The Many Features of Chinese Nationalism - Essay Example

Your Your The Many Features of Chinese Nationalism As China has grown into its current status as apolitical, economic and military power, its population has undergone an interesting transformation: the people have become fervently nationalistic. No matter what one thinks of the legitimacy of Chinese grievances against the nations in the West, Peter Gries describes the Chinese brand of nationalism as being strong with emotion, strengthened by "victim narratives [that are] beginning to influence the making of Chinese foreign policy" (Gries, p. 12). The fact that an Internet petition consisting of over 20 million Chinese signatures opposing Japan's admission to the Security Council, combined with the huge Chinese protests concerning the use of history books in Japan that mostly ignore the Japanese atrocities in World War II, shows that there is a lot of rage in China that could be tapped and sent in irresponsible directions. There are waves of nationalism that move from the grass-roots to political leadership, and waves that move in the opposite direction. One of the major challenges for the twenty-first century will be finding ways to channel the energies of the world's most populous nation into positive directions. There are many perspectives on the potential motivations, and possible outcomes, of Chinese nationalism. There are some that see this movement as a "reckless movement driven by China's traditional Sino-centrism and contemporary aspirations for great-power status" (Zhao, p. 131). Bernstein and Munro conclude, for example, that China is "[d]riven by nationalist sentiment, a yearning to redeem the humiliations of the past, and the simple urge for international power" (Bernstein and Munro, p. 19). This has led the Chinese to demonstrate with particular urgency against the United States, whom it wishes to replace as the dominant power in Asia. One example of this would be the massive demonstrations in front of the U.S. diplomatic missions in China after the mistaken bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO forces under the command of the U.S. Western diplomats were shocked to find that the Chinese assumed that the bombing had been intentional (Zhao, p. 132). After a U.S. Navy surveillance plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea in April 2001, similar demonstrations broke out, with the Chinese pilot, Wang Wei, honored as a "martyr of the revolution" (Pomfret, p. A1). James Lilley's 2004 article in Public Affairs and Maria Hsia Chang's book Return of the Dragon: China's Wounded Nationalism are two examples of anxious observations of the fervent nationalism that has arisen at the end of the twentieth century, which was seen by many Chinese as one of humiliation. However, it would be short-sighted to describe the new Chinese nationalism as nothing more than emotionalism running rampant in the streets and squares of China. After all, the Chinese government has shown considerable skill in managing the public outbursts of its citizens. The idea that Suisheng Zhao has termed "pragmatic nationalism" refers to the ways in which the Chinese government actually organizes the shows of patriotism. This nationalism, according to Zhao, is a force used to "hold the country together during its period of rapid and turbulent transformation into a post-Communist society" (Zhao, p. 132). However, the leaders of China want peace and development, and they realize that if Chinese nationalism is perceived as being out of control, the ideals of political stability and economic development would be threatened, as other countries would tend to distance themselves from what they saw as an unstable situation. Nationalism is a relatively new phenomenon in Chinese culture, particularly given the ancient times in which the Chinese Empire began. The Opium War with Great Britain (1840-1842), however, was a disaster. China was occupied and incorporated into Western empires, and it was only at this point in time that nationalism began to assert itself as part of the culture. In the 160+ years since the end of the Chinese Empire, the dominant theme in Chinese politics has been the removal of the embarrassment that the Chinese had to endure from the imperialists who overtook the country. Even though China has long been out from under the control of the West, this anti-imperialist doctrine has remained a part of political rhetoric. (Zhao, p. 133). Nationalism in China has taken basically two forms since its inception after the Opium Wars. Ethnic nationalism was prevalent early, but after the Chinese Communist Party defined the country as a multiethnic political community in 1949, after the Kuomintang Dynasty fell, the only Chinese who express this sort of nationalism are the ethnic minorities, such as the Tibetans, Mongols, and Uygurs, who would like to create their own states but are not permitted to (Hunt, p. 63). The second form of nationalism has been liberal nationalism. Rather than promoting ethnic identity, this type of nationalism seeks to improve China as a country, but through social and political reforms. It defines a nation as a "group of citizens who have a duty to support and defend the rights of their state in the world of nation-states, but also to pursue individual freedoms" (Zhao, p. 133). This group finds itself at odds, quite often, with the Chinese Communist Party, because liberal nationalism emphasizes public participation in the political process, an idea that the Communist Party has definitely not embraced during its time in power, and so both forms of nationalism are emerging from the grass-roots as movements of dissidence against the Chinese government (Yasheng, Huang, 1995). Because these feelings of nationalism have proven impossible to quash, the result has been the aforementioned "pragmatic nationalism." The Communist party has coopted the responsibility for speaking on behalf of the nation, and has demanded that citizens place their individual interests below the national interests of China, as far as priority goes. Given the idealistic aims of the original Communist movement, pragmatic nationalism has taken on some interesting forms in modern China. Once Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms that introduced market policies to the country in the 1980's, the Communist doctrines were basically shown to be invalid. And so, such patently capitalist slogans as "get rich is glorious" were prominently featured in Party propaganda. For a time, this proved wildly successful, as market economics provided many Chinese with a wealth that they would never have approached under the traditional Communist system. However, once some of the perils of a market economy began to manifest themselves, such as inflation, unemployment, and graft, and the government was not able to cover the losses of many Chinese, support for the Communist Party began to wane in earnest. The public began to demand democracy, a trend that climaxed in the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, and the subsequent violence by the government forces. Ironically, the demonstrations turned into a positive for the Chinese government. After the government's violence, Western nations began pressing for sanctions against the government in the world community. The Chinese leadership actually used the Western sanctions as a motivation for building pride within China, presenting the Western powers as imperialist nations, rather than as concerned parties trying to assist the dissidents (Zhao, p. 134). As the market has improved, dissidence has declined; other factors have included the upcoming Summer Olympic Games in Beijing in 2008 and the successful suppression of the independence movement in Taiwan (Bijian, p. 4). Deng's aphorism about cats, that he developed during the early 1980's, was particularly fitting in the post-Tiananmen Square machinations by the Chinese government: "A cat, whether it is white or black, is a good one as long as it is able to catch mice" (Zhao, p. 134). In other words, the particular forms of economic structure are not as important as that structure's ability to generate profitable results for its stakeholders. And so in the past twenty years or so, China has moved away from its cultural isolation, embracing the most advanced technology and science available in the world, initiating cultural and commercial exchanges throughout the world, even in the democratic West. At the same time, they have also denounced any ideas that would shake the grip that the Chinese Communist Party has on power (Zhao, p. 135). The official name for this "pragmatic nationalism" is aiguo, or "loving the state." The Communist Party has defined itself as the incarnation of the will of the people of China, and thus has defined support for the nation's well-being as support for the party. This came about through an exhaustive propaganda campaign that began in the 1990's. The primary aim of this campaign was to teach the Chinese people about patriotism. The central part of this campaign was "education in national conditions" (Guoqing jiaoyu), or a crash course in the reasons why China's unique situation would make liberal democracy an unwieldy form of government for the country. Keeping a one-party system, according to this course, would promote stability for the government, which would be a precursor to swifter, more stable economic growth. Interestingly, this program turned China's backwardness in economic matters from a criticism by dissidents into a reason why dissidents should be silent, and instead contribute to the government's efforts, so that the country would no longer be backward. The concept of aiguo, then, was an expression of "loyalty to and a desire to serve the state, either as it was or as it would be in its renovated form" (Lawrence, p. 16). The worldwide implications for this system can indeed be problematic. Because of the events between the Opium War and the end of World War II, the Chinese people have developed a sense of victimization at the hands of the outside world, as well as a dream of a return to the glory of their imperialist strength. As former officials in the Chinese government have stated, any perceived threat from outside China serves to strengthen the sense of solidarity within the country, and to legitimize the use of nationalist propaganda by the Communist Party (Ji, p. 92). Interestingly, even though many Chinese do not support their government, they bristle at negative comments by foreigners about that same government. The fact that the United States has pressured the Chinese government about so many issues, such as trade deficits, weapons programs, the Taiwan question, intellectual property rights, and human rights has been interpreted by many Chinese as an effort by the Americans to keep China from becoming a great power (Hui, p. 385). Over time, nationalism has had three major forms of influence on Chinese foreign policy: nativism, antitraditionalism, and liberal nationalism. Nativist nationalism sees foreign powers as a source of subversion for virtues that have been part of China since the beginning of history. These virtues include such ideas as self-reliance, Confucian ethics, and Chinese cultural traditions (Yongian, Zheng, ch. 5). When nativism enters foreign policy, it does so with calls for a belligerent attitude towards foreigners and xenophobia. When something resembling a foreign insult happens, the nativists are generally out front with a visceral, violent response. Perhaps the most extreme examples during the past 200 years occurred during the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, when many foreigners were murdered in a frenzy of rage against foreign influence. Additionally, many stores that carried foreign merchandise and books were destroyed, and the British legation in Beijing was burned. Another strong example was the virtually total isolation of China from the rest of the world during the Cultural Revolution under Mao in the 1960's. While this trend became dormant during the 1980's, it has revived with claims of Western cultural colonialism in the 1990's and beyond, as Western culture has taken hold in much of the Chinese cities (Zhao, p. 136). Antitraditionalism is basically the opposite of nativism. Instead of urging a return to traditional values, antitraditionalism argues that those values have led to the current backwardness in Chinese culture, and urges a rejection of Confucian ethics for Western culture and economic and political development. In the 1950's, this led to the acceptance of the Soviet model for Chinese Communism. In the 1980's, this took a more controversial turn when dissidents urged the assimilation of Western norms and capitalist economics (Zhao, p. 137). Both of these trends have been part of the liberal nationalist approach to foreign policy in China. However, the nativist approach has been more accepted by the mainstream in recent years. The fact that Chinese relations with the United States deteriorated during the 1990's, and that the Western media was seen by the Chinese as having a particular bias towards containing Chinese expansion, prompted a defensive reaction championing Chinese cultural norms. There is a middle way between nativism and antitraditionalism, however. Qin Hui has written that "it is not right to be slaves of foreign powers, nor is it right to be slaves of their own states" (Hui, p. 388). And so it would be possible for the Chinese to defend their national rights in matters of foreign policy, but to assert their personal rights to participate in the political process in matters of domestic policy. However, the current bent of the Chinese Communist Party is to make those two separate areas of policy one and the same, when it comes to matters of political loyalty (Zhao, p. 137). In the final analysis, the Chinese government has worked itself into a logically untenable situation. The only political party represents an economic and social ideology that has become such a failure in the country that its leaders have almost completely abandoned its tenets in favor of economic and social policy that, in some respects, are those used by the countries that the government officially suspects of trying to impose their will on it. And so China finds itself in the ironic position of railing against the "imperialist" tendencies of countries that it would love to emulate. In a true liberal democracy, the nationalist cries of such groups as the Mongols might well be heard, and those groups might be granted a certain amount of autonomy, if not outright independence. In a true liberal democracy, members of the political opposition would have access to political participation. These two trends would be corrosive to the power of the Communist Party, which is perhaps the most compelling reason that they have been quashed thus far. China is not the only country whose government substitutes an official form of nationalism for its authentic manifestations. Even the most liberal of democracies has to move forward with official decisions, periodically. An example of this would be the American government's objections to war protests, claiming that protesters against the war are not truly supporting the country's soldiers, who are placing themselves in harm's way for the good of the nation. And so the American government's definition of nationalism, in this instance, would be unquestioning support of the war in Iraq. However, just as many Chinese see support for a move to democracy as part of being a true Chinese patriot, there are American protesters who argue that bringing the soldiers home from Iraq would be the best way to support them, even more patriotic than continuing to fight in the streets of Baghdad. The contradictions between the official and actual ideologies of the Chinese government, however, make their case truly unique in representations of nationalism. Works Cited Bernstein, Richard, and Munro, Ross H. "The Coming Conflict with America, " Foreign Affairs 76/2: 19. Bijian, Zheng. "China's Peaceful Rise and New Role of Asia," China Forum, Autumn 2005, 1-16. Chang, Maria Hsia. Return of the Dragon: China's Wounded Nationalism. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001. Gries, Peter. China's New Nationalism. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. Hui, Qin, "Where is the convergent point between liberalism and nationalism" in The positions of intellectuals: Nationalism and China's future in the transitional period, ed. Li Shitao. Changchun: Shidai Wenyi Chuban She, 2000, 377-402. Zhao, Shusheng "Chinese Intellectuals" quest for national greatness and national writing in the 1990s. " China Quarterly, 152 (9. December, 1997) 725-747 Yasheng, Huang "Why China will not collapse" Foreign Policy, 99 (summer, 1995): 54-68 Hunt, Michael. "Chinese National Identity and the Strong State: the late Qing-Republican Crisis," in China's Quest for National Identity, eds. Lowell Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994, pp. 52-66. Ji, Liu. "Making the Right Choices in Twenty-First-Century Sino-American Relations," Journal of Contemporary China 7: 85-102. Lawrence, Susan V. "China-The Say No Club." Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 January 2000, 14-22. Lilley, James. China Hands. New York: Public Affairs, 2004. Yongian, Zheng "Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations." Chapter 5 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, chapters 2 and 3. Popular proto-nationalism and state-led nationalism. Pomfret, John. "New Nationalism Drives Beijing: Hard Line Reflects Popular Mood," Washington Post 4 April 2001, p. A1. Zhao, Suisheng. "China's Pragmatic Nationalism: Is it Manageable" The Washington Quarterly 29/1: 131-144. Read More