Pacific War: Architects of Success Macarthur or Nimitz - Essay Example

PACIFIC WAR - ARCHITECTS OF SUCCESS - MACARTHUR OR NIMITZ "Tokyo rocks under the weight of our bombs...I want the entire world to know that this direction must and will remain - unchanged and unhampered, Our demand has been and it remains - unconditional surrender."1 President Truman, in his initial address to Congress, 16 April 1945. Background Factors The Theatre and Personalities. The Pacific theater of the Second World War comprised of a vast area of oceans and islands extending from the Japanese Islands in the North to Australia and excluding the South East Asian Command in the West to the Pearl Harbor and beyond in the East. This vast land and sea mass was the principal area of conflict in which American and the Japanese forces were engaged in a number of land, sea and air engagements. The expanse of the oceans dictated preponderance of naval forces and prioritization of naval command in the Pacific. However control of the sea was practicable only after island territories had been secured as bases for air and logistics sustenance. This dictated equity in employment of land and air forces in conjunction with combat ships. This created intense service rivalries primarily between the land and sea force commanders. At the tactical level allotment of forces for operations was on a task force basis and overcame the service biases to an extent. The key personalities involved were of great significance. On one hand we have Douglas MacArthur, who has been referred to as the American Caesar an Army general with impeccable professional reputation. Decorated in the First World War, he had the distinction of being recalled on active service on the outbreak of the Second World War and then placed in command of American forces in the Philippines.2 Overwhelmed by the Japanese in the Philippines, MacArthur was determined to return, an obsession to some extent which dictated some of his strategic proclivities in the years ahead. His reputation as a military commander survived his failure in the Philippines. However Macarthur's status was perhaps one of the primary reasons for command diffusion in the Pacific as the US Navy, bitterly opposed to his domineering approach would never agree to a joint command led by him. On the other hand, Admiral Chester Nimitz's military reputation was not as impressive though his professional credentials could have matched that of Macarthur's. He was considered the fore most authority on submarines in the US Navy. He is credited to have successfully halted the Japanese advance after the initial disaster of the Pearl Harbor and led the counter offensive in the Pacific overcoming the deficiencies in supplies and ships by successive victories in the Battles of the Coral Sea, Midway and the Campaign in the Solomon Islands.3 The US Navy considered Nimitz as their mascot in the Pacific and despite the seniority differential felt that he was the most suited for a joint command with quantitative superiority with the Navy. Victory as is commonly said has many fathers. The controversy of ascribing success of Allied victory in the Pacific to Nimitz or MacArthur is contained in a number of factors as inter service rivalry, lack of unity of command, the concomitant success of the forces under each commander, strategic outlook and the personalities themselves. While each of these issues is important, the strategy ascribed to Nimitz and MacArthur would be a prime consideration which is being discussed along with other factors herein. The Strategic Backdrop With the tide of success having turned in favor of the Allies, at the Quadrant Conference at Quebec in August 1943, it was decided that two lines of approach for subjugation of the Japanese be undertaken. In South West Pacific, General MacArthur was placed in command of the forces to undertake an offensive in Eastern New Guinea to include Wewak, the Admirality Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago, neutralize Rabaul and advance along the New Guinea coast to the Vogelkop peninsula. The second approach was to be through the Central Pacific under Nimitz passing progressively through Gilberts Islands, the Marshals, Ponape, Truk, Palau and then to Marianas. These advances were to be mutually supporting and were expected to divide the Japanese forces as well as create surprise. Nimitz's advance was designated as the main one, supported by Macarthur's and hence the major forces were allotted to him.4 This was in conformity with the broad plan of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on 8 May 1943 for prosecution of war against Japan entitled the "Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan," It envisaged an invasion of Japan as a possibility to achieve the strategic objective of defeat of the Axis powers. To achieve this, advance through the Pacific was envisaged, seeking control of the South China coast, and the islands of Luzon and Formosa for developing air bases for severing Japanese supplies and developing air bases. 5 The Pacific Theatre fell within the US sphere of conduct of operations and thus command arrangements were to be evolved by the US forces. Ideally the operations in the Pacific should have been under a single commander, but inter service rivalries prevented this and thus the command responsibility was divided between MacArthur and Nimitz operating in the Southwest Pacific Area and Pacific Ocean Areas respectively.6 This was in addition to the American forces in China and Burma which were placed under Stilwell.7 The issue of a single commander and unified command though very positively fostered by President Roosevelt as well as General Marshall did not find favor primarily as no common candidate was acceptable. The Navy was averse to command of the fleet by an Army officer with MacArthur being the obvious candidate. Nimitz did not enjoy the prestige or professional status to assume the post being very junior to MacArthur, thus two commands were created.8 Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas included the entire Pacific Ocean less the areas allotted to Macarthur's command which included Australia, the Philippines, New Guinea, the Solomons, the Bismarck Archipelago, and Netherlands Indies except Sumatra. Nimitz's command was divided into three subordinate areas two of which, the Central and North Pacific, were under his direct control. The command areas were also so designated that the final assault on Japan would be launched through Nimitz's denoted area, which consoled the naval planners.9 This was the initial arrangement as the final command for capture of the islands too came under dual authority reporting directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. There were some fine distinctions in the command authority as well with MacArthur denied the authority to directly command or involve in internal administration of national forces of countries other than the United States, while Nimitz did not carry such a rider, may be as his forces were expected to be mostly American. Nimitz was also given the primary offensive mission with a wider spectrum than Macarthur's and in some ways offensive operations under the South Western Pacific area was also to be under Nimitz, though MacArthur with characteristic initiative quickly assigned himself the offensive role without awaiting formal approval.10 The question of unified command assumed greater significance as both the forces converged for the final offensive against Japan. MacArthur chose to overcome this problem by suggesting joint task forces. This problem was finally resolved with General MacArthur given the command of U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific (AFPAC), as well as the Southwest Pacific Area and Nimitz, command of naval forces in the Pacific in addition to the Pacific Fleet and area commands.11 In allotment of resources, Macarthur's Command received the short shrift. As compared to the North African Front where, Eisenhower received 15 tons per man as against 5 tons per man for MacArthur who had 12 percent of the US Army under his control. Even within the Pacific theatre, Nimitz's forces received priority.12 MacArthur complained of being the victim of shoe string logistics and of lost opportunities due to lack of administrative backup. His success was achieved despite these debilitations purely through the influence of his leadership, drive and determination. He even attempted to force the issue of logistics by going on record to the media that the war against Japan would have been won more quickly if men and material were diverted from Nimitz and sent to Australia.13 This did not endear him to the Navy and hence perhaps despite the apparent bonhomie between the Admiral and the General when they frequently complimented each other for their successes at Saipan for Nimitz and Hollandaise for MacArthur, a unified command could not be evolved in the Pacific.14 Admiral Nimitz no doubt had a wider sphere of operational influence thereby his ability to dictate strategic events in the theatre were perhaps much more than that of MacArthur. The command of naval operations in the high seas is complex and entails use of air, naval and marine power in tandem. To successfully consummate the same particularly the offensive denotes high accomplishment. Viewed from the strategic command perspective, Nimitz thus carries a greater impact on the course of the campaign. Impact on Tactical Operations Nimitz demonstrated critical tactical acumen during the Marshals island operations when he correctly determined the centre of gravity to be Kwajalein Atoll which was the command centre and focus of air power of the Japanese. Thus he directed the operations against the Atoll against the advice of his staff. These operations proved a great success and the Americans achieved a swift victory.15 When blending tactical operations with the overall strategic picture, minimizing casualties which is the art of strategic command perhaps Nimitz demonstrated limited ability. On September 15, 1944 as Macarthur's operations progressed from New Guinea to the Philippines, the Central Pacific forces planned to invade the Paluas. Though this did not affect MacArthur's plans greatly he had recommended that forces should proceed directly to the Philippines. Nimitz did not agree with this appreciation and felt that these provided flank protection for South West Pacific operations. In the course of these diversionary operations a large number of casualties occurred due to stiff resistance by the Japanese on the island which could have been well avoided but for insistence by Nimitz. This demonstrated perhaps lack of understanding of the tactical implications of ground operations as the caves and ravines in the island could be easily defended.16 Macarthur's most brilliant stroke was the operations in Hollandia, wherein he carried out a 400 mile envelopment, 200 miles behind the Japanese supply lines and successfully consummated the operations, compared by some analysts as equivalent to Hannibal's envelopment at Cannae.17 Macarthur's impact on the tactical operations affecting the overall operational direction of war was thus much more significant than that of Nimitz. Island Hopping Strategy Island hopping strategy entailed establishing a line of concurrent bases providing control of the air space in concentric circles till the Japanese mainland was within the striking range of the bombers. Successive island territories were captured to extend the logistics umbrella through establishment of air bases constructed by army engineers. This extended the reach of the B 17 bombers operating under fighter cover to secure island territories closing on to the Japanese mainland.18 This strategy was adopted by the Americans after the Battle of Midway and proved to be key to success in the Pacific. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, began with landings on Guadalcanal and the Solomon's following it up with Gilberts, Marshals, Marianas, Carolines, and Palaus.19 Nimitz earned the nickname of, "island hopper", however naval hierarchy denoted carrier borne forces playing a major role in operations in the Pacific, thereby denying full advantage being taken of this strategy in the Pacific Ocean areas. MacArthur too very clearly grasped the significance of the island hopping strategy in the Pacific as is seen from the operations in 1944 where his forces, "hopped" to Hollandia and Aitape on the north-central coast of New Guinea on April 22, Wakde Island on May 17, Biak Island on May 27, Noemfoor Island on July 2 and reached the Vogelkop peninsula on the north-west tip of New Guinea by 30 July.20 It was MacArthur's clear articulation of the island hopping strategy that saw its successful consummation. Conduct of Offensive Operations The string of victories for Nimitz was Mariana Islands capturing Saipan, destroying the Japanese Fleet in the Battle of the Philippine Sea, securing Guam and Tinian while isolating the bastions of the Central and Eastern Caroline Islands and over running Peleliu, Angaur, and Ulithi. In the Philippines campaign where MacArthur played major role Nimitz's forces dissuaded the Japanese Fleet from disrupting the operation in the Battle for Leyte Gulf from 24 to 26 October 1944. The culmination of Nimitz's success was the operations for over running Iwo Jima and Okinawa... He is also accredited to have successfully conducted the operations for isolation of Japan by mining of ports and waterways thereby strangulating the islands and veering them towards surrender.21 Macarthur's trail of operations led from defense of New Guinea, advance bypassing Rabaul, recapturing Manila, Bataan and Corregidor, as well as Central and southern Philippines. These successes were achieved against great odds and severe Japanese resistance.22 Comparing the contribution of the two titans of the Pacific is a difficult proposition as the degree of difficulty and the challenges were far from identical. Nimitz carried out systematic destruction of the Japanese fleet, an important criteria for successfully advancing to the Japanese mainland while Macarthur's success was crucial as without the capture of designated areas, the campaign could not have closed on to Japan. While the sheer scale and magnitude of Nimitz's operations and the destruction of Japanese forces was much larger, there would be a marginal advantage to MacArthur. Impact on Strategic Direction The overall strategy for defeat of Japan was finalized at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, where the Combined Chiefs planned to blockade Japan, carry out intense bombing and finally launch an assault. To achieve this there were two important pre requisites that were destruction of the Japanese Fleet and control of the bases provided by island territories for the advance to Japan.23 MacArthur favored a bold counter offensive and advance to Japan taking on Rabaul in one swoop with naval carriers under his command, New Guinea, Philippines and then Japan. Nimitz on the other hand favored a step by step attack along the Central Pacific to advance through Solomons to Rabaul and then to the China coast before launching the main operations on Japan. Nimitz's Central route had secure flanks and was considered better from the point of view of lines of communications. The argument between the planners on both sides continued throughout 1943 and was settled only by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who selected the Central Pacific route, and MacArthur acted in support of these operations with overall command too retained by the Joint Chiefs due to bickering expected between Nimitz and MacArthur.24 MacArthur proposal for attack on the Philippines and Luzon instead of Formosa was a strategic master stroke and displayed his understanding of the nuances of allied politics. In this he had to encounter very heavy opposition particularly from the Navy which favored an operation for Formosa islands and then advance to Japan.25 In the final stages of the Pacific War, the American forces were posed with the strategic dilemma of operations against Formosa Vis a vis the Philippines. The Naval staff led by Admiral Ernest J King promoted, Operation Causeway the plan for securing Formosa on the premise that this would provide better bases for blockade of Japan and facilitate its aerial bombardment. This would also gain control of the South China Sea for which the strategic triangle formed by the south China coast, Formosa, and Luzon had to be secured. The forces available for these operations were limited and hence the same would have to be undertaken in phases which did not fit the Allied time table. The choice thus fell between capture of Formosa or Luzon. MacArthur felt that there was no option but to reoccupy the Philippine Archipelago as a mark of political solidarity with the Philippino people, America's strategic ally in the region. King on the other hand argued that this would have delayed the main operation in the north. Nimitz' plans for Formosa did not envisage capture of the entire island territory as it would have been difficult due to heavy defenses but deemed simultaneous assaults on southern Formosa and Amoy area of the China coast. Formosa was to be occupied only if it was absolutely essential. This had attendant military risks of delay and heavy casualties in the well entrenched defences held in strength in Formosa. There was great military logic to what MacArthur had proposed as the tactical and logistics problems of operations for Japanese mainland deemed Luzon a military necessity which was supplemented by the political argument of recapture of Philippines.26 His arguments for Luzon also included the military necessity of control of the Manila Bay, the need for anchorages and fighter strips in South and Central Philippines for attack on Formosa and his unstinting support to Philippine liberation.27 Nimitz on the other hand based his arguments on service oriented logic fostered by his superior King and thereby losing out on the argument with the US President opting for Luzon which in the ultimate analysis proved a correct strategic decision with a major impact on the conduct of operations. Macarthur's clarity of strategic thought is also evident in the final plan evolved for subjugation of Japan. He proposed three varied options as follows:- Encirclement of Japanese Home Islands followed by an invasion. Encirclement of Japanese Home Islands followed by bombardment and blockade but no invasion. Direct assault on Kyushu to seek additional air and naval bases for attack on Honshu.28 While the initial phase proposed by Macarthur's final option was approved, the atomic bomb overcame the necessity of an invasion. Nimitz played a major role in the Kyushu operations directing these successfully and set the stage for Hiroshima by breaking the Japanese will. In the planning of a successful strategy for the overall campaign however Macarthur's contribution is very substantial dictating the ultimate course of history in the Pacific. Conclusion The operations in the Pacific were an innate test of a unified, joint strategy and command. While due to the complex nature of command relationship affected by inter service rivalry and turf battles, an acceptable solution failed to emerge throughout the Campaign. A survey of the issues discussed herein has provided us reasonable conclusions of the strategic contribution that had an overbearing impact on the outcome. Nimitz succeeded in destroying the Japanese forces, successfully consummated the island hopping strategy and very effectively commanded the vast array of land, sea and air forces at his disposal much more than what were under MacArthur. However the wily American general had the upper hand over the Admiral in strategic thought, whether it is the evolution of the island hopping strategy, advance from Australia to the New Guinea, prioritizing Luzon or providing the strategic lead in the plan for Japanese homeland. To that extent the strategic contribution of MacArthur in the Pacific far surpassed that of Nimitz. (Note by the writer - The foot notes have not used the op cit or ibid format but the full notes have been deliberately repeated so that you can if required review it easily). Read More