The Importance of Intelligence, Surprise, and Deception - Essay Example

?Introduction Since time immemorial intelligence, surprise and deception has been the cornerstone of every military unit operation. Military history is replete with examples of countries that comprehensively defeated stronger adversaries through timely use of intelligence, deception and surprise. The six days’ war that involved Israel against several Arab neighbors is one of the most appropriate examples of how effective application of intelligence, surprise and deception could secure decisive military success within the shortest time possible. Intelligence, deception and surprise are the major determinants of success or failure of any military operation. This paper is a comparative analysis of application of intelligence, surprise and deception within the Iraq and United States military during the period between 1990 and 1998. Before investigating on the use of intelligence, surprise and deception in the two countries, it is important to interrogate the meaning of the three terms in military operations. Intelligence support plays a critical role in determining the success of military operation. According to Pace, military intelligence “provides crucial insights regarding sensitive opportunities that could be exploited by the military to overcome the targeted enemy” (12). Intelligence enables military commanders to clearly indentify the intended end state and establish when the end state of a particular operation is attained (Pace, 12). Pace argues that visualization of the battle space is one the most important role of intelligence to the military. Visualizing the battle space includes possessing the facts about the physical and manmade installations in the areas of military operation. In addition, visualizing requires the knowledge about the most current information about the activities of the enemy forces in that particular space and the future potential of the adversary to function in the region of military interest (14). According to Handel (60), collection of accurate military intelligence requires an in-depth understanding of the enemy, especially the objectives that motivate their actions in the battle field (Sharp, 17). Establishing the objectives of the enemy in war is one of the greatest challenges of collecting military intelligence. These challenges are caused by difficulties in determining and predicting actions and response between the enemy and the offensive force once the process of establishing the intent is initiated. In most situations, well intended actions from the joint forces trigger a reaction from the enemy and this could jeopardize the entire operation prematurely. Betts (83) argues that determining the extent of reaction from the enemy requires possession of accurate and timely intelligence that would enable the commanders to determine and plan future friendly actions to extract the intentions of the enemy without raising undue suspicion. Possession of appropriate intelligence enables the force commanders to consider different factors that affect the operation directly or indirectly before deciding on the action for establishing the intentions of the adversary. According to Pace, intelligence plays an important role in the three stages of military operations which include during peace, war and during other operations that do not involve war (36). During peacetime, intelligence assists commanders in purchasing relevant supplies, defend and protect their technological appliances and structuring their organizations to enhance efficiency. In addition, periods of peace provide military commanders with opportunities of designing appropriate training regimens for the combatants and other servicemen. Moreover, intelligence agencies monitor foreign countries and organizations with objectives of establishing potential threats during peacetime (Pace, 38-40). During military operations other than war intelligence is helpful to military commanders because it enables them to make suitable decisions on which forces to deploy at a particular future period, how and where to deploy, in a manner that would ensure achievement of their objectives with minimal political and human costs. During this period intelligence also plays an important role in minimizing or eradicating possible causes of conflict by the supporting peace initiatives (Pace, 46). However, in spite of making efforts to reduce conflict, it is important to maintain high levels of intelligence collection in preparation for future war outbreak. During war intelligence informs the commanders about the technical abilities of the enemy. The information provided also includes the weaknesses of the adversary and methods of exploiting them to gain tactical advantage (Amatzia and Rubin, 96). According to Pace, intelligence is crucial at this time because it informs the force commanders on the enemy’s major strengths and weaknesses which provide the operations planners with opportunities for strategizing on the most effective way of launching an effective attack against the enemy (59). In addition, Handel (152) argues that during war time, intelligence enables the force commanders to concentrate and leverage their fighting powers and to estimate the risks acceptable to the force. Gordon and Trainor emphasize the importance of maintaining high levels of concentration in the fighting units in order to keep the enemy under intense pressure, especially in situations where the adversary is most vulnerable (84). Besides the actual combat in the battle fields, it is important to have backup that is competent and available when the need arises. Therefore, it is important for the intelligence to provide relevant mechanism for ensuring an effective support for the forces. The intelligence should exploit and coordinate its support for the forces while minimizing on the demands made by forces simultaneously during war time (Pace, 62). For military intelligence to serve its intended role, it must be timely, accurate, executable, and relevant and complete (Pace, 42). The intelligence should be available on demand and Sharp (36) argues that “intelligence delivered late is as good as no intelligence”. Early and timely intelligence enables the commanders to prepare and expect unfolding events in the area of military operation. This is of critical importance because it psychologically prepares the fighting unit for an impending event, avoiding unpleasant surprises in the process. Accurate intelligence is objective and it is devoid of any interference or distortions from political sources or other authorities (Betts, 159). Therefore, intelligence should not be designed with the intention of conforming to a particular authority. Although intelligence is one of the factors that determine strategy, strategy or policy should not at any time determine intelligence. Intelligence should be executable and applicable in a particular military operation. Amatzia argues that intelligence should be adapted to address a particular problem and delivered in a form that is easy to comprehend and execute. The military authorities responsible for executing the intelligence must be able to decipher and use within the shortest time possible. People generating the intelligence should be informed on the particular situations that the information could be applied (67-73). Complete intelligence addresses and respond to pertinent questions about the enemy in the most comprehensive manner. In addition, it informs the force commanders on new and unknown developments, in addition to providing possible approaches and predicting future activities and intentions of the enemy (Pace, 33). Finally, intelligence should be relevant to the planning and implementation of the military operation. Intelligence must contribute significantly to the achievement of the mission by helping the commanders understand the enemy better and formulate effective approaches of neutralizing the threat (Betts, 103). Deception in military terms is defined as “the actions that are implemented to intentionally mislead the decisions makers of the enemy” (Crystal, 96). These actions mislead the adversary into interpreting them as friendly intentions and operations and consequently, the enemy responds in a manner that contributes to the accomplishment of the mission. Military deception is applicable in all stages of an operation to trick the enemy about the strength, preparation, location and intention of the friendly forces. In the final stages of the mission just before its completion, Pollack argues that military deception should support the transfer of authority to the public control, ensuring that the national interests are sustained for a long period in the future (85). Therefore, it is imperative for the military commander of the offensive force to harmonize and coordinate all essential elements for successful running of the area under operation once the mission is completed. The most common deception techniques applied in the military include displays, demonstrations, ruses and feints. Feints are offensive actions that involve making contacts with the enemy with an objective of misleading the enemy about the location and the actual time of undertaking the actual attack. Demonstrations involve exaggerated show of military force without making contact with the enemy (Pace, 45-49). Demonstrations are usually intended to disrupt the tactics that the enemy intends to use leading to selection of “unfavorable course of action” (Pace, 52). Ruses are shrewd tricks that involve deliberate exposure of incorrect and misleading information for the adversaries to misinterpret at the advantage of the offensive forces. Displays are usually simulations where the forces portray themselves as friendly to the enemy. The offensive army could display military capabilities that do not even exist. Other forms of military deception include perfidy that entails the misuse of non violent signals such as the white flag to indicate surrender with the intention of attracting the enemy into a trap (Pace, 64-65). Betts (17) defines military surprise as the impacts of unexpected military actions. Surprise comprises of two major components, which are attacker exploitation and defender information gaps (Betts, 19). Basically, surprise involves execution of an attack with unprecedented speed and precision. In military operations, surprise can help an offensive force achieve four values of war which include maneuver, economy of force, mass and offensive advantage (Betts, 19). The effectiveness of utilizing surprise, intelligence and deception in United States and Iraq forces can be examined in the 1991 Gulf War. The war was triggered when Iraq military forces invaded Kuwait in august 1990. Prior to the war, Iraq military forces carried out various military deceptive operations which caught the Kuwaiti defense forces unprepared and largely unawares. According to Lawrence and Karsh, Iraq under the leadership of Saddam Hussein had formed close political and economic alliance with Kuwait administration. At a time when Iraq was engaged in a protracted conflict with Iran, Kuwait offered Iraq immense economic and logistical support to Iraqi military (62). Kuwait offered Saddam administration monetary support amounting to over 12$ billion and allowed Iraqi forces to use Kuwaiti airbases to launch attacks on Iran (Amatzia, 148). These close relations portrayed Iraq as a friendly country to Kuwait, which made the prospect of military invasion a distant imagination in Kuwaiti and the United States. When tension escalated between Iraq and Kuwait over oil production quotas, the United States was not inclined to intervene in the beginning because of the close ties that the two Arab countries had enjoyed for along period. The preceding events to Iraq invasion of Kuwait demonstrates the cunning and deceptive nature of Iraq forces, that was unfortunately not accompanied by informed intelligence. According to Crystal (115), Iraq military intelligence interpreted United States’ failure to intervene in the conflict with Kuwait as a signal to go ahead with the Kuwaiti invasion. However, Iraq intelligence overlooked the longstanding issue of harboring nuclear ambitions and weapons of mass destruction that had caused several conflicts with Israel, a close United States ally. Therefore, attacking Kuwait would have confirmed Israel concerns that Iraq wanted to assert its military superiority in the Middle East, threatening the existence of the Jewish state in the process. Therefore, invasion of Kuwait by Iraq would definitely attract the involvement of United States and other international powers in order to protect Israel and other friendly Arab countries in the region that produce a large proportion of oil in the global petroleum industry. The military intelligence that governed Iraq incursion in Kuwait was mainly motivated by Saddam Hussein’s sense of threat from Israel and United States in addition to economic benefits that would accrue from the vast Kuwait oil deposits (Gordon and Trainor, 130) Iraq forces use of deception in the Gulf War was witnessed when it launched ballistic missiles into Israeli territory in an attempt to provoke the Jewish state into a military response. According to Amatzia and Rubin, Saddam hoped that Israeli military response would confirm his fears that Israel was a key enemy to Iraq and other Arab countries (66). United States used military intelligence, deception and surprise more effectively than Iraq during the conflict. From the beginning, the Bush administration demonstrated a non partisan stance in the Iraq - Kuwait conflict. This military deception portrayed the United States as a friendly country, which made Iraq forces reveal their strategy and intentions of invading Kuwait. For a long time, the United States intelligence was aware that Iraq had developed unconventional arsenal and was in the process of developing nuclear weapons. Israeli air force had destroyed Iraqi nuclear reactors in the 1980s (Lawrence and Karsh, 86). Since then Israeli had persistently accused Iraq of harboring weapons of mass destruction including ballistic missiles leading to intensive collection of intelligence from Iraq. Therefore, by invading Kuwait, Iraq was playing into the hands of the United States and Israel, because it provided them with ideal opportunity of destroying the military infrastructure in the country. The threat Iraq posed to Israel was demonstrated in the build up to the Kuwaiti invasion, when Saddam Hussein threatened to annihilate Israel using chemical weapons if the Jewish state attacked Iraq again (Amatzia, 117). The United States’ application of surprise in the operation desert storm was exemplary. According to Pollack, the allied forces applied deception by focusing on the eastern part of the Iraq and taking advantage of poor Iraqi reconnaissance (75). A combination of these factors enabled the allied force conduct highly successful aerial attack on the Iraqi positions from the left flank. The duration and intensity of the allied attacks was a major surprise to Iraqi forces. According to Sharp, Saddam Hussein depended much on his air defenses, dug in forces and hardening of high value targets (59). However, the speed and accuracy at which the American forces destroyed Iraqi air defenses completely disabled their ability to withstand the superior firepower. Conclusion Lack of intelligence on the Iraqi side failed to predict the magnitude and ability of the superior air force that was to be used against it. From the onset, it was apparent that attacking Kuwait was going to unite superior military forces from the United States and its allies against the unpopular Saddam Hussein administration. Therefore, it seemed logical for Iraq to suspend Kuwait invasion for longer period until it developed nuclear weapons that could have deterred foreign forces intervention. The operation Desert Fox in 1998 is another apt example of the United States military effectiveness in using intelligence, deception and surprise. After acquiring valuable intelligence from the United Nations Security Council inspectors, the United States military was able to launch surprise attacks on Iraqis military infrastructure that drastically degraded and diminished Baghdad’s ability to use and acquire weapons of mass destruction (Pollack, 184). From 1990 to 1998, the operation Desert Storm and Desert Fox are the two most prominent operations that the United States applied effective military intelligence, deception and surprise. However, failure to conclusively find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq stained the otherwise highly successful operations. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and terrorist attacks in the United States embassies in East Africa in 1998 demonstrated a lapse in the country’s security operations (Handel, 182). Iraq military on the other hand demonstrated poor intelligence, but modest application of military deception and surprise during the same period. Work Cited Amatzia, Baram. Building towards Crisis: Saddam Hussein Strategy for Survival. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1998. Print. Amatzia, Baram, and Barry Rubin (eds). Iraq’s Road to War. New York: St. Martins Press, 1993. Print. Betts, Richard. Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning. Washington, DC. Brookings Institution, 1982. Print. Crystal, Jill. Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992. Print. Gordon, Michael, and Bernard Trainor. The Generals War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1995. Print. Handel, Michael. Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought. London: Cass, 2001. Print. Lawrence, Freedman, and Efraim Karsh. The Gulf Conflict, 1990-91. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. Print. Pace, Peter. “Joint Intelligence.” Joint Publications 2-1. 22 June 2007. 4 Apr. 2012. Web. . Pollack, Kenneth. The Threatening Storm. New York: Random House, 2002. Print. Sharp, Walter. “Military Deception.” Joint Publications 3-13. 4. 13 July 2006. 5 Apr. 2012. Web.< http://www.c4i.org/jp3_13_4.pdf>. . Read More