Bureaucratic and Normative Control - Essay Example

Running Head: BUREAUCRATIC AND NORMATIVE CONTROL Bureaucratic and Normative Control of the of the Institution] Bureaucratic and Normative Control Bureaucratic Control The ideal type of bureaucracy is a conceptual construction of certain empirical elements into a logically precise and consistent form, a form which, in its ideal purity, is never to be found in concrete reality. The detailed way in which this form is constructed will be examined in the paper ahead. For the moment, we shall only be concerned with the empirical elements which refer to the various characteristics of bureaucracy. Indeed, the characteristics contained in the ideal type, although transformed and exaggerated in a certain way, correspond, more or less, to concrete features of existing organisations. Briefly, the main characteristics of the bureaucratic type of organisation are: High degree of specialisation Hierarchical authority structure with limited areas of command and responsibility Impersonality of relationships between organisational members Recruitment of officials on the basis of ability and technical knowledge Differentiation of private and official income and fortune and so on. (Barker, 1993, p47) Now, if one tries to see what lies beyond the above characteristics, how they are linked with one another, one finds a common, all-pervasive element; the existence of a system of control based on rational rules, rules which try to regulate the whole organisational structure and process on the basis of technical knowledge and with the aim of maximum efficiency. Bureaucratic administration means fundamentally the exercise of control on the basis of knowledge. This is the feature of it which makes it specifically rational. (Barnett, 1990, p1) Actually hierarchy in general (in the sense of levels of authority) is to be found in any administration which has a certain degree of magnitude and complexity. The feudal type of administration had a complicated hierarchical system. (Davis, 1994, p73) 'There is hierarchy of a social rank corresponding to the hierarchy of fiefs through the process of sub-infatuation...' 6 But the difference between the two kinds of hierarchies, according to Weber, is to be found in the type of authority relations. In the feudal case the relationship between inferior and superior is personal and the legitimating of authority is based on a belief in the sacredness of tradition. In a bureaucracy, authority is legitimised by a belief in the correctness of the rules and the loyalty of the bureaucrat is oriented to an impersonal order, to a superior position, not to the person who holds it. So what makes an administration more or less bureaucratic from the hierarchical point of view is not the number of levels of authority, or the size of the span of control; the decisive criterion is whether or not the authority relations have a precise and impersonal character, as a result of the elaboration of rational rules. (Lee, 1990, p81) Concerning first the criterion of meaningful adequacy, it does not necessarily make sense to someone that a type of organisation having the Weberian characteristics to an extreme degree should yield maximum efficiency. One could equally well imagine such an organisation as being extremely inefficient. For example, some of these characteristics, even from a common sense point of view, seem to promote administrative inefficiency rather than efficiency (e.g. promotion by seniority). As to the criterion of objective possibility, in the light of the empirical research done since Weber, one can argue that a perfectly rational-efficient organisation having Weber's ideal characteristics is not objectively possible, in the sense that it runs against the known laws of nature -- in this case, against recent empirical findings. Such findings rather indicate that the more accentuated some characteristics of the ideal type are, the more inefficient the organisation becomes. In one sense, a great part of the literature on bureaucracy since Weber is a systematic exposition of the dysfunctional aspects and the unintended (mainly undesirable) consequences of strict bureaucratic control (Meyer, 1988, p60). For the moment a few examples will be sufficient. Consider for instance, the problem of the efficiency of rules. Although to a certain degree the elaboration of precise and strict rules avoids indeterminacy and arbitrariness, on the other hand, especially when there is efforts to control by procedural rules even the details of each bureaucratic activity, and thus reduce seriously the initiative of the official, the results are rigidity and inefficiency of the whole organisation. (Bass, 1985, p320) But on the other hand, the contradictions of the ideal type have not seriously handicapped Weber's insights and contributions to the study of organisations. This is because Weber has not used the ideal type in the way he said one should use it. As in other instances, there is a discrepancy between Weber's methodological writings and the actual method that he uses in his historical analyses. (Mouzelis, 1967, p95) has pointed out that Weber does not so much compare ideal to real phenomena in order to establish and investigate their discrepancy -- rather, he uses the ideal type as a tool for the historical comparison of two or more real situations. In this context the type helps to isolate 'the factors on which the comparison becomes critical'. Moreover, as Andreski remarks there is nothing very ideal about the way Weber talks about bureaucracy or feudalism. 'He moves on the level of abstraction which is not very far removed from observable reality'. Thus Weber does not use the concept of bureaucracy for a micro-analysis of the internal structure of an organisation. He uses it in his cross-cultural general analysis, mainly in order to distinguish various types of domination and their corresponding administrative apparatus. On this macroscopic level, where details and minor variations become irrelevant, the concept of bureaucracy, used as an extreme type, is useful and adequate. Even the assumption concerning the rational superiority of the bureaucratic type of administration, when considered as a hypothesis assessing the comparative efficiency of various historical types of administration, is very plausible. Indeed, in spite of all the dysfunctions of the organisational control by rational rules, one could hardly imagine a big modern corporation functioning without such rules. As a matter of fact the complexity and size of modern administrative tasks make the bureaucratic type of organisation, when compared with the feudal or the patrimonial, by far the most efficient. (Lambert, 1993, p41) A different approach to the concepts of rationality and efficiency consists in avoiding the identification of them with the existence of rules or any other bureaucratic feature. According to Blau for example, it is not strict discipline and rule elaboration which brings efficiency, but rather the achievement of conditions favourable to the development of individual initiative and spontaneity. In this positive sense, if the top management intervenes and regulates the official's activities, it is with a completely different intention: the aim of such an intervention is not to tell the official what to do, but rather to destroy the obstacles and to establish the conditions which could help him to cope spontaneously and responsibly with emerging problems. These considerations and findings cause (Langer, 1983, p230) to 'disregard all characteristics and to identify bureaucracy with efficiency: rather than considering it an administrative system with particular characteristics, it may be preferable to follow another lead of Weber's and to conceive of bureaucracy in terms of its purpose. Bureaucracy, then, can be defined as organisation that maximises efficiency in administration, whatever its formal characteristics. The above discussion has shown the confusion and ambiguity in the way bureaucracy is used in modern social theory. This situation is due partly to the inherent contradictions of the ideal type, and partly to the uncritical adoption and transformation of the term by various authors. The ideal type of bureaucracy was mainly constructed in view of a wide historical comparative analysis of administrative systems. Modern writers, although influenced by Weber's construction of bureaucracy, have ignored the problems of development and cross-cultural comparison of organisations. Normative Control In contrast to Bureaucratic Control, institutional theory in some of its variants has a normative component: emphasis is placed on normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension to social life. One of the researcher has defined institutionalization as to infuse with value. Another researcher has noted that "the study of institutions is the study of norm-governed behaviour. Two of the distinguished political researchers while arguing for the importance of institutions for understanding politics, noted the importance of social obligations in understanding behaviour: To describe behaviour as driven by rules is to see action as a matching of a situation to the demands of a position. Rules define relationships among roles in terms of what an incumbent of one role owes to incumbents of other roles. (Barley, 1988, p80) An interesting illustration of the effect of the normative order on the adoption of specific organisational practices is provided by the recent study of the diffusion of municipal civil service reform in the United Kingdom during the period 1885-1935. Early in the period, which cities adopted reforms could be predicted on the basis of characteristics that might be reasonably argued to account for the need and desire for reform: larger cities, cities with a larger proportion of immigrants, and those with a higher proportion of white-collar to blue-collar workers were more likely to adopt reform. Although city characteristics were strongly predictive of adoption of civil service reforms during the early period from 1885 to 1904, the effects of these characteristics became weaker over time so that by 1935, city characteristics no longer had predictive power. Some of the political scientists interpreted this result as demonstrating normative influence: "As an increasing number of organisations adopt a program or policy, it becomes progressively institutionalized, or widely understood to be a necessary component of rationalized organisational structure. The legitimacy of the procedures themselves serves as the impetus for the later adopters". (Barney, 1986, p125) The normative order is importantly influenced by the actions of the state, which has important coercive and regulatory powers. Researchers, while examining the diffusion and implementation of modern personnel practices, observed an important discontinuity at the time of World War II. At that point, the state intervened in organisational administration--for instance, forbidding strikes, demanding personnel records so that an inventory of manpower could be maintained and managed, and limiting wage increases. Some other political experts have noted that "these interventions fuelled the development of bureaucratic controls by creating models of employment and incentives to formalize and expand personnel functions. Other experts, analyzing a matched sample of employees and employers from London in the early 1980s, found that both government influence in the industrial sector and how close organisations were to the public sector had important effects on the development and spread of due-process procedures and bureaucratic control. (Baumol, 1959, p150) Because control and coordination are such ubiquitous issues, virtually the entire organisations literature concerns this topic, at least indirectly. This paper discusses four mechanisms of social control: The use of rewards and incentives, including negative rewards and surveillance Commitment and socialization processes Organisational culture Leadership Each of these processes is a fundamental mechanism of social control in organisational settings and is intended to direct and motivate behaviour, and each has stimulated substantial research and theoretical interest and controversy. There is an important difference in emphasis across these mechanisms of social control. Rewards and incentives work primarily on the environment of employees, and the literature on organisational rewards almost invariably proceeds from the presumptions of the economic model of behaviour. (Bazerman, 1991, p202) As such, reviewing the literature on rewards and compensation will permit us to see in yet another research context to what extent the predictions of the economic model of behaviour are, in fact, empirically supported and under what circumstances. The use of rewards and incentives as mechanisms of organisational control varies over time and place depending on the degree of acceptance and dominance of the economic perspective on organisational behaviour. By contrast, commitment, culture, and some aspects of leadership try to engage and change fundamental decision premises, self-perceptions, beliefs, and values and frequently work on the emotions using social psychological principles, using the heart as well as the head. As such, these control strategies are premised largely on the retrospectively rational and, to a lesser extent, the social and moral models of behaviour. Interest in rewards and incentives--a rational basis of control-and normative control, based importantly on social psychological principles, has waxed and waned over time and, contrary to some accounts has not simply evolved from coercive to normative control. These bases of control have fluctuated over time because of the fundamental tension between community and individual self-interest that forms the basis for the various control systems: (Baum, 1995, p205) Each sensed that industrialization was problematic because it juxtaposed two contrasting paradigms for social order. These two forms of social organisation were given different names by different scholars. Weber wrote of the communal and the associative. Durkheim contrasted mechanistic with organic solidarity. However, the essence of their vision was the same. In a Gemeinschaft, people share a common identity, are bound by common values and traditions, and partake of a way of life that contrasts sharply with the competition, individualism, and calculative self-interest associated with the Gesellschaft. The central dilemma identified, concerned the integrity of the social fabric. How relations based on utilitarianism and rational calculation could remain integrated and socially fulfilling (Kunda, 1992, p399) The political researchers have found no evidence that changes in managerial ideology followed changes in the quality of labour relations in the United Kingdom. Although heightened labour activity may have fanned interest in human relations during the 1940s rhetorics of organisational culture and commitment unambiguously arose in an era of declining labour militancy. Rather, they found that surges of normative and rational theorizing occurred, respectively, in conjunction with periods of contraction or expansion. They argued, Rational and normative rhetorics both promise managers greater productivity and profitability but advocate radically different means for obtaining these ends. Rational rhetorics should surge when profitability seems most linked to the management of capital. Conversely, normative rhetorics should surge when profitability seems to depend more on the management of labour. The study of the shifting language and preference for control of different types reminds us that particular control strategies are invariably historically and contextually located. That makes it important to understand how mechanisms of organisational control vary not only across time but also across different social contexts. Technologies of organisational control, and the models on which they are implicitly or explicitly premised, are neither timeless nor ubiquitous in their validity, a factor seldom acknowledged in the relevant literatures. There is concern with the pace of the development of organisational knowledge and even if there is such progress in our understanding. Political experts have argued that knowledge was developing slowly, and they buttressed this claim by noting that the strength of relationships, as measured by the size of reported correlations on a variety of topics, was actually getting smaller rather than larger over time. One of the researchers examined the connection between the usefulness, scientific validity, and frequency of mention by scholars for twenty-four organisation theories. He found little correlation among the three measures. For example, more useful or more valid theories were no more likely to be frequently mentioned than less useful or valid ones. This disconnection between validity, applicability, and prominence is troubling for a field that aspires to be scientifically valid and useful for understanding and managing organisations. Ancient political experts were concerned about the field's inability to get beyond an Anglo-British vision of social order that rests on an opposition between mechanistic and organic solidarity, associated, respectively, with normative and rational ideologies of control". (Singh, 1994, p38) But the implication of this fact is that truth will not necessarily triumph since truth is itself socially determined. Or, the best perspective offered to date is determined not by some unambiguous empirical test but rather by which theory or perspective can muster the most social support for its definition of truth and organisational reality. Consequently, those factors that produce advantage in a social struggle will be important in determining which theoretical perspective triumphs and unity in perspective and consensus are among the factors that provide the economic perspective with an edge in the contest among models and theories. Being unconcerned about the proliferation of economic explanations of organisations is also wrong as a matter of science. This paper has provided a detail of just a portion of what is wrong with the economic model as a way of analyzing organisations. Noted political experts have made the argument that not only are economic models often theoretically and empirically misleading; they are also bad for practice and, by inference, a poor foundation on which to build public or management policy. (Libermann, 1992, p431) Organisation economics sees managers as untrustworthy and as requiring controls from super ordinate levels in the organisation, thereby contributing to a control-oriented set of management practices (e.g., the emphasis on hierarchy, incentives, and surveillance) that are both expensive and counterproductive. If this is true--and certainly more research and argument may be warranted--then there are important consequences for organisations themselves from the field of organisation studies being seduced by economic logic and models. Recall that theories of behaviour, to the extent they guide policies and practices, can become true through their very implementation because of the self-fulfilling, interconnected nature of behaviour. Organisational scholars have an obligation to develop and test alternative models of behaviour and not simply cede the field to economics. (Lachman, 1989, p51) Somewhat paradoxically, even as the various strands of organisation theory may have become increasingly diverse and disconnected, the field as a whole has become more connected to adjacent social sciences that advocate the rational actor model of behaviour. Even as debate about positivism has occurred within the field of organisation studies, and even as critical perspectives have evolved, the field has come to be increasingly dominated by models and methods that would seem to epitomize what critical theory eschews. This is not to suggest that there aren't subcultures of organisation theory that embrace the humanities, postmodernism, and critical theory or that there aren't those who seek to maintain a diversity of paradigms. But the current trend seems clear. References Barker, J. R. (1993). Tightening the Iron Cage: Bureaucratic Control in self-managing Organisation: Administrative Science Quarterly: 38(8): p47. Barley, S. R. (1988). Normative Control Power, and the Social Organisation of Work: Research in the Sociology of Organisations: Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press: 6(33): p80. Barnett, W. P. (1990). The Organisational Ecology of a Bureaucratic Control System: Administrative Science Quarterly: 35(3): p1. Barney, J. B. (1986). Organisational Economics: Toward a New Paradigm for Understanding and Studying Normative Control: San Francisco: Jossey-Bass: p125 Bass, B. M. (1985). Leadership and Control in Organisations: Glasgow: University of Edinburgh Press: p320 Baum, J. A. C. (1995). The Changing Basis of Control in Organisational Setup: Social Forces: 74(17), p205. Baumol, W. (1959). Organisation and Control Behaviour: London: Macmillan: p150 Bazerman, M. H.. (1991). Contextualizing Bureaucratic and Normative Control: Research on Control in Organisations: Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press: 3(165), p202. Davis, G. F. (1994). A Social Movement Perspective on Corporate Control: Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(14): p73. Kunda, G. (1992). Design and Devotion: Surges of Rational and Normative Ideologies of Control in Managerial Discourse: Administrative Science Quarterly: 37(3), p399. Libermann, W. (1992). Normative Culture: Control and Commitment in a Organisation: Oxford: Oxford University Press: p431 Lachman, R. (1989). Power from What A re-examination of Bureaucratic and Normative Control With Structural Conditions: Administrative Science Quarterly, 34(3): p51. Lambert, R. A. (1993). The Structure of Organisational Control: Administrative Science Quarterly: 38(3): p41. Langer, E. J. (1983). The Psychology of Control: Cambridge University Press: Cambridge: p230 Lee, C. (1990). Interactive Effects of Bureaucratic Control on Organisation: Academy of Management Journal: 33(8): p81. Meyer, G. W. (1988). Cultures of Culture: Academics, Practitioners, and the Pragmatics of Bureaucratic Control: Administrative Science Quarterly: 33(24): p60. Mouzelis, Nicos P. (1967). Organisation and Bureaucracy: An Analysis of Modern Theories: Aldine de Gruyter: New York: p95 Singh, J. V. (1994). Organisational Niches and the Dynamics of Normative Organisational Control: British Journal of Management: 100(6): p38. Read More