Analysis of the Impact of US Intervention upon the Conduct of the War - Research Paper Example

?Vietnam War: 1965 Analysis of the impact of US intervention upon the conduct of the war Why Lyndon B. Johnson sent US ground troops to Vietnam Before 1965, the United States took a less active role in the conflict between the Viet Cong and South Vietnam. America limited her role to the sending of military strategists to help South Vietnam1. Nevertheless, the direct firing of two American water vessels in international waters by North Vietnam in the early August 1964 prompted Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which authorized President Johnson to escalate the country’s participation in Vietnam. The president used the constitutional powers in the office to order the deployment of US ground troops to the region in the end of the first quarter of 1965. The action, notwithstanding, President Johnson's objective for his country’s participation in Vietnam was not driven by the quest to win the battle, but for the military to stabilize South Vietnam's forces and government control of security situation in the region. Butterfield suggests that the ability of the Viet Cong "to build up their effort was consistently underrated" by the United States2. In light of this, President Johnson ordered what would turn out to be unpopular among Americans, when the country found itself mired in a deadlock with the warring factions of Vietnam. Although, the country participated in aerial bombings of the enemy North, President Johnson was of the opinion that the bombardment be restricted to defending South Vietnam. By restricting the battlefields, the American troops would not carry out a significant ground invasion of the North to eliminate the communist icons and structures nor would they seriously destabilize the Ho Chi Minh Trail or the major infrastructure used by his government. Impact of the 1965 American intervention in Vietnam The eight years of America's participation in Vietnam witnessed its military campaign fluctuate from enormous escalation of firepower to slow withdrawal. The American approach to the war, also evolved in its implementation, from a general “Search and Destroy” mission, which was intended to wear the enemy, to complete "Clear and Hold" strategies. The end result was based on pacification initiatives. Whereas, critics continue to argue that America’s poor performance in Vietnam was bound to happen, owing to the then prevailing political, social, and military issues, others are of the opinion that America’s involvement should not be regarded as such: that the “winning strategy” of the US military was to decisively prolong the conflict in order to wear down the North Vietnamese military3. Nevertheless, the North Vietnamese strategy of implementing a complex program of insurgency and long-drawn guerilla war proved an elusive goal for the superior American military, hence its eventual defeat and de-escalation4. America’s attrition strategy The 1965 US intervention in Vietnam greatly impacted the conduct of the war. Unlike previously, when the country played a limited role of offering military advice to the South Vietnamese military, American forces took part in combat, complete with ground troops. From 1965 to 1968, the main strategy of the United States was taking control of the combat in South Vietnam from the local South Vietnamese Armed Forces (SVAF). The American ground forces based their successes on the "Search and Destroy" missions, while the Air Force carried out air raids under the Rolling Thunder bombing crusade. Although, General Westmoreland was confident these strategies would wear down the Viet Cong forces and guerillas, political challenges driven by fear of attracting more states to the battlefield, such as China and or Soviet Union prompted the Johnson government to limit their combat to a strategic protection of South Vietnam. And whereas, Soviet played the role of a “diplomatic channel between Washington and Hanoi. . . Moscow always seemed unwilling to pile pressure on North Vietnam to give up its struggle,” hence the likelihood it could join the fray against America5. Regardless, the US military successfully helped to save the SVAF from collapse by putting up defense installations in the region. Nonetheless, the effort by the US to develop the SVAF into an American fashion failed. The army constantly looked upon the US for support, and was driven largely on Communist ideologies. It was a painful experience that, whereas the American army opportunely managed to rescue the SVAF from collapse, the major South Vietnamese ally’s subsequent operations were unintentionally condemning the local forces to an extended disastrous defeat. The Rolling Thunder, America's first large-scale air campaign, inexorably stretched the country’s involvement in the conflict and further strengthened the significance of the attrition strategy. Whereas, the offensive proved effective in inflicting far-reaching damage the North Vietnamese military equipment, and command centers, industrial complex and infrastructure, it eventually failed to defeat the Communist forces. US military escalation vs. guerilla warfare In early 1968, North Vietnamese troops, backed by Communist guerrillas undertook a military incursion into the South Vietnamese cities. Despite apparent signs that they could be under attack any time, the American soldiers were surprised. Eventually, after serious combat, which lasted a couple of weeks, the American military and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) took back the cities from the enemy control. The deadly offensive carried out by the North Vietnamese forces against the South alongside her primary ally, the US, proved a hard nut to crack, nonetheless. According to Lukas, “the gun flashes,” which could be “seen from Singapore” symbolized the bitter fighting in Vietnam6. The massive deployment of American troops may have dissuaded the North Vietnamese forces from carrying out direct attacks on the enemy forces, hence the development and implementation of guerilla tactics by the Viet Cong. After Tet Offensive, President Johnson refused to assent to the deployment of more soldiers to the battle-fields, as had been requested by General Westmoreland, and instead was seen to be sidling toward "The Vietnam Negotiations," proposed by Henry Kissinger7. That appeared to be the strong proof that the cost of Tet prompted the Johnson government to re-evaluate its involvement in the war. “Various agencies” had expressed their reservations about the war. Yet several major controversies about Tet still persist; for instance, whether the offensive was a defeat or a win for the US military. Regardless, after Tet, the US president ordered the de-escalation process in Vietnam. Nevertheless, whereas, it seems Tet Offensive was a significant defeat for the American military, the offensive may have been a military success, in that, it ultimately led to the withdrawal of the Communist forces from the urban posts they had occupied during the Tet holiday. In light of the perceived defeat, insurmountable pressure from the political leaders, the media and civilians may have lent credence to the perceived American defeat, and forced the withdrawal. Soaring casualties and losses Butterfield indicates that "no one really foresaw” the nature of the war or “what the troop needs in Vietnam would be.8" The military campaign caused a lot of casualties to all the participating armies and civilians as well. An estimated 3 million lives were lost in the war, most of who were civilians. America lost more than 58,000 troops and 300,000 soldiers were wounded in the war9. Communist forces also suffered greatly during the war. For instance, during Tet, they lost almost 60,000 soldiers, which was almost the number of American casualties during the entire military campaign. The Communists suffered damaged reputation as well: for instance, they arrogated themselves, the liberation force title; however, they had not enjoyed any public support from South Vietnam. The Tet Offensive is believed to have shown the limits of the US military might, nonetheless. Although, the capacity of the US military could reestablish the control of Saigon administration of South Vietnam's townships, it seemed a daunting task. For instance, after half a decade of US military intervention, the Communists remained largely intact and capable of carrying out a strong offensive. The people of South Vietnam were not ready to help the South Vietnamese government in the war, either, perhaps due to feared external interference from America. At stake, therefore, it appeared America was content with the status quo following the military impasse. The re-birth of psychological warfare The second major debate is whether the fourth-estate turned Tet Offensive into a psychological victory for the Viet Cong. The deployment of American ground troops and their supposed defeat during Tet impacted the conduct of the war by shifting the attention from the battle-fields to the media. Bigart suggests the Vietnamese were the first to bear the brunt of “negative reporting” in the early 1960s, when the country complained of “critical articles” by some American students that were targeted at the government10. It is conceivable that the Vietnam War was historic, because the outcome was established by the media, but not on the battlegrounds. In light of this, Whitehouse had raised alarm over the increasingly “negative reporting” of the war against the US in the period that followed 1965. Although, the media may have adopted a skewed way of reporting as President Johnson suggested, their conduct was likely to have been influenced by the extensive nature of the combat mission, and scanty information available for reporting. Generally, media played a pivotal role in the war, especially after the 1965 move by the Johnson government: for instance, the South Vietnamese military officials were depicted in the media as “inhuman” during the war. Photos showing summary executions of their harmless Communist captives tainted the image of the United States. These photos made many US citizens to see their ‘ally’ in bad light. Although, some of the actions captured on camera were later discovered to be “true,” the images were a thorough beating to America. In most cases, the media was just displaying the raw information they received from the battlefields, such as the occupation of the American embassy in Saigon by the Viet Cong at the beginning of the Tet Offensive11. Emerson avers that some members of President Nixon’s inner circle had “suddenly lost … anonymity” due to the bitter state of the war in Vietnam12. Some mulled over ‘lies,” while other went underground. Yet others played the blame game. Regardless, if media houses were to blame for inaccurate or falsified reporting, the US government officials in Saigon would not be spared either. From Saigon, the army, the intelligence officials and reports and the envoy Bunker all assured the government and the public that America was winning the war. In response, the American government undertook a public relations campaign to win the continued public support for the war. General Westmoreland suggested, in reassuring manner that the attrition war adopted by the military was almost won, which was not the case. Eventually, Gwertzman says, by demanding the complete American withdrawal from the region in 1975, North Vietnamese call for cessation of “any” American “involvement in South Vietnam, including military aid” to South Vietnam symbolized Viet Cong’s point of strength during the eight years of American involvement in the war13. Conclusion Although, the Vietnam War was a long-drawn conflict stretching back to the end of the Second World War, the 1965 American military intervention was a turning-point in the war. Before then, the United States was helping her South Vietnamese allied forces with military advice. Though, the stated goal of the US military in South Vietnam was to improve the defenses of the government, the firing of US ships in international waters in 1964, by Viet Cong in 1964 triggered the us-scaling of combat in the region, the following year. Nevertheless, after the deployment of American ground troops to Vietnam the conduct of the war changed: the search and destroy military strategy changed into clearing and holding the enemy; America massively increased her military fire-power and eventually de-escalated it after taking in many casualties and losses. Bibliography Beidler, Philip. The Invisible ARVN: The South Vietnamese Soldier in American Representations of the Vietnam War. War, Literature & the Arts: An International Journal of the Humanities, 19 No. 1/2 (2007): 306-317. Bigart, Homer. U.S. scholars irk Diem by articles; Vietnam Chief Won't Renew University's Aid Contract. The New York Times, 21 Feb. 1962. Web. 12 July 2012. http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html. Butterfield Fox, “Pentagon Papers: Vietnam Study Links '65 - '66 G. I. Build-Up to Faulty Planning; Pentagon Papers: Study Links 1965-66 U. S. 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