The US-China Relationship in the Chinese Civil War - Literature review Example

The US-China Relationship During the Chinese Civil War The Chinese Civil War of 1949, viewed by most scholars as a tale of a failed state involved military factions and various domestic political groups struggling for power. Moreover, some theorists viewed it as a full- scale rivalry between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT). This rivalry is claimed to have begun immediately after the end of World War II in 1945. Some contemporary scholars also believe that foreigners such as the United States (Chang 62) and the Soviet Union (Cairns 1) must have influenced the Chinese Civil War. Cairns (1) notes, “In late 1945 there was a brief period where foreign intermediaries, particularly the Americans, tried to broker peace talks between the communists and Nationalists.” On the other hand, a number of thinkers have tried to relate the Chinese Civil War with the internal problems, which had existed in China for a long time. This was one of the complicated wars because it coincided with the great depression, early stages of Cold War and World War II. This paper will elaborate on the relationship between China and the U.S during the Chinese Civil War. Although the US and China may have worked together at some point in history, the two have always remained suspicious of each other. The Chinese Civil War of 1949 can be traced back in the early 1920s. This period would then relate it to the bad blood that had existed between the Chinese Nationalists and the Communists prompting an on and off war between the two antagonistic groups. According to some theorists, Chiang Kai- Shek, Nationalist leader in1928 during the fall of the first Unlined Front, warned the first part of the Chinese Civil War. With the view to forming a new national government, Chiang broke ranks with the Communists. “To mediate the dispute between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong and work out a coalition government, the Truman administration sent George Marshall to China” (Hsiang-Ke and Lin 201). According to most researches, the Chinese Communist Party founded in 1921 in Shanghai existed as a study group and collaborated with the Nationalist Party. In 1926-1927, both the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists army joined hand to fight warlords who were opposed to the formation of a strong central government within China. This union between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists existed until the emergence of the “white terror” of 1927 when the Nationalists rose against the Communists, killing them. In the end, the Nationalists managed to chase the Communists from their union where the Nationalists remained and dominated almost everything (Chennault 468). In 1937, both Chinese Communist and the Nationalists entered a second union. This second union had been influenced by a group of generals who saw the need to fight the Japanese who had invaded Manchuria in 1931 as important. These generals abducted Chiang, the Nationalists leader and made him reconsider his stand with the Communists army. However, this second union was short lived as the Nationalists spent much of their resources and effort, dealing on how to tame the Communists rather than Japan, their perceived enemy. This marked the genesis of the nationalist’s failure to win the remaining part of the Sino-Japanese war. On the other hand, Mao had a revolutionary theory of war that raised his party from the lowest to the highest level of unlimited political ambitions. Through this theory, Mao managed to win the Sino-Japanese war and the second phase of the liberation war of 1945-1949. According to Global Security (1), “The first round of the Chinese civil war was won not by Mao Tse-tung.” Some of Mao’s strategic thoughts that helped him win the second part of the war included the following. Such were the political influence over the peasants, proper organization of the transitional military and lastly, achievement of victory via armed forces and political mobilization (Hsiang-Ke and Lin 211). Therefore, these revolutionary theories helped the Chinese Communist Party to strengthen its influence in the locality, giving it an edge over the Nationalist Party. This kind of organization also marked the start of all victories that the Communists would later realize throughout their liberation struggle (Global Security 1). Starting from the Sino-Japanese war of 1937, Russia, Just like the U.S was viewed to be very concerned with the communist affairs. Russia, therefore, played the role that handed victory to the Communists during the Sino- Japanese struggle. Russia, the cunning giant, had agreed to enter the war at the last minute, but this last minute rush had some hidden motives and intellectual weapons for psychological play. In this agreement, Russia had two motives, One was to help communists gain the industrial parts that had been occupied by the Japanese. Two was to gain benefits in northern China, Manchuria and Mongolia. In other words, the Soviet handed over all the reach wealth from the richest industrial zones to the sophisticated armed weapons from the departing Japanese to the Communist Red Army (Goldstein 104). On the other hand, the U.S also played part in giving moral support and military troops from America to help Jiang in the fierce battle of eliminating the communists. U.S would help airlift the Chinese Nationalist military to the strategic positions where Japanese were leaving. U.S even went to the extent of convincing Stalin to delay the evacuation of the Japanese until the arrival of the national army. It was also the U.S advice that the Japanese should engage the Communists in a fierce battle to keep them busy as the Nationalist army takes over most of the rich cities from the north. In fact, from the look of things, the U.S was on the side of the Nationalist Party led by Jiang rather than the Communist Party (US Department of States 1). According to some statistics, the Chinese Communists influence had immensely increased at the time of the World War II. Lack of democracy, together with the alleged corruptions in the Nationalist government gave the Communists advantage as they tried to address these disturbing issues. However, the Chinese Communist Party through its continued efforts to bring land reforms and to fight against Japanese inversion got full supports from the peasants who believed in them as their true redeemers. Meanwhile, the US did not stop giving full support to the Nationalist government despite the lack of democracy. The U.S support given to China was mainly seen as based on the need to curb the communist control of China, as well as a gift to her former war ally. After WWII, John (1) observes, “The tide of war shifted toward the Communists, and American public opinion became increasingly concerned.” Therefore, the war between the Chinese Communists was beyond the normal war as it involved two powerful nations rather than just two political groups in China. Behind this war, there was the Soviet giving both military and the economic support to the Chinese Communist Party. In fact, the Soviet Union would occupy Manchuria and only leave it when the Chinese Communist Forces were ready to take that territory. Meanwhile, the U.S forces could fly tens of thousands of the Nationalists Chinese troops to the Japanese occupied territories (Marrs 142). Furthermore, the U.S could give training to the Nationalist army on how to win the war. Through proper military assistance by the U.S, the Japanese would be made to surrender to the Nationalist army. Moreover, this war had a complex relationship between the reality and the theory. In this war, Mao took advantage of the Japanese inversion and occupation of China, and his Communist Party exploited all possible opportunities from 1937 up to 1945. It was during this Sino-Japanese war that the Communist Party took advantage and informed the public of their rights. The year 1945 is regarded as the historic year in the Chinese civil war. This was the year the Japanese surrendered leaving most of their property to the Communists and the Nationalists. The departure of Japan was to the advantage of the communists who had established their bases close to North China and particularly Manchuria. The communist then reached most of the Japanese bases and disarmed almost 1,383,200 against the Nationalists total of 30,000. The communists then settled in the industrial area of Manchuria leaving the Nationalists with bare towns. Without buying time, the U.S military aid was given to the Nationalists to help them capture the Japanese occupied areas as a matter of maintaining the national outlook. During this time, Washington is claimed to have given the Nationalist China a total of $ 812 million in aid under the Lend-Lease beginning from the V-J Day until the expiry date of June 1946. The year 1945 was also the year when U.S General George Marshal tried to reconcile the Communists and the Nationalist to form a coalition government. In this negotiation, Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-Shek met for a talk on the formation of a unified government. These two leaders agreed on the need for a unitary military, democracy and equality for all the Chinese Political Parties. However, an effort by U.S, through General George Marshal to seal the deal was never realized due to many years of mistrust between the two political divides. With the full exit of Japan in 1946, the Communist-Nationalist war entered its peak (China Folio 1). The total failure of the agreement between the communists and the nationalists is believed to have led to the Civil War that the communists would regard as the war of liberation. As the Civil War began, from 1946 to 1947, it seemed to be favorable to the Chinese National Government army who had outnumbered the Red Army. The national government also received financial and military support from the U.S, and this worked to its advantage. The nationalist army had mobilized its trained army to the fullest and managed to capture most cities from the Communists, for instance, Ya`nan, the communist capital. On the other hand, the communists moved further to the interior and buying time as though they were being defeated. The communists were rather not being defeated, but they were simply trying to play the guerilla tactics that they had perfected during their war with the Japanese. Through this style, the communists would move further and further whenever the government army tried to attack them. However, when their right time reached, the communists launched surprise attacks on the government forces, causing them a heavy damage. Specifically, the Communists concentrated on attacking supply troops and the enemy communication lines. In most instances, the communists never suffered, but it was the national army that would be attacked from behind by the communist guerrillas, destroying them in large numbers (Showalter 165). On the other hand, the fall of peace talks between the two antagonists led to the development of an ambiguous policy that would change depending on the situation. Heon observes “Truman believed that the Chinese Communists should not be admitted to the United Nations simply because they could not be trusted.” Even at this crucial point, the U.S never relented on her friendship with the Chinese National Government but rather maintained it. The only change realized was that the U.S had decided to reduce the military and economic aid given to the Chinese National Government. This U.S continued relationship with the Chinese National Government was so strong that it led to the various accusations against the U.S government. In most instances, the communist sympathizers would accuse the national government for having started the civil war with the backings from the U.S government. Moreover, the U.S government through the influence of her intelligence forces had to accept some of the realities on the ground. For instance, a telegram from U.S Department of commerce indicated that Chinese never liked communism, but would rather choose it beside the national government. This reality made U.S contemplate some of her dealings with the Chinese government by looking into better ways of saving the whole situation. Through these findings, the American government had to help advise the Chinese national government on the need to carry out some major reforms that touches lives of most citizens either directly or indirectly. These reforms were believed to be crucial in running of the national affairs and they included education, economic, political and social reforms. Accordingly, the American advisors suggested the need to carry drastic and abrupt reforms that would give charismatic leadership to help win up supports from the locals who had lost faith in the National government. Other American leaders such as General Marshall and President Truman had a view that the realization of peace in China would depend on the local residence rather than the foreigners. In other words, U.S saw no need of giving any military or economic support to the government, factors that other U.S leaders objected to the Congress (Watson 128). Meanwhile, as the U.S government contemplated on how to give aid to the Chinese government, they reached some conclusion that almost left them divided. In the congress, opinions were divided between the Liberals and the Conservatives. The Republicans supported the funding of the anti-communist government. They viewed CCP as pro-Soviet movement that threatens other free nations with international communism. They believed that direct aid should be given to China to help in dealing with the threat that the communists had posed to the National government. On the other hand, the Truman administration together with other liberals on the Congress never wanted to take part in the Chinese affairs any more, but wanted them left to solve their own problems. These liberals took the Chinese communists as agrarian reformers rather than Soviet trained communists. Though this was not the correct view, but they managed to convince their opponents basing their argument on Communists continued dealings with the peasants in the rural areas. In addition, Mao was seen as an independent thinker with policies that could at time clash with the Soviet policies. In the end, the Congress debated and came with the China Aid Act of 1948. Through the China Act of 1848, China would get economic support of about570 million dollars from the U.S government mainly for reconstruction period. Besides, the U.S would give the Chinese government clear guides for social reconstruction and economic measures. This act was to some extent interpreted as an indirect method used by the U.S to meddle in the Chinese Civil War. The China Act had been interpreted as an assumption of helping the already worsened situation in China. For instance, on 3 July 1948, the Congress appropriated a total of $ 400 million for 12 months period together with a special grant of $ 125 million to help the declining Nationalists operations. Without any specification, the Congress leaders had an opinion that the special grant given to China would be involved in military operations. In fact, the legislative branch in Washington had a priority to the military situation in China other than anything else. This priority was realized when the new China president, Li Zongren invested the money in buying military materials. From the look of things, the United States was highly involved in the Chinese Civil war either directly or indirectly. This involvement had been viewed negatively to some extent while other thinkers gave it a positive perception. However, most positive thinkers would give it credit for having tried to solve some of the problems that had existed in China. For instance, one may realize that it was through the U.S involvement that negotiations that were conducted that almost led to some kind of changes. Having ruined the lives of many, U.S felt it necessary to agitate for an inclusive government that could care for all irrespective of their political stand. Secondly, it should be realized is that the U.S never gave up in her negotiation for peace even in areas that difficulties were highly experienced. On the contrary, the negative viewers have tried to relate the U.S with the problems that China had experienced. From the scholarly angle, the Chinese problems were internal and they would continue to experience them even without the U.S intervention. For instance, lack of democracy and the need to redeem the peasants were matters of urgency and could not be realized bay almost all Chinese citizens. Therefore, it was very difficult to ignore these problems, and these, therefore, made the U.S come up and help the Chinese realize them. This must be one of the reasons that made the U.S agitate for the necessary reforms such as education and human rights among others. However, many observers would assert that, the China and U.S relationship remained quite intact throughout the Civil war until the time that the Communist government took over under Mao’s leadership. Moreover, with the National leadership under Jiang in Taiwan, the U.S government still reorganized Jiang and gave him the necessary support unlike the Communist leadership under Mao. In summary, it is observable that the Chinese and U.S leadership was intact throughout the Civil war period. Moreover, the U.S government was for the support of the Chinese Nationalist government that acted against the communists. It is quite believable that through U.S intervention, the Chinese citizens were able to realize the necessary changes that they would otherwise not realize. However, it is worth noting that the U.S later changed her position and diverted all her attention to other countries like Japan when the Chinese leadership felt to the communists. Although the US and China may have worked together at some point in history, the two have always remained suspicious of each other. Although the US and China may have worked together at some point in history, the two have always remained suspicious of each other. Works Cited Cairns, Rebecca. The Chinese Civil War: Tsar to Lenin. The Alpha History 2014. Accessed April 23, 2015 from http://alphahistory.com/chineserevolution/chinese-civil-war/ Chang, Johannes Han-Yin. 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