The Chinese Regime and Nationalism - Dissertation Example

 The Chinese Regime and Nationalism Introduction Nationalistic Chinese authors ascribed the emergence of Chinese nationalism to the response of native intellectuals to the international pressures, imposed on China, in the aftermath of the Cold War. Consequently, Chinese nationalism was the outcome of the foreign suppression of the Chinese, in the new era. Subsequent to the end of Cold War, there was a marked decline in Communism. Several of the erstwhile Communist nations, were witness to the emergence of nationalism, in their country (Zhao 1998: 287). This sentiment nurses considerable resentment towards the policies of Japan and the US. In the 1990s, the modern Chinese intellectuals preached about the importance of nationalism, so as to demonstrate China’s greatness. In the erstwhile Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, nationalism assumed a bottom up approach that comprised of separatist and ethnic movements. Some of the political commentators have adopted a bottom up approach, while contending that Chinese nationalism was the natural outcome of public aspirations, and that the government had no part to play in this process. There was a vociferous reaction from the Chinese public, in respect of the patronising attitude adopted by the Western nations towards them. Specifically, the Chinese launched a vituperative diatribe against their belittlement by the US (Zhao 1998: 287). In the post – Cold War period, Communist ideology was viewed as being obsolete and counterproductive. This made it difficult for the Communist rulers to continue with their authoritarian rule over society. In order to divert attention, the Communist rulers made repeated announcements to the public that the inimical international forces would make all possible efforts to damage the national pride of the Chinese (Zhao 1998: 288). Furthermore, it successfully claimed legitimacy for the unbridled repression that it had unleashed during the Tiananmen Incident. The success of this campaign enabled the government to regain legitimacy for its authoritative rule, which the Chinese believed to be in their best interests. The Communist Party of China exploited the patriotic sentiment of its masses to maintain its repressive rule in China. During the mid – 1990s, the Communist regime depended on patriotism to perpetuate its government in the nation. Its campaign of patriotic education proved to be extremely successful in indoctrinating nationalistic sentiment among the public (Zhao 1998: 287). All the same, the Communist regime developed and implemented nationalism in the 1990s. Subsequent to the end of the Cold War, China did not have to envisage any major threat to its national security, from foreign forces. However, China had to deal with serious problems related to internal legitimacy, occasioned by the swift decline of the Communist creed in the nation. In order to circumvent this grave threat, the Chinese authorities substituted performance legitimacy derived from a burgeoning economy, and nationalism that had been provided by the unique traits of Chinese culture, for the age old Marxist – Leninist ideology and Maoism (Zhao 1998: 287). The response of the Western nations to the development in China resulted in powerful nationalistic responses from the latter. The external stimuli have been the reason behind the new Sino nationalism. In other words, the ever changing global environment resulted in the recrudescence of the Chinese nationalism. This upsurge in popular nationalism has not deprived the Chinese leadership of its logical manner of functioning. It is the objective of the Chinese to continue with rapid modernisation; without any break, due to foreign issues (Zheng 1999: 159). The nationalist politics extant in China depend on the relationship between the Communist Party and the populace. The amalgamation of the strategies adopted by the people and the Communist Party, and the transformation of these strategies, is crucial for the legitimacy of the Chinese government (Gries 2004: 121). The late 1990s were witness to a triad of nationalistic movements. These were the 1996 Diaoyu Islands uprisings; the 1996 China Can Say No incident; and the 1999 protests relating to the Belgrade bombings. The Chinese authorities, employed suppression and co optation, in varying measures to deal with these movements (Gries 2004: 121). The Diaoyu protestors were brutally suppressed; whereas in respect of the China Can Say No movement, the authorities resorted to co optation. However, in the context of the Belgrade bombing agitators, the Chinese government was compelled to accommodate them. This proved to be a marked transition, because it had been the preferred practice with the Chinese to brutally suppress dissent. This novel trend indicates that nationalism has escalated the challenges that it poses to the Party state. A gradual loss of domination over Chinese nationalism is being experienced by the Party (Gries 2004: 121). China stands to lose an important facet of its erstwhile functions; principally the function of forming a national economy that is limited by territory. Such an economy had been an essential component of the larger global economy. Far reaching changes in international division of labour resulted in a deterioration in the functioning of national economies. This has transpired, since the 1960s. This decline in functioning has been accompanied by a development of interlinked transactions of an economic nature and global centres. The government has been unable to exercise control on these entities. There had been a growth in the number of international intergovernmental organisations, from 123 as of 1951 to 2173 by the year 1972 (Hobsbawm 1992: 181). Qing Dynasty A number of theories were put forth in the late nineteenth century, in order to describe the manner, in which Chinese orthodoxy could be preserved, whilst procuring knowledge from outside the nation. Some of these dichotomies were to promote sincerity as the function and self sufficiency as the essence of that endeavour; and that defence was to be treated as the essence of war, which was to be the function (Hughes 2006: 5). A telling example of such methods is provided by the example of Zhang Zhidong, who was a governor general in the Qing dynasty. It was his belief that state power could be obtained, by developing the infrastructure. To that end, he recommended the construction of heavy industry, railroads and the implementation of a foreign policy that would enable the opponents of the state to be controlled by others of their ilk (Hughes 2006: 5). This renowned official authored a work ‘Exhortation to Study’ in the year 1898; which advocates the garnering of functional knowledge of the developed countries, in order to preserve Chinese essence. This was typical of the Qing dynasty’s officials; who spared no effort to strengthen their nation. From these examples it becomes obvious that the Qing dynasty promoted an outlook towards economic, military and political issues that were based on a world order. This indicates a globalistic mentality (Hughes 2006: 5). The organisation and eye for administrative detail of the Qing was exemplary. It exercised adequate control over Inner Asia, and it achieved this daunting task, by segregating the Mongols into separate leagues, and providing them with specific grazing lands. This was akin to the practices of the Ming. The outcome of this initiative was to separate and immobilise the Mongols, to such an extent that they could never hope to unify under a common banner (Goldman & Fairbank 1998: 149). Furthermore, the Qing accorded support to a particular sect of the Tibetan Buddhists, as it had become popular with the Mongols and made them turn towards Lhasa. These Inner Asian activities were taken care of by the Ministry of Dependencies; whilst the Board of Rites was responsible for dealing with tribute missions from adjacent regions, such as Vietnam and Korea (Goldman & Fairbank 1998: 149). Subsequent to the dissolution of the Qing dynasty; claims to legitimacy, by the communist and nationalist elites, was based upon the capacity to employ the functional knowledge of the Westernised countries to protect Chinese essence. Thus, Yuan Shikai, the president of China, attempted to ascend the throne as the emperor, in the incipient stages of the Chinese Republic. In this effort, he attempted to reinstate Confucianism as the state ideology (Hughes 2006: 5). In 1978, Deng Xiaoping commenced economic reform in China. This initiative was discontinued in the year 1989 and restarted in 1992. This was the situation, prior to the Tiananmen incident. Subsequent to the protest, the Communist government launched an aggressive campaign of patriotic education, in 1994. This education movement promoted resentment against Japan and the US. Nationalism in China was from two opposite directions; namely, the top – down direction engendered by the government and the bottom – up initiative of the people. State – led nationalism, requires the people to accord greater priority to the interests of the state, in comparison to their individual interests (Zhao 2008: 51). These liberal nationalists continued to oppose the authoritarianism of the Communist regime. At the same time, they participated in agitations against American imperialism. For instance they participated in a demonstration before the American Embassy in 1999. Moreover, they took active part in the nationwide anti – Japanese protests, in 2005. They also participated in the 2008 Olympic Torch Relay, along with other Chinese nationalists (Zhao 2008: 52). The citizen – led nationalism, which is also termed as popular nationalism, is based on the efforts of the citizens. In general, it consists of liberal ideology and is led by liberal nationalists. Under this ideology, the nation is to be understood as being comprised of its citizens. In accordance with this system, citizens are under a duty to support their nation, in order to protect national rights, in the comity of nations (Easley 2007: 4). In addition, the citizens are required to ensure the individual’s right to participate in the government. Although, the liberal activists were in agreement with the government, regarding opposition to foreign imperialism; they had strived to obtain greater participation in the political process of China (Zhao 2008: 51). The official Chinese attitude towards the anti – Japan nationalism, in the nation is to adopt a dual policy. This policy comprises of an unyielding stance against Japan; while suppressing domestic agitations against Japan that have the potential to harm national interests. In April 2005, there were several demonstrations in China, against Japan. In an interview, the Chinese Premier Wen stated that his government was committed to its policies against Japan. Moreover, he urged Japan to display greater responsibility in international affairs, if it was desirous of securing the support of the international community (He 2007: 21). The Chinese Premier’s statement was a thinly disguised threat to Japan that it would have to accede to these demands, if it was to procure support for its initiative to secure a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. The anti – Japan demonstrations were glossed over by the official Chinese media. As soon, as the demonstrations assumed an alarming aspect, the government defused the situation, by holding out the threat of arrest and other such oppressive measures (He 2007: 22). As such, the authorities had feared negative reactions in Japanese business circles, if these demonstrations were to persist. Moreover, the visit of the Nationalist Party chair Lien Chan to Taiwan was scheduled at that time. Ultimately, these factors forced the government to initiate stringent actions against the protestors (He 2007: 22). Albeit, the government was successful in its efforts to suppress the mass demonstrations; it was unable to completely eradicate anti – Japanese sentiments, amongst the people. In the future protests are likely to be of greater severity, which the government could find very difficult to control. Beijing is veritably on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand it has to berate Japan, in order to appease domestic discontent; whereas on the other hand such verbal attacks against the Japanese would serve to inflame passions at home, rather than defuse the situation (He 2007: 22). The Liberal nationalists have claimed that there is a growing anti – Japanese sentiment in China. If China wants to emerge as a prominent and respected nation, then it will have to relinquish its anti – Japan policy. It will also have to do so, if it wishes to achieve economic benefit. It is essential for China and Japan to resolve their historic conflict, and cooperate to a much greater extent, if they desire to emerge as major economic powers in the region (He 2007: 22). The Chinese government has realised to its chagrin that popular nationalism was a double – edged sword. The mounting nationalistic sentiment promotes social mobilization, and fortifies loyalty to the state. However, the anti – international nationalism undermines China’s painstakingly cultivated image of a stable, peaceful and responsible entity. Over the years, China had made outstanding efforts to lure the Western countries to invest in China and supply technology to it (He 2007: 22). Nevertheless, China had to face a difficult situation, because its domestic political interests and foreign policy initiatives were essentially at logger heads. At that juncture, the Chinese policy makers attempted to find alternate and constructive solutions to these challenges. This is the background of the Sino-Japanese policy conflict, which resulted in the New Thinking on Japanese policy in China (Tang, 2004). Post – Tiananmen Protest Subsequent to the Tiananmen episode, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who came to power after him; embarked upon numerous education campaigns that had a patriotic flavour. The objective behind this move was to garb themselves, with the mantle of nationalism. It was their perception that nation­alism constituted the best strategy to procure the loyalty of their populace. Nationalism, per se, was the sole fundamental value that was shared by the Government and its critics, at home (Zhao, The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism 2008: 50). In the face of Western sanctions, the Chinese leaders assumed the stance of the protectors of the self respect and national interests of their people. This attitude was strengthened, in their bid to challenge the arms embargo, imposed on China, in the aftermath of the Tiananmen action; preventing Taiwan from gaining independence; and succeeding in becoming the hosts of the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing (Zhao, The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism 2008: 50). Since nationalism was led by the state, it identifies China as a communist state. The concept of aiguo constitutes the official name of Nationalist sentiment. Adoption of aiguo indicates a penchant to serve the nation, in any situation. According to this point of view, Chinese nationalism was state centric. China as a communist state is a manifestation of the will of the people. Consequently, the state attempts to obtain the fealty and support of its masses, in the nation (Zhao, The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism 2008: 50). The 1990s’ Chinese campaign, relating to patriotic learning, invoked nationalistic sentiments. This campaign was conducted under the pretext of patriotism, in order to ensure the loyalty of the people, who were disenchanted with the system, due to extreme dissatisfaction with a number of issues. The main component of this patriotic campaign was the guoqing jiaoyu, which emphasised education under the national conditions (Zhao, The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism 2008: 50). The Chinese Communist Party relayed to the people of China that their national conditions were different from that of other countries. Furthermore, it stressed the need to perpetuate the extant one party rule, which was indispensable for the economic, social and political situation obtaining in China (Zhao, The Olympics and Chinese Nationalism 2008: 50). The renowned teachings of Confucius were discarded by Mao and his cronies, along with other philosophical and refined subjects. This despicable situation continued for 50 years, and then suddenly, in the 1980s there was a revival of interest in the teachings of this great philosopher. This was truly momentous occasion, as the Communist regime had ruthlessly opposed Confucianism as being an impediment to modernity. It had also been the pernicious practice to accuse this philosophy of engendering feudalism, elitism, hierarchy and patriarchy (Hon 2009: 530). This surprising revival of Confucianism constituted the termination of the iconoclasm and revolutionary outlook that had assumed manic proportions in the thinking of the Chinese authorities. It is a highly commendable fact that the Chinese resorted to their own cultural moorings, instead of vapidly imitating the West; in their efforts to modernise their nations (Hon 2009: 530). Nationalism Movement The Chinese nationalism movement reflected national spirit and commitment of the public towards their nation’s pride. Moreover, the nationalism movements occurred during social transition towards modernity. The May Fourth movement had transformed China into a Communist power; whereas the 1990s nationalism propelled China towards socioeconomic supremacy and national development. This movement was also a witness to the departure of China from Communism, and its subsequent movement towards capitalism and foreign investment (Wu 2008: 468). Chinese nationalism transited from a revolutionary and cosmopolitan culture to a conservative approach that was against the foreign powers. Its primary objective was economic progress, and thereafter political and cultural survival. Subsequently this objective was changed to the development of cultural nationalism, political and economic reforms, and the promotion of a liberal economy (Wu 2008: 468). In 1989, the Chinese government decided to enact nationalism. In order to realise this objective, the government introduced patriotic education from the school level and embarked upon ambitious plans to indoctrinate nationalism among the public. The patriotic education campaign was an extremely well designed manoeuvre to convince the disgruntled public, about the necessity for Chinese nationalism (Zhao 1998: 287). They underlying reasoning for this campaign was to perpetuate the power of the authoritarian Communist regime, by ensuring the loyalty of the people towards the government. With the ushering in of the 1990s, China has been witness to the abandoning of modernism and humanism. In addition, philosophical discourses on modernism have become extinct; and the intellectual elite, in the field of human sciences are conspicuous by their absence. This disturbing trend has been accompanied by an increase in social activity, strengthening consumer culture and a rejuvenation of the nationalist sentiment (Zhang 2001: 316). The highly variegated, multi centred and export oriented economy of China, has been accompanied by a social sphere that admits of considerable variation. This situation has generated institutions that do not derive from the state. The interaction between this novel terrain and day to day life, in addition to its interaction with the state, has served to provide a vastly changed description of the intellectual field. On account of this newly emergent social space, it is now possible to visualise nationalism in the Chinese context, on the basis of socioeconomic provisions. It also enables one to reflect upon its far reaching political importance, in creating a novel interpretation of democracy, equality, community and individualism (Zhang 2001: 316). The democratic underpinnings of mass culture and popular national sentiment that is subscribed to by the intellectual elite, is being forced to undergo substantial internal changes and differentiations, due to having to envisage the secular world of consumption. This process, in spite of its evasiveness and ambivalence, has the capacity to constitute a forum for discussing mass culture, nationalism, and social change (Zhang 2001: 316). Effect of Globalisation The postmodern paradigm of the 1970s and 1980s was supplanted by globalisation, in 1990. This phenomenon has become near ubiquitous in its presence across the world. The accusation that globalisation constitutes overwhelming homogenisation, by means of Americanisation been levelled at it, in certain quarters (Nyíri & Breidenbach 2005: 293). There are others who view globalisation from the perspective of the form that it assumes; the form that it assumes, on account of privatisation, democratic politics, wars, and information technology. Moreover, there are some entities, which focus on the primary forces behind the process of globalisation. Some instances of these forces are the international finance system and marketing science. An important consideration, with regard to globalisation is whether it necessitates an adjustment with the older political theories or whether it requires dissociation with hegemonic principles (Nyíri & Breidenbach 2005: 294). There has been a drastic change in the attitude of China towards the international system. It is now seized with promoting and perpetuating this system, as it has developed confidence in the international system. There is a vast difference in the Chinese attitude, and it no longer lends support to the undesirable elements on the international arena. All the same, China is not averse to compromising its ostensibly rarefied principles, when it comes to procuring its energy supplies; and during such times, China has been known to deal with rogue states (Shirk 2007: 107). The outcome of becoming a member of the WTO or other similar international organisations requires China to comply with the rules of these organisations. It has been alleged by the military that these rules were formulated by the US, in order to circumscribe China. However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry has attempted to comply with these precepts. Despite, harbouring suspicions regarding the motives of the US, Party leaders in China, have come to accept the fact that compliance with international rules is beneficial for their country (Shirk 2007: 108). During the process of integrating China into the global market, it was apprehended by the intellectuals of China that the nation would have to be defended against pervasive Western influences and prominent consumerism. It had been stated by some scholars that the rejuvenation of Confucianism would provide such protection. Another section of scholars is of the opinion that the loss of fascination, among the people, Vis – a – Vis Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought, has sought to be substituted with nationalism and ethnic identity (Hon 2009: 530). China had been an absolute state, as well as a civil society. None of these structures had been renowned for their competence and efficiency. Thereafter, an ambiguous area came to the fore between these frameworks, which has wrought far reaching changes to the economy, politics and culture of China (Zhang 2001: 315). Conclusion It had been the practice amongst the Chinese to regard their nation as the ‘‘Central Kingdom”, during the traditional period. Thereafter, Chinese self respect was badly compromised, due to the subjugation and concomitant mortification that they were subjected to, in the wake of the depredations by the West and Japan. Consequently, China was seized with regaining its pre eminent status, in the comity of nations (Wang 2008: 804). This objective was the driving force behind the stupendous developments, in China, in the recent past. History and recollection serve to define the aspirations of the Chinese, in addition to providing a perspective that is based on these objectives. A significant number of the Chinese are elated and sanguine, due to the reclamation of Hong Kong and Macao, outer space explorations that entailed manned space flights, and playing host to the prestigious Olympics. As such, domestic discussions were utilised to bring to the fore, the extraordinary achievements of China (Wang 2008: 804). In addition, these discussions referred to the humiliations of the past, and the effect that these victories had on those distressing events. In 1997, the UK handed over Hong Kong to China. This had a grave effect on Chinese sentiment towards the capture of Taiwan. Many were of the opinion that nationalism would prove to be of great importance in the future of China. It was fondly anticipated that nationalism would engender domestic change and establish China as a powerful nation. There were widespread demonstrations in many cities against the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and Yugoslavia, and American dominance (Wu 2008: 468). In China, nationalism has re-emerged as a political ideology in the late 1990s. This time around, it proved to be embroiled in Chinese politics. The government was compelled to integrate nationalism into its patriotic campaign; by employing intellectual discourses that focused on national pride, power, and wealth. Nationalism has been included in the popular culture against foreign influences. References Easley, L. -E. (2007). ‘Correlates of Nationalism and Implications for Security in East Asia’. Issues and Insights 7(10), 3 – 8. Goldman, M., & Fairbank, J. K. (1998). China: a new history. 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