Why Did the Communists Win the Civil War with the Nationalists - Research Paper Example

Why did the Communists win the civil war with the Nationalists? In the context of international politics, the Chinese Civil War of 1946-1949 could beconsidered as a reflection of the social and political instability that appeared in Chinese society in the post-World War II, a phenomenon common in most countries worldwide. The specific War had a key characteristic: its outcome was not expected. Indeed, the victory in the above War of Communists, instead of Nationalists, led to surprise both locally, within China, and internationally. Current paper is based on the following thesis: during a war the underestimation of the power of the opponent can highly affect the outcome of the war. In the case of Chinese Civil War of 1946-1949 the defeat of Nationalists, despite their military superiority, is an example of the particular phenomenon. At a first level, it should be noted that the Civil War of China had not last only for three years, i.e. from 1946 to 1949; this was the final period of the conflict between the country’s Nationalist party and the Communist party (Hutchings 83). The two parties had been already in conflict from 1927 to 1937, i.e. for about 10 years (Hutchings 83). The war between these parties stopped because of ‘the invasion of Japan’ (Hutchings 83); then, the parties had to join their forces for facing the Japanese. After the end of the war with Japanese, World War II further delayed the continuation of the war between Nationalists and Communists in China (Hutchings 83). In order to check the validity of this paper’s thesis it is necessary to refer primarily to the characteristics of Chinese society. By studying the social environment of the particular war it would be easier to identify the exact reasons that led to the, unexpected, victory of Communists. Indeed, being aware of the challenges that people of different social classes in China had to face in the period under examination it would be easier to understand the response of these people to the War, meaning especially the involvement of people of each of these classes in the military conflict against Communists and Nationalists: the landlord class is influenced by the lifestyle of ‘international bourgeoisie’ (Tse-tung par.3). Another part of the population belongs to the middle bourgeoisie; this is the class of the people who have the control of the production, as based on the rules of capitalism (Tse-tung par.4). There are also those who can be characterized as part of the petty bourgeoisie; these are the people who have certain benefits from the capitalist production and who are able to improve their economic position as their earnings are above their expenses (Tse-tung par.5). Among those people there are people who failed in securing their economic status, as their earnings have started to decline and they cannot respond to their obligations (Tse-tung par.6). At the lower level of the society, there are two social classes: the semi-proletariats, mostly the peasants and those working in jobs of quite low earnings, and the proletariats, i.e. the people working in the country’s industries (Tse-tung par.7 & 8). In regard to the Chinese Civil War, the above social classes could be categorized as follows: the bourgeoisie, at all its levels, supported the Nationalists. Also, the Nationalists had the support of most people living in urban areas. On the other hand, Communists was mostly supported by peasants. When having to develop their plan of action in regard to the methods they would employ for facing their opponent, Communists had to face a critical problem: people in urban areas were more than peasants. Also, people in urban areas were more powerful in supporting a movement for the change of the country’s governance (Jowett 33). The power of the above people was related either to their educational background or to their financial status. Moreover, the military equipment of Communists was poor, compared to that of Nationalists (Jowett 33). At this point reference should be made to the following fact: the Communist party has not been as weak as initially estimated. More specifically, in the beginning of the Civil War, in 1946, the Nationalists had the view that could easily defeat the Communists due to their superiority in regard to military equipment but also due to their existing position as the country’s controllers (Jowett 33). However, this feeling was not justified. Indeed, Communists were not alone; they had the support of Mao Tse-tung, a political leader who had his ‘personal band of guerrillas’ (Jowett 33) and the political influence of whose was important. The critical role of Mao Tse-tung in the development of the power of Communists in China is made clear through the following example: Mao had eight-rules on which his political choices and practices were based and on which the decisions and the actions of his supporters should be also based. These rules imposed specific behavioral practices in people’s daily life. For example: there is a rule that ‘every deal should be fair’ (Mott and Kim 91) and another rule saying ‘return borrowed objects’ (Mott and Kim 91). Mao also offered to Communists important military support. More specifically, at 1944 Mao started to ‘update/ improve his army of guerrillas’ (Mott and Kim 91). Emphasis was given to the organization/ ruling of the relevant groups but also to their training (Mott and Kim 91). Within just two years, i.e. by 1946, this army had become similar ‘to a conventional army’ (Mott and Kim 91) offering to the Communist party the military support required for winning the Civil War. Under the guidelines of Mao Tse-tung Communists were able to overcome a critical barrier: the lack of experience in promoting their ideas and in organizing a country’s governance (Jowett 33). Towards such practice, the Nationalists who had already passed the line in regard to corruption had no plan to react, a fact that led to the victory of Communists at the end of the Civil War (Jowett 33). Nationalists failed in realizing the increase of power of their opponents. This failure could be resulted because of two reasons: a) Nationalists were unaware of the increase of influence and of the increase of military equipment of Communists; b) Nationalists possibly knew the increase of power of Communists but they, still, considered themselves as being at a superior position. The underestimation of the actual potentials of their opponents seems to be the key reason that led Nationalists to be defeated by Communists. Moreover, Communists had studied carefully the Chinese political environment. They had identified the weaknesses of Nationalists, meaning especially the corruption, and had tried to develop a detailed plan of action. Certain political theories, especially those related to Communism, have been also employed by Communists for helping them to attract more supporters. In regard to this issue, oppositions were developed among the members of the Chinese communist party in regard to the strategy that should be followed: the supporters of the ideas of Trotsky asked for the revolution to be based on the cooperation between ‘peasants and the working class of cities’ (Shuzi par.6). This view was justifying as follows: Chinese peasants would not be able to defeat the existing political powers of China unless they would have the support of people in the cities; actually in the particular alliance they would be the people of the working class that would lead the relevant initiatives (Shuzi par.6). People in the working class had to face the continuous deterioration of their life due to the extremely low wages; therefore, their support to the efforts of the Communist party to take the control of the country could be considered as, almost, guaranteed (Shuzi par.6). The above view was opposed by the supporters of Stalin’s ideas; these people claimed that peasants would be able to fight Nationalists with success ‘without having the support of the working class’ (Shuzi par.6). In practice, Communists combined these ideas: they emphasized to the involvement of peasants, as their key supporters, but they also tried to attract as many people from urban areas as possible. Nationalists did not follow such approach: they did not try to identify ideological framework for supporting their ideas or for increasing the effectiveness of their plans. However, in this way, they were unable to understand the actual needs and expectations of people across the country; this fact offered an important advantage to Communists who had emphasized on the continuous communication with people in both urban and rural areas. The defeat of Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War can be also related to a critical mistake of Nationalists in terms of military planning (Hutchings 83): Since the beginning of the civil war, the military sources of the Nationalists was much greater than the Communists; although the Communists had increased their power, it was still relatively incomparable with the Nationalists. Thus, the Nationalists began to attack the Communists as they thought they could defeat them in a short period of time. However, after only three years, the Communist Party has in turn defeated the Nationalists. Another important reason for the victory of Communists over the Nationalists has been the incompetence of the Nationalist party. This incompetence was made clear especially after the end of the World War II. It was at that period that the existing regime of China, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek (Shuzi par.8) revealed its brutality and its corruption: public assets were taken by the regime’s officials while peasants were forced to give their food for supporting the needs of the supporters of the regime (Shuzi par.8). In addition, the economic policy followed in China from 1937 onwards was characterized by high inflation (Pepper 95). In order to face the rapid expansion of the economic crisis, the Chinese government decided to adopt measures for reducing costs: this decision resulted to the limitation of wages/ salaries and the increase of costs (Pepper 95). The specific practice affected more the people in the city who were not able to respond to their daily needs; these were mostly the people of middle bourgeoisie and the working class (Pepper 95). Due to this strategy, the regime lost ‘the support of the urban salaried middle class’ (Pepper 96); these people were the key supporters of the regime. By losing its basis, the regime was too difficult to keep the control of the country (Pepper 96). On the other hand, Communists emphasized to the provision to the working class of specific benefits, a practice aligned with the ideologies that most influenced China’s Communist party, and in particular Marxism and Trotskism. Following this strategy, the Communists managed to take the ex-supporters of the regime by their side, a fact that was decisive for Communists’ victory. At the same time, Nationalists had over - relied on the support of external political forces, meaning especially the governments of USA and Soviet Union. This fact is proved through specific events. In 1950 the ‘Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty’ (Mott and Kim 161) was signed. In regard to the above Treaty the following fact should be made clear: the Treaty was signed between the Soviet Union and the government of China, i.e. the Nationalists (Hutchings 83). However, the Treaty was based on the friendship between Stalin and Mao; this means that the Treaty was not meant to declare the support of Soviet Union to Nationalists (Hutchings 83). Having this impression Nationalists considered the Treaty as an indicator of a strong alliance, a fact that led them to believe they would be the winners of the Civil War (Hutchings 83). It should be noted that the initial practices of Soviet-Union in regard to the Chinese Civil War seemed to verify the belief of Nationalists that between them and the Soviet Union a strong alliance was developed: indeed, in the Treaty a term is included through which Stalin ‘recognizes the Nationalist party as the only legitimate government’ (DeRouen and Uk 259). Moreover, through the Treaty the Soviet Union verified that it would not intervene in China’s politics (DeRouen and Uk 259). However, during the Civil War Stalin accepted the request of the Communists to ‘cross Manchuria for getting crucial equipment and supplies’ (DeRouen and Uk 259). This practice revealed the actual intentions of Stalin in regard to the Chinese Civil War; Stalin wanted the victory of the Communist party but did not declare it openly so that his strategy on international relations was not revealed. According to the issues discussed above, the victory in the Chinese Civil War of the Communists over the Nationalists has been based on specific reasons: the incompetence of the Nationalist government was high. Corruption and brutality had become part of daily life in both the urban and the rural areas of China. Refusing to tolerate the extended corruption, the high inflation and the cruelty of the regime the peasants and the people in working class decided to support the Communists who offered to them the perspective for a better life. Communists managed to pursue Chinese people in regard to this perspective by using behavioral practices suggested by Communism-related ideologies but also by providing a series of benefits that verified their intentions to keep their promises towards the Chinese people. As for the Nationalists, these were proved totally unable to estimate the actual potentials and powers of their opponents; this practice along with the over-relying on foreign political powers resulted to the defeat of Nationalists from Communists. References DeRouen, Karl and Uk Heo. Civil Wars of the World: Major Conflicts Since World War II, Vol 1. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2007. Hutchings, Graham. Modern China: A Guide to a Century of Change. Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2003. Jowett, Philip. Chinese Civil War Armies 1911-49. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 1997. Mott, William and Jae Chang Kim. The Philosophy of Chinese Military Culture: Shih Vs. Li. Oxford: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Pepper, Suzanne. Civil War in China: The Political Struggle 1945-1949. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999. Shuzi, Peng. The Causes of the Victory of the Chinese Communist Party over Chiang Kai-Shek, and the CCP’s Perspectives. Socialist Workers Party, February, 1952, from Tamiment Library microfilm archives. Report given to the Third World Congress of the Fourth International, August-September 1951. Transcribed & marked up by Andrew Pollack. Accessed March 19 2014. https://www.marxists.org/archive/peng/1951/nov/causes.htm Tse-tung, Mao. "Analysis of the Classes of Chinese society”. March 1926. Accessed March 19, 2014. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_1.htm Westad, Odd. Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946-1950. 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