Why didn't the United Nations pursue intervention in Rwanda - Research Paper Example

? Why didn't the United Nations pursue intervention in Rwanda? Introduction One of the most violent intra-state conflicts of the century occurred in Rwanda during the 1990s, and culminated in genocidal slaughter between April and July 1994. The death of up to one million Rwandans and the suffering of up to five million internal and external refugees shocked the world. The world, however, stood by while hundreds of thousands of Rwandans died, taking effective action only after the situation began to stabilize. The United Nations plays an essential role in any legitimate intervention. The two principal rationales justifying UN intervention in intra-state conflicts are the preservation of international peace and the protection of human rights. In case of Rwanda, UN was unable to play effective role to stop Genocide. Therefore, this paper will address following question: Why didn't the UN Pursue Intervention in Rwanda? This paper hypothesizes that several factors, including the structure of the UN, states' interests, international law and norms, and domestic factors of the conflict impeded effective UN intervention in the Rwandan conflict. It is hoped that this research paper will discern to the reader the incidents surrounding the Rwandan conflict and why UN didn’t intervene. Methodology This paper will employ qualitative research methodology to find out why UN was unable to pursue Intervention in Rwanda. It examines available literature on Rwanda Genocide, UN charter and international law pertaining to humanitarian intervention. It will specifically look for the impediments which obstructed UN intervention in the Rwandan conflict. It will begin with a brief history of the Rwandan conflict. Next, the case will be examined to determine whether the structure of the UN obstructed involvement in Rwanda. Following this, the case will be analyzed to determine if international law and the norms of the state system hindered UN intervention. The paper will then look to examine whether states' interests frustrated UN operations. Finally, the paper will explore whether domestic factors within Rwanda-such as the complexity of the conflict and terrain of the region stopped effective UN intervention. Background On April 6, 1994, hope for a peaceful transition to democracy and a broadly representative government ended when the plane carrying the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi was shot down near the Kigali airport, allegedly by extremists in Habyarimana's own party (Des Forges 1999, 31). The death of the Rwandan President was followed by the systematic killing of political opponents of the regime, both Hutu and Tutsi, and a resumption of the civil war. The massacres that followed the death of the President appear to have been well planned, because the speed with which the militia singled out its victims suggests the 'Interahamwe', the pro-government militia, was prepared with their names and addresses (Power 2002, 41). For over three months, Rwanda was gripped by chaos and death which left, out of a population of 7.9 million, up to one million dead and five million internally and externally displaced. The events ground to an eventual stop, not through international pressure or intervention, but through the success of the RPF, which had taken control of most of the country. On July 19, 1994, the RPF established a broad- based national government, a day after declaring a unilateral cease-fire (Ronayne 2001, 13). The international community had responded to the tragedy in Rwanda with inaction (Stanton 2004, 9). Following the death of ten Belgian peacekeepers and the subsequent removal of the Belgian contingent from UNAMIR---reducing the mission's strength to 1,515 troops-the UN pulled most of its remaining peacekeepers out of Rwanda. This event coincided with the intensification of the genocidal campaigns. It seems the plan to drive the UN forces out of Rwanda through armed attack, clearing the way for the genocidal campaign, had worked (Yohannes 2002, 29; Power 2002, 59). Due to the delays in UNAMIR's expansion, the UN authorized 'Operation Turquoise' a French-led multinational force, to intervene in Rwanda. Although it took quicker action than the expanded UNAMIR, 'Operation Turquoise' did not intervene in Rwanda until July, after the RPF had taken control of most of the country and the killings had drastically declined (Des Forges 1999, 51). With up to a million people killed, including over half of Rwanda's Tutsi population, the UN is widely criticized for not taking effective action to intervene in Rwanda. The events which occurred in Rwanda are all the more disturbing in light of information which claims a small contingent of properly equipped troops with a proper mandate could have prevented or largely reduced the slaughter. Structure of the UN UN Bureaucracy The UN, a bureaucratic organization, is slow to react to events. As Stephen Stedman claims in "The New Interventionists," it is "by its very nature prone to deliberation; that is the essence of a large bureaucracy that purports to represent all peoples of the world… (Stedman 1999, 12). Its very nature "… forms its weaknesses: slowness, inefficiency and the possibility that the national interests of its members will block constructive collective action" (Stedman 1999, 12). An article, which appeared in the World Press Review, outlines the difficulty in taking quick and effective action, delineating the process every UN operation goes through. After an operation is approved (which can take a great deal of time) (The Economist 1994, 14). Following the time line, the UN could not react quickly enough to protect the people of Rwanda, as approximately one million individuals were killed and five million displaced in the three months following the death of Rwanda's president. Supporting this claim, Canadian Major-General Romeo Dallaire, former UNAMIR commander, argues that the conflict in Rwanda degenerated from the point of imminent resolution to destabilization, in large part because of the UN's inability to intervene in a timely fashion (Dallaire 1995, 1). Ineffective Resolutions UN intervention is further impeded by ineffective and often confused resolutions. In the case of Rwanda, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has been accused of misinterpreting the situation following the death of Rwanda's president, believing it was simply a resumption of the civil war, not a genocidal campaign against the Tutsis (and a campaign of politicide against those Hutus who did not support the extremist government) (LaRose-Edwards 1994, 5). As a result, instead of recommending urgent movement, he advised the Security Council of three potential courses of action: to expand, abolish, or to reduce the UNAMIR mission. Even though it was aware of the humanitarian crisis and massacres occurring in Rwanda, the Security Council voted to reduce UNAMIR from its original mandated strength of 2,548 to about 270 (LaRose-Edwards 1994, 18). The Security Council Another problem impeding effective action to end the slaughter of innocent Rwandans was the UN Security Council. During the Cold War, ideological differences led both sides to employ their veto to prevent action which might benefit their opponents. While the Cold War may be over, the permanent Council members still use their veto to secure their interests, leading to potential gridlock (Wright 1993, 23). The United States, still smarting from the Somalian experience, was clearly reluctant to intervene in Rwanda. The US blocked efforts to expand the size and mandate of the force until mid-May (Picard 1994, 10). It was reported that “by the time that 250,000-500,000 Rwandans had been killed (equivalent in proportional terms, as Mr Boutros-Ghali pointed out sourly, to 9m-18m Americans) the Americans themselves had begun to realise that this position was untenable” (The Economist 1994, 13). America's veto on the Security Council ensured the UN could not take any action to prevent the genocide until the United States experienced a change of heart, an event that came too late to protect the lives of the majority of Rwandans killed. Effective action by the Security Council is contingent on the common interests of the permanent members. Historically, interests among the permanent members have seldom coincided. While there appears to be increasing cooperation in the Security Council following the end of the Cold War, nothing guarantees this will continue in the future. Without common values and interests, decisions passed by the Security Council are bound to be watered-down and ineffective (Kissinger 1994, 53) States’ Interest States' Interests States' interests played a role in the Rwandan conflict, influencing the decision over whether or not to intervene. UN Under-Secretary General Kofi Annan points to this factor's importance, claiming: "There is nothing UNAMIR needs that the Member States of the United Nations do not already possess, and could provide if the necessary political will existed to do so" (LaRose-Edwards 1994, 17). States such as France and South Africa profited from arms sales to Rwanda, and thus had an interest in Rwanda. France, for example, strongly backed the Hutu-dominated government in Rwanda, and was eager to keep it in the bloc of twenty-one Francophone African nations (LaRose-Edwards 1994, 9). French support may have played a role in how far the genocidal campaign proceeded. While Belgium withdrew its ambassador in protest for two weeks in March 1993, following the release of a report detailing the massacre of several thousand unarmed Tutsis between 1990 and 1993, France rationalized the events and excused the Rwandan government. France continued to sell Rwanda weapons, giving Hutu leaders the message "that they could get away with genocide facilitated by foreign arms" (Goose and Smyth 1994, 91). Given France's support for Rwanda's Hutu government, it might be questioned whether their motive for intervening in the conflict was to end the genocide which had already declined, or to protect the RGF and the Hutu-dominated government from the advancing RPF. The other seven African countries involved in Operation Turquoise also had an interest in resolving the conflict. The events in Rwanda threatened to destabilize a significant portion of Africa, through the massive refugee movement and the subsequent spread of disease (Goose and Smyth 1994, 94). National interests played a role in the Rwandan tragedy, but this case is more importantly marked by a general absence of national interest. Absence of Interests Few Western states had an interest in Rwanda. Rwanda was not an oil-rich country, nor was it a strategic military ally. In the words of Col. Sean Henry, "The truth is that in Rwanda and Burundi there are no, at this point in time, economic benefits for anyone…," and therefore they have "…little impact on the major players of the world" (UN Chronicle 1994, 6). Quite simply, intervening in Rwanda did not secure the West's strategic interests. It was because of an absence of sufficient interest, many claim, that little effective action was taken to protect the people of Rwanda (Dallaire 1996, 25). In an interview with Paul LaRose-Edwards, this argument was reinforced. In his opinion, a lack of interests led to a reluctance for Canada to get involved, because it was far away, there were few Canadians present, and the country was of no vital economic importance to Canada. Unfortunately for the Rwandans, the tragedy occurred when states were increasingly reluctant to intervene in issues beyond their direct strategic interests. This is because collective intervention entails risks which states are unwilling to run unless the benefits of intervening outweigh the costs. Following this, it may be observed that Americans are becoming less amenable to intervening for human rights in situations that are not in their immediate national interests. During the height of the slaughter in Rwanda, UNAMIR remained inflexible as the United States was unwilling to support peacekeeping. Feeling Rwanda was not in US national interests. American foreign policy makers blocked action until an estimated half-million Rwandans had been killed. It was not until millions of refugees threatened to destabilize the region of central Africa that the United States agreed that some action must be taken to deal with the situation in Rwanda (Navari 1993, 50) Further, most states were reluctant to react until the crisis attracted the attention of the international media. While many states, upon learning genocide and other serious breaches of international law had occurred, clamoured for action to illustrate such activities would not be tolerated in the 'new world order,' support came too late. The RPF had already pushed the 'interim' government, the RGF, and most of the militias responsible for the killing out of the country. International Law International Law and Sovereignty The international system is based on the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. States are commonly considered to be sovereign insofar as they have absolute authority within their territory. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign state is the norm in international relations. These principles are firmly entrenched in the Charter of the UN. Article 2(7) of the Charter states: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter…” (United Nations Charter Article 2.7). The principle of non-intervention was further strengthened by the General Assembly Resolution 2625, unanimously passed in 1970 and the International Court of Justice's 1986 decision in the case of the "Merits in Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua" (Little 1993, 13). Traditional interpretations of international law clearly state that international intervention in the 'domestic affairs' of a state is illegal. Recent Precedents The Gulf War marked the beginning of a new era of intervention. International intervention in Iraq in 1991 and Somalia in 1992 set the precedent of intervening in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. This change occurred because the Security Council claimed the authority to maintain international peace and security, and used this mandate to intervene in states where they deemed 'humanitarian' abuses to be a threat to international security. The precedent-setting case was the establishment of a 'safe haven' in Northern Iraq to protect the Kurds. Security Council resolution 688 deemed an act of internal aggression against the Kurds to be a threat to international order. The notion that the UN has the authority to protect people regardless of borders has since proven popular. The Secretary-General, supporting the expanded authority of the UN, stated: "The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty… has passed; its theory was never matched by its reality" (Boutros-Ghali 1992, 9). The expanded interpretation of threats to international peace to include sovereign states' internal affairs has emboldened the Security Council to intervene in states without their consent. Consent If the recognized government of a state consents to intervention, there is no violation of international law. In Rwanda, there was deemed to be no 'legitimate' government in place to consent to UN intervention. The fact that the 'interim' government was primarily responsible for the genocide in Rwanda seems to support the notion that they would be unwil1ing to consent to a UN mission which would obstruct their plans. The precedents of Iraq and Somalia, however, illustrate that consent is no longer necessarily required for UN intervention in internal conflicts (Little 1993, 29). Justifications for Intervention in Rwanda There were numerous justifications for UN intervention In Rwanda. In the article "The Case for A U.N. Army," Kai Bird argued that Rwanda demanded intervention because of the genocide occurring within the state (Bird 1994, 160). Because it is a crime under international law, genocide was commonly used as a justification for intervention in Rwanda (Sharp 1994, 41). In addition, Richard Little argues against the principle of non-intervention. With the world becoming increasingly interdependent, he claims the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states in the modern world is a myth (Little 1993, 24). If the concept of non-intervention has little meaning, the international community should have the right to intervene in a state to protect individuals. This argument corresponds with a dramatic increase in the international interest in human rights. The principal argument among critics is that since there was no sovereign authority in Rwanda capable of protecting the citizens, the international community had a responsibility to step in. Dangers of Intervention While a number of states agree that the international community has the right to intervene in intra-state conflicts to protect the innocent, it is not a universal belief. Many states and individuals believe that any intervention in the domestic affairs of a state, regardless of the reason, sets a dangerous precedent, legitimizing international interference by the great powers, effectively limiting the sovereignty of small and weak states (Thomas 1993, 100). As Caroline Thomas argues in her article "The Case Against Intervention," permitting intervention can in fact lead to misplaced moralism whereby states or the international community may get involved in a conflict simply because they believe what they are doing is 'morally' right (Thomas 1993, 97). This involvement could end up being costly to all panics, as was the case in the Viet Nam war. Indeed, some states feel the UN is an imperialist tool which should not be given the power to intervene in the internal affairs of a slate (Wright 1993, 20). For these reasons, many states and individuals, while admitting the situation in Rwanda was tragic, considered it to be an internal problem which would be best resolved within the state. To conclude, because the UN is a community of states, there is continued resistance to set precedents for diminishing state sovereignty in the international system. This appears to have led to a reluctance, and therefore a delay, by states to approve UN intervention in Rwanda. This factor obviously influenced the situation in Rwanda where Operation Turquoise arrived just as events in Rwanda were stabilizing, and the expanded UNAMIR mission did not get under way until well over a month after the RPF declared a cease-fire and established a broad-based government. The widespread belief that the UN should not intervene in the 'domestic affairs' of a state, even when clear violations of international and humanitarian law such as genocide are taking place, impedes the ability of the UN to build a consensus and take effective interventionary action to end such activities. Domestic Factors Complexity of the Conflict From 1959, Rwanda had been engaged in internal conflicts. The first clash linked to the current troubles occurred in 1959. Since that time, significant massacres have occurred in 1961 and 1963, with a period of civil war between 1990 and 1993 (Picard 1994, 10). The conflict is characterized by intense ethnic hatred between many members of each group. Countless massacres and retaliatory actions have scarred both sides. This background led many states to resist intervention into Rwanda in the early stages of the conflict. Early information could have been interpreted as a continuation of massacres on a traditional scale, or the resumption of the civil war. Although there were claims of genocidal activity, the magnitude of the atrocities were not realized until May or June of 1994. At the early stages, many states resisted the urge to intervene in what might have been considered another African disaster so soon after the Somalia incident. Policy makers felt intervention would solve little, because intense ethnic hatred would again manifest itself as soon as the UN interventionary force pulled out, or worse still, while they were still in the country. The feeling that the UN could not find a political solution to the conflict led many states to resist moves for intervention. This impeded the UN's ability to effectively intervene in Rwanda to protect the innocent civilians from genocide, displacement, disease, and starvation. It was only after the worst events of the conflict had occurred and the RPF had declared a cease-fire that the UN was able to take concrete, albeit inconsequential, action. Discussion Given the lack of a clear mandate, the UN forces, did not do anything to help stop the massacres. They only provided shelter and food to some of those hiding from the militias. A new UN intervention mission that should have been sent to Rwanda in order to reinforce the small peacekeeping mission that was already in Rwanda to help implement the Arusha Accords was undermined by the self-imposed rules of neutrality, impartiality and consent. As the renewed Rwanda conflict was originally considered a civil war, the UN decision-makers used the fact that there was no peace to keep in establishing that there was no basis for a UN peacekeeping mission (Barnett 2002, 12). As the genocide progressed, the mounting pressure to act was often rejected. The UN only delivered some small official statements, such as: “we remain actively seized by the matter” (Barnett 2002, 15). It also did not want to work with the RPF, as it would appear as a departure for the self –imposed neutrality rule (Barnett 2002, 15). The resolution authorizing the intervention finally passed on May 17th 1994, but diplomatic and logistical details took longer than expected and no concrete action was taken before July 19th 1994, the day of the RPF’s complete victory and the end of the genocide. Does the UN bear responsibility for the genocide? According to Michael Barnett in his book, Eyewitness to a Genocide, the UN’s moral responsibility for the Rwandan genocide is a multi-sided concept, since responsibility can mean occupying a role with specific duties and obligations, acting conscientiously, or causing the outcome. He mentions that the UN cannot be morally responsible in the third sense, because it had no control - even if he recognizes that the UN’s apologetic language betrays the fact that it knew that it was behaving badly (Barnett 2002, 16-21) Conclusion The conflict in Rwanda, which intensified with the outbreak of civil war in 1990, erupted into a genocidal campaign which lasted from April to July of 1994. The UN's inconsistent reaction to events, including the downsizing and subsequent expansion of the UNAMIR mission, coupled with a lack of cooperation among member states, resulted in little assistance for the suffering people within Rwanda. The UN response is not surprising in fight of the fact it had warnings of the events which occurred, yet took no action to plan for their occurrence. Looking at the initial hesitancy by the international community to call the 1994 Rwanda tragedy ‘genocide’ it is clear that most of decision makers saw the outbreak of killings as the intensification of the civil war. The final end of the Rwandan tragedy only came when the political will was there. Factors including the structure of the UN, individual states' national interests, international law, and domestic factors also have contributed in the failure of the UN to effectively intervene in Rwanda. However, the UN was incapable of taking effective action to resolve the conflict, because it lacked the will of member state governments. Work Cited Barnett, Michael, Eyewitness to a Genocide, Cornell University Press, 2002. Bird, Kai. "The Case for A U.N. Army." The Nation, X August 1994, 160-64. Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, An Agenda/or Peace. New York. 1992. Burkhalter, Holly. "A Preventable Horror?" Africa Report 39, no. 6 (November/December 1994): 17-21. Dallaire, Major-General Romeo, speech at Hague Colloquium, 23 March 1995, written text. Quoted in Adam Roberts, "Proposal for UN Standing Forces: History, Tasks and Obstacles." UN Rapid Reaction Capabilities: Requirements and Prospects, ed. David Cox and Albert Legault, 49-66. Clementsport, NS: The Canadian Peacekeeping Press, 1995. Dallaire, Romeo. The Ethics of UN Intervention: From Early Warning to Rapid Reaction, United Nations Associations in Canada: National Capital Region Branch, Roundtable, 25 April 1996. Des Forges, Alison, Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch & FIDH, New York, 1999. Eriksson, John. The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience. Synthesis Report. ed. David Millwood. Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda. March 1996. Goose, Stephen D. and Frank Smyth. "Arming Genocide in Rwanda." Foreign Affairs 73, no. 5 (September-October 1994): 84-96 Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy. Toronto: Simon & Schuster, 1994. LaRose-Edwards, Paul, The Rwandian Crisis of April 1994: The Lesson Learned. Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 30 November 1994. Little, Richard. "Recent Literature on Intervention and Non-Intervention ." In Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention, ed. Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman. 13-31. New York: 51. Martin's Press, 1993. Navari, Cornelia. “Intervention, Non-Intervention and the Construction of the State”, in Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention, ed. Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman (New York: ST. Martin’s Press, 1993), 50. Picard, Andre. "Yes: But we Chose to Ignore The Warnings" The Economist. Quoted in "Rwanda’s Agony: Can Horrors Be Prevented." World Press Review. September, 1994, 10-11 Power, Samantha. "Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Tragedy Happen." Atlantic Monthly 288, no. 2 (September 2001): 84-108. Power, Samantha. Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide. New York: Basic Books, 2002. Ronayne, Peter. Never again?: the United States and the prevention and punishment of Genocide since the Holocaust. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001. Sharp, Jane M. "Appeasement, Intervention and the Future of Europe." In Military Intervention in European Conflicts, ed. Lawrence Freedman. 34-55. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publisher. 1994. Stanton, Gregory H. "Could the Rwandan Genocide Have Been Prevented?" Paper presented at the "Generations of Genocide" conference sponsored by the Institute of Contemporary History and the Weiner Library, 2004. Stedman, Stephen John, "The New Interventionists," Foreign Affairs 72. no.1 (Winter, 1993) 12. The Economist, "The UN Crawls To the Rescue: Living With A Recalcitrant U.S." The Economist in World Press Review, 1994, 14 Thomas, Caroline. "The Pragmatic Case Against Intervention." In Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention, ed. Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman. 91-103. New York: 51. Martin's Press. 1993. UN Chronicle, Rwanda: 'Genocidal slaughter' claims up to 1 million." UN Chronicle XXXI. no. 4 (December 1994): 4-13. United National Security Council Resolution 688(1991), 5 April 1991, 1-2 United Nations. Charter of the United Nations: Article 2.7. 26 June 1945. Wright, Robert. "Bold Old Vision," The New Republic, 25 January 1993, 23. Yohannes,Okbazghi. "The United States and Sub-Saharan Africa after the Cold War: Empty promises and retreat." The Black Scholar 32, no. 1 (Spring 2002): 23-44. Read More