The most affected tribe during the genocide were the Tutsi who got mass slaughtered by the members of the Hutu tribe who formed the majority population of the country (Melvern 2006, p.12). The genocide had multiple impacts on Rwanda as a country, its neighboring countries, and the globe at large. The genocide provided the basis for the creation of the International Criminal Court- ICC, whose work became to prosecute those accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the event of future occurrences of Genocides in the globe. A deeper look into the impact of the Rwandese genocide is vital in understanding its contribution and importance in humanitarian intervention (Wheeler 2000, p.167). Using the Rwandese genocide as a case study, it is vital to understand the obstacles to humanitarian intervention in the globe today. Analysis of the international response to the Rwandan Genocide After the aftermath of the holocaust and World War II, the United Nations- UN passed a resolution that genocide is a crime under international law to which the contracting parties would undertake to punish or prevent whether committed during a time of war or a time of peace (Dallaire 2009, p.45). This resolution by the UN had little impact on the response that the genocide in Rwanda received. The massacres that took place in Rwanda constituted genocide, but the international community was slow in stepping in and stopping the violence taking place. The violence witnessed in Rwanda was intense and exterminatory in nature but the global super powers and the UN reacted slowly in averting the apparent crisis that was looming. To understand the response that the Rwandan genocide received, it is vital to look at the response of two key players in the genocide; the UN and the United States. In a bid to maintain its legacy, the UN developed the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda- UNAMIR, which aimed at alleviating the genocide. However, the response efforts of the UNAMIR got challenged from the very start through resistance offered by several UN Security Council members who objected to the interference of the UN in the genocide (Dallaire 2009, p.34). The US as a member of the council offered little support for the UN mission. The UN peacekeepers were under specific instructions of not to interfere in the crisis. The UN Security Council had the sole mandate to use force in stopping the crisis but due to a lack of support from its members, they watched as the manslaughter continued (Krisch 2002, p.19). The UN and its member states paid little attention to the fats of the genocide even when provided with information about the apparent happening of the genocide (U.N). Further, the Security Council elected to reduce the number of UNAMIR soldiers and thus further highlighting the little attention provided to the genocide. The US resisted intervening in the Rwandan genocide and instead viewed it as a ‘local conflict’. The US also blocked a number of opportunities that could have helped intervene in the situation and diminished the manslaughter. National interests, domestic and bureaucratic politics as well as higher priorities saw the US resist intervening in the genocide (Hehir 2000, p. 76). The US was fearful of intervening in the crisis as a result of the ghosts of Somalia where there were graphic consequences to the bodies of the US casualties. The country also failed to jam Rwanda’s extremist radio broadcasts that incited killings. Evaluation of the Response The slow response and failure of the international community to act in an effective and timely manner further deepened the Rwandese genocide. The president of the UN Security Council at the time had acknowledged the seriousness of the humanitarian problem (Fisanick 2004, p.56). The widespread killing that had continued and the displacement of more than a million persons force the UN Security Council members to re-examine their earlier decisions to downsize the UNAMIR. The UN Security Council approved for a contingency plan that saw the approval of a UNAMIR II that focused solely on humanitarian based action rather than enforcement action (Kuperman 2001, p.62). In evaluating the response of the international community to the Rwandan genocide, it is vital to outline and explain three likely obstacles that hindered effective and timely response. The international response to the Rwandan Genocide is evaluated as slow and poor because there was prior information and early warning (Gourevitch1998, p.184). The UN gets blamed for having failed to adequately act on a fax that indicated the impending extermination of Tutsi tribe members by the Hutus. Studies have indicated that the UN poorly interpreted the nature of the crisis in Rwanda. The UN and its Security Council members failed to recognize the warning signs of the crisis. Another reason for the poor response by the international community is laid on the incapacity to simply take any effective and time action against the genocide. This reason gets based off the idea that military intervention required sufficient time to plan before executing the intervention as the genocide took off suddenly (Dallaire 2009, p.43). The UNAMIR soldiers deployed were under instructions to act on humanitarian grounds rather than enforce action. The UNAMIR forces were also understaffed and ill equipped with few arms. The UN is unable to deploy troops rapidly during times of crisis. The UN secretariat and Security Council are poorly organized to plan rapid military operations at the tactical, strategic, and operational levels. The time lag that exists between communication levels at the operational headquarters and the specific operations at the ground level further incapacitate the UN in instituting timely interventions (Merkel 2000, p.29). The slow and ineffective response by the international community to the genocide is blamed on an unwillingness to respond. Lack of enough members of the international community with a defined national interest in Rwanda ensured that there was minimal public pressure on governments to act (Melvern 2000, p.33). There was little international interest in Rwanda during and before the genocide. Belgium and France appeared to be the only countries with interest in Rwanda alongside with Rwanda’s neighbors (Yamashita 2004, p.103). The super powers on the Security Council were negligent to Rwanda provided the countries small size and its marginality in their economic and political interests. A lack of major national interest in the country swayed the decision of individual countries not to take action. Importance of case study The Rwandan genocide of 1994 must be viewed as an extreme failure on the part of the international community to intervene in a humanitarian crisis of such proportions rarely seen. The unwillingness of the international community to commit military forces to prevent the genocide clear demonstrates how far there is to go in determining a well laid out principle or practice of humanitarian intervention (Holzgrefe & Okeohane 2003, p.65). The case of Rwanda raises a number of issues for consideration. First, some consideration must be placed to identify the types of humanitarian crises which might require UN intervention. The efforts to explore such requirements might become repulsed by many nations; however, it can also work to confirm the conditions that demand international intervention. Second, the case of Rwanda proves to governments, especially those in the West, that a lot of hopes are pinned on them through public pressure to act with immediate effect during humanitarian emergencies that may arise in the future (Cohen 2007, p.54). The governments in the west are encouraged to widen the scope of their national interests to register more development and international humanitarian issues that may curb unstable regions of the universe from deploring into crises. It is also vital for the governments in the west to recognize the necessity of economic and social stability alongside those of political and military stability as vital in the promotion and preservation of both basic human rights and humanitarian objectives. Third, the case of the Rwandan genocide calls for a deeper analysis into the concerns and composition of the Security Council. In a bid to fully undertake its mandate of preserving international peace and security, the council has to remain vigilant and exercise control over all regional blocs of the globe (Barnett 2003, p.32). The Security Council must seek to diversify its members to include members from non-permanent members in Africa and other regions of the world that are not represented. Such a composition of the council will assist in highlighting and keeping the council abreast in regards to affairs of promoting global peace. Finally, the case of Rwanda also calls for state and region perspective. Countries and regions of the international community must ask themselves on whether there is not an underlying bias in promoting international peace and security initiatives (HRW). If half a million people were threatened with murder or suffering in the Americas or Europe, would so many governments that belong to the international community be as slow and less effective in their response? Conclusion The Rwandan genocide remains one of the saddest atrocities to ever happen to the human race. The slow and no-effective response by the international community makes Rwanda a case study in examining the obstacles that prevent themselves during humanitarian interventions. This article has described the obstacles that led to the failure of the international society to intervene urgently in Rwanda. The article has also identified the vital lessons and questions that need to be gained from the Rwandan genocide. The United Nations and the Security Council remain largely at fault for the Rwandan crisis. The superpower countries and most nations of the west were also culpable for not undertaking any action to help curb the crisis. The crisis under defined the principles of solidarism, culture-relativism, and pluralism that marked the conception of the international society. Reference Barnett, M., 2003. Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda. New York: Cornell University Press. Cohen, J., 2007. One-hundred Days of Silence: America and the Rwanda Genocide. New York: Rowman & Littlefield. Dallaire, R., 2004. Shake Hands With the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda. London: Arrow Books. Fisanick, C., 2004. The Rwanda genocide. Chicago: Greenhaven Press. Gourevitch, P., 1998. We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. London: Picador. Hehir, A., 2002. Humanitarian Intervention: An Introduction. London: Palgrave Macmillan. J. L. 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Saving Strangers : Humanitarian Intervention in International Society: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Yamashita, H., 2004. Humanitarian Space and International Politics: The Creation of Safe Areas. London: Ashgate. Read More