Islam in Modern Turkey and in the Arab World - Essay Example

Islam in Modern Turkey and in Arab World Turkey is trying hard to sell itself to tourist as a modern nation, the nudist beaches, the shops with theirstale global items, the postcards, the discos-all these are second-hand and even culturally debasing. The challenge to the nation of Turkey as a Europe nation, the strong, unmistakable signs of Turks rediscovering their Islamic identity, are everywhere: the full mosques, the pride in the Ottoman past, the women with their hijab, even man wearing the fez (Ozal). These are the first tentative steps. They are significant because they are reviving what Atatruk had buried in his contempt for the past. For the Turks it is their legacy and they are set on reclaiming it; this quest will be the story of the Turks in the coming time. The push toward the Ottoman past is now too strong to stop. It has been fuelled by events in Central Asia whose only links with the Turks are through the Ottoman origins in the Asian heartland (Ozal). From the 1970s onwards a combination of factors has fed into an Islamic revivalism: the success of Sadat's October was against the Israelis in 1973; the use of oil as weapons by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia; the general resurgence of Islam -the triumph of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran. Islam for Khomeini meant Ithna Ashari or twelve Imam Shiism (Fereydoun 65). While providing the Shias with an immense reservoir of religious passion, this inevitably acted as a barrier between Shia and the Sunni areas and thereby created obstacles for Khomeini on the larger Muslim world stage (67). Henceforth Islam was to become increasingly a force in Arab politics. Islam meant cultural identity and pride; it also meant social and moral purity in a world seen as corrupted by the West. Furthermore, it was a local native response to organizing and living in the world, not something imported from Moscow or Washington. But Islam would not have any easy run; Muslim activist would be killed and jailed and tortured in their thousands (Ozal). Their legitimate participation in election would be frustrated and their aims deliberately distorted in order to misinform people. The struggle is far from over. Turks are tough and pound people, with developed perception of themselves as people of honour and worth. There is the story from the early 1950s about a Turkish bridge in the Korean War. Threatened by overwhelming communist forces, the Turkish commander refused to retreat. Defying the orders of his United Nation superiors, he sent a message back to saying the word "retreat" did not exist in the vocabulary of the Turks. The Turks were always in the front-line of Islam against Europe; but it was a sophisticated culture Islam embracing many societies (Ozal). Here many systems thrived; here Jews and Christians lived in safety and comfort. However, the Iranian strand reflects the oscillation in society between the dynastic principle of powerful kings and that of pious religious figures. The oscillation has been in evidence in the politics of Iran over the last few centuries. For example, how Majlisi, one of the leaders of the clergy in the late seventeenth century, actually led a revolution, not unlike that of Khomeini's, to impose the will of the clergy on the Safavid ruler (Fereydoun 31-63). The dilemma was difficult for the Iranians to resolve. According to one principle, power came from God, and humanity was to submit; according to the other, power came from the imperial dynasty, and genealogy decided their rich cultural heritage, the more they underlined the importance of royalty in their tradition, the further they moved away from the Islamic principle. So those who were against the Islamic principle would oppose it implicitly by talking of the glories of Persian culture, poetry and art. It was a subtext that announced their real political and religious positions (Fereydoun 31-63). There is a central debate in Turkey now about how Islamic the Turkish pass was at the time of the Ottomans. Although the debate may appear academic to an outsider, it relate directly to modern politics; it also reflects the central obsession in Turkish society, the relationship with Europe (Siddiqi 12). One school of thoughts maintains that the empire was simply empire just like any other. Turkish Muslims who practice their faith say it was not particularly Islamic. They argue that the shariah, the law of Islam, was concerned with only family law. Foreign policy remained outside the shariah. The sultan did not follow the shariah; the Ottomans were dictators (13). In any case the Sheikh-ul-Islam, the most senior member of the clergy, was an official nominated by the Sultan and thus under his power. Indeed, Kemal Ataturk's policies separating religion and state were, in a sense, continuations of those of the Ottomans (14). The other school argues that the Ottoman empire was self-consciously Islamic and based on the law of Islam; that the ulema presided our court which covered family law(this was most relevant to ordinary people); that, since by definition a Turks is a Muslim, the Turkish religion can be nothing but Islam (17). Turkish scholars like Professor Kemal Oke and Professor Nur Veergin maintain that during certain period the Ottoman state was indeed Islamic. The debate has entered Turkish politics. The national salvation party, which preceded the welfare party, and like it saw itself as 'Islamic', contested the 1977 election (18). It spoke of Turkey's 'national' heritage-meaning its Ottoman past- and of its national moral values-meaning its Islamic traditions. It also advocated headscarves for women, and opposed usury and alcohol. For such Turkish and Ottomans reflected the tolerance and compassion of Islam; they were generous to different peoples and faith. These Turks point out that even today mosque, synagogue and church exist side by side in Istanbul (19). Most important of all in the Ottoman Empire, the ulema, the religious figure, could check and remonstrate with the sultan. In the figure of the Sheikh-ul-Islam the ulema had a voice in the place. One sheikh was known to have warned a sultan that he was spending too much time hunting and in the harem. The sprit of Islamic justice was reflected in the 'court of the people', where ordinary citizens could present petitions to the sultan, who had to appear in person. (1451-81 when a petition against the sultan led to his being tired by the ulema) (Nicholas). Thus God's authority was established over the sultan's power. Bearded clergy in flowing black robes, women covered in dark sheets, rituals centred around martyrs long dead, national hatred concentrated on the USA as the Great Satan - where does Iranian society related to the USA How do we make sense of the close relationships between the two up to the 1970s and then almost obsessive mutual hatred from the 1980s The answers are as complex as any pattern on an Iranian carpet; let us try to separate the strands (James 10). The most important strand to identify in Iran is Shiism. Shia ideology in society encourage people to respond in terms of good versus evil, of immense sacrifices, of martyrdom in the cause, and to accept the leadership of religious figures who reflected the authority of the Imams (James 118). The Safavid dynasty ensured the close working relationship between Shia ideology and the Imam (120). Preofessor Oke, describing to me the Islamic legacy of the Ottomans and its relevance for modern Turkey, mention the insistence on justice as 'the governing sprit in administration and the foundation of all statecraft' He also thought the Ottomans showed humanism 'with respect to upholding the rights of minorities or the people they conquered. He thinks Ottomans achieved a tremendous record there by putting all these people together and achieved a kind of peaceful coexistence'. It was rather like a 'United nation of the Ottomans Empire'. In addition he stressed the great advancement in science, art and culture, the sophistication of the Ottomans (Neilson). The sign of Islamic revival are not difficult to read. At the 1991 election the welfare party, which represent the Islamic revivalism obtained 16 per cent of the seats in parliament. In November 1992 the party won nearly a third of the vote in the local election in Istanbul. The party talks to closer ties with the Islamic world and a rejection of the west and its 'corruption'. According to recent surveys, some 70 per cent of Turkey's population of about 65 millions claim they are 'devout Muslims' and about 20 per cent say they pray five time a day (Neilson). About 20 per cent of the populations proudly assert they are Muslim first and then Turks. But, significantly, only 3 per cent of the populations wish to see the Islamic shariah law implemented in Turkey, replacing the secular state (Neilson). In the 1995 election the RP or welfare party which is pro-Islam emerged as the larger political party of Turkey. The urban poor and many people in the rural areas supported it. It took power in mid 1996 as the first Islamic government since Ataturk had inaugurated a secular republic in 1923. It did not last long. Ousted next year it remained under the threat of a legal ban. Politics in Turkey tends to be more based around political figure then ideology: the modern female leader Tansu Ciller, a secularist who represents small business, found no difficulty in forming a coalition to support the pro-Islam RP in 1996-1997. Apart from statistic and surveys, a casual visit to Turkey will confirm the trend toward Islam. There are over three thousand mosques in Istanbul and they are more and more frequented. After public clamour, prayers have been allowed for the first time since Ataturk banned them in the St Sophia in one of the side room by the entrance to the Topkapi. The call to prayer is in Arabic and no longer in Turkish (as one decreed by Ataturk). There are eight technological colleges with about 10,000 students. Women increasingly wear veils to emphasize their Islamic identity. The Directorate of Religious Affair reports that there are now 57,000 mosques in Turkey. This number should spell the nation of Turkish society as secular. According to Professor Kemal Oke, although there is revival of Islam in Turkey today, there is no large scale political movement toward replacing the existing political institutions with an Islamic theocracy like that in Iran. Most Turkey simply wants Islam to be part of their culture identity. Fehmi Koru, chief columnist of the journal Zaman and an activist, would like to see a quicker pace of Islamization, a greater involvement in Muslim affairs abroad, both in the West and Central Asia. The sociologist Dr Ali Shariati condemned the obsession with the West as gharbzadegi (being 'struck' - i.e. seduced - by the West) a phrase full of resonance coined by the writer Jalal Ale-Ahmad. He remained popular, even somewhat of a cult figure; 100,000 copies of his lectures were published and thousands flocked to hear him speak. For them Shariati demonstrated the relevance of Shia Islam to contemporary life1. A Sorobonne-educated intellectual, Shariati quoted Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Frantz Fanon, and Che Guevara. In his work he synthesized Shia Islam and Western thought (Omar 2000). Having established that there are definite sign that Islam is reviving, we may then as why. There are several reasons of a cultural, political and sociological nature. First of all Islam did not disappear under Ataturk (as was widely assumed) but simply went underground to wait for a better climate to emerge. In particular, rural society did not abandon it. Besides, the attempts and drastic Westernization did not solve Turkey's problems (Neilson). Poverty and backwardness had not disappeared. Many Turks, although aware of Turkey's economic successes, were left wondering whether the sacrifices had been too much and the rewards too meager. Then there are is the effect of the larger Islamic revivalism that swept the Muslim world in the 1970s and 1980s. Many Turks felt a pride in the Islamic assertion and turn their eyes to the Muslim world. It made ordinary Turks conscious of their 'Muslimness' There is another reason, which is linked to social development in Europe. It is the growing awareness that however Westernized the Turks make themselves they will remain outsider in Europe. Member of this proud race, once master of the world, have become the despised immigrant underclass in Germany, the butt of the neo-Nazis (Neilson). Horror stories of racist attack in Europe triggered a reawakening of ethnic and religious identity among the Turks. Many feel that the price of becoming Europeanized is too high; many even challenged the official policy of trying to join the European community. Then there are the sociological factors. There is an element of class, the impact of urbanization and the demographic structure. The poorer classes, the recently migrated urban-dweller and the young seek solace in tradition and religion. For many of these Turks the ruling elites are alien, corrupt and far too westernized (Neilson). There is also another-completely unexpected-development which will assume increasing importance in the future; it is provided by the Central Asian republics of the former USST (Neilson). Although the European Turks has always been the terrible Turks, the loathed hammer of Islam, the threatening invader, in Central Asia (from where Turks derive their ethnic origins) he possesses the opposite image, as a brave and honourable leader of nation. Some of the most renowned rulers of that region have been Turks and the major tribes proudly proclaim their Turkic links; indeed the entire area is called Turkistan-the land of Turks (Neilson). People look back to the past with great pride, as we shall see in the next chapter. Babar himself, founder of the Mughal dynasty, reflecting Central Asian attitudes, was always proud of his Turkic ancestry (Babar 1922). For many in the Central Asian republic of the former Soviet Union emerging as independent countries, Turkey is a viable model. Turkey is the inheritor state of the Ottomans with which they were linked; as well spring link to their own historical identity. They already look to Turkey for cultural inspiration (kran & Ibrahim 84). More then ever Turkey will need to parade its past and emphasize its Islamic culture which is so closely linked to the past. It will not be simple. Many Turks and those in the former Soviet republics still owe allegiance to a secular ideology. Turkey's dilemmas will therefore assume an international dimension in the coming year (85). This is dilemma comes into sharp focus in Turkey's relations with the West. Turkey has the largest army in NATO after America. It is formidable fighting force. Cyprus remains a flash point over the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus. The situation could explode at any time bringing Greece and Turkey into military conflict and rapidly involving other allied nations. In 1998 once again there was a crisis as the EU offered Cyprus membership while continuing to ignore Turkey's application (88). Turkey was once NATO's first defence against the USSR but after the cold war was relegated to a less important status by the West. Now it looks to the Middle East and Central Asia. Its failure to find membership in the EU, fuelled by Greek antagonism, has aroused anger among Turks and driven them to explore their eastern links (89). At the same time Turkey has not helped its cause with its human right record, in particular its treatment of the Kurds (90). References: Hoveyda, Fereydoun. The Shah and The Ayatollah: Iranian Mythology and Islamic Revolution, Greenwood publishing group, 2003, pp 1-110. Ozal, Turgut. Turkish Islam and the Secular State. Occassional Paper no. 1, American Institute of Islamic Affairs, Washington, D.C, 1984 Nicholas Ludington. The Muslim World Today. Occassional Paper no. 1, American Institute of Islamic Affairs, Washington, D.C, 1984. Siddiqi, Dr. Muzammil H. "Muslims in a Non-Muslim Society", Brighton Islamic Centre Bulletin, vol. 15, no. 3 (July-September), 1991, pp. 12-19 Babar, Zahiruddin. The Babur-Namah (Memoirs of the Babar), translated and edited by A.S. Beveridge, London; repr. Luzac, London, 1969, (1922) Dr. Mohammad Omar Farooq. Humanity and People Power: A tribute to Dr. Ali Shariarti, 2000. Accessed May 02, 2008 http://www.globalwebpost.com/farooqm/writings/islamic/ali_shariati.html Fischer, Michael M.J. and Mehdi Abedi. Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1990. James Lee. The Final word!: An American refutes and the sayings of Ayatollah Khomeini, University of Michigan, Philosophical library, 1984, pg. 10-120 Neilson, J.S. Muslims in Western Europe, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 1992. kran Vahide, Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi. Islam in Modern Turkey: an intellectual biography of Bediuzzaman Said, Politics and Government. Sunny Press, 2005, pp. 83-105. Read More