The United States and Military Offensive in Iraq - Essay Example

Impact of U.S. Forces Withdrawal from Iraq

Introduction

According to Biddle, Friedman, and Long, civil war is the most prevalent type of armed conflict globally, resulting in significant costs in terms of lives lost, damage to infrastructure, financial expenses incurred, and elevated animosity amongst communities hence potential for violence escalation. As a result, outside intervention in this kind of warfare is vital for humanitarian reasons, as well as, for practical and conceptual policy purposes (Biddle, Friedman, and Long, 2012: 85). Iraq is one such country that has suffered recurrent civil violence, in addition to dictatorial rule and full-blown war. The 2003 invasion of Iraq by U.S., in counter-terrorism efforts, and subsequent occupation to maintain peace and nurture liberal democracy, quelled violence and paved way for administrative and socio-economic reconstruction. However, much of the current debate on this foreign intervention has shifted from initial concerns on justification to the danger of U.S. withdrawal (Biddle, Friedman, and Long, 2012: 86). The potential of increased violence and civil fighting poses a significant threat to Iraq’s partial progress in the aforementioned areas, especially after the U.S. troops pulled out and as the conflict in neighboring Syria spills over into the war-torn nation. This paper explores the possibility of Iraq’s breakup, taking into account the preceding major events. The paper begins by examining the historical context of sectarian violence in the country, invasion by the U.S. and subsequent occupation; the aftermath of the U.S. withdrawal and finally impact of all these aspects on its stability. The analysis is in pursuance of the argument that, withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq resulted in a power vacuum, triggering resurgence of sectarian conflict within Iraq.

Historical Context

Iraq’s sectarian conflict is ascribable to ethnic, religion, and political disparities that escalate to actual violence. The most relevant sectarian conflict to this study is the Sunni-Shia clash under the Saddam Hussein administration. As highlighted by Parasiliti, when Saddam took over power, he bolstered the political dominance of the Baath party suppressing purported political enemies hence political polarization (Parasiliti, 2012: 128). Romano points out that Saddam’s leadership also heightened ethnic tension. Given that Saddam was born and brought up a Sunni Muslim, the minority religious group in the country, Iraq was a primarily Shia nation, governed by a Sunni president. The author is emphatic that, during Saddam’s rule, there were numerous cases of executions and tortures of Shia adherents and religious leaders. Further, majority of the country’s Shia populace suffered acute marginalization and exclusion from government. Built-up resentment, lead to the Shia revolt after the Gulf War in 1991, but Saddam’s military viciously suppressed rebelling Shi’ites killing many. It was also after the Gulf War that the Kurds got autonomy, although not formally ratified, through creation of a ‘safe zone’ in northern Iraq. This, however, does not imply that the Iraqi Kurds stayed free of Saddam’s violent machinations, as seen by territorial conflict over the oil rich city of Kirkuk and actual attacks on Kurdish settlements (Romano, 2010: 1347). These incidents clearly show the already tense religious and ethnic situation in Iraq prior to invasion by the U.S.

U.S. Invasion and Later Withdrawal

The United States launched its military offensive in Iraq in March 2003, because of intelligence reports, which indicated that Saddam had technologically advanced weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The U.S. administration, at the time led by President George Bush upheld the belief that Saddam had links to the al-Qaeda militant group and could supply it with WMDs that it could use to attack the U.S. and its allies. America’s plan to eliminate the Iraqi threat exclusively comprised of a short-term strategy to oust the dictator’s regime. After successfully achieving the primary objective of removing Saddam from power, the U.S. and allies like the U.K, among others, created a temporary transitional government aptly named the “Coalition Provisional Authority” led by the U.S. (Dodge, 2010: 130-131)

After achieving the principal objective, the U.S. resolved to retain its troops on ground and help curb violence while fostering stability, until the newly elected Iraqi government got a grip on security and economic concerns necessary for reconstruction. However, in accordance with an agreement made by the Iraq government and the Bush administration (Dodge, 2008: 38), and later reiterated by the Obama government, the U.S. had to phase out removal of U.S troops from the country by the end of 2011. While addressing troops on 14 December 2011, President Obama announced that the U.S military would depart Iraq, ending the long war. According to President Obama, the U.S was leaving behind an independent, stable, and self-sufficient Iraq, governed by a representative administration elected by Iraqi people (Kam, 2012: 89).

Aftermath of U.S. Troops 2011 Withdrawal

The day after the U.S. armed forces left Iraq, the country’s prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, issued an arrest warrant for Tariq al-Hashimi, the vice president of Sunni descent, with the accusation being offering support to terrorists. Whether justified or false, the move instigated a crisis, as the vice president’s Sunni-majority political affiliates boycotted Maliki’s national unity administration (Brennan, 2014: 2). According to Brennan, the warrant issuance and subsequent boycott served to show that the government was not entirely inclusive, since it focused primarily on furthering the interests of the majority Shia at the expense of the country’s Kurds and Sunnis. On the same week, there were several explosions in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, killing more than 60 individuals and maiming many. The previously defunct al-Qaeda claimed to have carried out the heinous attacks (Brennan, 2014: 3).

Drawing support from Iran, the Maliki-led Iraqi government started to target prominent Sunnis, accusing them of terrorism or association with the banned Baath Party. As a result, there was a resurge in sectarian conflict, and as emphasized by Dodge, in 2013 the violence exceeded the levels it had reached prior to the U.S. invasion in 2003. The country seemed to be on the verge of a split, which worsened in 2014 as alienation of Sunnis and Kurds reached peak (Dodge, 2013: 245). The latter, combined with mismanagement of the country’s security forces made it easy for incursion by Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), from war-ravaged Syria. The jihadist faction with Sunni roots seemed to be an al-Qaeda replacement, which took advantage of divisions and security loopholes in Iraq to capture several Iraqi cities (Dodge, 2013: 246). Since waging war in Iraq, ISIS has wreaked havoc in the country, indiscriminately killing religious minorities, Sunnis and Shi’ites. In addition to killing Iraqis, the militant group has also shown a penchant for publicizing gruesome executions of Western hostages (Tuttle, 2015: 8).

Analysis of Iraq’s Stability

By the time, the U.S. officially withdrew its troops from Iraq in 2011, the country exhibited gradual growth in terms of security and economic advancement. Even though many Iraqis, especially young men, exhibited discontentment due to inadequacy of jobs, the economy showed transformation potential. According to Binnie, Iraq’s security seemed fairly stable, before it plunged after withdrawal of American armed forces. Irrespective of the nearly a decade of military training and aid from the U.S., Iraq’s government and security forces are clearly not adequately prepared to counter emergent threats like renewed sectarian violence and strengthened ISIS. This is especially the case since the U.S. military personnel presently in Iraq are there in an advisory capacity, as opposed to a combative one (Binnie, 2012: 1). Kam stresses that Iraq’s security forces face problems such as inadequacy of intelligence apparatus, which limits their ability to collect, analyze, and share relevant information to counter insurgence and terror attacks. In addition, the lack of precise command of Iraqi forces and absence of a properly developed training program, impede the ability of the country’s security forces to carry out counterterrorism tasks in the absence of direct U.S. military support (Kam, 2012: 88).

From a political perspective, Sky argues that challenges for inclusivity persist in spite of the fairly successful U.S.-aided transition to sovereignty (Sky, 2011: 125). This author highlights the political fragility of Iraqi politics, as shown by the tense formation of the governing coalition following the country’s 2010 national polls. For example, even though the 2009 provincial polls led to inclusion of Sunnis into local government and initiated reconciliation, the national elections instigated friction. In addition to Maliki’s government targeting Sunnis, as indicated in a preceding section, several Iran-sponsored Shi’ite politicians attempted to weaken the Iraqiya Party; a nationalist and nonsectarian party. Although the Iraqiya Party won the elections, garnering 91 seats, largely due to votes from secular Shi’ites and most Sunnis, Maliki’s party got 89 seats. The close win instigated the search of a majority lead by both parties, in order to eventually create a coalition government. As a result, Iraq remained in an uncertain political state for a long period of time (Sky, 2011: 126). Although the government was eventually formed, the country’s political factions failed to reinforce the public’s faith in an inclusive democratic system. Instead of showing a smooth transference of power and sustenance of unity, the electoral process exposed continued mistrust in the country’s political environment, especially amongst high ranking officials, who seemed more focused on individual interests than on national cohesion. This means that genuine reconciliation among religious and ethnic groups in Iraq is yet to be realized, and the progress achieved in the presence of the U.S. could unravel.

Conclusion

Even though Iraq is making concerted efforts to sustain stability and curb civil strife, the recurrent sectarian violence and the growing threat from ISIS, accentuated by war in Syria, push it closer to the verge of a split. The country’s security and overall stability principally depend on its leaders’ ability to form an inclusive national government, capable of bridging the increasing disparities between Iraqi Shi’ites, Sunnis, Kurds and other minority groups. Continued involvement of the U.S. in offering military aid and advice may not help uphold stability and unity in Iraq, if political disunity at the top ranks of the Iraqi government persists. America’s success in Iraq will mainly depend on the limited degree to which it can assist the government to foster effective and all-encompassing governance that does not favor the interests of one group over the rest. This implies that if remaining U.S. military personnel are withdrawn and the Iraqi government fails to sustain an inclusive administration structure, then the country is bound to break up. Alternatively, if the remnant U.S. staff leaves and Iraq’s government takes responsibility for unifying all Iraqis by amiably resolving internal ethnic, religious, and political divisions, then the country may remain cohesive. Ultimately, a stable and independent Iraq is largely dependent on government’s focus on national and not factional interests.