Reflections on the Vietnam Wars: Guerillas versus Great Powers - Essay Example

 Reflections on the Vietnam Wars: Guerillas versus Great Powers Introduction Being obsessed by the communist aggression in Vietnam, the successor of John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, undertook resolute steps in 1965 towards preventing what had been considered pending serious damage to the American international influence and prestige, namely the real probability of losing South Vietnam (King, 1980, p.332). These steps were actually the logical continuation of an earlier American commitment being made by previous administrations; thus, having addressed the audience at John Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland, on April 7, 1965, Johnson made his point – “We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Viet-Nam. ...I intend to keep that promise” (Pentagon Papers, 1965). Johnson’s determination resulted in the US air forces being sent in bombing campaigns over the North Vietnamese territory while the US marines were dispatched to the South (King, 1980, p.332). The further Americanisation of the Vietnam War, in turn, brought about two important developments – America’s failure in Vietnam and the rise of a noisy and mobilised anti-war movement (Reitano, 2004, p.30). This paper argues that the US escalating involvement in Vietnam had been justified insofar as it was intended first and foremost as a countermeasure against the communist aggression in South Vietnam, thus being part of the overall US Cold War strategy of containment. On the other hand, the efficiency of the North Vietnamese forces in combating the technologically superior US forces, just as the French colonial troops a decade ago, is believed to have stemmed from four crucial factors, as follows: the versatile guerrilla tactics employed, disregard for the casualties, better motivation, as well as the extensive Soviet-Chinese support – military advisors, equipment, weaponry, etc. The US Involvement in Vietnam – A Cold War Strategic Necessity The issue of the US involvement in an apparently internecine war in a godforsaken corner of the world, which claimed nearly 60 000 American military personnel’s lives and severely tarnished the American military reputation, has long been subject for discussion amongst politicians, historians and academia. Apart from the opposing, mainly ideology-driven interpretations, most scholars have agreed that the roots of American involvement in Vietnam should be sought in the US Cold War strategy of containment (Ruane, 2000, p.2). Thus, according to Herring (George C., cited in Ruane, 2000, p.2), the US involvement was neither been a result of wrong judgement nor of personality quirks of the policy-makers, although both had existed in abundance. Rather, it had been a “logical, if not inevitable, outgrowth of a world view”, which the US government, along with the ordinary Americans, bred and accepted for over two decades (Ruane, 2000, p.2). Robert McNamara, then Secretary of Defence, explicitly referred to the “North Vietnam’s belligerency” and the Soviet back-up as a “major communist effort, meticulously planned and controlled, and relentlessly pursued by the government in Hanoi” (Pentagon Papers, 1964). On the other hand, the very nature of the Cold War – a struggle for global influence conducted through a number of proxy wars and indirect confrontations – required the presence of US advisory missions and military equipment supplies at any place across the world where the Soviets attempted, in a way or another, to turn the tables on their rival. The US president, Lyndon Johnson, in turn, made it equally explicit in 1965 – “The confused nature of this conflict cannot mask the fact that it is the new face of an old enemy” (Pentagon Papers, 1965). Therefore, following the series of attacks launched by Vietcong forces across South Vietnam between January 1st and 7 February 1965, including the seizure of Binh Gia, a village located some forty miles from Saigon, which resulted in two hundred South Vietnamese troops being killed, along with five American advisors, a resolute government position on the issue was required (Brigham, n.d.). To add insult to injury, the NLF attack on a US helicopter base and advisory compound in the central highlands of South Vietnam on February 7, 1965, killed nine and wounded over seventy American servicemen (Brigham, n.d.). Given Johnson’s image of a man and politician “committed to the defence of good against evil” (Lerner, 2003, p.69), the US government reaction – operation ‘Rolling Thunder, a long lasting bombing offensive aimed at disrupting the North Vietnamese support for the guerrillas in the South – appeared a rather logical choice. The subsequent increase in US combat force in South Vietnam to more than 60 000 troops actually came after the North’s rejection of the US offer of economic aid in exchange for peace (Brigham, n.d.). From that point on, the further escalation of the conflict, hence expanded American commitment in the war was only a matter of time since the US commitment objectives in South Vietnam, as defined in 1964, included: first, preserving the independence of South Vietnam from the communist North, second, preventing the communists from seizing control of an area that was deemed of “great strategic significance in the forward defence of the United States”, and third, examining the nature of a new communist strategy, whose “test case” appeared the Vietnamese war (Pentagon Papers, 1964). Finally, as President Johnson stated in an interview in March 1964, the fall of Vietnam was considered largely intolerable insofar as it would bring about the fall of Southeast Asia to the communist bloc; hence, according to Johnson’s own words, “we must stay there and help them, and that is what we are going to do” (Pentagon Papers, 1964). The reference to the President Kennedy’s belief in the “domino theory” was intended to underline the continuity in American policy on the issue. The stealthy way the Americanisation of the conflict took place, so that the US general public had been hardly aware of the change in course, is another matter altogether (King, 1980, p.332). Nevertheless, the American involvement in the Vietnam vortex was strictly in accordance with the basic premises of the overall US strategy of containment during the Cold War, hence quite justifiable in the historical circumstances. The Efficiency of Vietnamese Communist Forces – A Prerequisite for the US’ Failure? While containment strategy would sufficiently explain why the United States got involved into the Vietnamese war, America’s failure at achieving its key objectives, most notably preserving the independent non-communist state in Southern Vietnam, is more or less weird, as against the American technological, economic and military superiority by that time (Ruane, 2000, p.2). The oddity of the situation is further emphasised by the fact that, from 1964-1965 on, the American commitment had gradually reached the staggering figure of more than 500 000 American soldiers fighting in the region (Brigham, n.d.). According to Ruane (2000), the explanations provided by historians are various and complex, ranging from deficiencies in the American military tactics to the adverse impact of domestic anti-war protests on both the troops morale and the will of the Johnson administration to prosecute the war with full vigour (p.2). Thus, the ‘quagmire’ theory, for example, is based on the presumption that the war was unwinnable by definition, which was only realised by the US political and military establishment after 1965, when the American power had been fully committed to the war effort (Ruane, 2000, p.3). Especially important in that regard would appear the tactics employed by the Vietnamese communists during the war. The hit and run attacks, as well as ambushes, along with the increasing infiltration of North Vietnamese regular troops into the South, faced the Americans with the impossibility of clearly recognising the enemy (Brigham, n.d.); actually, the same elusive and deadly enemy, who had successfully fought against the French ten year ago, using the very same frustrating tactics (Ruane, 2000, p.33). On the other hand, many civilians died, being wrongly identified with the enemy by the frustrated and terrified American soldiers. In a highly charged story describing episodes of the Vietnamese war, O’Brien (1990) writes on the issue, “They burned everything. They shot chickens and dogs, they trashed the village well, they called in artillery and watched the wreckage” (p.15). Having turned into an everyday occurrence, more or less, such practices not only worsened the American morale but also damaged the public image of the American army, both at home and abroad, giving rise to the vociferous anti-war protests in the United States which hampered the US government’s war effort (Ruane, 2000, p.3). Conclusion Despite being subjected to various interpretations, the US involvement in Vietnam reflected the peculiar realities of the Cold War era, most notably the strategic necessity of countering the Soviet attempts to spread their influence across that region of the world. The tactics employed by Vietcong forces, on the other hand, contributed towards America’s failure to achieve its key war objectives; which, in turn, has made many politicians, anti-war activists and historians to call into question the very premises of that strategy (Ruane, 2000, p.2). References Brigham, Robert K., (n.d.). “Battlefield: Vietnam, Timeline 1965-1966.” Retrieved from http://www.pbs.org/battlefieldvietnam/timeline/index.html King, Larry L., (1980). “Trapped: Lyndon Johnson and the Nightmare of Vietnam” in Of Outlaws, Con Men, Whores, Politicians and Other Artists. New York: Viking Press, Print. p. 332 Lerner, Mitchell, (July 2003). “Four Years and a World of Difference: The Evolution of Lyndon Johnson and American Foreign Policy.” The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 107, No1, 68-95. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/30239425 O’Brien, Tim, (1990). The Things They Carried. New York: Houghton Mifflin. Retrieved from http://books.google.bg/books?id=Op6eKrkxPq4C&pg=PP14&lpg=PP1&dq=The+Things+They+Carried Pentagon Papers, Part V.A – Vol. II: Justification of the War - Public Statements, D. Johnson Administration. “United States Policy in Vietnam,” by Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense, 26 March 1964, Department of State Bulletin, 13 April 1964, p.562. Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3, by NWD: 2011. Retrieved from http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/205536/pentagon-papers-part-v-a-volume-ii-d.pdf Pentagon Papers, Part V.A – Vol. II: Justification of the War - Public Statements, D. Johnson Administration. “Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia”, Address by President Johnson at John Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland on April 7, 1965, Department of State Bulletin, April 26, 1965, p.607. Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3, by NWD: 2011, Retrieved from http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/205536/pentagon-papers-part-v-a-volume-ii-d.pdf Pentagon Papers, Part V.A – Vol. II: Justification of the War - Public Statements, D. Johnson Administration. TV Interview with President Johnson, 15 March 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents, Johnson, 1963-1964, p.370. Declassified per Executive Order 13526, Section 3.3, by NWD: 2011. Retrieved from http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/205536/pentagon-papers-part-v-a-volume-ii-d.pdf Reitano, Richard, (October 2004). “LBJ Goes to War.” OAH Magazine of History, 18, pp. 27-31. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25163719 Ruane, Kevin, (2000). The Vietnam Wars. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press. Print. Read More