The Johnson Administrations Conduct of the War in Vietnam - Essay Example

TO WHAT EXTENT DID DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHAPE THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION'S CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 1965-68 2007 TO WHAT EXTENT DID DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHAPE THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION'S CONDUCT OF THE WAR IN VIETNAM, 1965-68 "No event in American history is more misunderstood than the Vietnam War. It was misreported then, and it is misremembered now. Rarely have so many people been so wrong about so much". Richard Nixon on the war in Vietnam Introduction In the 1965 America appeared to be involved in a long and prospectless war with Vietnam, the nation's longest war that cost fifty-eight thousand American lives and $140 billion1. Moreover, the war made a deep psychological impact on millions of non-combatants Americans, as the United States did not win the war for the first time in its history while Vietnam War was generally observed as the battlefield of Cold War between the USA and the USSR2. For the millions of Americans it signed a certain turnover point in society, a form of a deep social and psychological crisis. However, prior to the beginning of the large-scale war in the early 1965, the situation in the United States was quite different, with both Congress and public opinion supporting the war3. This rapid change of attitudes to the war raises a number of questions. The most important of them is, perhaps, how the USA domestic affairs affected the inclination of the war in Vietnam. Apparently, President's Lyndon Johnson decision to take the United States into a large-scale in Vietnam could not be completely understood without the assessment of domestic political issues and considerations in 1960s. In this project, I will examine all domestic sources of forces as well as forces themselves that shaped to one or either way, Johnson's administration conduct of the Vietnam War. Respectively, I will focus on the 1965-1968 period of the War known as "Escalation and Americanization of Vietnam"4. While analyzing this period of War, I will evaluate the influence of Johnson's administration that determined Presidents' decisions of deployment of combat troops in July 1965, escalation of troops' involvement in 1967, and Johnson's decision to limit the bombing of Vietnam as well as his later decision not to seek reelection. Historically, there are two dominant approaches in analysis of Johnson's administration decision making regarding Vietnam War5. One approach emphasizes Johnsons and his administration's irrationality and isolation from critique that consequently resulted in disastrous decisions about Vietnam. This approach describes Johnson as a single-minded "hawk" and extremely ambitious President reluctant to listen to the experts' views6. The second approach implies that Johnson had an access to the full range of information about Vietnam from diverse points of view, particularly from his foreign policy advisers: McGeorge Bundy, Dean Rusk, Walter Rostow and Robert McNamara, as well as from more informal ones78. This view provides a more rational view of Johnson, though makes him a hostage of his informants9. Another question under concern is the extent, to which domestic issues determined Johnson's decisions about Vietnam. In the other words, how domestic economy ("economic crisis" of 1968), growing Congressional opposition, shaping of public opinion and public riots (pacifists' movements), rapid loss of Johnson popularity, etc. determined the way of Vietnam War conduct. As Barrett (1993) believes, this "Vietnam dilemma" has significantly influenced generations of historians and political scientists10. Gulf of Tonkin incident and beginning of Johnson's Vietnam War era Until the August of 2004 Vietnam War was rather a local conflict than an issue, which further preoccupied the minds of average Americans in late 1960s. However, the attacks of Northern Vietnamese on American navies on August 2-4, 1964 prompted the large-scale involvement of American troops in the country. It is still debatable, whether Vietnamese indeed attacked US boats, or the incident was designed by the Americans11. However, regardless of nature of this incident, it is important to analyze how one could interpret the decision of troops' deployment from the perspective of the US domestic policy and Johnson's decision-making12. Regardless of the fact the "Gulf of Tonkin" incident was provoked by Vietnamese or was part of Johnson's administration plan to regain the control over the Southern Vietnam, I should admit that this incident literally gave Johnson a blank cheque for starting the large-scale operation in Vietnam13. Soon after the incident, Congress partly being impressed by the event and heated by Johnson approved the "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution", which gave President a power to conduct military operations in Vietnam without declaring a war14. I need to provide a deeper view on the other domestic issues that resulted in such a rapid involvement of American troops into the war in late 1964 early 1965. First, as mentioned before, Johnson, contrasting his predecessor John F. Kennedy, was initially extremely successful in his negotiations with Congress. Johnson's landslide over Republican candidate Barry Goldwater gave him another stacked card, i.e. extremely high support of the nation15. Reflecting the dtente between the US and USSR and being afraid of Communists' success in the Northern Vietnam, around 70% of Americans supported deployment of American troops in Vietnam in 196416. For both American public and Congress, Vietnam was an indicator of Cold War situation in general. To a large non-intervention in Vietnam would mean the subtle victory of Soviet Union in the whole South East Asia and loss of American authority in a global scale17. This said, the initial reason for the American military involvement in Vietnam was quite logical and compelling to American leaders. It was also coherent with the American foreign policy known as "containment" which assumed that the principal threat to American security and global peace was communism, spreading from the Soviet Union. Thus, the military response of the United States in Southern Vietnam was a response for the growing USSR presence in the North of the country18. Now I can conclude that domestic situation in late 1964 (after Johnson was elected a President on November 3, 1964) was quite favorable to start the large-scale war. Situation in congress almost fully supporting Johnson's policy to Vietnam, favorable public opinion with the unique consensus about the war, as well as unanimity within Johnson's administration marked the first stage of the war in Vietnam. F. Logevall (2001) quite illustratively defined this situation as the "Cold War mindset"19. Partially, this "Cold War mindset" derived from President's Eisenhower policy of opposition to communist spread in the third countries, and Vietnam War is quite often believed be predestined by Eisenhower, not Johnson20. Good beginning, however, was not even a half of the battle in this case. Quite soon, domestic affairs, situation in Congress and public opinion changed almost diametrically. Inclination of War and changes in domestic political agenda By the early 1967, the United States had sent more than 365.000 troops to Southern Vietnam, and the number of deaths reached 6.600. This state of affairs was aggravated by the unclear perspectives of the war, as American troops indeed seemed to be immersed in Vietnam and there was no clear vision of how and when the war was supposed to end21. At the same time, 1967-1968 time-periods indicated the rapid change of domestic agenda, which in that period started seriously affecting the conduct of war in Vietnam and finally resulted in troops pull-off. In my analysis, I will emphasize the following domestic issues that changed the character of War, i.e.: growth of opposition in the Congress, economical problems in the US during that time, ambiguity of vision of the war among Johnson's administration, changes in public opinion, role of mass media and peaceful movements in the US. Growing opposition in the US Senate to the War Although Congress granted Lyndon Johnson broad authority to use force in Vietnam and provided necessary funding in 1964, already during that euphoric support of troops' deployment there was a number of legislators that publicly challenged White House's view on the war. The group of War's opponents included Senators Frank Church, William Fulbright, Albert Gore Sr. Stuart Symington and Mike Mansfield22. The subtle opposition to the Vietnam War gave place to a blatant one as early as in 1966, when Senator W. Fulbright, Chair of Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, initiated first hearings on the war. Although hearings did not change Johnson's policy towards Vietnam, they were important in terms of its reconsideration as well as its budget cut23. Though Senator Fulbright initially supported Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964, he did not share Johnson's vision of the war conduct. In February 1966, he initiated six days of televised hearings on the conduct of the Vietnam War, partially to arrest public attention to the issue, partially to set the minds of Congressmen to this growing problem. The hearings were important as they brought the first spires of doubt between the senators and common Americans. Nevertheless, they did not manage to completely persuade the Senate in the impropriety of war. Up until late 1968, the influential Republicans and Democrats kept supporting Johnson's plan for Vietnam. However, the hearings split the Senate for the so-called "hawks" and "doves"24. The growing opposition in Senate as well as spreading concern in public opinion alarmed many members of the US government. On August 16, 1966, the House Un-American Activities Committee initiated investigations of Americans, suspected of aiding the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF). Although this attempt was not successful enough, it was important indicator of growing dissatisfaction with the Vietnam War25. Eventually, growing opposition in the Senate from both concerned Democrats and Republicans, prompted L. Johnson from nomination for the 1968 Presidential Election that, in its turn, finally changed the course of history in Vietnam. To my mind, the growing opposition to the Vietnam War in the US Senate was important because it created an opposition to the way the war was conducted on the state level (1), it stimulated more critical evaluation of the problem in Johnson's administration (2), stimulated growing publicity of the issue (3), finally, prompted the pluralism of thoughts an stimulated critical reflections among the American people (4). Vietnam War and American Economy The longest war in the United States history had a profound effect on the domestic economy. Requirements of the militaries and growing expenditures for the army supply strained country's production capacities and eventually caused imbalances in the United States industrial sector26. Contrary to Johnson's promise of fighting poverty in the United States, the military machine was draining recourses from the American economy. Factories that had been originally producing consumers' goods were requested to refocus on the military items (1), the funds were going overseas (2), US dollar started inflating since no corresponding funds would return to the country (3), eventually, military expenses and domestic problems created the budget deficit that fuelled inflation (4). Vietnam War cost and the Vietnam War cost about $600 billion, in current dollars and was too expensive for the domestic economy27. Although the affect of Vietnam War on the domestic economy is often underestimated, it terminated American development in 1950th and 1960th and brought the country to the huge 1970th economic crisis. Additionally, economic aggravation and inflation fuelled consumers' confidence and resulted in the anti-war sentiments and dissatisfaction with the government28. Anti-war sentiments and dissatisfaction with government further eroded consumer confidence. Interest rates rose, restricting the amount of capital available for businesses and consumers. Despite the success of many Kennedy and Johnson economic policies, the Vietnam War was a important factor in bringing down the American economy from the growth and affluence of the early 1960s to the economic crises of the 1970s29. The result of economic problems was the US $6 billion budgets' deficit for 1968 with which Johnson's administration had to compromise and adjust its plans to the war in Vietnam30. My conclusion from the economic problem resulting from the Vietnam War is that it was important not only in terms of budget cut for the militaries, but also because it changed public opinion regarding the war. It was the first serious crisis American people faced after the Great Depression and World War II. Until 1968, the economy was developing quite rapidly and welfare was steadily growing. The crisis, however, made people believe that Vietnam War was completely responsible for the economical problems. Naturally, it set public opinion against Johnson's administration and its plans for Vietnam. Public Opinion Another important phenomenon in domestic agenda was rapidly changing public opinion. Starting from the incredible 70% support of Vietnam invasion in the late 1964 (soon after Johnson's historical landslide), by mid 1966 and especially by 1967 public opinion changed completely31. In 1965, public opinion reflected what J. Mueller called the rally-around-the-flag effect32. Psychologically speaking, it means that during the military conflicts public opinion always temporarily supports the incumbent, regardless of war victories or defeats. However, quite soon emotional perception of war is usually substituted by its rational conceptualization. This psychological phenomenon was not an exception for President Johnson. As soon as in mid-1965, public opinion regarding the war changed profoundly. Since early 1965, increasing number of people started telling pollsters that the war in Vietnam was a mistake. Like now with the war in Iraq, the initial support of escalation of the war ("more men, more money") thus soon yielded to the new idea of troops' withdrawal33. In 1965, Gallup organizations included into their survey a question about public attitudes to the war in Vietnam: "In view of the developments since we entered the fighting in Vietnam, do you think the US made a mistake sending troops in Vietnam"34 By late 1967-early 1968, already 60% of respondents believed it was a mistake. In late 1968 the number of respondents choosing this answer increased to almost 65%35 Date No (wasn't a mistake)% August, 1965 61 1966 (average) 52 1967 (average) 46 1968 (average) 38 1969 (average) 35 1970 (average) 32 The figures above clearly demonstrate that after initial rally-around-the-flag effect, American people slowly began to move from the almost unanimous support of administration's policy. This tendency peaked in 1973, already after Johnson, when 79% of people said that the US should stay away from Vietnam even if the Northern Vietnam invades the Southern Vietnam. Apparently, public opinion is the key factor that influences American politics. Each president regardless of his initial support is literally the hostage of people's thoughts. President Johnson was hardly an exception: although people strongly supported his original decision of escalating the war in Vietnam in 1965, the swing in public opinion had clearly meant that both President and his administration were to have changed the conduct of the war36. War in Vietnam and media-effect This study would be incomplete without the analysis of what caused this quite rapid and powerful change in public opinion after the 1965-1966 strong approval of Johnson's politics. Researchers believe that mass media provides the most profound effect on people's psychology. Whether this is true or not is more a psychological question, but one could not object that news coverage was the huge reason for public opinion swing in 1967-1968. To the large extent, mass media affected the change in the US policy towards Vietnam in the last year of Johnson's presidency37. CBS evening news anchor Harry Reasoner declared the year of 1968 to be a year of "horrors and failures" US had never seen before. During that time, most of the TV channels, radio stations and printed press concentrated largely on war, politics and violence. Many of the news, and especially TV news, reporting deaths among the civilians and especially Vietnamese kids, were shocking for the American public. United States losses widely reported in the media did not as well contribute to the popularity of the war among the American citizens. Emphasis on horror and violence during the war resulted in the dramatic change in public opinion during 1967-196838. The other psychological studies conclude that in the new era of television (Vietnam War was probably the first in the US history widely broadcasted on TV) people were simply not ready to develop the impartial view on the broadcasted events. As a result, in 1967-1968 in American public consciousness there was "no clear margin between the observer and participant"39. Besides, the reports of American losses in the countries as well as coverage of what was going on in Vietnam appeared to be completely discordant with what Johnson's administration used to say. "Tremendous progress in Vietnam" continuously declared by the White House was not at all clear from what people would watch on TV and read in press. This state of affair as well aggravated the cleavage between the government and the nation40. Another reason for changes in public opinion was the predominant idea of pessimism on TV, radio and in press. Most of the journalists living and reporting from Vietnam saw no progress in the war since its beginning. According to Walter Cronkite, the most popular TV news anchor of his time, by 1967 the country was so far from the victory as it was in 1965. Cronkite, the original supporter of Johnson's decision, became one of the strongest followers of troops' withdrawal in 1967-1968. Among the rest, his position, coherent with the views of CBS direction, influenced the minds of millions and millions of Americans41. Thus, I can conclude that free press and changes in the media views in 1967-1968 had a profound effect on American public opinion. Changing news from the "battlefield" affected millions of Americans and changed their minds about the war. Starting from the general pro-war "Cold-War mindset" based mainly on the emotions and poor differentiation between good and evil, public opinion soon entered completely different phase, where emotions gave place to more rational assessment of situation. However, drawing parallels between media-effects and changing public opinion as key domestic issues that affected conduct of the War in Vietnam is not enough to provide the broad analysis of the whole picture. These two pillars of the change in the US military policy in Vietnam were the reasons of another key event that completely altered conduct of the war. American peaceful movements and the change in war conduct The war in Vietnam gave birth to "pacifism" - a new social phenomenon that seemed to seize all the youth of America in sixtieth42. The antiwar movements against the Vietnam War in the United States from 1965-1971 were the most significant protests of this kind not only within the country but obviously had no precedents in the world history. In the 1960th, pacifists' (from Latin "Pacificus" - conciliating) movements in the USA changed their previous noninvolvement "peaceful" policy and appeared to be influential power with making marches, blockades, picketing, editing antiwar leaflets etc trying to affect both the White House and Capitol. Indeed, these movements did have a serious impact on policy of the country and generally determined American army withdrawal out from Vietnam. The first manifestation of antiwar protests emerged at the University of Michigan on March 24, 1965 and soon spread to other campuses of the country. This protest was inspired by President Johnson's resolution to order systematic bombing of North Vietnam. The day after just established anti-war committees began to call for volunteers in dozens of university campuses. Already the first demonstrations of pacifists caught the attention of the White House and the first governmental reaction was performed on April 7, when making attempt to stabilize and calm down public opinion. On April 17, 1965, "Students for a Democratic Society" (SDS, the Union of American pacifists) called for a march against the Vietnam War for April 17, 1965. Twenty-five thousands of protesters joined the march and SDS appeared to be a leader of antiwar movement in the USA43. The war very soon became unpopular within the country and by the middle of 1967, the majority of Americans considered it a serious mistake of the government; at the same time, the antiwar movements that started from a small spring turned into a serious flood. In August of 1967, a massive demonstration, of not less than a half million, marched in New York City as well as dozens of demonstrations simultaneously took place all over the country. In Detroit, for example, the pacifists held major parts of the city for a week term and diverted thousands of troops from going to Vietnam as they had put down rebellion44. The most important antiwar manifestation of 1967 was definitely the march on the Pentagon in October, which many researches consider the turning point for the Johnson administration. There was no single trip of Johnson within the US and abroad which was not accompanied by thousands of anti-war protestors45. The antiwar movement apparently helped Richard Nixon to win the election campaign in October of 1969. Under the pressure of antiwar powers Nixon promised to perform a much quicker withdrawal from Vietnam as compared with the one he had planned before46. It is worth mentioning that serious antiwar feelings were clear even in the American army in Vietnam. Many soldiers and officers began to wear peace symbols and flash peace signs as well as movement salutes. Moreover, several divisions organized their own demonstrations to "join" this way the movement of their like-minded friends at home47. Thus anti-war movement apparently played the serious role in certain shaping of both American policy towards Vietnam and citizens' public opinion. The campus movements also helped in spreading the idea about the useless and incorrectness of the war and the necessity to stop it as well as the other wars on the planet. The movements of pacifists presumably helped to prevent further military actions of the USA in Panama, Libya, and the other hot spots. Moreover the consequences of antiwar movements seriously influenced mass consciousness of common Americans48. Conclusions There is probably no single way to examine the effect of each of the examined domestic issues on the Johnson's administration of war in Vietnam. My initial thesis is that Vietnam War was won inside the United States by American people, American press and American Senate. Paradoxically, for the US this victory meant withdrawal of troops and signing of peaceful treaty with Vietnam. I believe that growing opposition in Senate, economical problems as well as never yet seen anti-war movement in the US and silent public opinion opposition were equally important in the eventual change of Johnson administration's change of plans regarding Vietnam. Respectively, I would like to employ the broader analysis of what kind of changes regarding Vietnam domestic agenda had brought. Affect of the war on domestic economy resulted in $6 billion budget deficit for 1968, which certainly adjusted Johnson's plans on the war. This severe economic crisis, the first of that kind since the Great Depression and World War II certainly "tuned" public opinion making people think of Vietnam War as its primary reason. While mass media were reporting news literally from the "far-away Vietnam", the economic crisis appeared a direct experience of people - a part of their everyday lives. Naturally, this was important in changing public opinion that resulted in adjustment of Johnson administration's plan to Vietnam. Growing discontent in the Senate split both Democrats and Republicans and deprived President Johnson from his initial source of support. Not only was it important in terms of split of the Senate itself, but also for Johnson's administration, the members of which as well as the experts, had different views on the future of the war. I would summarize, that the split of Senate and Administration brought uncertainty to President Johnson. Originally enjoying fantastic support of the nations and politicians, he found himself in a right corner, rapidly loosing his followers and the nation. Naturally, changes in his view on the war were foregone. So was Johnson's decision not to run again for the Presidency in 1968. R. Nixon election and his "peace with honor" strategy to Vietnam finally meant the end of war for the United States. Growing concern of politicians, press and people prevented Johnson from sending 200.000 more troops to Vietnam after the leakage of this news and its coverage in press. Apparently, this means the growing concern of Johnson and his followers and correctives they made in their plans to the war49. The climax of domestic issues affect on Johnson's policy towards the War in Vietnam resulted in the peace talks between the United States and Democratic Republic of Vietnam that started on May 10, 1968. Although during this time US still kept bombing North Vietnam, it meant the readiness of Johnson's administration to resolve the crisis. His attempts to continue the fight were rather the tries to gild the pill of his own as well as country's loss. References: Barrett, M. 1988-1989. The Mythology Surrounding Lyndon Johnson, His Advisers, and the 1965 Decision to Escalate the Vietnam War. Political Science Quarterly, vol. 103, no. 4. (Winter, 1988-1989), pp. 637-663. Barrett, M. 1995. Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers: Review. The Pacific Historical Review, vol. 64, no. 2, pp. 322-323 Collins, R.M. 1996. The Economic Crisis of 1968 and the Waning of the "American Century". The American Historical Review, vol. 101, no. 2, pp. 396-422. Cuddy, E. 2003. 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Johnson and His Advisors: Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities in Their Operational Codes. Political Psychology, vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 529-543 Woods, R.B, 1999-2000. LBJ, Politics, and 1968. South Central Review, vol. 16, no. 4, Rethinking 1968: The United States & Western Europe, pp. 16-28 Woods, R.B. 2007. 'The Politics of Idealism: Lyndon Johnson, Civil Rights, and Vietnam,' Diplomatic History, vol. 31, pp. 1-18. Read More